DANIEL BASIL VS CHIEF LASSI FAJEBE
June 24, 2025DONGTOE V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PLATEAU STATE
June 24, 2025Legalpedia Citation: (2001) Legalpedia (CA) 11030
In the Court of Appeal
HOLDEN AT CALABAR
Tue Apr 24, 2001
Suit Number: CA/C/2/2000; CA/C/52/2000
CORAM
DENNIS ONYEJIFEEDOZIE
OKWUCHUKWU OPENE
SIMEON OSUJI EKPE
PARTIES
1. RAYMOND INYANG
2. CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT BANK PLC
3. RICUNWAWO FUNDS LIMITED
APPELLANTS
ENGR. DR. MAURICE A. EBONG
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
Not Available
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Plaintiff/Respondent sued the Defendants/Appellants claiming fraudulent transfer of the shares he held with the 2nd Defendant/Appellant to the 1st and/or 3rd Defendants/Appellants. The Respondent held 500,000 shares valued at N1, 000,000 in the 2nd Appellant’ Bank. He claimed that the 1st and 3rd Appellants being his financial and investment advisers, on his behalf obtained a short term loan of N3, 000,000 from a finance company. The Respondent further claimed that following the advice of the 1st Appellant he used his share certificate as an additional security when the Managing Director of the finance company became restive over the non-payment of the loan. This he did by instructing that a letter be sent to the 2nd Appellant directing that the share certificate which was yet to be issued to him be forwarded to the finance company for custody. The 2nd Appellant having received the letter, erroneously sent the share certificate to the Respondent. On realizing its error, it requested for the return of same, which the Respondent did. Subsequently, the Respondent received a copy of the letter from the 2nd Appellant bank addressed to the 1st Appellant congratulating him for acquiring the Respondent’s shares. The Respondent wrote the 1st Appellant expressing his dismay about the trick in acquiring his shares. The Respondent thereafter instituted an action after mediation had failed. In their defence, the 1st and 3rd Appellants denied acting as the financial adviser to the Respondent, stating that the Respondent engaged the 3rd Appellant to source for a short term loan which they succeeded in obtaining on its behalf. That when the loan had been outstanding, the Plaintiff/Respondent agreed to transfer the shares to the finance Company, which in turn transferred same to the 3rd Appellant. The trial court in its judgement held that the purported transfer was null and void as there was no instrument of transfer as provided by section 151 Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 and granted all the prayers of the Respondent. Dissatisfied with the said judgement, the Appellants filed this appeal.
HELD
Appeal Allowed
ISSUES
Not Available
RATIONES DECIDENDI
NOTICE OF APPEAL – STATUS OF A DEFECTIVE NOTICE OF APPEAL
“It needs hardly to be emphasised that the notice of appeal is a very important document, because it is the foundation of the appeal and if it is defective, the Court of Appeal has inherent power to strike it out on the ground that it is incompetent; See Okeke Amadi v. Okeke Okoli (1977) 7 SC 57; Tukur v. Gov., Gongola State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.68) 39.”
GROUND OF APPEAL- CONSEQUENCE OF AN INCOMPETENT GROUND OF APPEAL
“If all the grounds of appeal are found to be incompetent, the Court of Appeal will lack the competence to adjudicate on the matter as the question of competence is fundamental and crucial to any adjudication: Odofin v. Agu (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt.229) 350; Kalio v. Kalio (1975) 2 SC 15. Order 3 of the Court of Appeal rules supra deal with notice and grounds of appeal, and rule 4 thereof provides: (4) No ground which is vague or general in terms or discloses no reasonable ground of appeal, shall be permitted, save the general ground that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence and any ground of appeal or any part thereof, which is not permitted under this rule may be struck out by the court on its own motion or on application by the respondent.” –
OMNIBUS GROUND OF APPEAL- VALIDITY OF AN OMNIBUS GROUND OF APPEAL
“I am reinforced in this view by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Adeyeri v. Okobi (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt.510) 534 in which it considered the validity of an omnibus ground of appeal, framed in identical words as the one in the notice of appeal on p.106 of the record. Delivering the leading judgment of the court, Ogwuegbu, JSC at p.543 of the report observed:- “The appellants’ contention that the original ground of appeal in the court below (the omnibus ground) is incompetent, cannot be correct. It is a proper ground of appeal in a civil case. See Atuyeye Ors. v. Ashamu (1987)1 NSSC (Vo1.18) 117 (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.49) 267; Okezie v. The Queen (1963) All NLR 1 at 4; (1963) 1 SCNLR; Akibu v. Opaleye & Ors. (1974) 11 S.C. 189 and Aladesuru v. The Queen (1956) A.C. 49.” =
ADDITIONAL GROUNDS OF APPEAL – WHETHER AN APPELLANT NEEDS TO SEEK THE LEAVE OF COURT BEFORE FILING ADDITIONAL GROUNDS OF APPEAL
“The question that arises, is whether where a proper notice of appeal was filed, the appellant still needs leave of the court in order to file additional grounds within the stipulated time allowed for appealing. This issue arose for consideration in the case of The Registered Trustees of Amorc v. Awoniyi (1994)7 NWLR (Pt.355) 154 where at p.175, the Supreme Court per Wali JSC opined thus: The appellant will only require leave of Court of Appeal where the additional grounds are to be filed out of time. Where additional grounds of appeal are filed within time, such additional grounds will in my view, form part of the notice of appeal and the grounds of appeal filed thereunder. If an appellant can file as many notices of appeal as he wishes in one appeal provided that is done within 3 months period allowed for appealing as of right, nothing stops him from filing additional grounds to any of the notices of appeal, if done within time. The ratio in Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1988)1 NWLR (Pt.68) 39 is equally applicable to the filing of additional grounds. In the instant case, since the notice of appeal was properly filed within time and the additional grounds of appeal also filed within the statutory 3 months period of appealing against the judgment of the court below, leave of this court was not necessary to file additional grounds.”
APPEAL AS OF RIGHT – INSTANCE WHEN AN APPEAL SHALL LIE AS OF RIGHT TO THE COURT OF APPEAL
“By section 220(1)(a) of the 1979 Constitution, which is the applicable law at the material time, an appeal shall lie from a decision of a High Court to the Court of Appeal as of right in final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the High Court sitting at first instance. In this appeal, the 1st and 3rd defendants were exercising their constitutional right of appeal as of right against the final decision of the Federal High Court sitting at first instance. No leave of court is required to lodge the appeal whether the grounds are of law alone or of mixed law and fact.”
LEAVE OF COURT – IMPLICATION OF A FAILURE TO OBTAIN THE LEAVE OF COURT WHERE NECESSARY
“It is trite law that failure to obtain leave of court where necessary to file a particular ground of appeal, upon which an issue is raised for resolution of the case could render-both such grounds of appeal and the issue so formulated therefrom incompetent. See Ajibade v. Pedro (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt.241) 257 at 262 Arowolo v Adimula (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt.212) 753; Metal Construction Co. v. Migliore (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 126) 299. Where an appeal can only be lodged with the leave of the court, it is the leave that confers jurisdiction on the court and it is very vital and fundamental that leave must be obtained before an appeal is filed and any appeal filed without leave, is incompetent as no jurisdiction can be conferred on the court. Shaka v. Salisu (1996) 2 NWLR (pt.428) 28; Mosuro & Anor v. Akinyele 13 WACA 112-113; Yakubu v. The Governor of Kogi State & 4 Ors (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt.383) 367.”
ORAL EVIDENCE- WHETHER ORAL EVIDENCE MAY RENDER THE CONTENTS OF A DOCUMENT INADMISSIBLE
“The law is trite that oral evidence is inadmissible to alter or contradict the contents of a document. Section 132(1) of Evidence Act 1990, provides that where any judgment of any court or any other judicial or official proceedings or any contract or any grant or other disposition of property has been reduced to the form of a document… no evidence may be given… except the document itself: Okpalugo v. Adeshoye (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt.476) 77 at 103; Olaloye v. Balogun (1990)5 NWLR (Pt.148) 24; Eke v. Odolofin (1961) 1 All NLR (Pt.2) 404,842; Macaulay v. NAL Merchant Bank (1990)4 NWLR (Pt.144) 283.”
DOCUMENT- IMPLICATION OF SIGNING A DOCUMENT
“A literate person of full age, capacity and understanding who signs a document, is presumed to understand what he appended his signature upon. Whatever that document says and undertakes, is binding on him and a plea of non est factum does not avail him: Egbase v. Oriareghan (1985) 1 NWLR (pt.10) 884, 889-900; Okoya v. Santilli (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt.338) 256, 280-281.”
INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS- PRINCIPLE GUIDING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTENTS OF A DOCUMENT
“As to the contents of Exh. D, the general rule of interpretation is that where the words of a document are unambiguous, the operative words in it should be given their simple and ordinary grammatical meaning: UBN v. Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt.333) 385 at 403.”
“ASSIGNMENT”- DEFINITION OF THE TERM “ASSIGNMENT”
“In Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition p.119. Assignment is defined as “A transfer or making over to another of the whole of any property, real or personal in possession or in action or of any estate or right therein.”
TRANSFER OF SHARES- PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE TRANSFER OF SHARES IN A COMPANY
“The point was made and rightly too in my view, that the transfer of shares in a company is regulated by the Companies and Allied Matters Act and the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the company. The pertinent provisions are set out hereunder: Section 151 CAMA 151(1) The transfer of a company’s share shall be by instrument of transfer. (2) Notwithstanding anything in the articles of a company, it shall not be lawful for the company to register a transfer of shares in the company, unless a proper instrument of transfer has been delivered to the company Provided. (3) The instrument of transfer of any share, shall be executed by or on behalf of the transferor and transferee and the transferor shall be deemed to remain a holder of the share, until the name of the transferee is entered in register of members in respect of the share. (4) Subject to such of the restrictions of a company’s articles as may be applicable, member may transfer all or any of his shares, by instrument in writing in any usual or common form or any other form, which the directors way approve.” –
PROVISIONS OF A STATUTE – DUTY OF COURTS TO ENFORCE AND GIVE EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF A STATUTE
“Courts of law are generally duty bound to enforce and give effect to the mandatory provisions of a statute law and parties cannot by consent or acquiescence or failure to object, nullify the effect of a statute: See Adedeji v. NBN Ltd (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.96) 212. In the case of Co-operative & Commerce Bank of Nig. Plc v. Attorney-General of Anambra State (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt.261) 528, the Supreme Court per Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC at p.556 opined: “Prof. Kasunmu argues that it is clear from the provisions of s.573 of the Companies and Allied Matters Decree 1990, that the only method approved and recognized by the law for the issue of its shares, apart from capitalization out of its reserves, is by offer of shares to the public… Now it is the law that when a statute, provides for a particular method of performing a duty regulated by the statute, that method, and no other, must have to be adopted. As it is so, was it open to one of the shareholders of the appellant bank, ostensibly acting for three others, to have tried to carry out the directive of the Central Bank of Nigeria, with respect to the issue of share capital by paying a deposit rather than by complying with the requirement of s.573 of the Decree. It is true that the payment was made with the consent of the appellant. But can this court sanction an agreement of parties the sum total of which is to circumvent the law?”
PLEADINGS – AIM OF PLEADINGS
“Firstly, the issue of non compliance with CAMA 1990, was not raised in the pleadings. It was only in the written addresses of counsel that the matter surfaced. It did not even feature in the evidence of witnesses at the trial. Issues for trial are raised in the pleadings and not in oral address of counsel. The aim of pleadings is to set out clearly the facts upon which parties rely for their case; Obijuru v. Ozims (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.6) 167. It is to place parties on alert as to the facts they are to meet at the hearing of the case: Ezenwani v. Omwordi (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.33) 27; Salami v. Oke (1987)4 NWLR (Pt.63) 1; Union Bank Nigeria Ltd v. Chukwuelo Charles Ogboli (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt.380) 647 at 663.”
STATUTORY PROVISION- REQUIREMENT FOR RELYING ON A SPECIAL STATUTORY PROVISION FOR DEFENCE
“A party relying on a special statutory provision for his defence or case, must plead that defence specifically, although the specific statutory provision need not be stated specifically but there must be sufficient facts pleaded upon which the defence will be based: NBTC Ltd. v. Narumal & Sons Ltd. (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.33) 117.”
FRESH ISSUES ON APPEAL – INSTANCES WHERE FRESH ISSUES WOULD BE RAISED ON APPEAL
“It is conceded that under special circumstances, a question not raised in the court of first instance, may be raised on appeal. The position of the law is that an appellate court will not allow a party to raise on appeal, a fresh issue not raised or tried or considered in the trial court. However, where the fresh issue sought to be raised involves substantial points of law, substantive or procedural and it is plain that no further evidence would be adduced, which could affect the decision of those points, the court will allow the question to be raised and the points taken, in order to prevent an obvious miscarriage of justice, but leave to raise such point must be sought. Fadare v. A.-G., Oyo State (1982) 4 SC 1; Shonekan v. Smith (1964) 1 All NLR 168; Mogaji v. Cadbury (Nig) Ltd(1985) 2 NWLR (pt.7) 393.”
FRESH QUESTIONS ON APPEAL- REQUIREMENT FOR RAISING FRESH QUESTIONS ON APPEAL
“Where an appellant raises in his original grounds of appeal, a new question not raised or canvassed in the trial court and had not previously sought leave to argue it before the appeal comes up for hearing, he should indicate in his brief of argument that leave to argue it will be sought at the hearing of the appeal. This is in accord with Order 6 rule 3(a) of the Court of Appeal rules.”
REGISTRATION OF SHARES – WHO HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO APPLY FOR THE REGISTRATION OF SHARES?
“Although, as was decided in the case of See dorff v. Archbold Ins. Ltd (1996) 1 NWLR (P t423) 223 at 231, a transferee may also apply for the registration of his shares. Section 152(1) of the CAMA 1990, specifically provides that the responsibility is that of the transferor. The section provides: 152(1) On the application of the transferor of any share or interest in a company, the company shall enter on its register of members, the names of the transferee in the same conditions as if the application for the entry were made by the transferee.”
PARTY – WHETHER A PARTY CAN BE ALLOWED TO BENEFIT FROM HIS WRONG
“Since it is the transferor and in this case the plaintiff who has the responsibility of the registration of the transfer and since he too wrote Exh D, it was his duty to ensure that a proper instrument of transfer was executed and not having done so, it does not lie in his mouth to impugn the legality of the transfer. The maxim is ex turpi causa non oriter actio (an action does not arise from a base cause) in the case of Kish v. Taylor (1911) 1 K.B 625 it was said per Fletcher Moulton L.J. at p.34 that:- “A man may not take advantage of his own wrong. He may not plead in his own interest as self-created necessity.” In the case of Solanke v. Abed (1962) 1 SCNLR 371; (1962) All NLR D (Pt.1) 230, the question was, who could raise the illegality of a tenancy agreement and counsel for the respondent submitted, that since the agreement was not only unenforceable a party to an illegal contract was entitled to raise the illegality notwithstanding that he was a party to it. The Federal Supreme Court rejected such contention and held that a person who under a tenancy agreement, accepts rent but fails to obtain the requisite statutory consent for the transfer of possession cannot as against the tenant rely on his own wrongful act and contend that the agreement was void and unenforceable because he had failed to get the necessary consent. This decision is followed in the case of Adedeji v. NBN Ltd supra , in which the court had to consider whether the deed of legal mortgage made between the appellant and the respondent bank in respect of which the appellant mortgage did not obtain the Governor’s consent, for the mortgage was valid by virtue of section 22 of the Land Use Act 1978, which provides that it shall not be lawful for the holder of statutory right of occupancy granted by the Military Governor to alienate his right of occupancy or any part thereof by assignment mortgage transfer of possession, sublease or otherwise howsoever without the consent of the Military Governor first had and obtained. Delivering the judgment of the court, Akpata JCA, as he then was held at pp 226 to 227 of the report thus: “Apart from the principle of law involved in this case, it is morally despicable for a person who has benefited from an agreement to turn round and say that the agreement is null and void. In pursuance of the principle that law should serve public interest, the courts have evolved the technique of construction in bonam partem. One of the principles evolved from such construction in the interpretation of statutes, is that no one should be allowed to benefit from his own wrong. (Nullus Commodum Capera potest de juria sua propria). As Widgery L.J. said in Buswell v. Goodwin (1971) 1 ER 418 at 421: ‘the proposition that a man will not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong is no doubt a very salutory one and one which, the court would wish to endorse the effect is usually that the literal meaning of the enactment is departed from where it would result in wrongful self-benefit.’ Although the decision in the Adedeji’s case, upholding the validity of the mortgage appears to be in conflict with the subsequent decision in the case of Savannah Bank (Nig.) Ltd. v. Ajilo (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.97) 305, in which the Supreme court pronounced as null and void a mortgage executed in similar circumstances, the principle expounded in the former case about a party not being allowed to benefit from his own wrong remains sacrosant.”
DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL BY CONDUCT- PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL BY CONDUCT
“In the case of Ige and Ors. v. Amakiri & Ors. (1976) 2 SC 1, the Supreme Court discussing the concept of estoppel by conduct stated thus:- If a man by his words or conduct, willfully endeavours to cause another to believe in a certain state of things which the first knows to be false and if the second believes in such state of things and acts upon his belief, he who knowingly made the first statement is estopped from asserting afterwards that such a state of things does not exist at the time: Horicon Ltd v. Wasurum (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt.66) 646; Ikpuku v. Ikpuku (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt.193) 571; Ukaegbu & Ors. v. Ugoji & Ors. (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt.196) 127. In the case of Akanni v. Makanju (1978) 11-12 SC 13 at 76, the Supreme Court held that once a party either by his word or conduct has intimated that he consents to an act, which has been done and that he will offer no opposition to it, he cannot later question the legality of the act, he has so sanctioned to the prejudice of those who have given faith to his word. Before the doctrine of estoppel is raised in court, it must be duly pleaded. It need not be pleaded expressly. It is sufficient, if facts are pleaded which could support the plea: See Menakaya v. Menakaya (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt.472) 256; Obi Ezenwani v. Obi Onwordi & Ors. (1986) 4 NWLR (pt.33) 27; (1986) 6 SC 40; Chinwendu v.Mbamali (1980) 3-4 SC 31.”
PERVERSE DECISION OF COURT – WHEN IS A DECISION OF COURT PERVERSE?
“A decision of court is perverse, when it ignores the fact in evidence and when considered as a whole amounts to a miscarriage of justice: Atologbe v. Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.2) 360, Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.80) 1. A judgment which is merely speculative and not based on any evidence is perverse and will invariably lead to a miscarriage of justice; Overseas Construction Co.(Nig) Ltd. v. Creek Enterprises (Nig.) Ltd & Anor. (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 13) 407 at 414. In this case no particulars of negligence were pleaded and no evidence of negligence was proffered at the trial.”
GENERAL DAMAGES – NATURE OF GENERAL DAMAGES
“Damages may be categorised into general and special damages, General damages are such as the court may give when the judge cannot point out any measure upon which they are to be measured except the opinion and judgment of a reasonable man. They are loses which flow naturally from the defendant and the quantum need not be pleaded or proved, as it is generally presumed by law. They are presumed to flow from the negligence complained of: See Bello v. A.- G., Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt.45) 828; Ijebu Ode Local Government v.. Adedeji Balogun & Co. (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.166) p.136, UBN Ltd v. Odusote Bookstores Ltd (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt.421) 558.”
AWARD OF GENERAL DAMAGES – WHETHER GENERAL DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED WHEN THE QUANTUM OF LOSS IS ASCERTAINABLE
“The award of general damages is improper, when the quantum of loss is ascertainable. It is also wrong to take into account in awarding general damages matters, which have been considered in awarding special damages.”
SPECIAL DAMAGES – WHAT ARE SPECIAL DAMAGES?
“Special damages are those damages which are given in respect of any consequences reasonably and probably arising from the breach complained of. They denote those pecuniary losses which have crystallized in terms of cash and values before trial. ljebu Ode Local Government v. Balogun supra.”
AWARD OF SPECIAL DAMAGES- BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF SPECIAL DAMAGES
“Special damages must be specifically pleaded and proved strictly. See Warner Warner International v. Federal Housing Authority (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 298) 148. The rule that special damages must be strictly proved applies to cases of tort. The rule require anyone asking for special damages to prove strictly that he did suffer such damages as he claimed. This does not mean that the law requires a minimum measure of evidence or that the law lays down a special category of evidence required to establish entitlement to special damages. What is required is that the person claiming, should establish his entitlement to that type of damages, by credible evidence of such a character as would suggest that he indeed is entitled to an award under that head otherwise the general law of evidence as to proof by preponderance or weight usual in civil cause operates. Oshinjinrin & Ors. v. Alhaji Elias & Ors. (1970) All NLR 153.”
AWARD OF DAMAGES – INSTANCES WHERE AN APPELLATE COURT WILL INTEFERE WITH AN AWARD OF DAMAGES BY A TRIAL COURT
“There is a long line of judicial authorities that in order to justify interference with the decision of a trial court on account of damages awarded by it, it is necessary for the appellate court to be convinced either that the court of trial acted upon wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was extremely high or low, as to make it in the judgment of the appellate court an entirely erroneous estimate of the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled. See Flint v. Lovell (1935) 1 KB 360; Ziks Press Ltd v. Ikoku (1951) 13 WACA 188; Idahosa v. Oronsaye (1959) 4 SC 165;(1959) SCNLR 407; Bala v. Bankole (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt.27) 141; Onaga v. Micho & Co. (1961) 1 All NLR 236; (1961) 1 SCNLR 101; and Ijebu Ode Local supra.”
SPECIAL DAMAGES – CONDITIONS UPON WHICH A CLAIMANT WOULD BE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT FOR LOSS OF PROFIT
“In the case of A.-G., Oyo State v. Fairlakes Hotels (No.2) (1989) 5 NWLR (PU21) 255 at 286, anticipated loss of profit has always been treated as special damages. Chief J.K. Odumosu v. A.C.B Ltd. (1976) 11 SC 55. To enable a claimant to judgment of the court for loss of profit the special damages must be particularized and strictly proved: See Dumez Nig. Ltd v. Patrick Nweke Ogboli (1972) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 24. In this case, the special damages claimed by the plaintiff was not particularised, nor was there any evidence led in respect of the loss.”
AWARD OF DAMAGES- WHETHER A PARTY CAN BE COMPENSATED FOR THE SAME INJURY ON TWO HEAD OF DAMAGES
“It is the law that when a man has been fully compensated under one head of damages for a particular injury, it is improper to award him damages in respect of the same injury under another head; See Onaga v.Micho & Co. (1961) 2 SCNLR 101; (1961) I All NLR 326 at 328.”
RELIEFS- WHETHER COURT CAN GRANT RELIEFS NOT SPECIFICALLY CLAIMED BY A PARTY
“A court has no power to grant to a party any relief that he has not specifically claimed. While court can award less than what is claimed by a party it cannot award more; See Ekpenyong & Ors v. Nyong & Ors. (1975) 2SC71 at 80-81; Abang v. Effum & Ors. (1976) ISC 17; Obioma & Ors. v. Olomu & Ors. (1978)3SC 1; Chief Registrar High Court of Lagos State v. Vamos Navigation Lid (1976) 1 SC33, 40-41; Felix Okoli Ezeonwu v. Charles Onyechi & Ors. (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.438) 499, 592.”
PARTIES – WHO ARE PARTIES IN A LEGAL PROCEEDINGS?
“In legal proceedings the parties, generally speaking, are persons whose names appear on the record as plaintiffs or defendants.”
PARTIES – DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROPER, DESIRABLE AND NECESSARY PARTIES
“In the consideration of the effect of non-joinder of a party in a suit, the law makes distinction between three categories of parties via:- “Proper parties”. “Desirable Parties” and “Necessary parties.” Proper parties are those who, though not interested in the plaintiff’s claim are made parties for some good reasons, e.g. where an action is brought to rescind a contract, any person is a proper party to it, who was active or concurred in the matter which gave the plaintiff the right to rescind. Desirable parties are those who have an interest or who may be affected by the result. Necessary parties are those who are not only interested in the subject matter of the proceedings, but also who in their absence, the proceedings could not be fairly dealt with: See Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons (1936) I QB 357; Settlement Corporation v. Hochschild (No.2) (1969) 1 WLR 1664; Re-Vandervills Trust (1971) AC 312; Re-Vandervills Trusts (1969) 3 All ER 496.”
CASES CITED
Not Available
STATUTES REFERRED TO
1. Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990
2. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 (now 1999)
3. Court of Appeal Rules Cap. 62, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 (now 2016)
4. Evidence Act, 1990 (now 2011)
5. Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1976 (now 2009)
