THERE IS ONLY ONE CONSTANT THING IN YOUR FIRM …September 17, 2020
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LL.B (Hons.) BL; LL.M., Ph. D
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The issue of eye witness recognition and/or identification of suspects is one that is constant in many criminal trials. The case of Ndidi v. State is a case where the eyewitness identification of the suspect played a dominant role in the decision of the courts. In that case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeal found the accused person guilty, while the Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence and also discharged and acquitted the appellant. This piece lays out the principles governing eyewitness identification as handed down in the English case of R. v. Turnbull and adopted by our courts. It essentially appraises the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Ndidi v. State and examines the pertinent issues involved in the case while pointing to the areas the court should have directed its judicial mind.
Usually in criminal cases, the essential concern is not normally whether or not the offence was committed but that of proof of the guilt of the suspect. The guilt of a suspect can be proved through a variety of ways, which includes: documentary evidence; real evidence; circumstantial evidence; oral evidence in the form of confessional statement of the accused person; or evidence of eye witness of the crime. More often than not, controversy always rages over the identification of the person or persons alleged as the actual perpetrators of the offence charged. Many criminal court cases in Nigeria and other jurisdictions are based exclusively upon eyewitness testimony.
An eyewitness is an individual who sees or has knowledge of the commission of a crime as well as the guilty party. An eyewitness can be an innocent bystander who simply happened to come upon the crime, the victim of a crime, or a co-conspirator who has turned state’s evidence in exchange for a lesser penalty.
There is no statutory provision to guide the courts on witness identification of suspects. All we have are the Common Law principles that evolved from court decisions in the common law jurisdictions, especially, England. The case of R v. Turnbull a decision of the Court of Appeal [England] Criminal Division presided over by Lord Widgery C.J, is one of such cases.
In this case, Turnbull and Camelo were convicted of conspiracy to burgle. At the appeal, the problem relating to evidence of visual identification in criminal cases was raised, and the following guidelines were laid down. First, whenever the case against an accused depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of one or more identifications of the accused which the defence alleges to be mistaken, the judge should warn the jury of the special need for caution before convicting the accused in reliance on the correctness of the identification or identifications. In addition, he should instruct them as to the reason for the need for such a warning and should make some reference to the possibility that a mistaken witness can be a convincing one and that a number of such witnesses can all be mistaken. Provided this is done in clear terms the judge need not use any particular form of words.
Secondly, the judge should direct the jury to examine closely the circumstances in which the identification by each witness came to be made. How long did the witness have the accused under observation? At what distance? In what light? Was the observation impeded in any way, as for example by passing traffic or a press of people? Had the witness ever seen the accused before? How often? If only occasionally, had he any special reason for remembering the accused? How long elapsed between the original observation and the subsequent identification to the police? Was there any material discrepancy between the description of the accused given to the police by the witness when first seen by them and his actual appearance? If in any case, whether it is being dealt with summarily or on indictment, the prosecution has reason to believe that there is such a material discrepancy they should supply the accused or his legal advisers with particulars of the description the police were first given.
Our courts have by and large, adopted the principles laid down in that case. However, the Supreme Court in Ndidi v. State departed from the principles laid down for eye witness identification in R v. Turnbull. Besides the Turnbull principles, some other significant issues were very apparent from the facts of the case, nevertheless the Court in arriving at its decision which upturned the decision of the two lower courts, failed to accord those concerns their desired weight. Hon. Justice Niki Tobi, however, had a dissenting opinion in the case. This review while examining the case of Ndidi v. State, brings to the fore some relevant issues arising from the facts and the decision of the Court such as: inability to immediately gain consciousness and recognize things around due to sudden and forceful wake; prior knowledge of the suspect and prompt recognition of same; suspect’s false and belated Alibi and conviction on the evidence of a single witness.
FACTS OF NDIDI V. STATE
At about 1.00 am on 4th day of January, 2000, armed robbers struck at Abavo in Delta State. The appellant was accused of the robbery and was reported to the police. P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.3 were the alleged victims of the attack. It was P.W.1 who identified the appellant as one of the robbers that entered her house on the fateful day. She said that the armed robbers used torch light and she had lantern on. She made two statements to the police but the first one was not tendered during the trial. Four other persons testified for the prosecution.
The appellant testified on his behalf and denied the charge of armed robbery. He set up a belated alibi by stating that on the day in question, he was sleeping in his mother’s house and could not have been at the scene of the crime. He made this statement for the first time in the court. He however said in his statement to the police, that he was arrested by his own blood brothers and his mother on the following day. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court held that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt in the counts one and two (conspiracy and armed robbery) but not in count three (a second charge of armed robbery committed against one Helen Onyeije). The appellant was therefore found guilty of counts one and two but discharged and acquitted on count three. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court in a majority decision delivered by Hon. Justice Pius Aderemi JSC, set aside the conviction and sentence and discharged and acquitted the appellant.
The Court summed up the three grounds of appeal as set out in the appellant’s brief of argument into one issue in the following terms:-
Whether the Court of Appeal was right in affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant on the basis of the evidence PW1 only in the circumstances of this matter.
The respondent identified two issues for determination in their brief of argument as follows: –
(1) Whether from the totality of the evidence on record, the lower court was right in affirming the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant for the offences of conspiracy to rob and armed robbery.
(2) Whether the appellant was properly identified as the person involved in the armed robbery committed against Mrs. Comfort Apokueze, PW1.
The Court considered that issue No l on the appellant’s brief was materially similar to issue No2 on the respondent’s brief; while issue No l on the respondent’s brief dovetailed into the other two issues afore-mentioned. It therefore took all the issues together. The Court noted the fact that, PW1 in her oral testimony said she had known the accused before the incident occurred, but decided that the guidelines laid down in R.v.Turnbull would not apply hook, line and sinker in the case. It stated that the evidence of PW1 as it relates to the appellant must be examined in the light of her saying that she recognized the appellant in the early hours of that day. The Court went further to emphasize that visibility was blurred at the time of the robbery and for that reason, the evidence of PW1 was not credible enough to ground a conviction.
The Supreme Court per Pius Olayiwola Aderemi J.S.C., summed up the reason for the Court’s decision as follows:
The trial judge, it must be remembered, took a judicial notice that it was always dark at that very early hour of the morning. So visibility would normally be blurred at that time. Under cross-examination, she said it was not true that there was no light in Abavo at that time in question. She claimed she told the Police that there was light and that she also told the Police that she carried a small lantern at that material time. According to her, the robbers ordered her to put the small lantern she was carrying down and to quench it. It was her further evidence that at that time and place, the robbers used their own torchlight to pack her belongings. These pieces of evidence by PW1 go to support the findings of the trial judge; that it was dark at that material time. Visibility was blurred. There was definitely a need for the provision of lighting aid to make everything around to be visible. Also waking up by force at that time of the night, one would not immediately gain consciousness and as such one’s ability to be able to recognise things around one would be considerably reduced. There is no evidence as to the time she woke up from her sleep and the time the appellant appeared to her. It is a great surprise that the trial court did not avert its mind to the above crucial issues and neither were any findings made thereon. Tragically, the court below fell into that grave mistake. The quality of evidence proffered in support of the prosecution’s case that PW1 actually saw the appellant at that material time is very poor; it is not reliable. And the poorer the quality of such pieces of evidence, the greater the danger in convicting on them. Indeed, the quality of evidence at the end of the prosecution’s case on the issue of identity or even recognition of the appellant by PW1 was very low and poor that no reasonable tribunal could be heard to convict on it.
Hon. Justice Niki Tobi JSC however, while dissenting, commented on the facts and evidence before the Court, and summed up as follows:
This is a case of concurrent findings on the part of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. This court cannot tamper with such concurrent findings because they are clearly borne out from the evidence before the court. I do not see any perversity in the findings.
I have looked at this matter from all angles and I do not see my way clear in disturbing the concurrent findings of the two courts below. They are right. I accordingly dismiss the appeal. After all, lantern exudes light; though not as much as electricity light to identify a person. The appeal is dismissed.
Following R. v. Turnbull, the Supreme Court in this case, noted that to ascribe any value to the evidence of an eye-witness identification of a criminal, and to guard against cases of mistaken identity, courts must meticulously consider the following issues: –
 Circumstances in which the eye-witness saw the suspect or defendant.
 The length of time the witness saw the subject or defendant.
 The lighting conditions.
 The opportunity of close observation.
 The previous contacts between the two parties.
The eye witness in this case P.W.1 knew the appellant as a member of the community long before the incident, hence, identifying him will naturally be easier than identifying a total stranger. In fact in the case of somebody that was well known before to the witness, the issue of identification does not arise, but that of recognition. She positively recognized and identified the appellant, thereby linking him to the robbery. She recognized the appellant at the earliest opportunity. Part of her evidence reads:
I knew the accused before the incident occurred. It is not true that there was no light in Abavo. On the night in question I told the Police there was light. It is true I told the Police that I carried a small lantern. The robbers told me to put the lamp down and quench it.
The distance was very close for the witness to properly recognize the appellant, as she was in the same room with the robbers while they robbed. This is one of the principles laid down in Turnbull’s case, which should have weighed heavily on the mind of the Court. On this issue, Hon. Justice Niki Tobi JSC had this to say:
And that takes me to the minutest details of the identification by PW1. The appellant was wearing a pair of trousers and a short sleeve shirt; he was not wearing a cap. He did not cover his face. Can PW1 be fabricating the above merely because she wanted to score old animosity or take vengeance or vendetta? I think not. It is much more than that. I am convinced that the real thing is the evidence of PW1. That of the appellant is a deliberate falsehood; a fabrication. His evidence does not surprise me. After all, who wants to be hanged?
Part of the conclusion of the Supreme Court was that it was dark at the time of the robbery therefore PWI was not in a position to recognize the robber. The Court disregarded the evidence of PW1 that though there was no light in the town on the night of the incident, but she had a lantern with her which enabled her to see the robbers. Although she said that she was ordered to turn the lantern down, at least, they had entered the room before ordering her to turn the lantern down, so she would have been able to recognize a person she knew long before then. Besides this, the robbers had a torch light. If the robbers were able to see and rob in an unfamiliar room with a torch light then it is the view here that the witness was also able as she said to identify the appellant whom she knew before then. The Court should have directed their consideration to the fact that there was both lantern and torch light being used by the robbers. It is totally different from a case where there was no light to see or recognize any thing.
Niki Tobi JSC in his dissenting judgment well appreciated the situation when he observed:
Whether the light was generated by electricity or by lantern is, with respect, neither here nor there. What is in evidence is that there was enough light (whether electricity or lantern) to enable PW1 to identify the appellant. The rest of the evidence, I repeat, is unnecessary hair splitting. It should have been different if PW1 gave evidence that there was darkness when the robbery took place. In such a situation, issue of identification should have been difficult. But that was not the issue. Whether it is electricity or lantern, there was light. In most villages, people use lantern and it cannot be said that lantern cannot be used to identify person or persons.
Furthermore, there was also no evidence that she was ordered to lie on the floor, which would have impeded her ability to observe the robbers.
Other pertinent issues arising from the ratio above, which deserve discussion include:
- Inability to immediately gain consciousness and recognize things around due to sudden and forceful wake.
- Prior knowledge of the suspect and prompt recognition of same
- Suspect’s false and belated Alibi
- Conviction on the evidence of a single witness.
This review proceeds it’s discuss from these grounds and more.
- Inability to gain consciousness after waking up by force
One of the reasons given by the court is that waking up by force at that time of the night, one would not immediately gain consciousness and as such one’s ability to be able to recognise things around one would be considerably reduced. It is respectfully submitted that this consideration is purely subjective.
Drowsiness, known medically as hypersomnolence is the symptom of the inability to sustain a wakeful state. It can be a sign of impaired sleep; sleep deprivation; obstructive sleep apnea; intoxication with alcohol or sedative drugs; metabolic abnormalities such as hypothyroidism or adrenal gland dysfunction. It is common knowledge that people’s level of alertness and sleep pattern differ considerably depending on a lot of factors. Not everybody is given to very deep and heavy sleeping. It is also a known fact that people’s level of alertness on waking up differ in degree. Besides this, the time it took the robbers to search for and cart away the property of the witness was enough for any body given to heavy drowsiness to come fully wake from her drowsy state. The Court ought to have considered this fact and not draw the hasty conclusion on such a subjective issue and come to a decision that having waken up by force at that time of the night, one would not immediately gain consciousness and as such one’s ability to be able to recognise things around one would be considerably reduced.
- Prior Knowledge of the Suspect and Prompt Recognition of Same
Identification evidence is evidence which tends to show that the person charged with an offence is the same person who was seen committing the offence. The Supreme Court in Archibong v. State defined identification to mean a whole series of facts and circumstances for which a witness [or witnesses] associates an accused person with the commission of the offence charged. It may consist of or include evidence in the form of finger prints, hand writing, voice, identification parade, photographs identity, or the recollection of the features of the culprit by a witness who saw him in the act of commission of the crime or a combination of two or more of these.
It is trite as established in R. v. Turnbull that recognition may be more reliable than identification of a stranger; but even when the witness is purporting to recognise someone whom he knows, the jury should be reminded that mistakes in recognition of close relatives and friends are sometimes made. In Afolalu v. State, where there was evidence that the eye witness knew the appellant before the incident and that on the morning after the robbery incident, she went to look for him at the same place where she used to see him and he was there and she invited the police to arrest him. The Court of Appeal held that the witness made a positive and unequivocal identification of the appellant.
In Ndidi’s case under discussion, the PW1 also said in her testimony: At day break, I raised alarm, and our community member came around, he reported the matter to the police. I told the police that I saw the accused person. I made a statement to the police at Abavo. It is established that where the accused is well known to the victim, and is not identified by the said victim at the earliest opportunity, such delay in identifying the accused person makes the evidence of identification suspect and reduces the truth of the evidence below an acceptable and probative level. In the instant case, the witness did not delay in mentioning the appellant as the person she saw. In Archibong v. State, the appellant conceded that both PW2 and PW3 were known to him before the date of the incident in question. So the identification of the appellant by PW2 and PW3 who knew the appellant as their regular customer and as the person who went into the room with the deceased on that day could hardly be a mistaken identity. In considering the duty of the court where the accused challenges the correctness of his identification, the Supreme Court in Ukpabi v. State, Per Uwaifo J.S.C., asserted:
Whenever the case against an accused person depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of his identification, and he alleges that the identification was mistaken, the court must closely examine the evidence. In acting on it, it must view it with caution, so that any real weakness discovered about it must lead to giving the accused the benefit of the doubt. The principle however, is more appropriate in circumstances where an identification parade was considered necessary and had been conducted. In the instant case, there was no question of a formal identification parade. It was not necessary. What happened was that PW2 recognized one of those who robbed him while the matter was still fresh in his mind and incidentally, the man [appellant] was still in the neighborhood and within easy reach as it were.
The Supreme Court in Ukpabi’s case, which has similar attributes with the case of Ndidi v. State, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the concurrent findings of the Courts below. Just like in Ukpabi’s case, P.W.1 in Ndidi’s case, recognized the appellant and promptly identified him. In Ani v. State, the Supreme Court held that where an eye witness omitted to mention at the earliest opportunity the name or names of the person or persons whom he allegedly saw committing an offence, a court must be careful in accepting his evidence given later and implicating the person or persons charged, unless a satisfactory explanation is given. The Court went further to state in Ani’s case that:
the failure of the complainant such as PWI in the instant case, to mention the name or names of the accused person or suspects to the police at the earliest opportunity, gives the impression that at the time he was making the complaint, he did not know the person or persons who committed the alleged offence….
The case of Ndidi is certainly different from Ani because in Ndidi’s case, no time was lost between when the offence was committed and when PW1 raised an alarm. There was a clear instinctive spontaneity on the part of PW1 as she acted quickly to a situation of harm and grief.
- Suspect’s False and Belated Alibi
The false and belated alibi raised by the appellant supports the identification evidence. Time is of essence in a defence of alibi. An accused relying on an alibi has a duty to let the police know at the earliest opportunity where and with whom he was at the material time. The duty of an accused relying on an alibi does not end here. He is also duty-bound to give the police, at the earliest opportunity, some tangible and useful information relating to the place he was at the time. This will enable the prosecution investigate the truth of the Alibi and call evidence, if necessary in rebuttal. Failure of an accused to raise the defence at the earliest opportunity would be tantamount to an after thought. In this case, the appellant only raised a defence of alibi for the first time during the trial. This is very belated and an after thought which goes to no issue. Perhaps this is why the appellant did not dwell on it at the appeal. There was no opportunity for the police to investigate the alibi which was raised only at the trial. However the falsehood in the alibi was proved by the fact that the appellant himself admitted that he was arrested by his mother and blood relations. If members of the same house where he claimed that he slept at the material night were the ones that arrested him, then he was simply making up a defence. The Supreme Court noted that the trial judge reviewed the evidence in support of alibi as presented by the appellant and rejected same. The Supreme Court ought to have considered the effect of this evidence on the truth or falsehood of the appellant’s evidence, vis-à-vis the recognition by PW1. Equally unusual is the fact that someone’s own mother was the one that arrested him. This goes to prove his very bad character. Odd coincidences can, if unexplained, be supporting evidence.
Lord Widgery CJ of the English Court of Appeal Criminal Division, in his judgment in R. v. Thurnbull, observed:
The trial judge should identify to the jury the evidence which he adjudges is capable of supporting the evidence of identification. If there is any evidence or circumstances which the jury might think was supporting when it did not have this quality, the judge should say so. A jury, for example, might think that support for identification evidence could be found in the fact that the accused had not given evidence before them. An accused’s absence from the witness box cannot provide evidence of anything and the judge should tell the jury so. But he would be entitled to tell them that when assessing the quality of the identification evidence they could take into consideration the fact that it was uncontradicted by any evidence coming from the accused himself.
In Ndidi’s case, there were other evidence sufficient to support the identification evidence. The court in R v. Long established that the Jury should be told that proving the defendant a liar about where he was at the material time does not per se prove he was committing the offence. However, if the Jury is satisfied that the sole reason for the false alibi was to deceive them, then that false alibi can provide support for identification. In R. v. Long, the accused, who was charged with robbery, had been identified by three witnesses in different places on different occasions but each had only a momentary opportunity for observation. Immediately after the robbery the accused had left his home and could not be found by the police. When later he was seen by them he claimed to know who had done the robbery and offered to help to find the robbers. At his trial he put forward an alibi which the jury rejected. It was an odd coincidence that the witnesses should have all identified a man who had behaved in this Way. The Court concluded in their judgment that odd coincidences can, if unexplained, be supporting evidence. By application, odd coincidences of the false alibi of the appellant and his arrest by the members of his family who were in the house he claimed to have slept on the night of the robbery and the recognition by PW1 were enough supporting evidence to ground the appellants conviction.
In Aiguoreghian v. State the Supreme Court held that where an accused person raises a defence of alibi and it is not investigated, he can still be convicted if there is stronger and credible evidence before the court which falsifies the alibi. In Bolanle v. State the Court of Appeal held inter alia that the various activities of the robbers on the night of the incidence with the electricity on and the identification of the appellant at the parade by all the victims of the robbery as the leader of the gang showed extensively the certainty of those involved, and more so, when the appellant could not shake the testimonies of the witnesses of his identity under cross examination.
- Court Convicting on the Evidence of a Single Witness
The appellant in his brief of argument while urging the court to quash the sentence, submitted that the conviction and sentence handed down to him were based solely on the evidence of PW1. It is trite law that where identification evidence is poor, the trial court is to return a verdict of not guilty unless there is other evidence which goes to support the correctness of the identification. It has also been established that where there is no dispute as to the identification of an accused person by a witness, there is no reason why his evidence alone, if believed, cannot ground or sustain a conviction. It was held in Idiok v. State that a court is perfectly entitled to convict on the evidence of one witness if his evidence is credible, admissible and it is believed and accepted by the trial court. In fact, a lone witness if believed, can establish the usually contentious issue as to who killed the deceased in a murder case. The court stated:
where a person is seen by a witness tying up a human being with climbing ropes and later it turns out that the person tied met a violent death with multiple injuries or wounds, one does not need a witch doctor or prophet to know that the person who tied up the deceased is involved and connected with the death of the deceased. It is from this view point that I come to the conclusion that the evidence of PW4 leads to the guilt of the accused person and it leaves no degree of possibility that other persons could have been responsible for the commission of the offence
Hon. Justice Niki Tobi JSC, opined that the appellant could be convicted on the evidence of PW1 alone. He stated:
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned trial Judge was wrong in convicting on the only evidence of PW1. I do not know of any law which foists on the prosecution to call a village or community of witnesses in a criminal case. All I know is that an accused person cannot be convicted on the evidence of a single witness where the offence requires corroboration. The one in this appeal is not one of them…. I must say that the best evidence is one given by an eye witness.PW1 was not only an eye witness; she suffered it all as a victim. In my humble view, her evidence did not require corroboration.
Furthermore, where the witness was as in the instant case, not shaken under cross-examination, nothing stops the trial court from relying on such identification and convicting the accused on it.
The Supreme Court does not normally interfere with concurrent findings of fact of the High Court and the Court of Appeal unless reasons justify such interference. That is where there is a miscarriage of justice arising from a violation of some principles of law or procedure, or if the findings are perverse. In the instant case, the concurrent findings of fact were not in any way a miscarriage of justice or perverse. Considering the circumstances of the case and the evidence before the Court, there was no compelling reason why a Court of high esteem like the Supreme Court should not have upheld the concurrent findings of the courts below, taking into account the recognition of the suspect and other relevant issues discussed in this review.
ª Ag. Head, Centre for Conflict and Dispute Resolution, Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos. E. Mail:
  17 NWLR [Pt. 953] 17 CA; S.C. 128/2005 [Judgment delivered on Friday, the 11th day of May, 2007].
  3 WLR 445,  Q.B. 224.
 Supra note 1.
 See Akinola Aguda, The Law of Evidence in Nigeria,2nd ed [London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1974], pp. 13-14.See
also, Igabele v. State  6 NWLR [Pt. 975] 100.
 See Richardson, Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice, [London: Thompson, Sweet & Maxwell,
2008] p. 1505
  Q.B. 224
 Supra note 1.
 Supra note 2.
 Supra note 1
 Hon. Justice Niki Tobi JSC gave a dissenting judgement.
 Supra note 2
 Ibid, p. 9
 Supra note 2.
 Ibid p. 26.
 P. 9 of the Judgment delivered on Friday, the 11th day of May, 2007
 Pius Aderemi JSC
 Afolalu v. State,  3 NWLR [Pt. 1127] 160.
  14 NWLR [Pt. 1000] 349.
 Supra note 2
  3 NWLR [Pt. 1127] 160.
 See p. 27, ibid.
 Ani v. State  16 NWLR [Pt. 1168] 443
 Abudu v. State  1 NWLR [Pt. 1] 55.
 Supra note 22
 Supra, p. 372. See Adeyemi v. State  1 NWLR [Pt. 170] 679.
  11 NWLR [Pt. 884] 439.
Supra note 26.
 Per Ogbuage JSC at pp. 465-466.
 See Niki Tobi JSC supra
 Udo Akpan v. State  3 NWLR, [Pt. 27], p. 258.
 Kabiru v. A-G Ogun State  5 NWLR [Pt. 1134] 209.
 Chinyere Chukwu, “Legal Pre-Requisites for the Defence of Alibi”, in  Vol 7, No 5[Justice Journal, FMOJ
Lagos], pp. 88-89
 57 Cr. App. R 871.
  3 NWLR [Pt.860] 367.
 Yanor v. State  NMLR 337; Nwosisi v. State  6 SC 109 and Okosun v. A-G Bendel State 
3 NWLR [Pt. 12] 283.
  7 NWLR [Pt. 925] 431.
 See Aladu v. State  8 NWLR [Pt. 563] 618; Igbi v. State  3 NWLR [Pt. 648] 169; Ifejirika v.
State  3 NWLR [Pt. 593] 59.
 Archibong v. State supra note 22
 Bolanle v. State supra note 41
  12 NWLR [Pt. 993] 1.
 See also State v. Igbo  5 SC; Ali v. State  1 NWLR [Pt. 68] 1; State v. Ajie  11 NWLR [Pt. 678] 434.
 Per Omokri J.C.A. at p. 29.
 Supra pp. 10-11
 Ibrahim v. State  4 NWLR [Pt. 186]399; Okosi v. State  1 NWLR [Pt. 100] 642; Ikemson v.
State,  3 NWLR [Pt. 110] 455.
 Ugwumba v. State  5 NWLR [Pt. 296] 660; Effia v. State  8 NWLR [Pt. 613]1.