IJESU FOODS NIG. LTD V. GUINNESS NIG. PLC
March 28, 2025ASSET MANAGEMENT CORPORATION OF NIGERIA V. CANVASS FARMS NIGERIA LTD.
March 28, 2025Legalpedia Citation: (2021-04) Legalpedia 46413 (CA)
In the Court of Appeal
HOLDEN AT LAGOS
Thu Apr 1, 2021
Suit Number: CA/L/1587/2018
CORAM
BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEAL
FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO, JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEAL
FOLASADE AYODEJI OJO, JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEAL
PARTIES
MR. RAY OKPU
APPELLANTS
TRUST BOND MORTGAGE BANK PLC
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
APPEAL, COMPANY LAW, COURT, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, JUDGMENT AND ORDER, LAW OF BANKING, LAW OF EVIDENCE, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Respondent commenced an action before the Federal High Court, Lagos Judicial Division by a Writ of Summons under the Undefended List and by an Amended Writ of Summons filed upon the transfer of the Respondent’s claim to the General Cause list of the Court below, the Respondent claims against the Appellant the sum of N895, 186, 228. 35 as the amount outstanding on both Principal and Interest on the finance facilities granted to the Appellant by the Respondent and interest on the said amount. The Respondent claims that by an application letter dated 2/12/2008, the Appellant applied for facility in the sum of N344, 700, 000. 00 to enable him meet his immediate and urgent financial commitments, which application the Respondent granted by its facility letter. The Appellant duly accepted the facility letter and in line with the Appellant’s instructions, the facility sum was duly credited into the account of the Appellant and in accordance with the explicit terms of the offer letter the facility sum was meant to be fully liquidated within a period of 24 months. However, at the expiration of the tenor of the facility, the Appellant failed to liquidate the duly availed sum notwithstanding several demand letters from the Respondent to that effect and thus frustrated by the failure and/or refusal of the Appellant to repay the facility sum, the Respondent commenced the action before the lower Court seeking to recover the sum availed the Appellant plus accrued interest thereon. In reaction, the Appellant by his 2nd Amended Statement of Defense, denying the claims of the Respondent, Counter – Claims against him. At the end of the trial, the lower Court granted the claims of the Respondent against the Appellant while the Counter – Claim of the Appellants against the Respondent was dismissed.Dissatisfied with the judgment of the lower Court, the Appellant had appealed against same vide his Notice of Appeal containing two Grounds of Appeal. The Cross-Appellant brought a Cross-Appeal vide its Notice of Cross-Appeal being dissatisfied that lower Court discountenanced the Cross-Respondent’s Statement of Account on the ground that it was inadmissible in evidence.
HELD
Appeal Dismissed, Cross Appeal Allowed
ISSUES
Whether from the evidence adduced and established before the court below, the Honourable trial court was right when it held that the Respondent has made out a case for the recovery of the facility sum availed the Appellant, plus the accrued interest and cost of the action?
Whether the Court below was right when it dismissed the Appellant’s counter claim for being frivolous, unmeritorious and lacking in merit?
CROSS – APPEAL
Whether the Court below was right in its decision to expunge the statement of the Cross – Respondent’s account (Exhibit B3) on the ground that it failed to satisfy the mandatory provisions of Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011?
RATIONES DECIDENDI
CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN AN APPELLATE COURT WOULD INTERFERE WITH A TRIAL COURT’S PRIMARY DUTY OF EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
“My lords, in law when an Appellant alleges that a trial Court had not properly evaluated the evidence led by the parties it is simply a call on the appellate Court to consider first whether or not the trial Court had properly evaluated the evidence led before it and if it finds that the trial Court had not done so, then to proceed to and re – evaluate the evidence in the printed record to determine if the trial Court had made correct findings borne out by the evidence as led by the parties. Thus, it is only where the trial Court had not properly carried out its sacred duty of dispassionately evaluating the totality of the evidence led and had thus failed in this primary duty that an appellate Court would have the legal justification to intervene and re – evaluate the evidence on the printed record in order to make appropriate findings of facts in line with the evidence led and in the dictates of justice to the parties. So, until an appellate Court arrives at such a conclusion the need for re – evaluation of evidence does not arise since an appellate Court has no business interfering with correct findings of a trial Court. See African Songs Limited & Anor V. King Sunny Ade (2018) LPELR – 46184 (CA) per Georgewill JCA. See also Williams V. Tinubu (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 755) 200; Amuneke V. The State (1992) NWLR (Pt. 217)347; Sule Asariyu V. The State (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 709. PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
WHETHER AN APPELLATE COURT HAS A DUTY TO INTERFERE WITH EVIDENCE EVALUATED BY A TRIAL COURT WHERE THE CONCLUSION REACHED IS CORRECT
“However, in carrying out its re – evaluation, even where it finds that the trial Court had failed to carry out its primary duty to do so properly, it must still be borne in mind by the appellate Court that evaluation and ascription of probative value to the evidence led is ordinarily the turf of the trial Court, and thus once a trial Court discharges that duty on the strength of the evidence placed before it, unless it arrives at perverse conclusions or findings not supported by the established evidence before it, an appellate Court will not interfere once the conclusion reached is correct. See Alhaji Ndayoko & Ors. V. Alhaji Dantoro & Ors. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187 @ p. 198. See also Abaye V. Ofili (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 15) 134; Ukejianya V. Uchendu 18 WACA 46. PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
DUTY OF APPELLATE COURTS IN EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
“Therefore, an appellate Court which had not seen the witnesses testify and observed their demeanor in the witness stand should respect the views of the trial Court and not to readily substitute its own views for that of the trial Court except where it is shown that the conclusion or finding reached by the trial Court was perverse. In such a case, the appellate Court is in good a position as the trial Court to intervene to re-evaluate the evidence in the printed record to draw necessary inference and make proper findings on the proved and admitted facts in the record as the justice of the case requires but which the trial court had failed to do. See Obajimi V. Adeobi (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1075) 1 @ p. 19. See also Owor V. Christopher (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 511) 962 @ p. 992; Sogbamu V. Odunaiya (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 700) 1249 @ p. 1302; Mini Lodge V. Ngei (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 506) 1806 @ pp. 1820 -1821; Sa’eed V. Yakowa (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 692) 1650 @ p. 1681.- PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
WHETHER EVIDENCE ELICITED IN CROSS – EXAMINATION WHICH SUPPORTS THE CASE AS PLEADED BY THE OTHER PARTY, CAN BE ACTED UPON BY THE COURT
“The law is well settled that evidence elicited in cross – examination, as in the instant appeal from the DW1 by the Respondent, which supports the case as pleaded by the Respondent, the cross – examining party, is good evidence on which a trial Court, such as the Court below can legitimately act on to make appropriate findings of facts. See Daggash V. Bulama (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 892) 144.”- PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
WHETHER A DEBTOR’S STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT IS A SINE QUA NON FOR ESTABLISHING INDEBTEDNESS
“In law, facts admitted need no further proof. Thus, it cannot be the law as vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the Appellant that in all cases of action for recovery of debt by a creditor the debtor’s Statement of Account must be tendered and that failure to do so would be fatal. Rather, once a debtor admits, as the Appellant admitted, that the creditor did advanced to him the money, the subject matter of the debt recovery action, the debtor’s Statement of Account is not a sine qua non for finding of liability against the debtor. Thus, in law with or without any admission of debt and or presence or absence of a Statement of Account, once a creditor leads sufficient credible evidence in proof of the indebtedness of the debtor on a balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence as required of him by law, he will succeed notwithstanding whether he tendered the debtor’s Statement of Account in evidence or not or whether the debtor admitted his indebtedness or not.
I am thus in complete agreement with the apt and unassailable submission of the learned counsel for the Respondent that with or without the Appellant’s Statement of Account with the Respondent there were sufficient credible evidence, as accepted and acted upon by the Court below, which proved clearly that the loan sum was first credited into the Appellant’s personal account with the Respondent and subsequently upon his instruction transferred by cheques into his company, Ocean Deep Properties Limited account with ISL, and was therefore, utilized by the Appellant. See Section 134 of the Evidence Act 2011. See also Ehinlanwo V. Oke (2008) LPELR – 1054 (SC); Oguntimehin V. Unity Bank Plc. (2017) LPELR – 43244 (CA); Oceanic Bank International Plc. V. Broken Agro Allied Industries Ltd (2008) LPELR – 4671 (CA). – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE OF A WITNESS WHO HAS GIVEN MATERIALLY INCONSISTENT EVIDENCE ON OATH OR LIED, CAN BE TREATED AS A CREDIBLE WITNESS
“It is settled law that no witness who has given materially inconsistent evidence on oath, and or tell lies on matters within his own personal knowledge before the Court, is entitled to the honour of being ascribed with any credibility by the Court on issues or matters in contention between the parties. See Ogunde V. Abdulsalam (2017) LPELR – 41875 (CA) per Georgewill JCA. See also Ezemba V. Ibeneme (2009) 14 NWLR (Pt 798) 623. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
POSITION OF THE LAW ON THE TRANSFER OF A LOAN SUM FROM THE PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF A PARTY TO THE ACCOUNT OF A SUBSIDIARY COMPANY
“There is no argument about it that in law the Respondent and ISL even if they be sister company, but of which nothing of sort was proved in the evidence before the Court below, having been distinct incorporated companies, each has its own legal personality and therefore, money held in one cannot be said to be held in the custody of the other. Thus, when the loan amount was moved from the Appellant’s account with the Respondent, being in its custody as the Banker, to the Appellant’s company account in ISL the custody of the loan money moved from the Respondent to the Appellant’s company Bank, ISL for the benefit of the Appellant’s company. Ocean Deep Properties Limited. I find therefore, and as already rightly found by the Court below, that in law the transfer of the loan sum from the Appellant’s personal account with the Respondent on his instruction into the Ocean Deep Properties Limited’s account, a company in which he holds a 95% majority shareholding and he is one of only but two Directors, with ISL, it clearly amounted to a transfer of the loan sum to the Appellant for his company’s and his utilization. See Uni – Petrol {Nig.} Plc. V. State Board of Internal Revenue (2001) 10 NWLR (Pt. 720) 167. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
BASIS ON WHICH AN APPELLATE COURT WILL INTERFERE WITH THE JUDGMENT OF A LOWER COURT
“The Court below did carried out a meticulous review of the pleadings and evaluation of the entirety of the evidence, oral, on oath and documentary as led by the parties through their respective sole witness and arrived at correct findings of facts and conclusions in the judgment appealed against as regards the claims of the Respondent against the Appellants. Thus, this Court would have no business interfering with these correct findings of the Court below.See Alhaji Ndayoko & Ors. V. Alhaji Dantoro & Ors. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187 @ p. 198,where Edozie JSC., had pronounced with finality on this issue, thus:
“An appellate court is only concerned with whether the judgment appealed against is right or wrong not whether the reasons given are right or wrong. Where the judgment is right but the reasons given are wrong, the appellate court does not interfere. It is only where the misdirection has caused the court to come to a wrong conclusion that the appellate court will interfere….” See also Abaye V. Ofili (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 15) 134; Ukejianya V. Uchendu 18 WACA 46. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
DUTY OF A COURT TO ACT ONLY ON ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE IN DECIDING CASES BEFORE IT
“In law, a Court of law is under a duty to act only on admissible evidence in arriving at its findings and decisions. The sole issue for determination in the Cross – Appeal deal with the power of a Court to discountenance or expunge, at the stage of writing its judgment, evidence which though inadvertently already admitted but which turns out to be inadmissible in law since a Court of law is under a duty to act only act on admissible evidence only in deciding cases before it. See Michael Hausa V. The State (1994) 7 8 SC 144. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
RELEVANCY IS THE HALLMARK OF ADMISSIBILTY
“My lords, in law admissibility is governed by amongst other relevant considerations the pleadings of the parties as it is the pleadings that will state the facts upon which evidence, whether oral or documentary will be adduced at the trial and admitted in evidence. In so far as what is pleaded is relevant, including the fact of existence of a document, it is admissible in evidence. Thus, generally it is relevancy that governs admissibility. See Omega Bank Nig. Plc. V. OBC Ltd. (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt. 794) 583 @ p. 483. See also Oladele V. Aromolaran 11 (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 453) 180; Torti V. Ukpabi (1984) 1 SC 214”. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
AT WHAT STAGE CAN AN OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSIBITY OF A DOCUMENT BE RAISED AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Now, at the trial before the Court below, it is true as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the Cross – Appellant that when the Cross – Respondent’s Statement of Account was sought to be tendered in evidence by the Cross – Appellant through its witness, CW1, it was not objected to by the learned counsel for the Cross – Respondent and was thus, admitted in evidence by consent of both parties and marked as Exhibit B3, yet it is also true as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the Cross – Respondent that since a Court of law has the duty to act only on admissible evidence, it has the power to expunge or discountenance at the judgment writing stage any piece of evidence though already admitted but which turns out to be inadmissible in evidence and to act only on admissible evidence in reaching its decisions. Indeed, such an objection can even be raised for the first time on appeal. See Nwabuoku V. Onwordi (2002) FWLR (Pt. 123) 341. See also Suberu V. The State (2010) 3 SC (Pt 11) 105.
However, it must be pointed out at once that it is one thing to raise an objection to admissibility of a document for the first time on appeal, or at the final address stage having not raised such an objection at the time the document was sought to be tendered at the trial, as in the instant Cross – Appeal, and quite another thing entirely to substantiate such an objection. The law is well settled that whether a complaint against inadmissible evidence being admitted by a trial Court should be raised on appeal or not or after it has been admitted and at the final address stage will depend on whether the evidence so admitted by the trial Court was one admissible on proper foundation and no such foundation was laid or one which is rendered inadmissible by law and thus, not admissible in evidence in any event.
Thus, where the evidence is of the former category and admitted in evidence without proper foundation but without any objection, it will be too late in the day for a party who had not objected to its admissibility to do so for the first time on appeal or at the final address stage. Where however, the evidence belongs to the latter category of being inadmissible in any event or rendered inadmissible by law, an objection can validly be taken against its admissibility for the first time on appeal or at the final address stage even where it was not objected to when it was sought to be tendered at the trial and was admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibit B3. This is so because in law a Court of law is under a duty to act only on admissible evidence in deciding matters before it. See Okulade V. Alade (1976) 1 SC 83. See also Esso West African Incorporated V. Alli (1968) NMLR 414; Ajayi V. Fisher l FSC 97; Ugbala V. Okorie (1975) 12 SC 13; Yasin V. Barclays Bank (1968) 1 All NLR 171; Kossen Nig. Ltd. V. Savanah Bank Nig. Ltd.(1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 421) 1”.- PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
WHETHER A PARTY CAN RESCIND EVIDENCE ADMITTED BY CONSENT OF PARTIES ON APPEAL
“In law where the parties have given their respective consent and agreed on a particular issue, including the admissibility of evidence which by itself is not declared by law to be inadmissible in any event, such as Exhibit B3, none of the parties will be allowed to rescind the said agreement and to turn 360 degree summersault later in the proceedings or even on appeal to raise an objection to the admissibility of such a document. In Gilbert V. Endean {1878} 9 Ch. D 259, Cotton L. J., had made the following pertinent observations:
“But I must add this where in the Court below the evidence not being that on which the Court cannot properly act, if the person against whom it is read does not object, but treats it as admissible, then before the Court of Appeal, in my judgment, he is not at liberty to complain of the order on the ground that the evidence was not admissible.”
See also Mrs. Elizabeth Anyaebosi V. R.T. Briscoe {Nig.} Ltd. {1987} 6 SC 15, where the Supreme Court had reiterated inter alia thus:
“In general, it is true that where a document, which is inadmissible in evidence, if admitted at trial, such document must be rejected on appeal ….However, this rule is not without exception. Certain class of evidence is absolutely inadmissible by virtue of some statutory provisions; while another class is made admissible under certain conditions. In the case of the former class, the evidence cannot be acted upon whether it was admitted by consent of the parties or otherwise; and the evidence will be rejected on appeal if it was admitted in the trial court ….With regard to the later class if the conditions laid down for the admission of the evidence are not absolute, as in the former class, then such inadmissible evidence if admitted without objection, the appellant cannot complain against the admission…. Accordingly, in those cases, where the evidence complained of is not, by law, inadmissible in any event a party may, by his own conduct at the trial be precluded from objecting to such evidence on appeal…..” PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
DISTINCTION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A DOCUMENT DECLARED INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE BY LAW AND ONE REQUIRING THE FULFILMENT OF A PROCEDURAL CONDITION FOR ITS ADMISSIBILITY
“Now, it is true that a Court of law has the powers to expunge a document or any evidence for that matter wrongly admitted in evidence but there is a world of difference between when a document is declared inadmissible in evidence by law in any event and when a document on its face has no defect but however requires a procedural condition for its admissibility. In the former case, the law is that the parties cannot by their consent get it admitted in evidence but in the latter case where the document only requires proper foundation to be admitted in evidence the parties can by consent get it admitted without going through the rigors of laying foundations for its admissibility in evidence. In my finding, therefore, Exhibit B3, which is not evidence declared by any law to be inadmissible in any event and having been admitted with the consent of the parties and without any objection to its admissibility by the Cross – Respondent before the Court below when it was sought to be tendered in evidence by the Cross – Appellant, was in law properly admitted in evidence and was thus wrongfully discountenanced by the Court below in its judgment. In Jude Onwuzulike V. The State {2017} LPELR – 41889 (CA), this Court had held inter alia thus:
“…the computer generated evidence recorded his conversations with the Appellant….MTN also recorded the Statement of each prosecution witness that had conversation with the deceased, the appellant … Each of the Prosecution witnesses Nos. PW6 and PW6 had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in the computer by MTN. This was tendered at the trial through PW5 and PW6. The fact that PW5 was a ‘Mobile Forensic Expert’ … was not contradicted during cross examination. The defence counsel did not challenge the credential or expertise of PW6…Section 84 of the Evidence Act relates specifically to ‘admissibility of statements in documents produced by computers’. There is no challenge to the fact that the information contained in the statement in the computer which the Prosecution derived to prosecute the Appellant was ‘derived from information supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of those activities’ under Section 84 (1)(d) in the course of the business carried out by MTN in the telecommunication industry….It is very clear that Exhibit P4 in the present case was admissible under the provisions of Section 96 subsections (1) and (2} of the Evidence Act. But the Respondent did not lead evidence to show which of the conditions under Section 96{1} applied to the Exhibit. Appellant on the other hand did not object; he cannot therefore, now complain that the Exhibit P4 is inadmissible”
See further Hon. Dickson V. Chief Timipre Sylva &Ors (2016) LPELR – 41257 (SC), where the Supreme Court had stated inter alia thus:
“In this digital age when different creations can be achieved electronically, the reason for the requirement of authentication or certification of the gadget or computer used in producing and processing the electronically-generated documents is not far-fetched. The party seeking to rely on such evidence must be able to show that the data and information contained in the electronically-generated document is truly what it claims to be…In actual fact, Section 84 consecrates two methods of proof, either by oral evidence under Section 84(1) and {2} or by a certificate under Section 84{4}. In either case, the condition stipulated in Section 84(2) must be satisfied. However, this is subject to the power of the Judge to require oral evidence in addition to the certificate…” – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
WHETHER PRODUCTION OF CERTIFICATE FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF COMPUTER GENERATED DOCUMENTS IS A MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF THE LAW
“Happily, as recent as 2018 the Supreme Court has spoken on the issue of Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 in Daudu V. FRN 2018 10 NWLR (Pt. 1626) 169 and I have heard that there is nothing sacrosanct about a certificate for admissibility of computer generated document under Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011, and that oral evidence or certifying on the document itself would suffice! This Court is bound to follow and apply this latter decision of the Supreme Court in Daudu V. FRN 2018 10 NWLR (Pt. 1626) 169 rather than the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Kubor V. Dickson 2013 4 NWLR Pt. 1345 534. See Osakwe V. FCE (Tech) Asaba (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 1. See also Okpozo V. Bendel Newspaper Corp (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 153) 652.
I therefore, cannot but agree completely with the apt and unassailable submission of learned counsel for the Cross – Appellant that on the state of the plethora of authorities on the applicability or other wise of Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 relating to admissibility of computer generated documents, it is no longer the law that a party must produce a certificate of computer generated document in all circumstances before any computer generated document can be admitted in evidence. Rather, the law now is that a party who intends to use a computer generated document, having filed and frontloaded it, must at trial either produce the required certificate or give oral testimony as to the use of the computer in producing the said document, both of which method is permissible under Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 and none of these two methods, in my view, is superior to the other. See Daudu V. FRN 2018 10 NWLR (Pt. 1626) 169, where the EFCC had tendered statements of account of the Appellant and admitted in evidence at trial without production of a certificate as required under Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011. On appeal to this Court it was argued by the Appellant that the said statement of account was wrongfully admitted and should be expunged but this Court overruled this argument and held that statement of account was properly admitted in evidence. On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision of this Court was upheld whilst stating that though the statement of account was a computer generated evidence, however whereas the Bank released the said statement of account to EFCC it certified the contents of the said document as being correct. Thus, the Court can presume that the provisions of Section 84 of the Evidence Act have been satisfied without more. See also Hon. Dickson V. Chief Timipre Sylva &Ors (2016) LPELR – 41257 (SC); Jude Onwuzulike V. The State {2017} LPELR – 41889 (CA); Brila Energy Ltd V. FRN 2020 Volume 1 ACEE 331(CA); – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
WHEN IS A DECISION OF COURT PERVERSE?
In law, a decision or finding or conclusion reached is perverse amongst other grounds if it does not flow from the established facts from the evidence before the Court or it takes into consideration matters extraneous to the issues placed before the Court in evidence by the parties or it misapprehends and misapplies the applicable law to the established facts in evidence before it. See Obajimi V. Adeobi (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1075) 1 @ p. 19. See also C.S.S Book Shop Ltd. V. The Regd. Trustees of Muslim Community in Rivers State (2006) 4 SCM 310. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
DUTY OF COURT WITH RESPECT TO DOCUMENTS ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE BY CONSENT OF PARTIES
The said document was admitted in evidence as Exhibit B3 by consent of parties and should have been given its full legal effect by the Court. See Longe Vs. First Bank of Nigeria Plc (2006) 3 NWLR (PT. 967) 228 @ 280, Paragraphs. B-D, where this Court, per Ogunbiyi, JCA(as she then was) held as follows:
“In other words, and with the document exhibit ‘R’ having been admitted in the circumstances at hand, it would no longer be within the legal sphere for the court’s refusal to give full effect to the contents of the said exhibit. Any objection by the appellant at this stage is without more very belated. A document tendered by consent and admitted ought to be given full legal effect.” –PER F. A. OJO
CASES CITED
NONE
STATUTES REFERRED TO
Court of Appeal Rules 2016
