ALHAJI EMIOLA AMUSA ADELEKE V. BAYO ASANI
June 18, 2025AYISATU ASHABI EWUOSO & ORS V. MR. RAUFU ADEOYE FAGBEMI
June 19, 2025Legalpedia Citation: (2002-04) Legalpedia 37644 (SC)
In the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Fri Apr 19, 2002
Suit Number: SC.118/1997
CORAM
IDRIS LEGBO KUTIGI, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
EMMANUEL OBIOMA OGWUEGBU, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
UTHMAN MOHAMMED, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
SAMSON ODEMWINGIE UWAIFO, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
AKINTOLA OLUFEMI EJIWUNMI, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
PARTIES
FEDERAL MORTGAGE BANK OF NIGERIA
APPELLANTS
P.N. OLLOH
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, JURISDICTION, BANKING LAW, CIVIL PROCEDURE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, APPEAL
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The respondent obtained a loan from the appellant’s Benin City Branch in 1979 secured by a mortgage deed on his property at No.23 (now No.63) Okumagba Avenue, Warri as collateral. In September 1992, the respondent liquidated the principal loan together with accrued interest and requested that a deed of release be prepared to have his property back unencumbered. The appellant failed to prepare the deed but merely returned his document of title. The respondent alleged that he could not raise another loan to develop his country home because without the deed of release, the property remained apparently encumbered.
On March 16, 1994, the respondent filed a writ of summons in the High Court of Delta State at Warri against the appellant claiming damages of N5,000,000.00 and an order directing the appellant to release his property from encumbrance. After pleadings were exchanged, the appellant applied on November 4, 1994, to have the suit struck out for incompetence, arguing that the State High Court lacked jurisdiction because the appellant bank was an agent of the Federal Government created by statute and could only be sued in the Federal High Court. The appellant relied on Section 230(1) paragraphs (q), (r), and (s) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993.
The trial Judge dismissed the application, holding that the dispute was between a bank and its customer, and by virtue of the proviso to Section 230(1)(d) of the Constitution, a State High Court had jurisdiction. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which upheld the trial court’s decision. The appellant further appealed to the Supreme Court.
HELD
1. The appeal was dismissed.
2. The court held that a State High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a cause founded on a customer/bank relationship as in the present case, by virtue of the proviso to Section 230(1)(d) of the 1979 Constitution.
3. The case was remitted to the Delta State High Court to be heard on the merits with an order for expeditious hearing.
4. Costs of N10,000.00 were awarded in favor of the respondent.
ISSUES
Whether the Court of Appeal correctly held that the State High Court had jurisdiction to entertain this action by virtue of the provisions of Section 230(1)(d) of the 1979 Constitution as amended?
RATIONES DECIDENDI
JURISDICTION OF STATE HIGH COURT – CUSTOMER/BANK RELATIONSHIP
“The decision of this court in Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria v. Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (supra) has established that a State High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a cause founded on a customer/bank relationship as in the present case.” — Per SAMSON ODEMWINGIE UWAIFO, J.S.C.
DEFINITION OF A BANK – WHETHER APPELLANT QUALIFIES AS A BANK
“The word ‘bank’ is not defined in the Constitution nor in the Interpretation Act. In its ordinary grammatical meaning, the word ‘bank’ means an organisation or place that provides financial service. Having regard to the provisions of the law selling up the plaintiff, particularly Section 5(1)(a) and Section 6(1)(a) & (b) of the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria Decree No. 82 of 1993, I think it is right to say that it falls within this ordinary meaning.” — Per SAMSON ODEMWINGIE UWAIFO, J.S.C.
SPECIAL VS. GENERAL PROVISIONS – INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
“Paragraph (d) of Section 230(1) specifically provides for banks and banking inter alia and is a special provision. Assuming therefore that the appellant is a Federal Government agency, it would be both a bank and a Federal Government agency. Paragraph (s) of Section 230(1) is applicable to agencies generally. It follows, in my view, that paragraph (d) rather than paragraph (s) is applicable specially to the appellant.” — Per SAMSON ODEMWINGIE UWAIFO, J.S.C.
PRINCIPLE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – SPECIAL VS. GENERAL PROVISIONS
“The law is that where there is a special provision in a statute, a later general provision in the same statute capable of covering the same subject matter is not to be interpreted as derogating from what has been specially provided for individually unless an intention to do so is unambiguously declared. To do otherwise is to indirectly use a general provision to alter the intention to provide specially by way of an exception for a subject-matter.” — Per SAMSON ODEMWINGIE UWAIFO, J.S.C.
APPLICATION OF LATIN MAXIM IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
“The Latin maxim is: Generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea quae antea specialiter sunt comprehensa [A general clause does not extend to those things which are before specially provided for].” — Per SAMSON ODEMWINGIE UWAIFO, J.S.C.
APPLICABILITY OF PROVISO TO SECTION 230(1)(d) – CUSTOMER/BANK DISPUTES
“I agree with his reasoning and conclusions. The dispute between the parties herein is that of a bank and its customer, and by virtue of the proviso to Section 230(1)(d) of the 1979 Constitution, a State High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit (see for example the case of Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria v. Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt.591) 333).” — Per IDRIS LEGBO KUTIGI, J.S.C.
NATURE OF BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP – CONTRACTUAL NATURE
“I agree that the State High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim filled by the respondent against the appellant. The relationship between the appellant and the respondent is purely contractual and is not caught up by the provisions of Section 230(1), (d), (q), (r), and (s) of the Constitution (suspension and modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993.” — Per UTHMAN MOHAMMED, J.S.C.
DEFINITION OF GOVERNMENT AGENCY – WHETHER APPELLANT IS A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY
“There is nothing whatever in the Federal Mortgage Bank Act to suggest that the appellant is an agency of the Federal Government. It is no doubt true that the said Bank was created by an Act of the National Assembly and therefore at best considered the property of the Federal Government with the sole aim of providing financial assistance in the form of long-term facilities to ‘Nigerian individuals desiring to acquire houses of their own and the granting of long-term credit facilities to mortgage institutions with a view to enabling those institutions to grant comparable facilities to Nigerian individuals’ as per the preamble of the Act. The Bank is no more than a business establishment given functions to perform; but neither of those functions nor the Bank itself has any connection with the affairs or the running of the Federal Government.” — Per SAMSON ODEMWINGIE UWAIFO, J.S.C.
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 277(1) – PUBLIC SERVICE OF THE FEDERATION
“The appellant cannot be regarded as a Federal Government agency simply because its staff are by definition under Section 277(1) of the 1979 Constitution referred to as persons working in the public service of the Federation. That is not a criterion and it should in addition be said that that definition has a limited connotation which does not even make such staff Federal Government employees.” — Per SAMSON ODEMWINGIE UWAIFO, J.S.C.
PURPOSE OF SECTION 277(1) – CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PUBLIC OFFICERS
“It has been decided by this court in Okomu Oil Palm Co. Ltd. v. Iserhienrhien (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt.710) 660; (2001) FWLR (Pt.45) 670; (2001) 85 LRCN 873, that the definition therein, read along with the Fifth Schedule to that Constitution, is essentially for the purpose of the Code of Conduct for public officers; that is to say, to specify by definition who is a public officer to whom the Code of Conduct applies. It does not imply that an establishment in which such public officers are employed is a Federal Government body or an agency of the Government as learned counsel for the appellant’s contention would seem to suggest.” — Per SAMSON ODEMWINGIE UWAIFO, J.S.C.
EXPEDITIOUS HEARING – IMPORTANCE IN ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
“This appeal which is on that very issue fails and is accordingly dismissed. The suit which was filed in March, 1994 will now have to go back to the High Court after some 8 years of its institution. It is ordered that the suit be remitted to the Delta State High Court to be heard on the merits. It will be in the interest of the administration of justice that it be given an expeditious hearing it now obviously deserves.” — Per SAMSON ODEMWINGIE UWAIFO, J.S.C.
APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT – RELIANCE ON PREVIOUS SUPREME COURT DECISION
“Having read before now the judgment of my learned brother, Uwaifo, J.S.C., I agree with him that the issue raised in this case is on all fours with the decision of this court in Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria v. Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt.591) 333, I will therefore for the reasons given in the said judgment also dismiss the appeal.” — Per AKINTOLA OLUFEMI EJIWUNMI, J.S.C.
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 230(1) – EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL HIGH COURT
“I do not think that reasoning in regard to the nature of the provisions of paragraph (d) and paragraph (s) is correct. On the contrary, paragraph (d) is a special provision relating to banks while paragraph (s) is general to the Federal Government and its agencies. I have already made it clear that the appellant is a bank.” — Per SAMSON ODEMWINGIE UWAIFO, J.S.C.
CASES CITED
STATUTES REFERRED TO
• Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 (as amended)
• Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993
• Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria Act (Cap. 138), Laws of the Federation, 1990
• Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria Decree No. 82 of 1993
