Legalpedia Citation: (2023-06) Legalpedia 26736 (CA)

In the Court of Appeal

ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

Mon Jun 5, 2023

Suit Number: CA/A/880/2017

CORAM

STEPHEN JONAH ADAH JCA

UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU JCA

BATURE ISAH GAFAI JCA

PARTIES

FBN MERCHANT BANK LIMITED (FORMER KAKAWA DISCOUNT HOUSE LIMITED)

APPELLANTS

ABEL OWOTEMU

RESPONDENTS

AREA(S) OF LAW

APPEAL, CONTRACT, EVIDENCE, LABOUR LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

 

SUMMARY OF FACTS

The Respondent/Cross-Appellant herein, who was the Claimant at the lower Court, contended that he had validly resigned from his employment but the Appellants (Defendants at trial Court) contended that he was dismissed before his alleged resignation and was therefore not entitled any benefits. The Respondent took his grievances to the National Industrial Court (The trial/lower court).

The lower Court entered judgment for the Respondent/Cross Appellant. The Appellant was dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court hence this appeal the respondent took liberty to appeal the parts of the decision he was dissatisfied with hence a cross-appeal.

 

HELD

Appeal allowed in part

Cross-appeal dismissed

ISSUES

Whether the trial Court erred in law when he determined and based his judgment delivered on 25th October, 2017 in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/44/2013 on the Respondent’s statement of facts dated 28th February, 2013 and filed on 1st March, 2013?

Whether the Respondent validly terminated his employment with the Appellant?

Whether the trial Court was right in awarding 20% interest per annum on the judgment if not satisfied within 30 days, as against the 10% interest claimed by the Respondent?

Whether the trial Court erred in law when it failed to properly pronounce on all the reliefs submitted to it?

Whether the trial Court misdirected itself when it reached a finding contrary to its own finding on an employee’s entitlement to the payment of his allowances and entitlements that accrue prior to his termination or dismissal?

 

RATIONES DECIDENDI

REPLY BRIEF – PURPOSE OF A REPLY BRIEF

Let me post-haste state that by Order 19 Rule 5 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2021 a reply brief is filed to deal with all new points raised and argued in the respondent’s brief. The purpose of a reply brief is not to highlight submissions made in the Appellant’s brief which the appellant perceives that the respondent did not counter in the respondent’s brief. In the same vein, a reply brief is not to be used to strengthen the appellant’s brief by repeating the submissions already made in the appellant’s brief. OKONJI vs. NJOKANMA (1999) 12 SCN 259 at 277, OLAFISOYE vs. FRN (2004) 4 NWLR (PT 864) 580 at 644 and ADEMOK CONTINENTAL LTD vs. OGUN STATE GOVT (2022) LPELR (56418) 1 at 6-7.  – Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA

PLEADINGS – WHEN PLEADINGS ARE AMENDED

It is agreed on all sides that when pleadings are amended, the amended pleadings supersede the original pleadings and define the live issues to be tried before the Court. ANAMBRA STATE ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION AUTHORITY vs. EKWENEM (2009) LPELR (482) 1 at 26-27, AGBAHOMOVO vs. EDUYEGBE (1999) 3 NWLR (PT 593) 170 at 186-187 and JULIUS BERGER vs. TOKI RAINBOW COMMUNITY BANK LTD (2019) LPELR (46408) 1 at 32. However, it does not mean that the original pleadings ceases to exist; it still forms part of the proceedings, and a Court cannot close its eyes to it. See SALAMI vs. OKE (1987) 4 NWLR (PT 63) 150, AGBAISI vs. EBIKOREFE (1997) 4 NWLR (PT 502) 630 and ANAMBRA STATE ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION AUTHORITY vs. EKWENEM (2009) 13 NWLR (PT 1158) 370 at 436. – Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA

MISTAKE/ERROR – THE STAND ON MISTAKES OR ERRORS OF COURTS

“It is generally accepted that it is not every mistake or error of a Court that would result in the decision appealed against being set aside. AKOMOLAFE vs. GUARDIAN PRESS LTD (2010) LPELR (366) 1 at 10, UKAEGBU vs. UGOJI (1991) LPELR (3338) 1 at 21 and ODUWOLE vs. WEST (2010) LPELR (2263) 1 at 35.

The mistake of a Court that would lead to its decision being set aside is where the mistake occasioned a miscarriage of justice. See OWHONDA vs. EKPECHI (2003) 9-10 SC 1 at 21, KWARA STATE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. TOLANI (2019) LPELR (47539) 1 at 19-20 and JANKADA vs. OLORUNTOBA (2022) LPELR (57058) 1 at 36-37.

Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA”

RELIEF – CONDUCT OF COURTS IN GRANTING RELIEFS

The trite law is that a Court cannot grant a relief that has not been claimed, neither can it grant more than what was claimed. EKPENYONG vs. NYONG (1975) 2 SC 71, HASTON NIG LTD vs. ACB PLC (2002) 12 NWLR (PT 782) 623 at 647 and SOUTHBEACH CO LTD vs. WILLIAMS (2021) LPELR (57746) 1 at 36-38 and 44-46. – Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA

COURTS – WHERE A COURT SETS OUT RELIEFS IT IS GRANTING

“The Latinism expressio unis est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) or its variant of inclusio unis est exclusio alterius or enumeratio unis exclusio alterius still remains good law. See OGBUNYIYA vs. OKUDO (1979) 6-9 SC (Reprint) 24 at 35, UDOH vs. ORTHOPAEDIC HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT BOARD (1993) 7 NWLR (PT 304) 139 at 148, EHUWA vs. ONDO SIEC (2006) LPELR (1056) 1 at 20-21 and SUN INSURANCE (NIG) PLC vs. UMEZ ENGINEERING CO LTD (2015) LPELR (24737) 1 at 24-25.

So, the lower Court having expressly set out what it granted, meant that what it did not set out was not granted…

Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA”

TERMINATION OF CONTRACT – WHEN THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT FOR TERMINATION OF CONTRACT IS COMPLIED WITH

“It is hornbook law that the motive for the termination of a contract by an employer is immaterial, provided that the terms of the contract for terminating the same are complied with. See FAKUADE vs. OBAFEMI AWOLOWO UNIV TEACHING HOSPITAL IFE (1993) LPELR (1233) 1 at 14-15, OFORISHE vs. NIGERIAN GAS CO. LTD (2017) LPELR (42766) 1 at 24 and ISIEVWORE vs. NEPA (2002) LPELR (1555) 1 at 13.

Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA”

RESIGNATION – WHERE AN EMPLOYEE COMPLIES WITH TERMS OF CONTRACT AND RESIGNS FROM EMPLOYMENT

By parity of reasoning or analogous reasoning and to avoid the concept of forced labour; where an employee complies with the terms of the contract and resigns from his employment, the motive which impelled him to resign is of no moment. – Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA

EVIDENCE – CONDUCT OF THE COURTS IN RELATION TO EVIDENCE

“The documents were as good as dumped on the Court, and it is not for the Court to do cloistered justice by scrutinizing the documents outside of open Court to ascertain how the computation was arrived at. The function of the Court is to decide between the parties based on what has been demonstrated and tested.

See ONIBUDO vs. AKIBU (1982) LPELR (2679) 1 at 30, ACN vs. LAMIDO (2012) LPELR (7825) 1 at 38, and ALI UCHA vs. ELECHI (2012) LPELR (7823) 1 at 46.

Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA”

FAIR HEARING – WHO CAN RAISE A COMPLAINT OF BREACH OF FAIR HEARING

“It is trite law that the complaint of breach of fair hearing can only be raised and avail a litigant when in fact the right had been denied. The admonition of the apex Court in this regard is instructive. Hear Tobi, JSC in ADEBAYO vs. A-G OGUN STATE (2008) 7 NWLR (PT. 1085) 201 at 205-206 or (2008) LPELR (80) 1 at 23-24:

“Learned counsel for the appellant roped in the fair hearing principle. I have seen in recent times that parties who have bad cases embrace and make use of the constitutional provision of fair hearing to bamboozle the adverse party and the Court, with a view to moving the Court away from the live issues in the litigation. They make so much weather and sing the familiar song that the constitution is violated or contravened. They do not stop there. They rake the defence in most inappropriate cases because they have nothing to canvass in their favour in the case. The fair hearing provision in the Constitution is the machinery or locomotive of justice not a spare part to propel or invigorate the case of the user. It is not a casual principle of law available to a party to be picked up at will in a case and force the Court to apply it to his advantage. On the contrary, it is a formidable and fundamental constitutional provision available to a party who is really denied fair hearing because he was not heard or that he was not properly heard in the case. Let litigants who have nothing useful to advocate in favour of their cases leave the fair hearing constitutional provision alone because it is not available to them just for the asking.”

See also KOLO vs. COP (2017) LPELR (42577) 1 at 45-46, MAGAJI vs. NIGERIAN ARMY (2008) 8 NWLR (PT. 1089) 338 and BROSSETTE MANUFACTURING LTD vs. M/S OLA ILEMOBOLA LTD (2007) 14 NWLR (PT 1053) 109 at 139.

Equally, in MAGAJI vs. NIGERIAN ARMY (2008) 8 NWLR (PT 1089) 338 or (2008) LPELR (1814) 1 at 40, Tobi, JSC observed as follows:

“It has become a fashion for litigants to resort to their right to fair hearing on appeal as if it is a magic wand to cure all their inadequacies at the trial Court. But it is not so and cannot be so. The fair hearing constitutional provision is designed for both parties in the litigation, in the interest of fair play and justice. The Courts must not give a burden to the provision which it cannot carry or shoulder. I see that in this appeal. Fair hearing is not a cut-and-dry principle which parties can, in the abstract, always apply to their comfort and convenience. It is a principle which is based and must be based on the facts of the case before the Court. Only the facts of the case can influence and determine the application or applicability of the principle. The principle of fair hearing is helpless or completely dead outside the facts of the case.”

See also ORUGBO vs. UNA (2002) 16 NWLR (PT. 792) 175 at 211 and 212.

Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA”

DISMISSAL – CONDUCT OF COURTS IN RELATION TO DISMISSAL

“The employment relationship between the parties is not one that has statutory flavour. In this regard, whether the dismissal is lawful or unlawful, being a purely master and servant relationship, it brings the relationship to an end as the Court cannot force a willing servant on an unwilling master. The remedy available to the employee in such a situation will be damages for breach of the contract.

See OLAREWAJU vs. AFRIBANK (NIG) PLC (2001) LPELR (2573) 1 at 29, UTC NIG PLC vs. PETERS (2022) LPELR (57289) 1 at 23-24, and OSAKWE vs. NIGERIAN PAPER MILL LTD (1998) LPELR-(2788) 1 at 14.

Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA”

EVIDENCE – DUTY OF AN APPELLATE COURT TO EVALUATE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

…it is trite that an appellate Court is in as good a position as a trial Court in the evaluation of documentary evidence. IWUOHA vs. NIPOST (2003) LPELR (1569) 1 at 29, GONZEE (NIG) LTD vs. NERDC (2005) LPELR (1332) 1 at 16 and D. M. V. (NIG) LTD vs. NPA (2019) 1 NWLR (PT 1652) 163 at 183. – Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA

RESIGNATION – WHEN RESIGNATION TAKES EFFECT

It is abecedarian law that the resignation of an employee need not be formally accepted before it takes effect. The resignation letter becomes effective from the date the letter is received by the employer. BENSON vs. ONITIRI (1960) SCNLR 177 at 189-190, SUNDAY vs. OLUGBENGA (2008) LPELR (4995) 1 at 7-9 and YESUFU vs. GOV OF EDO STATE (2001) LPELR (3526) 1 at 24. In IBRAHIM vs. ABDALLAH (2019) LPELR (48984) 1 at 21-22, Abba-Aji, JSC intoned: “Resignation need not be formally accepted before it took effect … A notice of resignation is effective, not from the date of the letter or from the date of the purported acceptance, but from the date the letter was received by the employer or his agent … There is absolute power to resign and no discretion to refuse to accept notice.” – Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA

COURTS – PRIMARY DUTY OF THE JUDGE AT NISI PRIUS – CONDUCT OF APPELLATE COURTS IN RELATION TO FINDINGS OF LOWER COURTS

“The primary duty of the Judge at nisi prius is perception of evidence, evaluation of evidence, and ascription of probative value thereto by making the requisite findings of facts which entails both perception and evaluation. GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER LTD vs. AJEH (2011) 10 NWLR (PT 1255) 574 at 592, WACHUKWU vs. OWUNWANNE (2011) LPELR (3466) 1 at 50-51, and ONI vs. JOHNSON (2015) LPELR (24545) 1 at 26-27.

It is hornbook law that where a trial Court unquestionably evaluates and justifiably appraises the facts, it is not the business of an appellate Court to substitute its own views for the views of the trial Court. However, an appellate Court can intervene where there is insufficient evidence to sustain the judgment or where the trial Court fails to make proper use of the opportunity of seeing, hearing, and observing the witnesses or where the findings of facts by the trial Court cannot be regarded as resulting from the evidence or where the trial Court has drawn wrong conclusions from accepted evidence or has taken an erroneous view of the evidence adduced before it or its findings are perverse in the sense that they do not flow from accepted evidence or are not supported by the evidence before the Court. See EDJEKPO vs. OSIA (2007) 8 NWLR (PT. 1037) 635 or (2007) LPELR (1014) 1 at 46-47, ARE vs. IPAYE (1990) LPELR (541) 1 at 22, WOLUCHEM vs. GUDI (1981) 5 SC 291 at 320, and FASIKUN II vs. OLURONKE II (1999) 2 NWLR (PT 589) 1 or (1999) LPELR (1248) 1 at 47-48.

The law is that the conclusion of the trial Court on the facts is presumed to be correct, so that presumption must be displaced by the person seeking to upset the judgment on the facts. See WILLIAMS vs. JOHNSON (1937) 2 WACA 253, BALOGUN vs. AGBOOLA (1974) 1 ALL NLR (PT2) 66, and EHOLOR vs. OSAYANDE (1992) LPELR (8053) 1 at 43.

The evaluation of evidence and the findings made by the lower Court are not perverse. An appellate Court will not lightly interfere with the same unless for compelling reasons. See OGBECHIE vs. ONOCHIE (1988) 1 NWLR (PT 47) 370, MAKINDE vs. AKINWALE (2000) 1 SC 89, and AGBOMEJI vs. BAKARE (1998) 9 NWLR (PT 564) 1.

Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA”

APPEAL – DUTY OF APPELLATE TO SATISFY THE APPELLATE COURT THAT THE DECISION ON APPEAL IS WRONG

EHOLOR vs. OSAYANDE (supra) at 43 and ONI vs. JOHNSON (supra) at 11-13. The onus is on an appellant to satisfy the appellate Court that the decision on appeal is wrong. Where he fails to do this, the decision appealed against will be allowed to stand. MACAULAY vs. TUKURU (1881- 1911) 1 NLR 35 at 40, AKINLOYE vs. EYIYOLA (1968) NMLR 92 at 95, OBISANYA vs. NWOKO (1974) 6 SC 69 at 80, WOLUCHEM vs. GUDI (1981) 5 SC 291 at 326-330 and OBODO vs. OGBA (1987) 1 NSCC (VOL. 18) 416 at 421. – Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA

RELIEF – THE COURT IS BOUND BY THE RELIEFS SOUGHT

“It is limpid from the relief claimed that the paregoric desired by the Respondent is 10% interest on the judgment sum. Having so conceived his desired relief, he formulated and claimed the desired paregoric accordingly as the relief from the Court. This being so, the Court, and all the parties became bound by the relief as framed as it is not the duty of the Court to grant any relief outside what had been claimed.

In the words of Tobi, JSC in EAGLE SUPER PACK (NIGERIA) LTD vs. ACB PLC (2006) 19 NWLR (PT 1013) 20 or (2006) LPELR (980) 1 at 40: “It is elementary law that a Court is bound by the relief or reliefs sought. The generosity or charity of a Court of law is confined strictly to the relief or reliefs sought to the extent that a Court of law cannot give a party what he did not claim. That is completely outside our procedural law. The rationale behind this is that a party who comes to Court knows where the shoe pinches him and therefore knows the limits of what he wants. The Court, as an unbiased umpire, so to say, cannot claim to know the relief or reliefs better than the party…”

See also DUMEZ NIGERIA LTD vs. NWAKHOBA (2008) LEPLR (965) 1 at 26 and AKINTERINWA vs. OLADUNJOYE (2000) LPELR (358) 1 at 40 or (2000) 6 NWLR (PT 659) 92.

Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA”

CLAIM – MEANING OF CLAIM

“In defining the meaning of ‘claim’ in OSUJI vs. EKEOCHA (2009) 16 NWLR (PT. 1166) 81 or (2009) LPELR (2816) 1 at 55, Tobi, JSC stated thus: ‘A claim, in our adjectival law, originates an action. It is the pivot or the cynosure of the case. It sets out the relief or reliefs sought by the plaintiff. A plaintiff is bound by his claim and must not deviate from it willy-nilly. A plaintiff cannot in law present a case different from his claim as the law regards such an unsolicited procedure completely outside the law.’

Just as it is elementary that the claimant cannot present a case different from his claim, so also can a Court not adjudicate between parties based on a claim not formulated by them. In OSUJI vs. EKEOCHA (supra) at page 44, Adekeye, JSC stated: ‘The position of the law is clear that a Court of law can only grant reliefs claimed by a party and not more. It is trite that a Court is duty bound to adjudicate between the parties on the basis of the claim formulated by them.’

Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA”

APPEAL – CONDITIONS TO BE SATISFIED BY AN APPLICANT FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME

“I stated at the outset that the Cross-Appellant was granted leave of this Court to file the cross-appeal. By Order 6 Rule 9 (2) of the Rules of this Court, an applicant for enlargement of time to (cross) appeal must satisfy two conditions: – good and substantial reasons for failing to appeal within the prescribed period and grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard.

See LAFFERI NIG LTD vs. NAL MERCHANT BANK (2015) LPELR (24726) 1 at 21, KOTOYE vs. SARAKI (1995) 5 NWLR (PT. 395) 256 and MINISTER OF PETROLEUM & MINERAL RESOURCES vs. EXPO-SHIPPING LINE (NIG) LTD (2010) 12 NWLR (PT 1208) 261.

Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA”

GROUNDS OF APPEAL – APPEAL SHOULD BE BASED ON PROPOSED GROUNDS OF APPEAL

“By all odds, the order of Court granting leave directed that the Notice of Cross-Appeal to be filed should be in terms of the proposed Notice of Appeal attached to the application. (See page 11 of the Supplementary Record of Appeal).

When it is remembered that it is the grounds of appeal that inter alia informs whether leave to (cross) appeal should be granted under Order 6 Rule 9 (2) of the Rules of Court, it becomes effulgent that what is material in the order for the appeal to be filed in terms of the proposed notice of appeal is that the appeal be filed based on the proposed grounds of appeal on which leave was obtained.

Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA”

TECHNICALITY – CONDUCT OF THE COURT IN RELATION TO UNDUE TECHNICALITY

“The law is a technical discipline. Even with the zeitgeist of the Courts to eschew technicality in pursuit of substantial justice; what the Courts frown at is not technicality per se, but resort to undue technicality.

A-G ENUGU STATE vs. AVOP NIG PLC (1995) 6 NWLR (PT 334) 90 at 123-124, ADEMOK CONTINENTAL LTD vs. OGUN STATE GOVT (2022) LPELR (56418) 1 at 30-31 and UNION BANK vs. BEAR MARINE SERVICES LTD (2018) LPELR (43692) 1 at 24-25.

Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA”

TECHNICALITY – THE CONDUCT OF THE COURT IN RELATION TO UNDUE TECHNICALITY

Here’s the text arranged into clear paragraphs: “It is apothegmatic to state that the law is an ass, but I do not think that the law has sunk that low in its asininity for the Notice of Cross-Appeal to be said to be incompetent in the circumstances of this matter as contended by the Cross-Respondent. The days when the whirligig of technicality rendered justice grotesque are long gone. The Courts have successfully worked their way in the mass exodus from the Egypt of undue technicality and arrived at the promised land of substantial justice.

The Cross-Respondent’s preliminary objection is a quest to scuttle the hearing and determination of the merits of the cross-appeal by resort to undue technicality. It invites the Court to embark on the retrogressive step to the foregone days of resort to undue technicality. I decline that invitation with all the strength I can muster.

See generally AFOLABI vs. ADEKUNLE (1983) 2 SCNLR 141, NNEJI vs. CHUKWU (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 81) 184 and BANKOLE vs. DENAPO (2019) LPELR (46444) 1 at 20.

Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA”

JUDGMENT – HOW THE JUDGMENT OF A COURT IS TO BE TAKEN

Now, it is rudimentary law that the judgment of a Court is to be taken as a single decision. It is not to be read in convenient instalments. ADEBAYO vs. A-G OGUN STATE (2008) 2 SCNJ 352 at 366-367 or (2008) 7 NWLR (PT 1185) 201 at 221,ADEGBUYI vs. APC (2014) ALL FWLR (PT 761) 1486 at 1504 or (2015) 2 NWLR (PT 1442) 1 at 24-25 and FIJABI vs. FIRST BANK OF NIG PLC (supra) at 31. – Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA

MISCONCEPTION- WHERE THERE IS A MISCONCEPTION AS TO THE DECISION REACHED BY A COURT

It is an established principle of law arising from the logic of reasoning that where there has been a misconception as to the decision reached or arrived at by a Court in a matter, any argument flowing from that misconception will undoubtedly be fallacious since it will be based on a wrong premise. See UDENGWU vs. UZUEGBU (2003) 13 NWLR (PT 836) 136 at 152, LADEJOBI vs. OGUNTAYO (2004) 7 SC (PT. 1) 159 at 169, CHUKWUKELO vs. FIDELITY BANK (2020) LPELR (51632) 1 at 25-26 and ALIU vs. THE STATE (2021) LPELR (53354) 1 at 15-16. – Per U. A. Ogakwu, JCA

RELIEFS – CONDUCT OF COURTS IN GRANTING RELIEFS

“No Court is allowed to grant reliefs not claimed or to exceed the claim of the plaintiff without any regard to the Rules of the Court.

By Order 47 Rule 7 of the Rules of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, the Court’s Rules provide as follows:

“The Court may at the time of delivering the judgment or making the order give direction as to the period within which payment is to be made or other act is to be performed and may order interest at a rate not less than 10% per annum to be paid upon any judgment.”

This rule gives the Court the discretion to award post-judgment interest, and the minimum is 10%. That signifies that the Court has the discretion to award post-judgment interest above 10%. Our practice is that this discretion can be exercised regardless of the fact that it was not claimed by the claimant in his reliefs. It is purely meant to be an exercise of Court’s discretion which must be exercised judicially and judiciously having regards to the facts and circumstances of each case. See the case of Ntukidem v. Oko (1986) 5 NWLR (Cp. 45) 909. (per Oputa, JSC).

“Judicially means, inter alia, well considered, decided or determined upon the facts and the law. It means determined on the merit. After all discretion est scire per legem quid sit justum – Discretion is the knowledge of that, which is just through the law. A discretion that produces an obvious injustice is one not judicially or even judiciously exercised.”

The discretion of the Court must not run riot or ride roughshod over the claim presented by the parties. Where a claimant chooses not to leave the issue of post-judgment interest entirely to the discretion of the Court but made a specific claim, the Court must not be injudicious in giving to such a claimant any interest rate higher than the amount claimed by the claimant to which the respondent joined issues. In the instant case, the Claimant/Respondent claimed interest of 10%. By this claim, he has restricted the Court to the circumference of 10% interest. The Court cannot give the claimant what he did not claim nor improve on the claim of a claimant without breaching the tenets of his duties as an unbiased arbiter.

See the case of Ilona v. Idakwo & Anor (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt. 830) 54 where the Supreme Court per Edozie, JSC held as follows:

“The cases of Obayagbona v. Obazee (1972) 5 SC 247 and Akinbobola v. Plisson Fisko Nigeria Ltd. (supra) were alluded to in support of the contention, ‘It is now clearly settled that a Court has no power to award to a plaintiff more than what he has claimed. The rationale for the principle is not far fetched. A Court of law is not a charitable institution doling out reliefs which have not been claimed.’ In the case of Nwanya v. Nwanya (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 62) 697 at 704, Olatawura, J.C.A. (as he then was) said: ‘We have consistently been reminded that our Court is not father Christmas; hence, he who comes to Court must come prepared to prove his claim in accordance with the law.’ In the same vein, this Court in the case of Ekpenyong v. Nyong (1975) 2 SC 71 at 80 reiterated the principle thus: ‘Secondly, as we think that as the reliefs granted by the learned trial Judge were not those sought by the applicant, he went beyond his jurisdiction when he purported to grant such reliefs. It is trite law that a Court is without power to award to a claimant that which he did not claim.'”

Per S. J. Adah, JCA”

CASES CITED

STATUTES REFERRED TO

Court of Appeal Rules, 2021

Kakawa Discount House Limited Staff Handbook

National Industrial Court Rules

 

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