“It is rudimentary law that this Court is bound by its previous decisions based on the doctrine of stare decisis. The diacritical circumstances of this matter even goes beyond the scope of binding precedent or stare decisis. It is a lot more deep-rooted. The previous decision of this Court is on the same judgment of the lower Court, which is complained about in this appeal. The offences charged as well as the evidence adduced against the appellant in the previous appeal and the Appellant herein are the same offences and evidence. That evidence has been held in the previous decision of this Court as not establishing the offences charged beyond reasonable doubt, consequent upon which the judgment of the lower Court being challenged in this appeal was set aside. The legal position in this regard was authoritatively stated by Ogundare, JSC in the following words in the case of Usman vs. Umaru (1992) LPELR (3432) 1 at 21: “It is now well settled that under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court below as an intermediate Court of Appeal between the Court below it and this Court as the final appellate Court, is bound by its own decisions except in circumstances specified in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (1944) 2 All E.R. 293, 300, that is; (a) the Court of Appeal is entitled to decide which of two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow; (b) it will refuse to follow its own decision which, though not expressly overruled, cannot in its opinion stand with a decision of this Court; and (c), it is not bound to follow a decision of its own if it is satisfied that the decision was given per incuriam. See Osumanu v. Amadu (1949) 12 WACA 437; Davis v. Johnson (1978) 1 All E.R 1132.” ?It is therefore abecedarian law based on the rule in Young vs. Bristol Aeroplane Co. (supra) that this Court is bound by its previous decision except where the circumstances specified in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. (supra) are applicable. See Okeke vs. The State (1995) 4 NWLR (PT 392) 676 and Apari vs. Hose (1999) LPELR (6650) 1 at 8 (CA). The said circumstances are not present in the circumstances of this matter and therefore this Court remains bound by the decision in APPEAL NO. CA/IB/262C/2013 and there is no need to depart from the same. It cannot be otherwise as this Court cannot approbate and reprobate and cannot, flowing from the intimate kinship of the two appeals arrive at a conflicting verdict as it cannot be said that the previous decision of the Court was given per incuriam. –

“Howbeit, I will further demonstrate how this appeal is unmeritorious in its own right. The learned counsel on both sides of the divide have redacted the essential ingredients of the offence of murder, which the prosecution has the onus of establishing beyond reasonable doubt, id est: 1. That the deceased is dead. 2. That the death of the deceased is as a result of the act or omission of the accusedperson (the Appellant herein). 3. That the act or omission of the accused person (Appellant) which has caused the death of the deceased is intentional with full knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm is the probable consequence. See Ilodigwe vs. The State (2012) LPELR (9342) 1 and Uwagboe vs. The State (2008) LPELR (3444) 1 at 29. The above ingredients which have to be proved are cumulative. In order to ground a conviction, all the three ingredients must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Let me brevimanu state that I am not at one with the Appellant’s contention that the evidence did not establish that the deceased is dead. It cannot be confuted that the evidence on record, particularly the testimony of the PW7, the medical doctor and the medical report, Exhibit K, authenticate that the deceased is dead. So raising any contention on that ingredient would be beating a dead horse. It is my informed view that the critical consideration in this appeal are the second and third ingredients. In order to secure a conviction, the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, the act or omission of the Appellant, which directly or indirectly caused the death of the deceased. The Prosecution has to establish, not only that that act of the Appellant caused the death of the deceased but that in actual fact the deceased died as a result of the said act of the Appellant to the exclusion of all other possibilities. The evidence has to also establish beyond reasonable doubt that the act or omission of the Appellant, which caused the death of the deceased, was done intentionally with full knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was the probable consequence. Most often in criminal trials, the crucial issue is not ordinarily, whether or not the offence was committed. It is often whether the person charged is the culprit: Ndidi vs. The State (2007) 13 NWLR (PT 1052) 633 at 651”. –

“This brings us to the inconsistency rule. The apex Court explained the legal effect of the inconsistency rule in the case of Ikenne vs. The State (2018) LPELR (44695) 1 at 9-10 as follows: “Now, this appeal is about the inconsistency rule and how it impacts on the burden of proof in criminal proceedings. Our jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the principle. The inconsistency rule, in relation to the testimony of a witness, renders incredible and unreliable the oral evidence of a witness as well as his earlier statement the oral evidence materially contradicts. Thus in the instant case, if as asserted by the appellant, the oral evidence of PW2 and PW3 indeed materially contradict their extra-judicial statements, their statements as well as their contradictory oral evidence, must necessarily be discountenanced. Being incredible and unreliable, the statements and the oral evidence will be incapable of sustaining the concurrent conviction of the appellant by the two lower Courts.” See also Egboghonome vs. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (PT 306) 383, Ogudo vs. The State (2011) LPELR (860) 1 at 19-20, DOGO vs. THE STATE (2001) LPELR (956) 1 at 30-31 and Simon vs. The State (2017) LPELR (41988) 1 at 17-19. The well settled position of the law is that where a witness made a statement before trial which is inconsistent with the evidence he gives in Court on a material point and gives no cogent reasons for the inconsistency, the Court should regard his evidence as unreliable: Onubogu vs. The State (1974) 9 SC 1 and Orisa vs. The State (2018) LPELR (43896) 1 at 29-30. –

“It is settled law that where there are material contradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence of the prosecution, the accused person is entitled to be given the benefit of the doubt so created as a result of the inconsistencies. See Onubogu vs. The State (supra), Boy Muka vs. The State (1976) 9 – 10 SC 305 and Nwabueze vs. The State (1988) 4 NWLR (PT 86) 16. In the words of Fatayi-Williams, JSC (as he then was) in Onubogu vs. The State (supra) at 20: “We are also of the view that where one witness called by the prosecution in a criminal case contradicts another witness on a material point, the prosecution ought to lay some foundation… before they can ask the Court to reject the testimony of one witness and accept that of another witness… It is not competent for the prosecution which called them to pick and choose between them… We also think that, even if the inconsistency in the testimony of the two witnesses can be explained, it is not the function of the trial judge, as was the case here to provide the explanation. One of the witnesses should furnish the explanation and thus give the defence the opportunity of testing, by cross examination, the validity of the proffered explanation.” I am allegiant. It was not the function of the lower Court to provide the explanation for the inconsistency in the manner it did. The lower Court ought to have given the Appellant the benefit of the doubt arising from the material contradiction and inconsistencies in the evidence of the prosecution: Dogo vs. The State (2001) 3 NWLR (PT 699) 192. –

“Without a doubt, the evidence adduced by the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the act or omission of the Appellant caused the death of deceased and that the said act or omission which caused the death was intentional with full knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was the probable consequence. The Appellant was entitled to full benefit of the doubt: Omopupa vs. The State (2007) LPELR (8571) 1 at 45 and Abdullahi vs. The State (2008) 17 NWLR (PT 1115) 203 at 224”. –

“Having held in this judgment that the evidence did not establish the substantive offence, the Appellant’s conviction for the offence of conspiracy cannot stand: Abioye vs. The State (1987) 2 NWLR (PT 58) 645 at 653-654, Amadi vs. The State (1993) 3 NWLR (PT 314) 644 at 677, Balogun vs. The State (2018) LPELR (44215) 1 at 4-5, Amachree vs. Nigerian Army (2003) 3 NWLR (PT 807) 256 at 281 and Temitope vs. The State (2010) LPELR (37521) 1 at 24. ?The law is now firmly settled by a plethora of authorities that it is better for nine guilty persons to escape than for one innocent person to suffer. In aliisverbis, it is better to acquit nine guilty men than to convict an innocent man: Ukorah vs. The State (1977) 4 SC 167 at 177, Olekaibe vs. The State (1990) 1 NWLR (PT 129) 632 at 644 and Shehu vs. The State (2010) LPELR (3041) 1 at 10. –