“In the case of Amaechi vs. Governor of Rivers State & Ors (2017) LPELR-43065 (CA), the Court held: “The law is well settled that, a person will be a proper and necessary party when his or her joinder as a party to the action will enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the action. Therefore, the interest of the Appellant can not be said to be oblique in the instant matter, rather, his interest is directly in issue in ensuring that justice is done in the subject-matters of the inquiry to be conducted by the 3rd Respondent. This is our firm view and we so hold. See the cases of: (1) Green v. Green (1987) NSCC P. 115; (2) Ede v. Nwidenyi (1988)12 S.C. (Pt.3) p.12 and (3) Carrena v. Akinlase (2008)14 NWLR (Pt.1107) p.262.” Per OMOLEYE ,J.C.A ( Pp. 97-98, paras. E-C ).

“The case of Global West Vessel Specialist (Nig) Ltd vs. Nigeria NLG Ltd & Anor (2017) LPELR-41987 (SC) also presents another view of who is a proper/necessary party to a suit. Who is a proper/necessary party to a suit, was thus defined in that case: “It has long been held that proper parties are those who though not interested in the plaintiff’s claim, are made parties for some good reasons, for example, in an action instituted to rescind a contract, any person who was active or concurring in the matters which gave the plaintiff the right to rescind, is a proper party to the action. Necessary parties are those who are not only interested in the subject matter of the proceedings but also who in their absence, the proceeding could not be fairly dealt with. In other words, the question to be settled in the action between the existing parties must be a question which cannot be properly settled unless they are parties to the action instituted by the plaintiff. See Chief Abusi David Green v. Chief (DR) E. T. Dublin Green (1987) NWLR (pt. 61) 481 (1987) LPELR SC206/1986; Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Cons (1956) 1 WB 357; Re Vandervills Trust (1971) A.C. 812; Re Vandervelle (1969) 3 All ER 497.” Per ARIWOOLA ,J.S.C ( Pp. 31-32, paras. D-B ). See also T. Delak Distribution Service Ltd & Anor vs. Ugbowanko (2018) LPELR-46480 (CA), per Garba, JCA (Pp. 28 – 29, paras F – C)”.

The definition of who is a privy in the case of Agbogunleri vs. DEPO & Ors (2008) LPELR-243 (SC) is apt. In the said case, the Supreme Court defined privy thus: “But, who is a privy. In Arabio v. Kanga (1932) 1 WACA 253 at p. 254, a privy was defined as that person whose title is derived from and who claims through a party. It may also imply identity of successive interest or persons having interest in property.” Per MUHAMMAD ,J.S.C (P. 23, paras. C-D). See also the case of Makami vs. Umaru (2013) LPELR-20799 (CA), Pp. 12 – 13, paras G – B.

“In the case of Dorsu & Ors vs. Eyegbangharen & Ors (2019) LPELR-48300 (CA), the Court held: “it is settled law that estoppel per rem judicatem is usually pleaded as a defence. And where a plaintiff fails to file a reply in respect of a plea of estoppel per rem judicata, the failure is treated as a denial of the previous suit or suits pleaded. See Potter v. Haruna Bako Kolo (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt. 317) 254 and Alhaji Madi Mohammed Abubakar v. Bebeji Oil and Allied Products Ltd (supra). In the case of Clay Industries (Nig.) Ltd. V. Adeleye Aina & Ors. (1997) 7 SCNJ491 at 509, Per Iguh, JSC, the Supreme Court stated the law in respect of estoppel succinctly as follows:- “It is a general principle of law that estoppel must be pleaded before the trial Court .” See also the cases of Obanye v. Okwunwa (1930) 10 NLR 8; Sowa v. Amachree (1944) 10 WACA 164.” Per ADUMEIN, JCA (Pp. 17 – 18, paras. F –D ). Having not pleaded estoppel, same cannot avail the Appellant.

Let me adopt the definition of abuse of Court process as given in the case of Ahmed Saka vs. Mr. Pelumi Adeboye & Anor (2009) LPELR-4920 (CA) where Bage, JCA (as then was) defined what constitutes abuse of Court process thus: “On the meaning and connotation of abuse of Court process, this Court in the case of Pam V. A.N.P.P. (2008) 4 NWLR (pt. 1077) 219 at 231 Ratio 16 provides thus:- Abuse of Court process consist of the intention, purpose and aim of the person exercising the right to harass, irritate and annoy the adversary and interfere with the administration of justice, such as instituting actions between the same parties simultaneously in different courts even though on different grounds. An abuse of Court process may lie in both a proper and improper use of judicial process in litigation. The employment of judicial process is only regarded generally as an abuse when a party improperly uses the issue of the judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent and the efficient and effective administration of justice, this will arise in instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same matter between the same parties even where there exists a right to institute an action is regarded as an abuse. The abuse lies in the multiplicity and manner of the exercise of the right parse. See :- Shell Trustees (Nig.) Ltd. V. Imani & Sons Ltd (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 662) 139 at 660; Okorodudu V. Okorodudu (1977) 3 SC 21; Oyebola V. Esso West Africa Inc. (1966) 2 SCNLR 35; Saraki V. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156.” Per BAGE, JCA (Pp. 20 -21, paras. D – E).