“I must say that the Issue for Determination as formulated by the Appellant and adopted by the Respondent leaves much to be desired. There was no mention of the Court of Appeal and it is well settled that there is no nexus or connection between this Court and the trial Court; not directly anyway. The Findings of a trial Court must be affirmed or reversed by the Court of Appeal before its decision gets to this Court – see Uor V. Loko (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 77) 430, Djukpan V. Orovuyovbe (1967) 1 All NLR 134, Ajuwon V. Adeoti (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 131) 271.

Per A. A. AUGIE, J.S.C

“A confessional statement made by an Accused Person which is properly admitted in evidence is in law, the best pointer to the truth of the role played by such Accused Person in the commission of the offence. Such confessional statement can be accepted as satisfactory evidence upon which alone the Accused can be convicted.

Per A. A. AUGIE, J.S.C

“Once the trial Court is satisfied, as the trial Court was in this case, that the Statement is free, voluntarily made, unambiguous, true, direct and positive with reference to the offence charged, it can convict on it. Thus, the U-turn made by the Appellant was of no avail. See FRN V. Iweka (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1341) 285 at 336.

Per A. A. AUGIE, J.S.C

“Now, it is an established principle of criminal law that the burden of proving a fact, which if proved, would lead to the conviction of the Accused Person, is on the Prosecution, and the Prosecution is enjoined to prove such fact beyond reasonable doubt. What is more, any doubt as to the guilt of the Accused must be resolved in favour of the Accused -Ahmed V. State (1999) 7NWLR (Pt. 612) 641, Oforlete V. State (2000) 12 NWLR (PL 681)415, Kalu V. State (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 90) 502/513.

Per A. A. AUGIE, J.S.C

“The legal definition of doubt is “to question or hold questionable. Uncertainty of mind; the absence of a settled opinion or conviction”; and a “reasonable doubt” is defined as “such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and prudent person – – to pause and hesitate to act upon the truth of the matter charged. It does not mean a mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs – – is open to some possible or imaginary doubt”- legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com.

Per A. A. AUGIE, J.S.C

As the Respondent rightly submitted, the Prosecution must prove its case “beyond reasonable doubt”, and as Oputa, JSC, observed in Bakare V. State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 52) 579, the said standard of proof “stems out of the compelling presumption of innocence inherent in our adversary system of criminal justice”. He further explained as follows: To displace this presumption, the evidence of the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond the shadow of any doubt, that the Person accused is guilty of the offence charged. Absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure including the administration of criminal justice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt means just what it says. It does not admit of plausible and fanciful possibilities but it does admit of a high degree of probability. As Denning, J. (as he then was) observed in Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All E. R. 373: – “The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence – ‘of course it is possible but not in the least probable’, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt”.

Per A. A. AUGIE, J.S.C

“So, as much as the Prosecution has to prove its case against an Accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, the emphasis is on the word “reasonable”, and the word “reasonable” means “fair, proper or moderate under the circumstances; according to reason”- see Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Ed”.

Per A. A. AUGIE, J.S.C

This Court has repeatedly said that the appropriate time to object to the admissibility of a Statement said to be a Confession is when the Statement is sought to be tendered-see Oseni V. State (2012) 5 NWLR. (Pt. 1293) 351, wherein I.T, Muhammad, JSC (as he then was) observed: The Appellant’s counsel at the trial stage did not object to the admissibility of [his] confessional statement, yet he went on to blame the trial Court in not treating [the] confessional statement with utmost caution. It [is] too late in the day to seek to supply a remedy to a dented or a crucified matter, which can hardly be revived. – – It is too late to seek to retract such confessional statement after its admission without objection from the defence. It is – -taken as an afterthought, which Courts are not ready to accommodate.

Per A. A. AUGIE, J.S.C

“So, the Appellant is raising this issue for the first time in this Court, but he is asking for the impossible because, this Court is not in a position to consider any issue that was not determined by the two lower Courts – see Uor V. Loko (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 77) 430, wherein this Court held: It is the opinion appealed against, which is affirmed or reversed. Hence, without the benefit of such opinion, an appellate Court will be extremely reluctant to interfere. Any Judgment – -founded on grounds not canvassed in the Court below and not adverted to and pronounced upon in the Judgment appealed against ideally is not an appeal against such a Judgment. Since an Appellant’s right of appeal is circumscribed within the parameters of the Judgment appealed against, this Court will not lightly permit impugning the Judgment on grounds of error other than are contained therein.

Per A. A. AUGIE, J.S.C

“Moreover, an appellate Court will very rarely, if at all, interfere with the findings of facts made by the trial Court because as this Court observed in Ibafidon V. Igbinosun (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 716) 653, “such findings of fact enjoy the privilege of passing through the furnace of acrimonious cross-examination, the tooth comb scrutiny of the observation of the witnesses’ reactions and assessment of the veracity of their testimony”.

Per A. A. AUGIE, J.S.C

“Reasonable doubt automatically excludes unreasonable doubt, fanciful doubt, imaginary doubt and speculative doubt-a doubt not borne out by the facts and circumstances of the case – see Bakare V. State (supra).

Per A. A. AUGIE, J.S.C

“Indeed, this is an offshoot of the prescription that in criminal cases, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution throughout and does not shift to the accused person, except in a few limited circumstances, such as where an accused person raises a defence of insanity, The State v. Emine [1992] 7 NWLR (pt. 256) 658; Ogundiyan v The State [1991] 3 NWLR (pt. 181) 519; [1991] 4 SCNJ 44; Alonge v IGP (1959) 4 FSC 203; [1959] SCNLR 516.

Per C. C. NWEZE, J.S.C.

“This notion of the Prosecution’s burden derives from our accusatorial criminal justice system under which, in contradistinction to the inquisitorial system, it is anathematic to expect an accused person to purge himself of guilt since the fundamental law of the country, the Constitution, avails him of the presumption of innocence until proven otherwise, Uso v C. O. P [1972] NSCC 631; Kinnami v. Bauchi Native Authority (1957) NRNLR 42, approvingly, adopted in Ani and Anor v The State (2009) LPELR -488 (SC) 14 -15, D-E; Section 36 (5) thereof. This is, actually, a fundamental principle of most commonwealth penal laws, often couched in the ancient maxim in dubio pro reo – a principle which has been interpreted as imposing the burden of proving the guilt of an accused person on the prosecution, Obiakor v. State (2002) 10 NWLR (pt. 776) 612; Bello v State (2007) 10 NWLR (pt. 1043) 564, 585 Oladele v. Nigerian Army (2004) 6 NWLR (pt. 868) 166.

Per C. C. NWEZE, J.S.C.

“To simultaneously put up self defence and provocation is to shoot oneself at the foot. Accused persons who scamble for defences to save themselves from drowning often go into unpardonable errors to lump up defences that cannot agree or betray their innocence and inculpability in an offence. Self defence and provocation are not birds of the same feather nor same bed fellows, hence, wherever and whenever they are raised together, the innocence of the accused person is already jeopardized. PER Chima Centus Nweze, JSC in Emmanuel Ogar Akong Edoko V. The State (2015) LPELR-24402(SC) (PP. 62- 63, PARAS. A-C), expatiated the matter thus: Whereas the Criminal Code provides for self defence in Sections 286 and 287, the same code provides for the defence of provocation in Section 284. Whilst the former [the defence of self defence] is an exculpatory defence, because, where it is established, it exonerates the accused person…the latter (the defence of provocations) is, merely, an attenuating or a mitigating defence. Where available, it merely, attenuates; dis-rates or demotes the offence from murder to manslaughter. In effect, the defence of provocation does not exonerate the accused person. It only earns him a mitigation of the punishment due for the offence of murder to a sentence for manslaughter…It is thus, the dissimilarity in the consequences of the availability of these defences that make them mutually exclusive, that is, that make them inconsistent defences – defences that cannot avail an accused person at the same time ….

Per U. M. A. AJI, J.S.C.