Legalpedia Citation: (2023-07) Legalpedia 99618 (SC)

In the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Fri Feb 24, 2023

Suit Number: SC.359/2017

CORAM

Uwani Musa Abba Aji JSC

Mohammed Lawal Garba JSC

PARTIES

SIFAX NIGERIA LIMITED

APPELLANTS

PHOENIX CAPITAL LIMITED & ANOR

RESPONDENTS

AREA(S) OF LAW

APPEAL, LAW OF TORTS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

SUMMARY OF FACTS

The Appellant and other parties not on the record were involved in business transactions which became the subject matter of a law suit. The 1st Respondent was not a party to that suit at the Federal High Court in suit no. FHC/L/CS/664/2006. That suit was a purely contractual suit in which ownership of the bid for Terminal “C” was in issue and was decided on 30/1/2007 by TIJJANI ABUBAKAR J (as he then was). The same parties with the same cause of action came to the Court of Appeal No. CA/L/843/2013, and at that time Hon. Justice Tijjani Abubakar had been elevated to the Court of Appeal. When the appeal came up before a panel of which he was a member, Hon Justice Tijjani Abubakar, JCA informed his co-panelists of the fact that he had decided the case at the Federal High Court. The presiding justice then stated in the record of proceedings that the case would consequently be sent back for assignment to another panel.

After the judgment of the Federal High Court was delivered on 30/1/2007, the 2nd Respondent published in the Business Vanguard section of its Vanguard Newspaper of 25th January, 2007 at page 25 a statement credited to the Appellant’s Head of Corporate Affairs and Marketing, Dr. Phil Ofulue, which has been found by the two lower Courts to be defamatory of the 1st Respondent. He took out a summons against the Appellant and the publisher at the High Court of Lagos State for defamation on 11/5/2007. That Suit No. LD/588/2007 was decided on 28/5/2010. The trial court held in favour of the claimant and awarded damages while dismissing the counter claim of the appellant. Dissatisfied, the appellant went to the court of appeal where Hon. Justice Tijjani Abubakar was part of the panel and the decision of the trial court was upheld. Still aggrieved, the instant appeal was made

HELD

Appeal Dismissed

ISSUES

Ø Whether from the facts of this case, the Court below was properly constituted to guarantee fair hearing to the parties.

Ø Whether the Appellant showed that any miscarriage of justice was caused by the failure of the trial Court to deliver its judgment outside the 90 days constitutional provision to warrant a nullification of the judgment.

Ø Whether given the facts of this case, the Court bellow was right in affirming the judgment of the trial Court.

 

RATIONES DECIDENDI

PILLARS OF NATURAL JUSTICE – THE TWO PILLARS OF NATURAL JUSTICE

The twin pillars of natural justice and fair hearing are: Audi alteram partem – you must hear both sides; and Nemo judex in causa sua – You must not be a judge in your own cause. – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

JURISDICTION – THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION CAN BE RAISED WITHOUT LEAVE DEPENDING ON FACTS

However, the issue of fair hearing or its lack thereof is one of jurisdiction and can be raised before this Court for the first time without leave depending on the facts of the case. – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

RECUSAL – MEANING OF RECUSAL

Recusal, with respect to judicial proceedings, is the stepping aside or disqualification of a judicial officer from a case on the ground of personal interest in the matter, bias, prejudice, or conflict of interest, or if he has conducted himself in such a way that he could be regarded as having become, directly or indirectly, a party to the proceedings. – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

RECUSAL – WHEN THE APPLICATION FOR RECUSAL SHOULD BE BROUGHT

I agree with the learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent that the application for the recusal should have been brought before the judge sought to be recused.

It is improper (which seems to be the norm in this jurisdiction) that a petition should be written against the judex to higher authorities to trigger a recusal. A motion on Notice should be filed with relevant reasons and facts before the Court or an Oral Application to the Court can be made to initiate a recusal of the judex.

It is after notice has been given of the anxiety by one of the parties that there may be likelihood of bias in the course of the proceedings, and the application is refused by the Court that it automatically becomes a ground of appeal. – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

BIAS – THREE CATEGORIES OF BIAS – COMPETENCE OF COURT

Bias can be of three categories:

“a) Pecuniary bias as exhibited by a member of the Tribunal or Court having a pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the dispute.

1. b) Personal bias shown in the existence of close relationship between a member of the Tribunal or Court and one of the parties to the dispute; and

1. c) Official bias shown in an abnormal desire or inclination to pursue a pre-determined line of action which would prevent an impartial adjudication of the dispute between the parties.” See ADEBESIN v. STATE (2014) 9 NWLR Pt.1413 Pg. 609 at 635 – 636 paras. G – C. In MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (1962) 1 ALL NLR 587, (1962) 2 SCNLR 341, this Court held thus:

“A Court is competent when:

1) It is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench and no member is disqualified for one reason or the other.

2) The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and

3) The case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.” – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

FAIR HEARING – CONDUCT OF COURTS WHEN VIOLENCE IS DONE TO PILLARS OF NATURAL JUSTICE WHICH ENSURE FAIR HEARING

Where violence is done to any of the twin pillars of natural justice which ensures fair hearing, the Court or an Appellate Court is obliged to declare the proceedings a nullity. See DASUKI (Rtd) v. FRN (2021) 9 NWLR Pt. 1781 Pg. 249 at 272, SOKOTO STATE GOVT. v. KAMDEX (2007) 7 NWLR Pt. 1034 Pg. 466 at 495. – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC

 

BIAS – TEST TO BE APPLIED TO ASCERTAIN/DISPROVE BIAS

In THE SECRETARY, IWO CENTRAL LG. v. ADIO (2000) 8 NWLR (PT. 667) 115 at 135 G, this Court on the meaning of likelihood of bias stated thus:

“It means, in my respectful view, a substantial possibility of bias and the test to be applied is based on the apprehension of a reasonable man who is in full knowledge of the facts or circumstances and not that of a capricious and unreasonable man… Also, in a case where bias is being alleged against a Court or judge, it is not the real likelihood that the Court or judge could or did favour one side at the expense of the other that is important, it is that any person looking at what the Court or judge has done, will have the impression in the circumstance of the case, that there was real likelihood of bias.”

In ONIGBEDE v. BALOGUN (2002) 6 NWLR Pt. 762 Pg.1, this Court referred to ADEFULU v. OKULAJA (1998) 5 NWLR Pt. 550 Pg. 435 and opined that there must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or as the case may be, would, or did favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other. The Court will not inquire whether he did, in fact, favour one side fairly. This Court went further to say that a Judge would be precluded from hearing a case when:

“1. He has personal interest and would seem to be a Judge in his own matter; or

2. Having dealt with the same issue and it comes or resurfaces when he is in a superior Court and is being called upon to decide an appeal against his own decision; or

3. Because of some obvious or latent connection of his with either of the parties or all of them, it will not be conscionable of him to participate in hearing the case; or

4. Generally, his being a member of the Tribunal would not appear to be in the interest of justice as he will not be seen to do justice.”

​However, the rule against bias must take cognizance of certain circumstances:

“a. The duty of the judges to sit and decide cases before them.

1. It is assumed that judges are able to administer justice without fear or favour and capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.

1. It is reasonably expected that the judicial officer would, in suitable cases only, recuse himself when the application is brought before him or on his own motion.

1. In all cases of automatic disqualification or of reasonable apprehension of bias, there must be a link, direct or indirect, between the judicial officer and one of the parties to the litigation.

1. Where the circumstances are too remote to give rise to apprehension of bias, it should not be raised.” – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

JUSTICE – FOR A TRIAL TO QUALIFY AS JUSTICE

My Lords, to qualify as justice, a trial must include hearing and the hearing must be impartial, dispassionate (independent), just, non-discriminatory, open-minded, evenhanded, fair-minded, reasonable and rational. These are the import of the provision of fair hearing in Section 36 CFRN 1999. It is the longest section under the fundamental human rights. The grundnorm thus takes it seriously.

On the whole, justice is not just about the result of a trial, but the validity thereof is dependent on the fairness of the process of hearing. – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

UNFAIRNESS OF A TRIAL – UNFAIRNESS IN A TRIAL IS IN TWO FORMS

Unfairness of a trial is in two forms. The first where party is put at a juridical disadvantage by procedure that fails to ensure fairness; it deprives a party of procedural equality. Then substantive unfairness arises when a judge approaches adjudicative function with a mind closed or a mind influenced by considerations other than the evidence before him; substantive unfairness features bias or real likelihood of bias. In the determination of this issue, a Court will not look at the mind of the judge, but if there is a real likelihood that he could or did favour one side as against the other; re-submission of same case to same judge could lead to bias unless the parties are not the same and the judge is an umpire to determine where balance tilts in preponderance of evidence. CHIEF KENON & ORS v. CHIEF A. TEKAM & ORS (2001) FWLR Pt. 70 Pg. 166 at 1678-9 (SC), KALEJAIYE & ORS v. RT. REV. OGUNDANA (2002) FWLR Pt. 85 Pg. 297 at 314 (C.A), ALAKE & ORS v. DR. ABALAKA (2002) FWLR Pt. 88 Pg. 931 at 945 (CA). – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

FAIR HEARING – FAIR HEARING IS NOT FOR THE INDOLENT

In NEWSWATCH COMMUNICATIONS LTD v. ALHAJI ATTA (2006) 4 SC Pt. ii Pg. 114 at 128-129, Tobi JSC stated that it is the duty of the Court to create an atmosphere or environment for fair hearing of a case, but not the duty of the Court to make sure that a party takes advantage of the atmosphere or environment by involving himself in the fair hearing of the case. Fair hearing was said to be not for the weakling, the slumberer, the indolent or the lazy litigant, but for the party who is alive and kicking in the judicial process by taking advantage of the principle at the appropriate time. See also the similar view of ONNOGHEN JSC in BILL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD. v. IMANI & SONS LTD./SHELL TRUSTEES LTD. (2007) ALL FWLR Pt. 348 pg. 806 at 817 8 S.C. – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

BIAS – THINGS THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER IN DECIDING WHETHER THERE IS A REAL APPREHENSION OR A LIKELIHOOD OF A BIAS

My Lords, in deciding whether there is a real apprehension of bias or whether there can objectively be said to have existed a real likelihood of bias, this Court also ought to take into consideration the fact that the Appellant did not raise this issue at the Court of Appeal but waited until judgment was given in that Court before making an allegation of likelihood of bias an issue in this appeal. It would not be improper to conclude that the Appellant waited to generate an issue for the appeal. The Court also should consider whether any other panel would have arrived at a different decision. In other words, does the allegation of the likelihood of bias stand alone as the only issue that the Appellant have a real argument on, or are there other weighty issues raised in the appeal which could lead to a reasonable conclusion that but for the influence of Hon. Justice Tijjani Abubakar on the panel a differently constituted panel would have reached a different decision on the issues decided at the Court of Appeal?

Of no less importance to note is the fact that the Appellant’s allegation taints the whole panel that decided the appeal at the Court below. When, as in the instant appeal, a party alleges bias against one justice of a panel of justices of the Court, the allegation also connotes that the other members of the panel were so pliable as to be influenced away by the named judge from an objective consideration of the appeal before them. – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

BIAS – BIAS NEEDS TO BE ESTABLISHED ON EXTRA-JUDICIAL FACTORS

In WOMILOJU v. ANIBIRE (2010) 10 NWLR Pt. 1203 Pg. 545 at 561-562 Paras H-E, the Court held as follows:

“For an allegation of judicial bias against the person of a judge to succeed, the accuser must establish his allegation on some extra-judicial factors/reasons such as where such factors or reasons are absent such “perceived”. Judicial bias is insufficient to justify disqualifying a judge from participating in a case which is properly brought before him for adjudication. The allegation cannot be founded on mere conjecture or hearsay.”

In AGWUNA v. ISADINSO (1996) 5 NWLR Pt. 451 Pg. 705 at 719 Tobi JCA (as he then was) deprecated counsel presenting their case and aiming at victory “at the expense of the reputation and integrity of the judge”. According to the learned justice,

“counsel who levels any charge of wrong on a judge can only do so on very clear and unequivocal evidence; not on speculations and conjectures”.

See also AKOH v. ABOH (19880 3 NWLR pt. 85 Pg. 696.

In KENON v. TEKAN (SUPRA), Ayoola JSC tried to conceptualize “a reasonable man”. According to his Lordship, a reasonable man “is not a Barrister who knows the procedural rules” but an ordinary man who after watching the proceedings, comes out with the impression that the judge must have been biased”.

My Lords, a cursory look at other jurisdictions is instructive. In R v. GOUGH (1993) AC 646, P. 670, Lord Goff of Chieveley made it categorical that the test of bias by a judicial officer ought to be

“real danger rather than likelihood, to ensure that the Court is thinking of possibility rather than probability of bias.”

However, Lord Hope of Craighead in PORTER v. MAGILL (2002) 2AC 357, (2002) 1 ALL ER465/(2001) UK HL 67, reviewing all the major authorities on the subject including R v. GOUGH (SUPRA), did adjust Lord Goff’s test by following current judicial thinking in other parts of the Commonwealth and the European Court of Human Rights. In his judgment on this issue which was endorsed by all the other Law Lords of the House of Lords, Lord Hope cited HAUSCHILDIT v. DENMARK (1989) 12 EHRR 266, 279 Para 48 and agreed with the European Court of Human Rights in that case that:

“In considering whether there was a legitimate reason to fear that a judge lacks impartiality, the standpoint of the accused is important but not decisive” and that “what is decisive is whether this fear can be held objectively justified.”

Next, Lord Hope reviewed English authorities and observed the reluctance of English Courts “for obvious reasons” to depart from the test formulated by Lord Goff in R v. GOUGH (SUPRA) and that although the language of the test appeared to differ from other parts of the Commonwealth, yet “in the overwhelming majority of cases the application of the two tests would lead to the same outcome”. Finally, Lord Hope married the two seemingly different tests and came up with an “adjustment” of the test in R v. GOUGH (SUPRA) in the following words, at paragraph 103:

“I respectfully suggest that your Lordships should now approve the modest adjustment of the test in R v. Gough set out in that paragraph. It expresses in clear and simple language a test which is in harmony with the objective test which the strasbourg Court applies when it is considering whether the circumstances give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. It removes any possible conflict with the test which is now applied in most Commonwealth countries and in Scotland. I would however delete from it the reference to “a real danger”. Those words no longer serve a useful purpose here, and they are not used in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. The question is whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.” – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

FAIR HEARING – FAIR HEARING IS DESIGNED FOR BOTH PARTIES – INFLUENCED BY THE FACTS OF THE CASE

As stated earlier, it is always a necessity that there must be evidence linking the judge in question to one of the parties in a way which would objectively raise a likelihood of bias.

In T.M. ORUGBO & ANOR v. BULARA UNA & ORS (2002) FWLR Pt. 127 1024; (2002) 9 SCNJ 12; (2002) 9-10 S.C.61, the Supreme Court stated, that it has become a fashion for litigants to resort to their right to fair hearing on appeal as if it is a magic wand to cure all their inadequacies at the trial Court. But it is not so and it cannot be so. The fair hearing constitutional provision is designed for both parties in the litigation and the interest of fair play and justice. The Courts must not give a burden to the provision which it cannot carry or shoulder.

Fair hearing is not a cut-and-dry principle which parties can, in the abstract, always apply for their comfort and convenience. It is a principle which is based and must be based on the facts of the case before the Court. Only facts of the case can influence and determine the application or applicability of the principle. The principle of fair hearing is helpless, or completely dead outside the facts of the case. The facts of this case as enunciated above do not support the contention of the Appellant. – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

DELAY IN DELIVERING JUDGMENT – THE LENGTH OF AND REASON FOR DELAY IN DELIVERING JUDGMENT MUST BE CONSIDERED

It is not the law, as contended by the Appellant, that the length of the delay outside the Constitutional 90 days is not taken into consideration in determining whether the trial Court lost its impression of the case at the time of judgment; instead, the authorities are consistent that both the length of delay and the reason given by the Court for the delay should be taken into account. See EGBO v. AGBARA (SUPRA).

Consequently, a five-day delay as in the case, and a one month delay cannot weigh the same on the scale of inference. Impressions on human memory are time-factored, although time alone cannot justify the nullification of the judgment except the time delay occasioned a miscarriage of justice. In STATE v. USMAN (2005) 1 NWLR Pt. 906 Pg.80, a delay of eight months from the time the case was set down for judgment was held not enough to earn a nullification of the judgment. In MIKA’ILU v. STATE (SUPRA), a judgment delivered seven months after address was upheld on the ground that the Appellant could not demonstrate that he suffered a miscarriage of justice. – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

LIBEL – DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFF IN A LIBEL SUIT

A plaintiff in a defamation suit needs to quote verbatim only that aspect of the publication that it alleges to be defamatory, and nothing more. If there is anything contained in the publication which would render the quoted part no longer defamatory, it is the duty of the defendant to state so in its defence and supply the missing part. In the instant case, the Appellant has not pointed out anything omitted that would render the quoted part no longer defamatory.

It is the duty of a Plaintiff in a libel action to establish that the words complained of are defamatory. However, where the words complained of are defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning, the Plaintiff has no legal duty to lead any evidence to show additional defamatory meaning as understood by persons possessing some particular facts; he owes no duty to prove that the words are false; it is the defendant who, in pleading justification, must establish the truthfulness of the words. See ILOABACHIE v. ILOABACHIE (2005) 113 NWLR Pt. 943, 695 at P. 734-736. – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

CONCURRENT FINDINGS – CONDUCT OF THE SUPREME COURT WHERE THERE ARE CONCURRENT FINDINGS BY LOWER COURTS

My Lords, in this case, there are concurrent findings of facts and law by the two lower Courts. Unless these judgments are manifestly perverse, they will not be set aside on appeal. See MTN v. CORPORATE COMMUNICATION INVESTMENT LTD (2019) LPELR – 47042 (SC), ILA ENTERPRISES LTD & ANOR v. UMAR ALI & CO. (NIG) LTD (2022) LPELR- 58067 (SC), EKWEOZOR & ORS v. REG. TRUSTEES OF THE SAVIOURS APOSTOLIC CHURCH OF NIG (2020) LPELR – 49568 (SC), OJEH v. FRN (2022) LPELR- 58493 (SC) and LAWARI FURNITURE & BATHS LTD v FRN (2019) LPELR – 49011 (SC) – Per H. M. Ogunwumiju, JSC.

LIBEL – DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFF IN A LIBEL ACTION

I entirely agree with my Lord that it is the duty of a plaintiff in a libel action to establish that the words complained of are defamatory. I had occasion to deal with this question in Dr. Innih Ebong v Friday Udoh and Anor [Court of Appeal, Calabar Division, judgment in CA/C/262/2012 of July 8, 2014]. Speaking for the Court of Appeal, Nweze, JCA (as he then was) had this to say:

“Text writers and jurists are ad idem that the province of the tort of defamation, either in its written genre [technically known as libel] or in its transient species [called slander], is the injury occasioned on another person’s reputation by either written or spoken words, P. Milmo and W Rogers (eds), Gatley on Libel and Slander (Ninth Edition) (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1998) paragraph 1. 5; G. Fawehinmi, Nigerian Law of Libel and the Press (Lagos: Nigerian Law Publications Ltd, nd) passim; G. Kodilinye and O. Aluko, Nigerian Law of Torts (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd, 2007) (Reprint) 136; Tolley v Fry [1930] 1 KB 467, 479, approvingly endorsed in Egbuna v Amalgamated Press of Nigeria Ltd [1967] 1 All NLR 25, 29; Byrne v Dean [1937] 1 KB 818.

True, indeed, the law takes the view that nothing could be more intangible than a person’s reputation, dignity or feelings. In essence, the injury to these intangible attributes forms the essence of the tort of defamation, Offoboche v Ogoja Local Government (2001) LPELR-2265 (SC) 28, or more accurately, the law of libel and slander,  A. Mullis, “The Law of Defamation,” in A. Grubb (ed), The Law of Tort (London: Butterworths, 2002) 1014, paragraph 24. 1.

Like English Law, which gives effect to the Biblical ninth commandment that a man shall not speak evil, falsely, of his neighbour. [and supplies a temporal sanction], per Lord Diplock in Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135, 149, cited in A. Mullis, “The Law of Defamation” (supra), Nigerian Law does not brook the habit of people maligning or disparaging their neighbours before third parties, Sketch Publications Ltd v Ajagbemokeferi [1989] 1 NSCC 346, Ciroma v Alli [1999] 2 NWLR (pt 590) 317, Nsirim v Nsirim [1990] 3 NWLR (pt 138) 285, 297.

Such statements either tend (a) to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally; or (b) to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or (c) to cause other persons to shun or avoid him; or (d) to discredit him in his office, trade or profession; or (e) to injure his financial credit, Sketch Publications Ltd v Ajagbemokeferi (supra); Corabi v Curtis Publications Co 441 pa. 432, 273 A 2d, 899, 904, cited with approval in Guardian Newspapers and Anor v Ajeh (2011) LPELR -1343 (SC) 42-43, C-A.

However, to constitute a cause of action, Dairo v UBN Plc [2007] 7 SC (Pt 11) 97, citing Ezomo v Oyakhire [1985] 1 NWLR (pt 2) 195); Egbue v Araka [1988] 3 NWLR (pt 84) 598, they must be false and disparaging statements against a person to a third person, Sketch Publications Ltd v Ajagbemokeferi (supra); Ciroma v Alli [1999] 2 NWLR (pt 590) 317; Nsirim v Nsirim [1990] 3 NWLR (pt 138) 285, 297; that is, the injury must be to the plaintiff’s reputation in the minds of right-thinking people, Edem v Orpheo Nig Ltd [2003] 13 NWLR (pt 838) 537, 558; Sketch Publications Ltd v Ajagbemokeferi (supra); Gatley on Libel and Slander (supra).

The Nigerian jurisprudence on the constitutive ingredients which a plaintiff in an action for libel must prove now spans a wide compass. We can only scratch the periphery, Iloabachie v Philips [2008] 8 WRN 79; [2005] All FWLR (pt. 272) 223; [2005] 5 SCNJ 84; [2005] 13 NWLR (pt. 943) 695; Din v African Newspaper (Nig) Ltd [1990] 3 NWLR (pt. 139) 392; Sketch Publishing Co Ltd v Ajagbemokeferi (supra); Ekanem-Ita v Fetuga [1991] 7 NWLR (pt. 204) 449; Concord Press (Nig) Ltd v Olutola [1999] 9 NWLR (pt. 620) 578;

African Newspapers of Nigeria Ltd v Coker [1973] 1 NMLR 386; Benue Printing and Publishing Corporation v Gwagwada (1989) 4 NWLR (pt. 116) 439 etc.

In all, these authorities are unanimous that such a plaintiff can only be entitled to judgment if he proves that the defendant: (i) published a statement in a permanent form; (ii) that the statement referred to him; (iii) that the statement was defamatory of his person in the sense that -(a) it lowered him in the estimation of right-thinking members of the society or (b) it exposed him to hatred, ridicule or contempt; or (c) it injured his reputation in his office, trade or profession; or (d) it injured his financial credit.

The cases are many. We shall, only, cite one or two of them here, Sketch Publishing Co Ltd v Ajagbemokeferi (1989) LPELR – 3207 (SC) 37, B-G; African Newspapers Ltd v Ciroma [1996] 1 NWLR (pt 423) 156, Ugo v Okafor [1996] 3 NWLR (pt 438) 542, Guardian Newspapers Ltd and Anor v Ajeh (2011) LPELR -1343 (SC) 15, B-D, Iloabachie v Iloabachie [2005] 13 NWLR (pt 943) 695, 736.

Although, the “right-thinking person” standard has become a subject of scathing strictures, Markesinas and Deakin, Tort Law (1994); Professor Prosser, Prosser and Keaton on Torts (1984, 5th edition), cited in A. Mullis, (supra), Nigerian Courts still espouse that standard, Sketch Publishing Co Ltd v Ajagbemokeferi (supra); African Newspapers Ltd v Ciroma (supra); Ugo v Okafor (supra); Guardian Newspapers Ltd and Anor v Ajeh (supra); Iloabachie v Iloabachie (supra).

Failure to establish any one of these ingredients is fatal to the plaintiff’s case, Okolo v Midwest Newspapers Corp [1977] NSCC 11, Okafor v Ikeanyi [1979] 1 NSCC 44, Sketch Publishing Co Ltd v Ajagbemokeferi (supra), African Newspapers Ltd v Ciroma [1996] 1 NWLR (pt 423) 156, Ugo v Okafor [1996] 3 NWLR (pt 438) 542, Din v African Newspapers of Nig Ltd [1990] 3 NWLR (pt 139) 392, Nsirim v Nsirim [1990] 3 NWLR (pt 138) 295.” – Per C. C. Nweze, JSC

BIAS – COUNSEL MUST HAVE COMPELLING EVIDENCE OF BIAS

In the case of Dickson v. Assamudo (2013) LPELR-20416 (CA), 1, relying on some decisions by this Court, had restated, inter alia, that:-

“The allegation of bias against a Court is a very serious attack on the integrity of the Court and so counsel should desist from unfairly accusing Courts of bias unless there is concrete, cogent and compelling evidence on which they rely in making the allegation.

The likelihood of bias must be manifestly real and not a caricature or pure blackmail. See Olue v. Enenwali (1976) 2 SC, 23, Deduwa v. Okorodudu (1976) 1 NWLR, 236, Akor v. Abuh (1988) 696, Anuebe v. Adesiyun (1997) 5 NWLR (pt. 505) 403 at 423 – 424, Onigbede v. Balogun (2002) 6 NWLR (pt. 762) 686, Abalaka v. Min. of Health (2006) 2 NWLR (pt. 963) 105.”

See also Ojengbede v. Esan (2001) 18 NWLR (pt. 746) 771, Majoroh v. Fasasi (1986) 5 N WLR (pt. 5) 243, Odudu v. Atoyebi (1987) 2 NWLR (pt. 68) 660, Magaji v. Nigerian Army (2008) 34 NSCQR, 108; (2008) 8 NWLR (pt. 1089) 338. – Per M. L. Garba, JSC

DELAY IN DELIVERY OF JUDGMENT – PARTY MUST SHOW THAT HE INDEED SUFFERED MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE AS A RESULT OF DELAY IN DELIVERY OF JUDGMENT

On the issue of the judgment by the trial Court being delivered outside of and after the expiration of the ninety (90) days period of time stipulated in Section 294 (1) of the Constitution, the law is now elementary that for the judgment to be nullified by an appellate Court on ground of the non-compliance with the provisions, the party complaining about it must satisfy the appellate Court that he, indeed and fact, suffered a real miscarriage of justice by reason thereof. It is not sufficient to merely show the non-compliance, ipso facto, but the party must satisfactorily demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice was occasioned to him by the delivery of the judgment in question outside the period prescribed. See Atungwu v. Ochekwu (2013) 7 SC (pt. II) 42, Akoma v. Osenwoku (2014) 11 NWLR (pt. 1419) 462 (SC), Nyesom v. Peterside (2016) 2 CAN (pt. 2) 112 (SC), Ogundele v. Fasu (1999) 9 SC, 44, (1999) 12 NWLR (pt. 632) 662 (SC). – Per M. L. Garba, JSC

CASES CITED

STATUTES REFERRED TO

1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)

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