SUNDAY JACKSON V. THE STATE

CORAM

Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Emmanuel Akomaye Agim Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Haruna Simon Tsammani Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Habeeb Adewale olumuyiwa abiruJustice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Mohammed Baba Idris Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

PARTIES

SUNDAY JACKSON

APPELLANTS 

THE STATE

RESPONDENTS 

AREA(S) OF LAW

CRIMINAL LAW, PENAL CODE, CULPABLE HOMICIDE, SELF-DEFENCE, PROVOCATION, CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT, EVIDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE, BURDEN OF PROOF

SUMMARY OF FACTS

The Appellant, Sunday Jackson, was arraigned on a one-count charge of culpable homicide punishable with death contrary to Section 221(a) of the Penal Code CAP 98 Laws of Adamawa State 1997. On January 27, 2015, in a bush within the village area of Kodomti in Numan Local Government Area of Adamawa State, the Appellant was alleged to have caused the death of Ardo Bawuro by stabbing him twice on the neck, causing his death.

The prosecution called two witnesses and tendered several exhibits, including the Appellant’s confessional statements (Exhibits B1 and B2) and coroner reports (Exhibits A and B). The Appellant testified as the sole witness in his defense.

According to the Appellant’s confessional statement, he was cutting thatching grasses in the bush when the deceased attacked him after losing sight of some persons he was pursuing for allegedly killing his cattle. The deceased attacked the Appellant in frustration and tried to stab him with a dagger. During the ensuing struggle, the Appellant seized the dagger from the deceased and used it to stab him thrice on the throat, resulting in his death.

In his testimony in court, the Appellant elaborated that he was working on his farm when the deceased arrived with his cattle, inquiring about certain people. When the Appellant denied seeing them, the deceased drove his cattle onto the Appellant’s farm. When the Appellant attempted to drive the cattle away, the deceased attacked him with a knife. The Appellant claimed he ran and shouted for help, but was stabbed by the deceased on the back of his head and left leg. During the struggle, he managed to seize the knife from the deceased, who then picked up a stick. The Appellant then stabbed the deceased, who subsequently died.

The trial Court rejected the Appellant’s plea of self-defense, convicted him and sentenced him to death by hanging. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence, prompting this appeal to the Supreme Court.

HELD

1. The appeal was dismissed by a majority decision (4-1).

2. The Supreme Court held that the Appellant’s defense of self-defense failed because, although he succeeded in disarming the deceased, he exceeded the bounds of self-defense by stabbing the deceased thrice on the throat, causing his death when there was no further imminent danger.

3. The Court held that the defense of provocation could not avail the Appellant as the defenses of self-defense and provocation are mutually exclusive and cannot be raised simultaneously.

4. The Court affirmed that the Appellant’s statement was properly classified as a confessional statement and was sufficient to sustain a conviction for culpable homicide punishable with death.

5. Justice Ogunwumiju dissented, holding that the Appellant was entitled to the defense of self-defense, and that his response was not excessive given the circumstances.

ISSUES

1. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were in grave error when they refused the Appellant’s defense of self-defence and upheld the conviction and sentence of the trial Court?

2. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were in error when they stated that the statement of the Appellant was confessional and the trial Court could safely convict the Appellant on same?

RATIONES DECIDENDI

INGREDIENTS OF CULPABLE HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE WITH DEATH — WHAT THE PROSECUTION MUST PROVE

By the foregoing provision and in tandem with the provision of Section 135(1)(2) of the Evidence Act, the prosecution is to establish the following elements beyond reasonable doubt to secure the conviction of the accused to wit: (a) That there was the death of a human being (b) That the death was caused by the act of the accused Person (c) That the act of the accused person was done with the intention of causing death. – Per MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.S.C.

STANDARD OF PROOF — REQUIREMENT FOR PROVING BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

The Prosecution is not obliged to prove his case beyond all shadows of doubt. The standard expected of him is to discharge his duty by leading evidence of such “a high degree of cogency consistent with an equally high degree of probability.” See BAKARE VS. STATE (1987) LPELR -714 (SC) per Oputa, JSC. Therefore, if the evidence adduced by the prosecution is so strong against the accused person as to leave only a remote possibility in his favor which can be dismissed with the sentence “of course it is possible but not in the least probable”, the case is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but nothing short of this will do. – Per MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.S.C.

CONDITIONS FOR SELF-DEFENCE — REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL PLEA

For a successful plea of self-defense, the following conditions must co-exist: (a) the accused must be free from fault in bringing about the encounter; (b) there must be present an impending peril to life or of great bodily harm, either real or apparent as to create the honest belief of an existing necessity; (c) there must be no safe or reasonable mode of escape by retreat; and (d) there must have been a necessity for taking life. – Per MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.S.C.

RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE — LEGAL BASIS AND LIMITATIONS

Under our legal system, if a man is attacked in circumstances where he seriously believes his life was in danger of serious bodily harm, he may use such force as he believes is necessary to prevent and resist the attack. And if in using such force he kills his assailant, he is not guilty of any crime even if the killing was intentional. [In deciding whether it was reasonably necessary to have used such force as was used regard must be had to all the circumstances of the case including the possibility of retreating without danger or yielding anything that he is entitled to protect.] – Per MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.S.C.

DISENGAGEMENT — THE REQUIREMENT TO RETREAT FROM CONFLICT

For an accused to avail himself of the defence of self-defence, he must show by evidence that he took reasonable steps to disengage from the fight or make some physical withdrawal. But the issue of disengagement depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case. Sometimes it may be possible to run away from an unwarranted attack at times it may be impossible to physically withdraw. – Per MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.S.C.

PROPORTIONALITY IN SELF-DEFENCE — PRINCIPLES OF NECESSITY AND PROPORTION

The guiding principles of self-defence are necessity and proportion. The two questions which ought to be posed and therefore answered before the Trial Court were: (1) on the evidence, was the defence of self-defence necessary? (2) was the injury inflicted proportionate to the threat offered, or was it excessive? If, however, the threat offered is disproportionate with the force used in repelling it, and the necessity of the occasion did not demand such a self-defence, then the defence cannot avail the accused… – Per MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.S.C.

MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE DEFENCES — INCOMPATIBILITY OF SELF-DEFENCE AND PROVOCATION

To simultaneously put up self defence and provocation is to shoot oneself at the foot. Accused persons who scramble for defences to save themselves from drowning often go into unpardonable errors to lump up defences that cannot agree or betray their innocence and inculpability in an offence. Self defence and provocation are not birds of the same feather nor same bed fellows, hence, wherever and whenever they are raised together, the innocence of the accused person is already jeopardized. – Per MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.S.C.

CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT — SUFFICIENCY FOR CONVICTION

A confession alone without corroboration is good enough to support a conviction as long as the Court is satisfied that the confession is true. – Per MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.S.C.

INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN ORAL TESTIMONY AND CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT — EFFECT ON CREDIBILITY

The law is that where an accused does not challenge the making of his confessional statement but merely gives oral evidence that is inconsistent with or contradicts the contents of the statement, the oral evidence should be treated as unreliable and liable to be rejected, and the contents of the confessional statement upheld unless a satisfactory explanation of the inconsistency is proffered. – Per MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.S.C.

INTENTION TO CAUSE DEATH — INFERENCE FROM USE OF DANGEROUS WEAPON

The law presumes that a man intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts and the test to be applied in these circumstances is the objective test, namely, the test of what a reasonable man would contemplate as the probable result of his acts.– Per MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.S.C.

RIGHT TO PRIVATE DEFENCE — CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION

The court ruled that Regulation 127 interferes with the privacy and family life of female officers by penalizing them for becoming pregnant while unmarried. This contravenes Section 37 of the Constitution, which guarantees the privacy of citizens. The police regulations should not intrude into the private lives of officers in this manner. – Per HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, J.S.C.

DUTY OF COURT TO CONSIDER ALL AVAILABLE DEFENCES — REGARDLESS OF MERIT

It is also trite that while it is the law that in criminal trials the Court can consider all defences available to an accused person irrespective of its merit or stupidity, it is trite that the principle does not mean that the Court can uphold conflicting defences. – Per MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.S.C.

DISSENTING VIEW ON SELF-DEFENCE — JUSTIFICATION FOR ACQUITTAL

In the circumstances, I am of the view that the defence of self defence avails the Appellant and that his response was not excessive. It is my view that the judgment of the two lower Courts should be set aside as a miscarriage of justice. – Per HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C. (DISSENTING)

CASES CITED

STATUTES REFERRED TO

1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as altered), Sections 33, 34, 37

2. Penal Code CAP 98 Laws of Adamawa State 1997, Sections 59-67, 221(a), 222(2)

3. Evidence Act, Section 27, 135(1)(2)

4. Criminal Code, Sections 286, 287, 288

CLICK HERE TO READ FULL JUDGMENT