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RT. HON. ROTIMI CHIBUIKE AMAECHI V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Legalpedia Citation: (2009) Legalpedia (SC) 81169

In the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Tue Nov 3, 2009

Suit Number: SC. 252/2007

CORAM


MAHMUD MOHAMMED , JUSTICE SUPREME COURT

FRANCIS FEDEDO TABAI, JUSTICE SUPREME COURT

MAHMUD MOHAMMED , JUSTICE SUPREME COURT

FRANCIS FEDEDO TABAI, JUSTICE SUPREME COURT

MICHEAL EKUNDAYO OGUNDARE JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT (Read the Leading Judgment)

FRANCIS FEDEDO TABAI, JUSTICE SUPREME COURT


PARTIES


RT. HON. ROTIMI CHIBUIKE AMAECHI APPELLANTS


INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION

RESPONDENTS 


AREA(S) OF LAW



SUMMARY OF FACTS

The Plaintiff/Appellant, Hon. Rotimi Chubuike Amaechi, won the PDP’s Gubernatorial Primary election for Rivers State and his name was first forwarded by the PDP (3rd Defendant/Respondent) to INEC (1st  Defendant/Respondent).  However, long after submitting the name of the Appellant to the 1st Respondent,  the 3rd Defendant/Respondent, wrote another letter to the 1st Defendant/Respondent forwarding the name of the 2nd Defendant/Respondent, Barrister Celestine Ngozichukwu Omehia, who did not participate in the party’s primaries at all, as its candidate for the general gubernatorial election in Rivers State which was scheduled in 2007, on the ground that the name of the Plaintiff/Appellant was submitted to the 1st Respondent, by the 3rd Respondent, in error.

In consequence of the foregoing development, the Plaintiff/Appellant instituted an action against the 1st Defendant/Respondent (and later joined the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Respondents by the order of the trial Court) in the Federal High Court, Abuja seeking a declaration that the substitution of the Plaintiff/Appellant with the 2nd Defendant/Respondent was unconstitutional, illegal and unlawful and an infraction of section 32(3) of the Electoral Act, 2006.  The trial Court held in its judgment that the substitution of the Plaintiff/Appellant with the 2nd Defendant/Respondent was in order. Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court, the Plaintiff/Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal whiles the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Respondents cross-appealed. The Defendants/Respondents also filed an application challenging the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court to entertain the appeal on the ground that the gubernatorial election had been conducted in Rivers State, in addition to the fact that the Plaintiff/Appellant had been expelled from P.D.P. Meanwhile, the case of Ugwu & Anor. v. Ararume & Anor, whose facts were on all fours with the instant appeal, was pending at the Supreme Court, and the Appellate Court made an order staying proceedings in the instant appeal until the delivery of the judgment by the apex Court in the Ararume’s case.

After the delivery of the judgment in Ararume’s case, the Appellate Court defied its order to be bound by the decision of the apex Court in Ararume’s case; upholds the Defendants/Respondents’ objection and dismissed the Plaintiff/Appellant’s appeal.  Dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Plaintiff/Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court whiles the 2nd and 3rd Defendant/Respondents cross-appealed.

 


HELD


Appeal allowed and cross-appeal dismissed. It was held that the application was an abuse of the process of the court. It was accordingly dismissed.


ISSUES


1.Whether or not the two courts below were correct in their conclusion that the reason given by the Peoples Democratic Party (P.D.P) for substituting Amaechi with Omehia satisfied the requirements of section 34 of the Electoral Act, 2006.CROSS-APPEAL?

2.Whether the Court of Appeal was correct when it held that the appeal in issue did not abate upon the 2nd respondent being sworn in as the Governor of Rivers State whereupon he acquired constitutional immunity pursuant to section 308 of the 1999 Constitution ?Whether the Court of Appeal was correct in law when after finding that the entire gamut of appellant’s dispute arose from nomination and sponsorship (matters within the domestic sphere of the 3rd respondent) it did not rule the entire dispute non justiciable?

3.Whether the proceedings are not void ab initio on the basis that evidence viva voce was not taken in a suit commenced by writ of summons/statement of claim in respect of reliefs that were all declaratory in nature.”?

 


RATIONES DECIDENDI


CONTENT OF PLEADING- PLEADINGS SHOULD CONTAIN STATEMENT OF ALL MATERIAL FACTS ON WHICH THE PARTY PLEADING RELIES, BUT NOT THE EVIDENCE BY WHICH THEY ARE TO BE PROVED


“It is settled law that every pleadings shall contain statement of all material facts on which the party pleading relies, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved.” PER W.S.N. ONNOGHEN, J.S.C


INDICTMENT – AN INDICTMENT IS NO MORE THAN AN ACCUSATION


“An indictment is no more than an accusation”: PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


NEW OR FURTHER EVIDENCE ON APPEAL- PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDES THE COURT OF APPEAL IN GRANTING SPECIAL LEAVE FOR NEW OR FURTHER EVIDENCE TO BE ADDUCED ON APPEAL


“See also Asaboro v. Aruwaji [1974] 4 S.C 119 at pages 123 – 125 where this court said
“But that is not the only hurdle in the way of the applicant in this case. For instance, there is the fact that the application does not seem to satisfy at least, one of the recognized principles of law which govern the exercise of its power by the Court of Appeal in granting special leave for new or further evidence to be adduced on appeal. The three cardinal principles are as follows:-
First, it must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial.
Secondly, the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive.
Thirdly, the evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed, or in other words, it must be apparently credible, though it need not be incontrovertible.” PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


NON-EXISTENCE OF INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES- INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES ARE NO LONGER PERMITTED TO CONTEST AN ELECTION


“However, I hasten to say that under the present dispensation, independent candidates are no longer permitted to contest an election. To be eligible to contest an election, a candidate must be a member of a political party. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 recognises this fact hence it vests the political parties with the exclusive function of canvassing for votes for candidates at election and of contributing to the campaign funds of candidates at election.” PER P.O. ADEREMI, J.S.C


STATUS OF AN INQUIRY BOTHERING ON CRIMINALITY BY A JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY – AN INQUIRY BY A JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE CULPABILITY OF A CITIZEN BOTHERING ON CRIMINALITY IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DENY A CITIZEN ELIGIBILITY TO THE OFFICE OF


“It seems to me that section 182(l)(i) only enables a Judicial Commission of Inquiry or administrative tribunal to determine the culpability of a citizen where it is alleged that such citizen has been in breach of the standards of behaviour expected in public life. Where such Inquiry or tribunal finds a citizen liable or culpable of a conduct bordering on criminality, and the Federal or State Government accepts such report through a published white paper, it is still not good enough to deny a citizen eligibility to the office of Governor unless and until he is afterwards prosecuted in a court of law and found guilty.” PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS – BINDINGNESS OF THE COURT OF APPEAL BY THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT


“Under the doctrine of stare decisis the Court of Appeal was bound by the decision of this court.” PER KATSINA-ALU, JSC


CONSEQUENTIAL ORDER- A CONSEQUENTIAL ORDER IS ONE MADE GIVING EFFECT TO THE JUDGMENT WHICH IT FOLLOWS – A COURT CAN ORDER AN INJUNCTION WHERE IT IS NOT SPECIFICALLY CLAIMED BUT APPEARS INCIDENTALLY NECESSARY TO PROTECT ESTABLISHED RIGHTS


“It is the law even where a person has not specifically asked for a relief from a court the court has the power to grant such a relief as a consequential relief. A consequential order must be one made giving effect to the judgment which it follows. It is not an order made subsequent to a judgment, which derails from the judgment or contains extraneous matters. It is settled law that court can order an injunction even where it is not specifically claimed but appears incidentally necessary to protect established rights. See Atolagbe v. Sharun [1985] 4 SC (Pt 1) 250, Okupe v. F.B.I.R. [1974] 1 NMLR 422, Liman v. Mohammed [1999] 9 NWLR (Pt 617) 116.” PER D. MUSDPAHER, J.S.C


SUBSTITUTION OF A CANDIDATE – WHETHER GIVING “ERROR” AS THE REASON FOR SUBSTITUTION MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 34 OF ELECTORAL ACT


“Thus, merely providing cogent reason without providing the platform upon which to authenticate the truthfulness is not enough. As I have pointed out supra, giving “ERROR” as the reason for substituting Barrister Celestine Omehia for Rotimi Amaechi does not meet the requirements of the provisions of the law.” PER P.O. ADEREMI, J.S.C


APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF STARE DECISIS /JUDICIAL PRECEDENT- IF THERE IS LIKENESS BETWEEN THE PREVIOUS CASE AND THE ONE BEFORE THE COURT, THE PREVIOUS JUDICIAL DECISION SHOULD BE FOLLOWED EXCEPT WHERE THE FACTS OF THE PREVIOUS JUDICIAL AUTHORITY A


“I must hasten to point out that application of the principles of stare decisis or judicial precedent does not involve an exercise of judicial discretion at all. It is what must be done; mandatory. The doctrine is based first of all on the relevant likeness of or between the cases – the previous case and the one before the court. If there is no likeness between the two, it is an idle exercise to consider whether the previous one should be followed or departed from. It is settled law that a previous decision is not to be departed from or even followed, where the facts or the law applicable in the previous case are distinguishable from those in the latter case.” PER W.S.N. ONNOGHEN, J.S.C


EXERCISE OF EQUITABLE JURISDICTION – A COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS EQUITABLE JURISDICTION WITH CONSCIENCE AND SHOULD BE READY TO ADDRESS NEW PROBLEMS AND EVEN CREATE NEW DOCTRINES


“Court, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction must be seen as a court of conscience. And judges who dispense justice, in this court of law and equity must always be ready to address new problems and even create new doctrines where the justice of the matter so requires.” PER P.O. ADEREMI, J.S.C


PRINCIPLE OF WAIVER – A PARTY CANNOT BE HEARD TO COMPLAIN OF AN IRREGULARITY WHICH HE ACQUIESCED TO


“Each party or litigant is sui juris; none of them is under any legal disability to forgo or waive any of the two procedures open to them in the instant case. Having made an election, a party cannot later set to revert to the other. That principle is to the effect that where an action was commenced by any irregular procedure and a defendant took steps to participate in the proceedings, as in the instant case, he cannot later be heard to complain of the irregularity as a person will not be allowed to complain against an irregularity which he himself has accepted, waived or acquiesced. See United Calabar Co. v. Elder Dempster Lines Ltd (1972) 1 ALL NLR (p.2) 244 and Ariori & Ors v. Elemo & Ors (1983) 1 S.C. 13.” PER P.O. ADEREMI, J.S.C


DUTY OF A JUDGE – A JUDGE MUST ALWAYS RESORT TO THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATORS AS FOUND IN THE WORDS USED IN FRAMING THE PROVISION OF THE STATUTE


“The fundamental duty of the judge is to expound the law and not to expand it. He must decide what the law IS and not what it might be. Where the words used in couching the provisions are clear and unambiguous as the provisions of Section 34 aforesaid, they must be given their ordinary and grammatical meanings, no more. Yes, it is true that it is said, that the judex must always have a resort to the intention of the legislators; that intention can only be found in the words used to frame the provisions and nowhere else”. PER P.O. ADEREMI, J.S.C


SECTION 308 OF THE CONSTITUTION – WHETHER SECTION 308 OF THE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS A GOVERNOR FROM LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN AN ELECTION MATTER


“Section 308 of the Constitution does not protect a governor from legal proceedings in a matter of his election per se or in a matter connected with the election even when he as a contestant has been declared duly elected or returned as governor. Election petitions and election related proceedings are special proceedings divorced and separated from civil or criminal proceedings within the intendment and context of section 308 of the Constitution. See Onitiri v. Benson (1960) 5 FSC 150, Oyekan v. Akinjide [1965]1 NMLR 381”. PER D. MUSDPAHER, J.S.C


NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF AN ACT – IF THE LAW PRESCRIBES A METHOD BY WHICH AN ACT SHOULD BE DONE, SUCH ACT CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED EXCEPT SUCH METHOD IS FOLLOWED


“If the law prescribes a method by which an act could be validly done, and such method is not followed, it means that that act could not be accomplished.” PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


PROOF OF GUILT FOR OFFENCES OF EMBEZZLEMENT AND FRAUD – TRIAL AND CONVICTION BY A COURT IS THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED WAY TO PROVE GUILT AND IMPOSITION OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT FOR THE OFFENCES OF EMBEZZLEMENT AND FRAUD


“The trial and conviction by a court is the only constitutionally permitted way to prove guilt and therefore the only ground for the imposition of criminal punishment or penalty for the criminal offences of embezzlement or fraud. Clearly, the imposition of the penalty of disqualification for embezzlement or fraud solely on the basis of an indictment for these offences by an administrative panel of inquiry implies a presumption of guilt, contrary to Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. I say again that convictions for offences and imposition of penalties and punishments are matters appertaining exclusively to judicial power. See Sokefun v. Akinyemi [1980] 5-7 S.C. (Reprint) 1; [1981] 1 NCLR 135; Garba v. University of Maiduguri [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550”. PER OGUNTADE, J.S.C


DUTY OF THE ECONOMIC FINANCIAL CRIME COMMISSION AFTER INVESTIGATION – THE DUTY OF THE ECONOMIC FINANCIAL CRIME COMMISSION WHERE ITS INVESTIGATION ESTABLISHES A PRIMA FACIES CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST A PERSON IS TO HAVE SUCH AN OFFENDER PROSECUTED IN A COURT


“The EFCC is a statutory body created under the Laws of Nigeria. Its duties include the investigation and prosecution of a class of criminal offences. In essence, once its investigation has shown prima facie that a person has committed a criminal offence, the duty of EFCC is to have such offender prosecuted in a court of law. I know of no provision of the law which enables EFCC upon the conclusion of investigation in a criminal case to send the report or case file to either the Federal or State Government.” PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY – A JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY IS NOT THE SAME THING AS A COURT OF LAW


“A judicial Commission of inquiry or an administrative panel is not the same thing as a court of law or its equivalent. Because a court of law operates within a judicial hierarchy any person wrongly convicted is enabled to contest his conviction to the Supreme Court of Nigeria. This is a right granted by the Constitution of Nigeria. It has not been curtailed or abridged by section 182(1)(i) above”. PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


TECHNICALITIES – THE ADJUDICATORY POWER OF COURT TO DO JUSTICE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRAINED BY ADHERENCE TO TECHNICALITIES


“The court must move away from the era when adjudicatory power of the court was hindered by a constraining adherence to technicalities. This often results in the loser in a civil case taking home all the laurels while the supposed winner goes home in a worse situation than he approached the court.” PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDIS TO ELECTION- THE DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDENS PREVENTS ANY TRANSFER OF ANY RIGHT TO ANY PERSON DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE LITIGATION


“The doctrine of LIS PENDENS finds expression in the assertion that it prevents any transfer of any right or the taking of any steps capable of foisting a state of helplessness and/or hopelessness on the parties or the court during the pendency in court of an action and even after. By that doctrine, the law does not allow litigant or parties or give to them during the currency of the litigation involving the rights in it so as to prejudice any of the litigating parties. The doctrine negates and disallows any transfer of rights or interest in any subject-matter that is being litigated upon during the pendency of litigation in respect of the said subject-matter. The well-known Maxim is “PENDENTE LITE NIHIL INNOVETUR” meaning: DURING A LITIGATION NOTHING NEW SHOULD BE INTRODUCED. See Dan-Jumbo v. Dan-Jumbo (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt.627) 445.” PER P.O. ADEREMI, J.S.C


NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES FOR ELECTION – IT IS MANDATORY THAT POLITICAL PARTIES SHOULD INFORM INEC OF THE DATE OF HOLDING A CONVENTION OR CONGRESS FOR THE PURPOSE OF NOMINATING CANDIDATES FOR ANY OF THE ELECTIVE OFFICES


“Under Section 85 of the Electoral Act, 2006, it is mandatory that political parties inform INEC of the date and time of holding a convention or congress summoned for the purpose of nominating candidates for any of the elective offices under the Electoral Act 2006.” PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


FRESH EVIDENCE ON APPEAL – INSTANCES WHERE THE COURT WILL ALLOW FRESH EVIDENCE ON APPEAL IN CIVIL CASES


“In civil cases the Court Will permit fresh evidence in furtherance of justice under the following circumstances:
(i) Where the evidence sought to be adduced is such as could not have been obtained with reasonable care and diligence for use at the trial.
(ii) Where the fresh evidence is such that if admitted would have an important, but not necessarily crucial, effect on the whole case.
(iii) Where the evidence sought to be tendered on appeal is such as is apparently credible in the sense that it is capable of being believed. It need not necessarily be incontrovertible”. PER OGUNTADE, J.S.C


INAPPLICABILITY OF DOCTRINE OF WAIVER TO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT- A RIGHT THAT INURES TO THE BENEFIT OF THE ENTIRE PUBLIC CAN NEVER BE WAIVED BY AN INDIVIDUAL OR THE STATE BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN MADE IN FAVOUR OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY


“That a court, particularly, a court of last resort has a fundamental duty to safeguard fundamental rights of citizens admits of no doubt. A right that inures to the benefit of the entire public can never be waived. Nobody, not even the State can waive the rights entrenched in statutory or constitutional provisions which have been made in favour of the whole country. It is clearly not PRO PUBLICO but CONTRA PUBLICO to introduce the doctrine of waiver to such rights. See A-G Bendel State v. A-G of the Federation & Ors. (1985) 10 S.C. 1.” PER P.O. ADEREMI, J.S.C


DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATE – THE POWER TO DISQUALIFY CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION DOES NOT RESIDE WITH THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION(INEC) BUT WITH THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT OR THE STATE HIGH COURT


“It is obvious from the clear and unambiguous provisions of the aforesaid section of the Electoral Act 2006, that the Commission lacks the power to disqualify any candidate on its own. The power of disqualification of any candidate from contesting an election after his name has been forwarded to the Commission belongs exclusively to the Federal High Court or the State High Court.” PER P.O. ADEREMI, J.S.C


LOCUS STANDI TO PRESENT AN ELECTION PETITION- CATERGORIES OF PERSONS TO PRESENT AN ELECTION PETITION – WHERE A PETITION COMPLAINS OF THE CONDUCT OF AN ELECTORAL OFFICER, SUCH OFFICER SHALL BE DEEMED THE RESPONDENT AND SHALL BE JOINED IN THE ELECTION PETI


“Sections 144 and 145 of the Electoral Act 2006 provide:
“144.(1) An election petition may be presented by one or more of the following persons:
(a) a candidate in an election;
(b) a political party which participated in the election
(2) The person whose election is complained of, is in this Act, referred to as the Respondent, but if the petitioner complains of the conduct of an Electoral Officer, a Presiding Officer, a Returning Officer or any other person who took part in the conduct of an election, such officer or person shall for the purpose of this Act be deemed to be a Respondent and shall be joined in the election petition in his or her official status as a necessary party PROVIDED that where such officer or person is shown to have acted as an agent of the Commission, his non-joinder as aforesaid will not on its own operate to void the petition if the Commission is made a party.” PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


DECLARATIONS OF RIGHT – IMPROPRIETY OF THE COURT MAKING DECLARATIONS OF RIGHT WITHOUT TAKING EVIDENCE


“It is trite law that the court does not make declarations of right either on admission or in default of defence without hearing evidence. That is however not the same thing as saying that the proceedings in the two courts below up to this court are void for the reason that evidence viva voce was not taken.” PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


SUBSTITUTION OF CANDIDATE BY A POLITICAL PARTY – REQUIREMENT FOR SUBSTITUTION OF CANDIDATE BY A POLITICAL PARTY – SECTION 34 0F THE ELECTORAL ACT 2006


The said section provides:
“34- (1) A political party intending to change any of its candidates for any election shall inform the Commission of such change in writing not later than 60 days to the election.
(2) Any application made pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall give cogent and verifiable reasons.
(3) Except in the case of death there shall be no substitution or replacement of any candidate whatsoever after the date referred to in subsection (1) of this section.” PER OGUNTADE JSC


COURT WITH FINAL JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE APPEALS FROM TRIBUNALS – THE COURT OF APPEAL IS THE FINAL ADJUDICATOR IN ELECTION PETITION APPEALS EMANATING FROM TRIBUNALS ESTABLISHED UNDER SECTION 285 OF THE CONSTITUTION


“In any event by section 246 (3) of Constitution, the Court of Appeal is the final adjudicator in appeals emanating from such tribunals established under section 285 of the Constitution. So clearly, in my view, the Supreme Court would have no jurisdiction or competence to order a fresh election. To do so would have been unlawful for we could not dabble into the matter which was not before us, moreover the other parties who contested the election are not parties before us and that the conduct of the election was not an issue before the Supreme Court”. PER MUSDPAHER, J.S.C


NOMINATION OR SUBSTITUTION OF CANDIDATES FOR ELECTION – WHETHER INSISTENCE ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT FOR SUBSTITUTION AMOUNTS TO INTERFERENCE BY THE JUDICIARY WITH THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF POLITICAL PARTIES TO NOMINATE OR SUBSTITUTE CAND


“I do not think that insistence on compliance with the statutory requirement of the giving of “cogent and verifiable reasons” amounts, by any stretch of imagination, to interference by the judiciary with the domestic affairs of the political parties or their power to nominate, sponsor or change or substitute any candidate for any election. To argue that it does to me, smacks of nothing but arm twisting or out-right blackmail, apart from being a complete misconception of the issues involved in the relevant section calling for interpretation/application.” PER W.S.N. ONNOGHEN, J.S.C


ELECTION – GROUNDS UPON WHICH AN ELECTION MAY BE QUESTIONED


145. (1) An election may be questioned on any of the following grounds,
(a) that a person whose election is questioned was, at the time of the election, not qualified to contest the election;
(b) that the election was invalid by reason of corrupt practices or non compliance with provisions of this Act;
(c) that the respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the election; or
(d) that the petitioner or its candidate was validly nominated but was unlawfully excluded from the election.
(2) An act or omission which may be contrary to an instruction or directive of the Commission or of an officer appointed for the purpose of the election but which is not contrary to the provisions of this Act shall not of itself be a ground for questioning the election.” PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


JUDICIAL NOTICE- DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL NOTICE


“These requirements of Section 74 of the Evidence Act CAP 12 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 are in line with the definition of the term judicial notice in the case of Commonwealth Shipping Representative v. P. O. Branch Services (1923) AC 191 at 212 where the Court said –
“Judicial notice refers to facts, which a judge can be called upon to receive and to act upon, either from his general knowledge of them, or from inquiries to be made by himself for his own information from sources to which it is proper for him to refer.” PER I. MOHAMMED, J.S.C


INDEPENDENT CANDIDATURE IN ELECTION – WHETHER INDEPENDENT CANDIDATURE IS PERMITTED IN ELECTION UNDER OUR LAWS


“Now section 221 of the 1999 Constitution provides:
“No association other than a political party shall canvass for votes for any candidate at any election or contribute to the funds of any party or to the election expenses of any candidate at an election.”
The above provision effectually removes the possibility of independent candidacy in our elections; and places emphasis and responsibility in elections on political parties. Without a political party a candidate cannot contest. The primary method of contest for elective offices is therefore between parties.” PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


DEEMED ABANDONMENT OF FACTS IN PLEADINGS- WHERE A PARTY FAILS TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF FACTS PLEADED, THE PLEADINGS ARE DEEMED ABANDONED


“It is a settled principle of law that he who alleges must prove and that where a party fails to adduce evidence in support of facts pleaded, the pleadings are thereby deemed abandoned.” PER W.S.N. ONNOGHEN, J.S.C


JUDGMENT OF A TRIAL COURT – JUDGMENT OR DECISION OF A TRIAL COURT MUST BE SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.


“It is indeed elementary principle of law that judgment or decision of a trial Court must be supported by evidence. See cases of Metal Construction (W.A.) Ltd. v. D.A. Migliore (1990) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 126) and Obulor v. Oboro (2001) 8 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 714) 25 at 32, (2001) 5 SCM, 142.” PER I. MOHAMMED, J.S.C


POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO HEAR AN APPEAL AS COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE-THE SUPREME COURT CAN INVOKE SECTION 22 OF THE SUPREME COURT ACT TO HEAR APPEAL AND MAKE NECESSARY ORDERS AS A COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE SO AS TO MEET THE ENDS OF JUSTICE


“And Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act provides:
“22. The Supreme Court may, from time to time, make any order necessary for determining the real question in controversy in the appeal, and may amend any defect or error in the record of appeal, and may direct the court below to inquire into and certify its findings on any question which the Supreme Court thinks fit to determine before final judgment in the appeal and may make an interim order or grant any injunction which the court below is authorized to make or grant and may direct any necessary inquiries or accounts to be made or taken and generally shall have full jurisdiction over the whole proceedings as if the proceedings had been instituted and prosecuted in the Supreme Court as a court of first instance and may rehear the case in whole or in part or may remit it to the court below for the purpose of such rehearing or may give such other directions as to the manner in which the court below shall deal with the case in accordance with the powers of that court.” PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


RIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTIES TO NOMINATE A CANDIDATE FOR AN ELECTION- THE RIGHT TO SPONSOR A CANDIDATE BY A PARTY IS NOT A LEGAL RIGHT BUT A DOMESTIC RIGHT OF THE PARTY WHICH CANNOT BE ORDINARILY QUESTIONED IN A COURT OF LAW


“Indeed in the Dalhatu v. Turaki case supra at 347 of the report. TOBI JSC stated:-
“From the decision of this court in ONUOHA, it is clear that the right to sponsor a candidate by a party is not a legal right but a domestic right of the party which cannot be questioned in a court of law. The political organization has a discretion in the matter, a discretion which is unbelted in the sense that a court of law has no jurisdiction to question its exercise one way or the other. The moment a court goes into such a domestic affair of a party, it has involved itself in nominating a particular candidate, a jurisdiction which a court cannot exercise.” PER D. MUSDPAHER, J.S.C


PRIMARY DUTY OF COURTS – COURTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT ALL CITIZENS OBTAIN JUSTICE IN THEIR CASE AND SHOULD NOT ALLOW ITS POWERS TO BE SUBVERTED SO AS TO DO INJUSTICE TO THE PARTIES BEFORE IT


“This court and indeed all courts in Nigeria have a duty which flows from a power granted by the constitution of Nigeria to ensure that citizens of Nigeria, high and low get the justice which their case deserves. The powers of the court are derived from the constitution not at the sufferance or generosity of any other arm of the Government of Nigeria. The judiciary like all citizens of this Country cannot be a passive on-looker when any person attempts to subvert the administration of justice and will not hesitate to use the powers available to it to do justice in the cases before it”. PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


DUTY OF COURT IN INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION- THE COURT IN INTERPRETING THE PROVISIONS OF A STATUTE OR CONSTITUTION, SHOULD NOT READ THE PROVISION IN ISOLATION BUT READ TOGETHER RELATED PROVISIONS SO AS TO DISCOVER THE MEANING OF THE PROVISIONS


“It is settled law, that the court in interpreting the provisions of a statute or Constitution, must read together related provisions of the Constitution in order to discover the meaning of the provisions. The court ought not to interpret related provisions of a statute or Constitution in isolation and then destroy in the process the true meaning and effect of particular provisions: See Obayuwana v. Governor [1982] 12 S.C. 47 at 211 and Awolowo v. Shagari [1979] 6 – 9 S.C 51 at 97.” PER G.A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C


CONSEQUENTIAL ORDERS AND RELIEF – THE SUPREME COURT HAS WIDE JURISDICTION TO MAKE CONSEQUENTIAL ORDERS


“This court has wide jurisdiction to make consequential orders and to grant reliefs which the circumstances and justice of a case dictate. On the principle of Ubi jus ibi remedium if the court is satisfied that a person has suffered a legal injury, it will surely provide a remedy irrespective of the fact that no remedy is provided either at common law or by statute“. PER A.I. KATSINA-ALU, J.S.C


CASES CITED


None.


STATUTES REFERRED TO


African charter on Human Rights cap. 10., Laws of the Federation. Electoral Act, 2006.

Constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria1999.

Evidence Act CAP 12 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990

Supreme Court Act

 


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