DR. UMAR ARDO V. ADMIRAL MURTALA NYAKO (RTD) & ORS

CORAM

Walter Samuel Nkanu Onnoghen Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Suleiman Galadima Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Olabode Rhodes-VivourJ ustice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Kumai Bayang Aka’ahs Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

John Inyang Okoro Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

PARTIES

DR. UMAR ARDO

APPELLANTS 

1. ADMIRAL MURTALA NYAKO (RTD)

2. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP)

3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAl ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC)

RESPONDENTS 

AREA(S) OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ELECTORAL LAW, POLITICAL PARTY AFFAIRS, JURISDICTION, ELECTORAL PROCESS, PRIMARY ELECTIONS, LOCUS STANDI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

SUMMARY OF FACTS

The Appellant, Dr. Umar Ardo, was a bonafide member of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) who expressed interest in contesting the Gubernatorial Primary Election in Adamawa State scheduled for 2012. On 14/10/2011, he purchased, completed and submitted the Expression of Interest Form for Gubernatorial Nomination. On 17/10/2011, he was screened and cleared by the Gubernatorial Screening Committee, along with the 1st Respondent (Admiral Murtala Nyako).

The Special Ward Congresses to select three Ward Ad-Hoc Delegates in all 226 wards was fixed for 19/10/2011. At this stage, the Appellant noticed that the procedure adopted by the 2nd Respondent (PDP) in the conduct of the election of the Ward Ad-Hoc Delegates was discriminatory. He claimed that known supporters of his were excluded from the membership revalidation exercise, and that delegate nomination forms were not issued or sold to his known supporters, thereby denying them the opportunity to be elected as Ad-Hoc Delegates.

The Appellant did not participate in the Gubernatorial Primary Election held on 24/10/2011, where the 1st Respondent emerged as the candidate. He subsequently filed a suit at the Federal High Court, Yola, challenging the outcome. The 1st Respondent filed a preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the court. The trial court, in its ruling delivered on 20/01/2012, declined jurisdiction and struck out the suit, holding that the Appellant was not an “aspirant” as he did not participate in the primary election.

Dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed his appeal. He then appealed to the Supreme Court, principally asking the court to revisit its previous decisions regarding the definition of who an “aspirant” is under the Electoral Act.

HELD

1. The appeal was dismissed for lacking merit.

2. The Supreme Court affirmed its previous decisions that only an aspirant who participated in a party’s primary election can challenge the outcome of such primary under Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act.

3. The Court held that the jurisdiction conferred by Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act cannot be invoked where the acts of non-compliance alleged occurred prior to the primary election.

4. The Court ruled that the general definition of “aspirant” in Section 156 of the Electoral Act must be read in the context of Section 87(9), which specifically deals with primary elections.

5. Parties were ordered to bear their respective costs.

ISSUES

1. Whether having regard to the definition of who is an ‘aspirant’ in Section 156 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), the decision of the Supreme Court in several cases (Lado vs CPC, Uzodinma vs Izunaso, etc.) is contrary to the statutory definition, which has occasioned hardship and miscarriage of justice against the Appellant as a person aspiring, striving or seeking to contest election?

2. Whether having regard to Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, the lower courts were in error when they held that complaints arising from the selection of Ward Delegates or any of the complaints which formed the basis of the Appellant’s claim are not justiciable?

RATIONES DECIDENDI

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES – RIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTIES TO NOMINATE CANDIDATES

The right to nominate or sponsor a candidate by a political party is a domestic right of the party. A political matter within the sole discretion of the party. A member of the party has no legal right to be nominated/sponsored by his party. A Court thus has no jurisdiction to determine who a political party should sponsor.– Per OLABODE RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C.

JURISDICTION OF COURTS – EXTENT OF COURT’S JURISDICTION IN PARTY PRIMARY DISPUTES

Nomination or sponsorship of a candidate for election is a political matter solely within the discretion of the party, and this is so because the sponsorship or nomination of a candidate is a pre-election affair of the party. But where the political party conducts its primary and a dissatisfied contestant at the primary complains about the conduct of the primaries, the Courts have jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act to examine if the conduct of the primary elections was conducted in accordance with the party’s Constitution and Guidelines.– Per OLABODE RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C.

LOCUS STANDI – WHO QUALIFIES AS AN ASPIRANT UNDER SECTION 87(9)

The power of an aggrieved aspirant who is not satisfied with the conduct of the primaries by his party to elect a candidate must bring himself within the purview of Section 87(4)(b)(ii); and (9) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) supra, It is only if he can come within the provisions of those sub-sections that his complaints can be justiciable as the Courts cannot still decide as between two or more contending parties which of them is the nominated candidate of a political party; that power still resides in the political parties to exercise.” — Per WALTER SAMUEL NKANU ONNOGHEN, J.S.C.

INTERPRETATION OF ELECTORAL ACT – PURPOSE OF SECTION 87(9)

The enactment is not designed to encourage factions emerging from the political parties with each electing its candidates but claiming some to be candidates of the political party concerned. — Per WALTER SAMUEL NKANU ONNOGHEN, J.S.C.

DEFINITION OF ASPIRANT – CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 156

Looking closely, at the definition of the word ‘aspirant’ under Section 156 of the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended, and the context in which it is used in Section 87(9) of the said Act, it is very clear that the definition in the said Section 156 is general in nature while the context in which the word is used in Section 87(9) is in particular. — Per WALTER SAMUEL NKANU ONNOGHEN, J.S.C.

GENERAL AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS – APPLICATION OF LEGAL MAXIM

It is the law that in considering situations where general and special provisions are seen to apply to a subject matter, the law takes the course which does not permit a general provision to derogate from a special provision. It follows that where a subject matter is covered by both general and special provisions, the special provision apply to it in such a way that one general provision does not derogate from its effect. The Latin Maxim is generalia specialibus non derogant. — Per WALTER SAMUEL NKANU ONNOGHEN, J.S.C.

SCOPE OF COURT’S JURISDICTION – LIMITATION IN POLITICAL PARTY MATTERS

It is very important for us to always keep in mind the fact that the Court has no business dealing with political questions, which is exclusively reserved for the politicians and their political party machineries. The Court always deals within its jurisdiction as expressly defined by either the Constitution or statute. — Per WALTER SAMUEL NKANU ONNOGHEN, J.S.C.

RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF JURISDICTION – AVOIDING JUDICIAL OVERREACH

An interpretation of a Section of a statute which has the effect of conferring jurisdiction on a Court beyond what is expressly conferred by either the Constitution or statute is to be avoided like the plague, particularly in political matters. — Per WALTER SAMUEL NKANU ONNOGHEN, J.S.C.

STARE DECISIS – WHEN SUPREME COURT CAN DEPART FROM PREVIOUS DECISIONS

The Supreme Court does not make the practice of departing from its provisions decision(s) merely because the decision(s), as in this case, is/are against the case presented by the appellant. It has not been shown that the decision complained of are erroneous in law or given per incuriam or contrary to public policy thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice. — Per WALTER SAMUEL NKANU ONNOGHEN, J.S.C.

LOWER COURTS BOUND BY SUPREME COURT DECISIONS – PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS

The principle of judicial precedent or stare decisis is designed to ensure orderliness, certainty and discipline in the judicial process. The principle holds inferior Courts to the Supreme Court of Nigeria bound by the previous decision(s) of the Court on similar facts in the consideration and determination of matters before them. — Per WALTER SAMUEL NKANU ONNOGHEN, J.S.C.

AVOIDING JUDICIAL ANARCHY – CONSEQUENCES OF IGNORING PRECEDENT

Where the lower Courts are encouraged not to follow the previous decision(s) of this Court on similar facts such an encouragement is designed to promote anarchy, chaos and judicial rascality which is not the design or purpose of the principles of the Rules of Law. — Per WALTER SAMUEL NKANU ONNOGHEN, J.S.C.

PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENT – NECESSITY FOR STANDING IN PRIMARY DISPUTES

It follows that for a party/person to qualify or have the locus to institute an action on a matter arising from the nomination of a party’s candidate for an election, he must have participated in the nomination exercise of the party and failed irrespective of whether nomination is a process or an event. — Per WALTER SAMUEL NKANU ONNOGHEN, J.S.C.

PRE-PRIMARY COMPLAINTS – NON-JUSTICIABILITY OF PRE-PRIMARY ISSUES

My lords, jurisdiction is conferred on the Courts to hear complaints from an aggrieved member of the Party who took part in the Primaries. Since the appellant did not take part in the Primaries he has failed to show any interest in the conduct of the Primaries. — Per OLABODE RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C.

CASES CITED

STATUTES REFERRED TO

1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)

2. Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended)

3. Supreme Court Rules (Order 6 Rule 5(4))

4. Interpretation Act

5. Electoral Act, 1982

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