CORAM

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JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY        JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEAL

S BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL    JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEAL

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PARTIES

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1.    TANIMU MOH’D DANLELE

2.    PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

APPELLANTS 

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RESPONDENTS 

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AREA(S) OF LAW

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ELECTION LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, JUDICIAL PRECEDENT, TIMELINE FOR FILING ELECTION PETITIONS, COMPUTATION OF TIME

 

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SUMMARY OF FACTS

Tanimu Moh’d Danlele (1st Appellant) was the candidate of the Peoples Democratic Movement (2nd Appellant) in the election for Member representing Wukari II Constituency of the Taraba State House of Assembly conducted by INEC (3rd Respondent) on April 11, 2015. Josiah John Aji (1st Respondent) contested for the same seat on the platform of the Peoples Democratic Party (2nd Respondent).

On April 12, 2015, the 1st Respondent was declared the winner of the election and returned as the elected Member. Dissatisfied with this declaration, the Appellants filed a Petition on May 3, 2015, before the National and State Houses of Assembly Election Tribunal of Taraba State.

During the hearing, after the Petitioners had called 4 witnesses and the 1st Respondent had also called 4 witnesses, the 2nd Respondent filed a motion seeking to dismiss/strike out the Petition on grounds that it was filed out of time, contrary to Section 285(5) of the 1999 Constitution.

In its Ruling delivered on September 19, 2015, the Tribunal struck out the Petition as incompetent, holding that it was filed outside the 21-day period prescribed by Section 285(5) of the Constitution. The Tribunal calculated the 21 days from April 12, 2015 (the date of declaration of results) and determined that the last day for filing was May 2, 2015, making the Petition filed on May 3, 2015 out of time.

Aggrieved by this decision, the Appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

 

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HELD

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1. The appeal was allowed.

2. The Court of Appeal held that Section 285(5) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which provides that an election petition shall be filed “within 21 days after the date of the declaration of the result of the election,” expressly excludes the date of declaration of results from the computation of the 21 days.

3. The Court held that the Tribunal erred in including the date of declaration of results (April 12, 2015) in computing the 21-day period.

4. The Court found that by the correct computation, excluding April 12, 2015, the 21-day period would end on May 3, 2015, making the Petition filed on May 3, 2015 timely and competent.

5. The Court set aside the ruling of the Tribunal and ordered that the Petition be restored to the Tribunal’s Cause List for expeditious hearing and determination on the merits.

6. The Court awarded costs of N50,000 to the Appellants against the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

 

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ISSUES

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Whether the learned Judges of the trial Tribunal were right in law to have construed the time within which to file election petitions prescribed in Section 285(5) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) to be inclusive of the date of the declaration of the results of the election?

 

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RATIONES DECIDENDI

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INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 285(5) OF THE CONSTITUTION – MEANING OF “AFTER THE DATE”

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Section 285(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) provides as follows: ‘(5) An election petition shall be filed within 21 days after the date of the declaration of result of the election.’ (Emphasis supplied) This constitutional provision is a marked departure from the provision of Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 which had provided thus: ‘An election petition under this Act shall be presented within 30 days from the date the result of the election is declared.’ (Emphasis supplied) Whereas the extant Constitutional provision expressly states that the petition should be filed ‘within 21 days after the date…,’ the previous Act provided that a petition should be filed ‘within 30 days from the date…’ of the declaration of the result. The operative words here are ‘after’ and ‘from’. – Per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA

 

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MEANING OF “AFTER” IN SECTION 285(5) – LINGUISTIC INTERPRETATION

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The Oxford Advanced Learners’ Dictionary 7th Edition defines the word ‘after’ as ‘following something in time’; while it defines the word ‘from’ as ‘when something starts’. Therefore, there is a clear distinction in the meaning and use of the two words ‘after’ and ‘from’ whenever used in an enactment. The words of this provision are so clear and unambiguous that no external aids are necessary for its interpretation. The introduction of the word ‘after’ into Section 285(5) of the Constitution (as amended) clearly introduced a new dimension with regard to the time for the filing of an election petition.” – Per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA

 

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LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION – APPLICATION TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

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The underlying principle in the interpretation of a statute is that the meaning of the statute or legislation must be collected from the plain and unambiguous expressions or words used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained as to what is just and expedient… The literal construction must be followed unless this would lead to absurdity and inconsistency with the provisions of the statute as a whole… This is because it is the duty of the Judge to construe the words of a statute and give those words their appropriate meaning and effect… It is certainly not the duty of a Judge to interpret a statute to avoid its consequences…- Per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA (quoting Niki Tobi, JSC in Ugwu v. Ararume (2007) LPELR 3329 (SC) 30-32)

 

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APPLICABILITY OF PRECEDENT – NEED FOR SIMILAR FACTS

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The doctrine of judicial precedent postulates that where the facts in a subsequent case are similar or close as the facts in an earlier case that had been decided, judicial pronouncements in the earlier case are subsequently utilized to govern and determine the decision in the subsequent case. The doctrine recognizes that decisions of courts draw their inspiration and strength from the facts which framed the issues for decision, and once such decisions are made, they control future judgments in like or similar cases. Hence, the facts of two cases must be the same or at least similar before a decision in the earlier case can be used in a later case. – Per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA

 

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DISTINGUISHING PRECEDENTS – WHEN FACTS ARE DISSIMILAR

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I am therefore, with due deference, of the humble view that the facts and circumstances of the two cases cited and relied upon by the Tribunal in arriving at its decision, as well as the cases relied upon by learned Counsel for the Respondents in their Briefs of argument, are completely different and dissimilar from those of the instant case like chalk and cheese. The authorities are therefore both inapt and inapplicable to this case. – Per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA

 

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COMPUTATION OF TIME FOR FILING ELECTION PETITIONS – EXCLUSION OF DATE OF DECLARATION

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In the case of Dariye V PDP (supra) relied upon by the lower Tribunal in arriving at its decision now appealed against, the issue before the Court was the interpretation of Paragraph 12 of the Election Tribunal and Court Practice Directions, 2011… In the case of PDP V Danlele (supra), what was under consideration was the computation of time for the filing of the Respondent’s Brief of Argument after having been served the Appellant’s Brief… Clearly, the provision of Section 285(5) of the 1999 Constitution was never directly up for consideration and interpretation before that Court, and so the erudite pronouncement of the Court cannot, regardless of the facts and circumstances, be imputed to this constitutional provision which is, without a doubt, differently worded from Paragraph 6 of the Practice Directions. – Per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA

 

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INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 285(5) – EXCLUSION OF DATE OF DECLARATION

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The plain and natural meaning of the word ‘after’ in Section 285(5) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) admits of no ambiguity. It simply means that the 21 days within which an election petition shall be filed shall begin to run after the date of the declaration of the results of the election. It is obviously the manifest intention of the legislature to exclude the date of the declaration of the result in computing the 21 days within which a person may present a petition by the use of the word ‘after’.” – Per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA (quoting Ekpe, JCA in Dariye v. PDP)

 

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INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE – DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS POSITION

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It was also an innovation introduced by the Legislature to correct the mischief perceived in Section 133(3) of the Electoral Act, 2002 and Section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006 which had previously been rightly and fittingly interpreted by Courts to include the date of the declaration of the result. By the deliberate utilisation of the words ‘within 21 days after the date of the declaration of the result…’ and not ‘within 21 days from the date the result is declared’, it is self-evident that the spirit behind the law is that there should be a marked departure from the previous position in which the actual date on which the result is declared is counted in the computation of time for the presentation/filing of an election petition.” – Per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA

 

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ACTUAL COMPUTATION OF TIME IN THE PRESENT CASE

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From the facts on Record, it is not in dispute that the results of the election being contested by the Appellants were declared on 12-04-15, while the Petition was filed on 03-05-15. This is common ground between all the parties to this Appeal as well as a fact accepted by the Tribunal, and therefore it is unnecessary to dissipate any energy in that direction. The only issue in controversy is whether time should be computed from the actual date of the declaration of the result, which is 12-04-15, or it should be computed from the date after the declaration of the result, which is 13-04-15.” – Per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA

 

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RATIO DECIDENDI – WHAT CONSTITUTES BINDING PRECEDENT

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The ratio decidendi of a case is the reason for the decision, the principle of the decision. A court lower in the judicial hierarchy is bound by the ratio decidendi of a higher court not necessarily the obiter dictum. That seems to be the first rule designed, no doubt, to ensure uniformity in decision-making, foster stability, and enhance the development of a consistent and coherent body of law as well as assure equality of treatments for litigants similarly situated – Eperekun V University of Lagos (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 34) 162 at p. 193.” – Per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA (quoting Oputa, JSC in Clement v. Iwuanyanwu (1989) LPELR-SC.137/1988)

 

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DUTY OF THE COURT IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

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Courts of law in their constitutional role of arbitration and interpretation of the law are required to faithfully interpret and apply the law as it is and not as it ought to be. Thus, courts have no business reading into the Law what is not there, or else they would be in danger of usurping the role of the Legislature in a democratic dispensation where the separation of powers is a cardinal pillar.” – Per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA

 

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GRAMMATICAL APPROACH TO INTERPRETATION

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One of the cardinal rules of construction of written instrument must in general be taken in their ordinary sense notwithstanding the fact that any such construction may not appear to carry out the purpose which it might otherwise be supposed was intended by the maker or makers of the instrument. The rule is that in all written instruments the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words should be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument; the instrument has to be construed according to its literal import unless again there is something else in the contest which shows that such a course would tend to derogate from the exact meaning of the words. – Per SAIDU TANKO HUSAINI, JCA (quoting Idigbe, JCA in Obianwuna Ogbunyiya v. Obi Okudo & Ors (1979) 6-9 SC 24)

 

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HIERARCHICAL ASPECT OF STARE DECISIS – LIMITS TO BINDING NATURE

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In law the facts of each case are sacrosanct. Thus, a judgment of the Court should be read carefully and discerned in the light of the facts on which the case was decided. It is only after a careful appreciation of the facts and decisions in a case that it would be determined whether it is apposite and binding on the lower Court or inappropriate and inapplicable and thus not binding within the principle of the rules of stare decisis. The law is thus well settled, beyond peradventure, that the principles of stare decisis do not allow Courts to apply the ratio of a case across board with little regard to the facts of the case before them as was erroneously done by the Lower Tribunal in the instant appeal.- Per BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, JCA

 

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CASES CITED

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STATUTES REFERRED TO

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