CORAM

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JOHN INYANG OKORO

CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE

UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI

MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU

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PARTIES

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DR. DENNIS ISSAC IFENNE

APPELLANTS 

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1. AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA

2. THE GOVERNING COUNCIL, ABU-ZARIA

3. AMB- IBRAHIM BINDAWA, (CHAIRMAN, SENIOR STAFF DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE)

4. MRS. M. A. NKOM (SECRETARY, SENIOR DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE)

RESPONDENTS 

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AREA(S) OF LAW

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APPEAL, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

 

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SUMMARY OF FACTS

The appellant in this appeal was employed by the first respondent on June 30th, 1982. He rose to the rank of Senior Lecturer. He was, later, confirmed as a Consultant in the Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology.

On March 26th, 2001, one Ms. Salamatu Usman, a 600 Level Medical Student, wrote a petition against him alleging sexual assault to her person and victimization.

He was queried and he replied same after which he was suspended from duty and an investigative committee was set up to investigate the allegations of sexual harassment levelled against him. He was found guilty and the committee recommended that he should be punished.

He received a second query and replied same after which he was invited to appear before the senior staff disciplinary committee. A member of the said committee was a brother in-law to the petitioner and so the appellant objected to the composition of the committee.

The committee found him guilty without cross-examining the witnesses who testified against him and recommended that his appointment should be terminated which was consequently executed.

Aggrieved by the decision of the committee, he commenced an action at the Federal High Court. The trial court dismissed his application and the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision.

Aggrieved, he appealed to the apex court.

 

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HELD

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Appeal Dismissed

 

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ISSUES

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Whether the Court of Appeal’s reference to the exhibits examined by the trial Court and its (Court of Appeal’s) observation/finding that the learned trial Judge based his decision largely on the construction of the statute creating the first respondent herein amounts to approbating and reprobating which occasioned a miscarriage of justice?

 

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RATIONES DECIDENDI

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PROCEDURE – FORMULATION OF ISSUES – CONDUCT OF COURT

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My understanding of the rationale of all binding authorities is that the principle which governs the formulation of issues is that a number of grounds could, where appropriate, be formulated into a single issue running through them and argued together, Labiyi v. Anretiola and Ors (1992) LPELR-1730 (SC) 16; Dokun Ajayi Labiyi v. Alhaji Mustapha Moberuagba Anretiola and Ors [1992] 8 NWLR (pt. 258) 139; Sanusi v. Ayoola [1992] 9 NWLR (pt. 265) 275. In observance of this principle, and in pursuit of the proper administration of justice in the instant case, I consider the respondents’ first issue as determinative of this appeal. – Per C. C. Nweze, JSC 

 

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PROCEDURE – FORMULATION OF ISSUES – CONDUCT OF COURT

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This Court, no doubt, has an unfettered discretion to re-frame, re-arrange or re-formulate issues for determination by the parties to meet the justice of a case and in the interest of accuracy, clarity and brevity, Delphine Zikere Okonkwo v. Amaka Ezeaku and Anor [2020] 5 NWLR (pt. 1718) 477, 499-500; African International Bank Ltd v. Integrated Dimensional System Ltd. [2012] 17 NWLR (pt. 1328) 1; Unity Bank of Nigeria Plc and Anor v. Edward Bouari (2008) SCM 193, 240; Hon. Adeyemi Sabit Ikuforiji v. Federal Republic of Nigeria [2018] 6 NWLR (pt. 1614) 142, 157. – Per C. C. Nweze, JSC 

 

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APPEAL – CONDUCT OF COURT

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For the umpteenth time, I take the liberty to state that an appellate Court, sitting in its appellate jurisdiction, has as its primary concern the determination of whether the decision of the lower Court, being appealed against, is correct, Skye Bank v. Iwu (2017) LPELR-42595 (SC); A. G. Leventis Nig. Plc v. Akpu (2007) 6 SC (pt. 1) 239; Ngwu and Ors v. Onuigbo and Ors (1999) LPELR – 1992 (SC); Ajadi v. Okenihun [1985] 1 NWLR (pt 3) 484, 492; Oredoyin v. Arowolo [1989] 3 NWLR (pt. 114) 172. In truth, it has little to do with what the lower Court’s reasons for arriving at its decision were, Skye Bank v. Iwu (supra). An appellate Court has no business in substituting its own views for those of the trial Court. It is only where the necessary finding has not been made and there is evidence on the record, that the appellate Court can make its own findings. Besides this, an appellate Court will only interfere with a finding of fact where it is satisfied on the evidence before it that the finding is wrong, and could not ordinarily have been based on the evidence on record. This principle was put succinctly in the case of Tsokwa Motors (Nig) Ltd v. UBA Plc (2008) LPELR- 3266(SC) 15 -16, paras D-A, where it was held that: “In appeals on findings on facts, the attitude of the appellate Court (which this Court is) is now well established; it is one of caution and of reluctance in interfering with the facts found by the trial Courts. But where there is an obvious or patent error in appraisal of oral evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence or even where there is an improper or imperfect use by the trial Judge of the opportunity he had in seeing and hearing the witnesses or where he has reached a wrong conclusion on proved or accepted facts, the appellate Court in such circumstances, is duty bound in law to interfere and set aside such perverse findings.” In Aminu v. Hassan [2014] 5 NWLR (pt. 1400) 287, 318, this Court held thus: “An appellate Court should be slow to disturb a finding of fact by a trial Court which is supported by evidence unless it is satisfied that such finding is unsound.” The case of Okiemute v. The State (2016) 15 NWLR (pt. 1535) 297 335 – 336, paras H- B, is also apposite here. This Court held as follows: “It is also clear that where a Court of trial unquestionably evaluates the evidence and justifiably appraises the facts and arrives at a conclusion on the credible evidence before it, an appellate Court will not interfere with such findings of fact. It is not the business of the appellate Court to substitute its own views of the facts for those of the trial Court. The duty of the Court is to scrutinize the evidence on record to find out whether there is evidence on which the trial Court could have acted.” This reluctance is principally grounded on the recognition that the learned trial Judge, who had the undoubted advantage of seeing and hearing the evidence presented by the parties, at first- hand, is in a superior position to make determinations on the credibility of evidence presented by parties to the case, Agbi v. Ogbeh [2006] 11 NWLR (pt. 996) 55; Ojokolobo v. Alamu [1998] 9 NWLR (pt. 565) 226; Sha Jnr. v. Kwan (2000) 5 SC 178, Fagbenro v. Arobadi [2006] 7 NWLR (pt. 978) 174. To borrow from another jurisprudence, the trial on the merits should be the main event, rather than a “try out on the road,” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564 (1985) 574 – 575. Scholars have advanced some additional judicial policy concerns to justify the rule, These include: the need to preserve the autonomy and integrity of trial proceedings; the need to discourage the multiplicity, length and cost of appeals; and that appeals are unsuited for reviewing voluminous amounts of evidence, C. A. Wright, “The Doubtful Omniscience of the Appellate Courts,” (1957) 41 Minnesota Law Review 751, 780; R. D. Gibbens, “Appellate Review of Findings of Fact”, (1991-92) 13 Advocates Q. 445, 445 448.

In this regard, the trial Court has an advantage over the appellate Court. The greater that advantage the more reluctant the appellate Court should be to interfere, Ali Pinder Kwajaffa and Ors v. Bank of The North Ltd (2004) 5 SCNJ 121; Military Governor of Lagos State and Ors v. Adebayo Adeyiga and Ors (2012) 2 SC (pt. 1) 68. – Per C. C. Nweze, JSC.

 

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APPEAL – GROUNDS OF APPEAL

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It has to be noted that it is not every indication of the Court’s intention or state of mind or repetitive observation or remark made by the Court that qualifies as a decision or determination of the Court. It is, equally, not every such comment, observation, and/or passing remarks of the lower Court that is appealable Nwosu v. PDP and Ors (2018) LPELR- 44386 (SC); Xtoudos Services Nig. Ltd and Anor v. Taise (W.A) Ltd and Anor (2006) LPELR-3504 (SC); Saude v. Abdullahi [1989] 4 NWLR (pt. 116) 387. Comments, therefore, consequent upon the Court’s finding on facts presented before an appellate Court by parties cannot constitute or form the basis of a Ground of Appeal. – Per C. C. Nweze, JSC.

 

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APPEAL – CONCURRENT FINDINGS BY LOWER COURTS

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What is more, there are concurrent findings of fact and law by both lower Courts, to the effect that from the facts presented before them, the appellant was not entitled to judgment thereof. These concurrent findings are unassailable. Interference is impermissible. As it is well-known, such interference would only be warranted where such findings are perverse, that is, persistent in error, different from what is reasonable or required, against the weight of evidence; put differently, where the trial Judge took into account matters which he ought not to have taken into account or where he shut his eyes to the obvious, Atolagbe v Shorun (1985) LPELR -592 (SC) 31; C-D. Such a perverse finding is a finding of facts which is merely speculative and is not based on any evidence before the Court. It is an unreasonable and unacceptable finding because it is wrong and completely outside the evidence before the trial Judge, Iwuoha and Anor v NIPOST and Anor (2003) LPELR-1569 (SC) 39-40; Overseas Construction Company Nig. Ltd v. Creek Enterprises (Nig.) Ltd [1985] 3 NWLR (pt. 13) 407.

In all, then, a decision is said to be perverse: (a) When it runs counter to the evidence; or (b) Where it has been shown that the trial Court took into account matters which it ought not to have taken into account or shut its eyes to the obvious; or (c) When it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice, Misr v. Ibrahim [1975] 5 SC 55; Incar Ltd. v. Adegboye [1985] 2 NWLR (pt.8) 453; Atolagbe v. Shorun [1985] 4 SC (pt. 1) 250, 282. – Per C. C. Nweze, JSC.

 

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APPEAL – CONCURRENT FINDINGS – CONDUCT OF THE SUPREME COURT

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The position has been well expatiated by my learned brother in the lead judgment that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of lower Courts unless such findings are established to be perverse. In this case, the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts are not perverse; thus, there will be no need to interfere. See Sokwo Vs. Kpongbo (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt.1086) 346; Ogunjumo vs. Ademolu (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt.389) 254.

Per J. I. Okoro, JSC.

 

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APPEAL – CONCURRENT FINDINGS – CONDUCT OF THE SUPREME COURT

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The established attitude of this Court has been not to make a casual practice of interfering with decisions of the lower Courts based on concurrent findings of facts unless they are shown to be unreasonable by not being supported by the evidence or had taken into account irrelevant matters/points or had ignored relevant points/matters or had overall, occasioned a miscarriage of justice. See Oju Local Government v. INEC (2007) 14 NWLR (pt. 1054) 242, Egba v. Appah (2005) 10 NWLR (pt. 934) 464, Ladunni v. Wema Bank Ltd. (2011) 4 NWLR (pt. 1236) 44, John Shoy Int. Ltd. v. Abuja Env. Board (2013) 8 NWLR (pt. 1357) 625.

Per M. L. Garba, JSC.

 

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CASES CITED

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STATUTES REFERRED TO

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Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)

The Federal High Court (Civil Procedure Rules), 2000

Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules

Supreme Court Act

 

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