CORAM

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JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JUSTICE COURT OF APPEAL

ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, JUSTICE COURT OF APPEAL

JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, JUSTICE COURT OF APPEAL

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PARTIES

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SABO ZANGYE

 

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AYIMABA TUKURA

 

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AREA(S) OF LAW

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SUMMARY OF FACTS

Sometime in the year 2002, the Appellant commenced an action seeking title to land at the Grade 1 Area Court Karshi in Nasarawa State vide suit no CV/37/2002. At the trial, the Grade 1 Area Court entered Judgment for the Respondent. Dissatisfied with the Judgment of the trial Court, the Appellant appealed to the High Court of Nasarawa State sitting in its appellate jurisdiction still in 2002 complaining of a lack of fair hearing. The Appeal succeeded and the Judgment of the trial Area Court was consequently set aside and an order for re-trial of the suit was made. Thirteen years thereafter i.e. sometime in 2015, the Appellant filed another suit before the same trial Grade 1 Area Court, to wit: suit no CV/05/2015. Therein and attached to the particulars of claim was “Annexure A” being the printed Record of the said High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction wherein the order for retrial was contained. Before the matter proceeded to hearing, the Respondent filed a motion on notice raising an objection to the hearing of the suit on two grounds namely: that suit no. CV/05/2015 was statute-barred, the cause of action having accrued in 2002; and was also an abuse of Court process in view of the existence of suit no CV/37/2002 earlier sent back to the same Area Court for retrial in 2002. The trial Grade 1 Area Court heard arguments on the objection and dismissed same. Aggrieved by the ruling of the trial Court, the Respondent appealed to the Court below sitting in its appellate jurisdiction, challenging again the jurisdiction of the trial Grade 1 Area Court, New Karshi on two grounds, to wit: that suit instant was statute-barred; and that the suit constitutes abuse of Court processes as contained in their Notice of Appeal dated 6th November, 2015. Judgment was issued in favour of the Respondent in the second appeal and the lower Court held that in view of suit no CV/37/2002 sent back to the trial Area Court for retrial, the fresh suit, number CV/05/2015, amounted to an abuse of Court process. Consequently, the Appeal was allowed and the claim of the Appellant at the trial Area Court was dismissed. Being dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed to this Court vide a Notice of Appeal wherein he complained on three grounds.

 

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HELD

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Appeal Dismissed

 

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ISSUES

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Whether the lower Court was right in holding that the suit instant constitutes abuse of Court process? Whether the lower Court was right in holding that the suit instant is statute-barred?

 

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RATIONES DECIDENDI

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ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS – WHAT AMOUNTS TO ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS?

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“It is evident from the processes of the trial Area Court contained in the printed Record that suit no CV/37/2002 and suit no CV/05/2015 are virtually identical in content. They are between the same parties, in respect of the same subject matter and seeking essentially the same reliefs, except for a few consequential orders. The latter suit, i.e. CV/05/2015 was filed ostensibly in compliance with the order for retrial of suit no CV/05/2002 made on 16th October, 2002 by the High Court. As rightly held by the Court below, the order for retrial resuscitated the case which was decided by the trial Area Court on 12th July, 2002. Thus, filing suit no CV/05/2015 has led to a multiplicity of Court processes between the same parties on the same subject matter and seeking the same reliefs, in addition to being before the same Court. Such an act has been described as an improper use of the judicial process to the irritation, annoyance and harassment of the other party. See Comm. of Education V Amadi (2013) 2 SCNJ 120 at 140, per Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was). –

 

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STATUTE OF LIMITATION – WHETHER STATUTE OF LIMITATION IS APPLICABLE TO LAND

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“The law is trite that it is the claim of the Plaintiff that should be examined to determine the date on which the cause of action in a given case accrued. In respect of suit no CV/05/2015, from the statement of claim filed by the Appellant, particularly paragraph 8 thereof (at pages 4-5 of the main Record of Appeal), the cause of action arose in 2002. Now even though there were intervening factors in the form of the Appeal from the decision of the Area Court and the subsequent order for retrial in the same year, the date of the accrual of the cause of action remains constant, to wit: 2002. Thus, purporting to file a fresh suit in 2015 based on a cause of action that accrued in 2002 renders the suit statute-barred by virtue of the express provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of the Limitation Law of Plateau State (Edict No. 16) 1988 applicable to Nasarawa State (supra). For ease of reference, the relevant provisions read: 2.”Land” includes land held under a right of occupancy or any other tenure”. 3.No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the expiration of ten years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him or, if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person.” (Emphasis supplied) On the question of whether or not the Limitation Law applies to land-holdings under native law and custom, it is apparent from the above Limitation Law of 1988 applicable to Nasarawa State that it does. The law makes no distinction on the nature of land-holdings. In this regard, I have read the decision of this Court referred to by the Appellant in Ogunlana V Dada (supra) at pages 559-560, paras G-A per Rhodes-Vivour JCA (as he then was), wherein it was held as follows: “Statutes of limitation are not applicable to land tenures held under native law and custom. Accordingly, the provision of Section 12(2), Limitation Law of Lagos State or any statute of limitation cannot be invoked to stop execution of judgment where the land is held under native law and custom…” The rationale behind this holding is that land possession and ownership is a customary practice, which is jealously guarded in different forms by different communities in Nigeria. One common denominator is the perpetuity of land ownership by its original owners. It is however evident that the Limitation Law under consideration in that case was Section 12(2) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State. It reads: “An action shall not be brought upon a judgment after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the Judgment became enforceable.” The Limitation Law under consideration in the instant case was however framed by the lawmaker in more absolute terms. It specifically states that it applies across board to “land held under a right of occupancy or any other tenure” or “any land”. Thus, in the more recent case of Nwiboeke V Nwokpuru (2016) LPELR-41524(CA) 13, this Court drew an important distinction as follows: “The argument by learned Counsel for the respondent that limitation laws are not applicable to customary law or actions to recover land held under Customary Law cannot be accommodated by the clear words of S. 3 of the limitation law. Such argument is contrary to that provision. It is clear from the opening words of that provision thusly; ‘No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land’, that its legislative intention is that it should apply to actions by all persons in respect of lands without exception. This is supported by the definition of land in S. 2 of the same limitation law as including land held under a right of occupancy or any other tenure.” In the matter of the interpretation of statutes, Courts have been well guided over the years with the clear boundary beyond which Courts cannot enter. Thus, while Courts have the power to interpret the law, it has no licence to veer into the legislative arena or constitute itself into the legislator, however harsh or distasteful the piece of legislation may be. Once the words are plain and unambiguous, the Court is duty bound to give effect to it. In other words, in the interpretation of statutes, words should always be given their ordinary meaning. Where the words are clear, unambiguous and to the point, any addition or subtraction will be sequel to introducing an illegal backdoor amendment. See SetracoNig Ltd V Kpaji (2017) LPELR-41560(SC) 25-26, paras D-A, per Peter-Odili, JSC; & Skye Bank Plc V Iwu (2017) LPELR-42595(SC) 118 paras B-C, per Ogunbiyi, JSC. Consequently, the case of Ogunlana V Dada (supra) cannot be forced on the facts of this case where it is contrary to the express provisions of the applicable law governing the land in dispute. It is distinguishable from the facts of the instant case since a Limitation Law, such as the one now under consideration, was not a factor in that case. It cannot therefore serve as an authority for the proposition made by the Appellant. I find that the Court below came to a right decision that by virtue of Sections 2 and 3 of the Limitation Law of Plateau State (Edict No. 16) 1988 applicable to Nasarawa State, suit no CV/05/2015 was statute-barred. –

 

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CASES CITED

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Not Available

 

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STATUTES REFERRED TO

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Area Courts Civil Procedure Rules, 1971|Civil Procedure Rules of the Nasarawa State High Court (2010)|Limitation Law (Edict No. 16) 1988 of Plateau State applicable to Nasarawa State|

 

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