PRINCE JOHN KEGAR DANJUMA UMAR VS WUKARI TRADITIONAL COUNCIL & ORS
March 30, 2025ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS (APC) & ORS v. MR. PETER AGUELE & ORS.
March 30, 2025Legalpedia Citation: (2020) Legalpedia (CA) 15861
In the Court of Appeal
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
Thu Oct 1, 2020
Suit Number: CA/ABJ/EPT/GOV/703/2020
CORAM
PETER OLABISI IGE
PETER OLABISI IGE
PETER OLABISI IGE
PETER OLABISI IGE
PETER OLABISI IGE
PETER OLABISI IGE
PETER OLABISI IGE
PETER OLABISI IGE
PETER OLABISI IGE
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
PETER OLABISI IGE
PETER OLABISI IGE
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
PETER OLABISI IGE
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
PETER OLABISI IGE
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
PETER OLABISI IGE
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
PETER OLABISI IGE
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
ABDULLAHI MAHMUD BAYERO
ABDULLAHI MAHMUD BAYERO
PETER OLABISI IGE
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
PETER OLABISI IGE
PETER OLABISI IGE
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
PETER OLABISI IGE
ABDULLAHI MAHMUD BAYERO
PETER OLABISI IGE
PETER OLABISI IGE
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
PETER OLABISI IGE
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
PETER OLABISI IGE
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
IKECHI FRANCIS OGBUAGU (Lead Judgment) JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
IKECHI FRANCIS OGBUAGU (Lead Judgment) JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI
PETER OLABISI IGE
IKECHI FRANCIS OGBUAGU (Lead Judgment) JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
ABDULLAHI MAHMUD BAYERO
PETER OLABISI IGE
PARTIES
DOUYE DIRI
1. ADVANCED NIGERIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY (ANDP) 2. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) 3. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP)ELECTIONAL COMMISSION (INEC) 4. KANO STATE CHAIRMAN OF THE ALL PROGRESSIVE COMMISSION(ALHAJI UMAR HARUNA DOGUWA)
AREA(S) OF LAW
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The 2nd Respondent, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) conducted election to the office of the Governor of Bayelsa State on 16th November, 2019. Prior to the election, it issued Regulations and Guidelines for the conduct of the election. The Appellant was the flag bearer of the 3rd Respondent, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP), while the 1st Respondent had Lucky King-George and Mr. David Peter Esikuma and Miss Inowei Janet as its nominated candidates for the positions of Governor and Deputy Governor respectively. Lyon David Pereworimini and Biobarakuma Degi-Eremienyo were the standard-bearers of the All Progressives Congress (APC). The 1st Respondent alleged that the 2nd Respondent unlawfully excluded it and its candidates from participating in the election. After the polls, the 2nd Respondent declared and returned Lyon David Pereworimini of APC as the winner of the election on 17th November, 2019. The 1st Respondent and its candidates, on 5th December, 2019, filed a petition, Petition No: EPT/BY/GOV/02/2019, against the election on grounds of unlawful exclusion from its conduct, which petition was dismissed. The 3rd Respondent and the Appellant challenged the declaration and return made by INEC in the tribunal. The petition meandered from the tribunal via the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court. On 13th February, 2020, the Supreme Court, in Appeal No: SC1/2020, disqualified the candidates of APC and nullified the declaration/return of the 17th November, 2019 and ordered the 2nd Respondent to declare the candidate with the highest number of votes in that election of 16th November, 2019. The 2nd Respondent hence, declared the Appellant as the winner of the election on 14th February, 2020. Sequel to the return, the 1st Respondent, with its three candidates whose names were later struck out on their application, beseeched the tribunal, via a petition filed on 26th February, 2020, and tabled against the Appellant, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents some reliefs among which, was that the election be nullified in that the election was invalid by reason of the unlawful exclusion of the 1st Petitioner and its candidate in breach of Section 138(1)(d) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), that the declaration and return of the 3rd Respondent as winner of the 2019 Bayelsa State Governorship Election be nullified. In reaction, the Appellant, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents separately joined issue with the 1st Respondent and denied liability by filing their respective replies to the petition. They also challenged the petition by dint of preliminary objections. The tribunal had a full-scale determination of the preliminary objections and the petition wherein in its final decision it granted the petition. Aggrieved by the decision, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal urging the court to allow same and dismiss the 1st Respondent’s Petition in its entirety. The 1st Respondent filed a motion on notice seeking an order striking out some grounds of appeal on grounds that they were contradictory as they alleged that the cause of action crystallised on 16th November 2019 and 27th September 2019, and issues for determination as they were incompetent having been formulated from competent and incompetent grounds of appeal.
HELD
Application Dismissed, Appeal Allowed
ISSUES
Motion of Notice Whether or not considering the facts in support of this application and the law, this application ought to be granted. Main Appeal Whether the learned Justice of the Tribunal were right in holding that the 1st Respondent’s Petition was not statute-barred pursuant to Section 285(14) (c), Section 285(9) and Section 285 (5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). 2.Whether the learned Justices of the Tribunal were right in holding that the 1st Respondent’s candidates were validly nominated to contest and unlawful excluded from contesting the Bayelsa Governorship election held on 16th November 2019. Whether the learned Justices of the Tribunal were right in holding that the 1st Respondent had discharged the burden on them in establishing their case as required by law in the light of the evidence before the Tribunal. Whether the learned Justices of the Tribunal were right in granting to the 1st Respondent the reliefs sought in the Petition as constituted.
RATIONES DECIDENDI
GROUND OF APPEAL – APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE IN CHALLENGING INCOMPETENT GROUNDS OF APPEAL IN THE PRESENCE OF AN EXISTING VALID GROUND(S)
“It is now trite, that motion on notice is filed where a party intends to challenge the incompetence of one or two grounds of appeal in the presence of an existing valid ground(s), see Garba v. Mohammed (2012) NWLR (Pt. 1537) 114; Kente v. Ishaku (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1587) 96; PDP v. Sheriff (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1588) 219; NNPC v. Famfa Oil Ltd. (2012) LPELR – 7812 (SC)/(2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 148; Cocacola (Nig.) Ltd. v. Akinsanya (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 17 NWLR (Pt. 1593) 74; Ezenwaji v. UNN (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1598) 45; Petgas Resources Ltd. v. Mbanefo (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1601) 442; KLM Royal Dueth Airlines v. Aloma (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1601) 473; Isah v. INEC (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 175.
TECHNICALITY – MEANING OF AND ATTITUDE OF COURTS TO TECHNICALITY
“Indubitably, I share the view point of the appellant that the allegations against to those grounds smells of invitation to technicality. Indisputably, nowadays, the courts have evolved the paradigm shift from the pangs of technicality to dishing out substantial justice: “Justice fairly administered accordingly to rules of substantive law, regardless of any procedural errors not affecting the litigant’s substantive right; a fair trial on the merits,” see Bryan A. Garner(ed) Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edition) page 881. Technicality means a harmless error/mistake that does not go to the root of a case, see Olley v. Tunji (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1362) 275. The “spirit of justice does not reside in form and formalities, nor in technicalities,” see Bello v. A. –G., Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828 at 886, per Oputa, JSC; Omisore v. Aregbsola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 205. Substantial justice and technical justice, arch enemies in adjudication, had been in a protracted imaginary battle on which to win and arrest the attention of the Nigerian courts. In the process of the juridical duel, however, the case-law, rightly, intervened and slaughtered technicality and buried it, deeply, under the temple of substantial justice. To accede to the first respondent’s request tantamounts to resurrecting the deceased technicality. This will be an affront to the law.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MEANING AND ESSENCE OF GROUNDS OF APPEAL
“To start with, a ground of appeal is the focus of an appeal. It denotes the totality of the reasons why a decision complained of is considered wrong by an appealing party, see Ehinlanwo v. Oke (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1113) 357; Ugboaja v. Akintoye-Sowemimo (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 113) 278; Akpan v. Bob (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 421; Labour Party v. Bello (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1548) 145; Ngere v. Okuruket ‘XIV’ (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 440. It binds the courts and parties, see Udom v. Umana (No. 1) 2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1526) 179. Its essence is to notify an opponent, usually a respondent, the nature of the adversary’s, invariably an appellant’s, complaints against a decision, see Abe v. Unilorin (supra); Aderounmu v. Olowu (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt. 652) 253; Lagos State v. Sarhuna (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 456) 1617; Ladoja v. Ajimobi (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1519) 87; Ogboru v. Okowa (2016) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1522) 84; Achonu v. Okuwobi (2017) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1584) 142; PDP v. Sheriff (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1588) 219; Kente v. Ishaku (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1587) 94; PDP v. Sheriff (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1588) 219; GTB Plc. v. Innoson Nig. Ltd. (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1591) 181; Nweke v. Unizik, Awka (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1598) 454; Atanda v. Comm., L & H., Kwara State (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 32”.
GROUND(S) OF APPEAL – WHETHER COURTS ARE COMPELLED TO LABEL GROUND(S) OF APPEAL INCOMPETENT ON THE SLIGHTEST INFRACTION OF THE RULES OF COURTS
“The law does not compel the courts to label ground(s) of appeal incompetent on the slightest infraction of the rules of courts. It is not the intent and spirit of the rules of court, which are designed to ensure fairness to litigating parties, to shut out an appellant from ventilating his complains in an appeal, see – Mil. Admin. Benue State v. Ulegede (2001) 17 NWLR (Pt. 731) 194, Aderounmu v. Olowu (supra), Abe v. Unilorin (supra), The Minister of Petroleum & Min. Resources v. Expo Shipping Line (Nig.) Ltd. (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1208) 261. I am not armed with the law to brand the grounds as guilty of contradiction”.
APPEAL – RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A GROUND OF APPEAL AND AN ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION
“It cannot be gainsaid that there exists a judicial relationship between a ground of appeal and an issue for determination. An issue for determination is a combination of facts and law which, when decided, determines and affects the fate of an appeal, see Odunze v. Nwosu (2007) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1050) 1; Aderibegbe v. Abidoye (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1150) 529; Okonobor v. D. E. & S. T. Co. Ltd. (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1150) 529; Ukiri v. Geco Prakla (Nig.) Ltd. (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1220) 544; Ezeuko v. State (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1509) 529; PDP v. Umeh (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1579) 272.
It is a settled law, that an issue for determination must flow from a ground (s) of appeal. Where an issue is not a progeny of a ground(s) of appeal, it is rendered incompetent and the court will be disrobed of the jurisdiction to entertain it, see Omagbemi v. Guinness Nig. Ltd. (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 377) 258; Lewis v. UBA Plc. (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1508) 329; Isaac v. Imasuen (2016) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1511) 250; Okereke v. Umahi (2016) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1524) 438; Udom v. Umana (No.1) (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1526) 179; Nsirim v. Amadi (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1504) 42; Udom v. Umana (No. 1) (supra); Lewis v. UBA Plc. (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1508) 329; Salisu v. Mobolaji (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1535) 242. It is trite, that a ground of appeal must produce an issue for determination, either singly or jointly, or taken as abandoned, see Odunze v. Nwosu (supra); Aderibegbe v. Abidoye (supra); Okonobor v. D.E. & S.T. Co. Ltd., (supra); D.T.T. Ent. (Nig.) Co. Ltd. v. Busari (2011) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1249; Ezeuko v. State (supra). Similarly, in the mind of the law, where a competent and an incompetent grounds of appeal beget an issue, then both are rendered incompetent, Ikpeazu v. Otti (2016) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1513) 38; Sogunro v. Yeku (2017) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1570) 290. Nevertheless, this hallowed principle of law is elastic. It admits of an exception. The rider is, deeply, rooted in the wide domain of jurisdiction as: “The fact that a competent ground of appeal is lumped with an incompetent ground of appeal in an issue for determination will not constitute a ground for ignoring the jurisdictional question. This is so because jurisdiction is the soul of any action, “see Osude v. Azodo (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1588) 293 at 320, per Galinge, JSC.
QUESTION OF JURISDICTION – WHETHER THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION SUPERCEDES THE DETERMINATION OF INCOMPETENT ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION
“There are no extenuating circumstances that will propel me to disturb the solemn finding which is in tandem with the law. Besides, it will unveil anon that the meat of the appellant’s appeal falls within the ambit of jurisdiction. To this end, the ancient doctrine, that an issue for determination, which is an offshoot of admixture of competent and incompetent grounds of appeal is incompetent, will pale into insignificance in the face of the jurisdictional question raised in the appellant’s appeal. I take shelter under the exception enunciated in the ex cathedra authority of Osude v. Azodo (supra)”.
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE – INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 285 (14) (C) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, AS AMENDED.
“It castigates the finding of the tribunal that the first respondent’s petition was not statute-barred within the purview of section 285 (9) and (14) (c) of the Constitution, as amended. The feuding parties expressed discordant views on it. While the appellant took the view that it was statute-barred, the first respondent stuck to a diametrically opposed stance – it was not.
The appellant staked his stand on the provision of section 285 (14) (c) of the Constitution, as amended. Since the provision is the cynosure of this limb, it is germane to pluck it out from where it is ingrained in the Constitution, ipsissima verba, as follows:
(c) a political party challenging the actions, decisions or activities of the Independent National Electoral Commission disqualifying its candidate from participating in an election or a complaint that the provisions of the Electoral Act or any other applicable law has not been complied with by the Independent National Electoral Commission in respect of the nomination of candidates of political parties for an election, timetable for an election, registration of voters and other activities of the Commission in respect of preparation for an election.
The provision does not harbour any ambiguity. On this score, the law compels the court to accord it its ordinary grammatical meanings without any interpolation, see Bakare v. NRC (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 606; PDP v. Okorocha (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1323) 205; Kawawu v. PDP (2017) 3 NWLR(Pt. 1553) 420; Setracto (Nig) Ltd. v. Kpayi (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1558) 280; Adeokin Records v. MCSCN (2018) NWLR (Pt. 1643); Ecobank v Honeywell Flour (2019) NWLR (Pt. 1655) 55. Indeed, as a matter of law, once a word or phrase/expression is defined by case-law or statute, a fortiori the Constitution, which sits atop of pyramid of all laws, it takes that meaning judicially assigned to it and drops/sheds its erstwhile technical or ordinary meaning it onwed before, see Dapianlong v. Dariye (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1036) 322; Shettima v. Goni (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 127) 413; A.-G. Fed. v. A.-G., Lagos State (2013) 16 WLR (Pt. 1380) 249; Ardo v. Nyako (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1416) 5915; Utomudo v. Mil. Gov., Bendel State (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1417) 97”.
CAUSE OF ACTION – MEANING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
“To begin with, a cause of action connotes a combination of facts which, if proved or substantiated, entitles a party (plaintiff) to an enforceable right/remedy against a wrongdoer (defendant). It consists of two elements, the wrongful act of the defendant, which bestows cause of action on a plaintiff, and the consequent damage, see Savage v. Uwaechia (1972) 3 SC 214; Omiomeji v. Kolawole (2018) 14 WLR (Pt. 1106) 180; Iliyasu v. Rijau (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1697) 1, Maigari v. Malle (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1697) 69. The content of a writ of summons or statement of claim determines the existence or otherwise of a cause of action, see UBN Plc v. Umeoduagu (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 352”.
ELECTION PETITION – STATUS OF A PETITION IN ELECTION PETITION PROCEEDINGS
“Petition serves as statement of claim in election petition proceedings. The law grants the court the unbridled licence to read pleading (petition herein) holistically in order to garner a flowing story of the crux of a party’s case, see Okochi v. AnimKwoi (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 851) 1; Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 366.
PRE-ELECTION MATTER – NATURE OF A PRE-ELECTION MATTER
“In Abubakar v. INEC (2020) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1737) 37 at 161, the Supreme Court, per Eko, JSC, incisively, proclaimed that “…disqualification of candidate on grounds of false information in his form CF001 is pre-election matter by dint of section 285(14) (c) of the Constitution”. The apex court re-echoed and consolidated the hallowed principle of law in Akinlade v. INEC (unreported) Appeal No: SC. 1438/2019, delivered on 18th December, 2019. In view of that magisterial pronouncement/declaration, in those ex cathedra authorities, which are binding on this court, I have no difficulty in classifying/categorising the first respondent’s cause of action as one of pre-election as it falls, squarely, within the perimeter of the sacred prescription of section 285 (14) (c) of the Constitution, as amended. It is of no moment, in my humble view, that the disqualification in Abubakar case was anchored on false information in his form CF001 in contradistinction to disqualification of the first respondent’s first Deputy Governorship candidate on the footing of underage. Both instances trace their paternity to the provision of section 285 (14) of the Constitution, as amended, which is a new regime in our electoral jurisprudence. The bottom line is disqualification, which was anterior to the conduct of the election. A pre-election matter, in the mind of the law, is as the name implies, a matter that occurred before the election proper, see APC v. Lere (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1705) 254”.
CAUSE OF ACTION- WHEN IS A CAUSE OF ACTION STATUTE-BARRED?
“As a necessary prelude, where a statute prescribes a time-bar within which an action should be commenced, such legislation bears the name of limitation law. If an aggrieved person exhibits tardiness by suing his wrong doer outside the statutorily allowed time-bracket, his action is usually declared as statute-barred. Thus, a cause of action is statute-barred when no proceedings can be brought to enforce it because the period laid down by the limitation law has expired by passage of time, see Egbe v. Adefarasin (No. 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 47; Nasir v. C.S.C., Kano State (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1190) 253; Cotecna Int’ Ltd. v. Churchgate (Nig.) Ltd. (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 346; A-G., Adamawa State v. A-G., Fed. (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1428) 515; Mulima v. Usman (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1432) 160; Ibrahim v. Lawal (2015) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1489); N.R.M.A & F.C. v. Johnson (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 247; Daniel v. Ayala (2019) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1703) 25.
LIMITATION LAW – RATIONALE FOR LIMITATION LAW
“The raison d’etre for limitation law are to ginger up aggrieved persons to be vigilant, to discourage cruel actions and to preserve the evidence by which a defendant will defend the action, see Aremo II v. Adekanye (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 572; Olagunju v. PHCN Plc. (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1254) 113; Lafia L.G. v. Gov., Nasarawa State (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 943; Sulgrave Holdings Inc. v. FGN (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 309; Asaboro v. Pan Ocean Oil Corp. (Nig) Ltd. (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1563) 42; Awolola v. Gov., Ekiti State (2019) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1668) 247; Obazee v. Ekhosuehi (2019) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1701) 245; APC v. Lere (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1705) 254.
LIMITATION LEGISLATION -PRINCIPLE FOR GAUGING LIMITATION LEGISLATION
The orthodox judicial formula for gauging limitation legislation is simple. A court is enjoined to examine the filed writ of summons or the originating process, either of which will showcase when the cause of action was disclosed in it, with the period stipulated in the limitation statute within which to sue. If the date of filing in the matter is beyond the period allocated by the limitation law, then it is statute-barred. Conversely, if the time limit comes within that permitted by that law, then it is not statute-barred, see Woherem v. Emeruwa (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 398; Aremo II v. Adekanya (supra); Elebanjo v. Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 76; Williams v. Williams (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095); Hassan v. Aliyu (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 574; Nweke v. UNIZIK, Awka (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1598) 454; Saki v. APC (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1706) 515.
JURISDICTION OF COURT – DETERMINATION OF THE JURISDICTION OF COURT
“Nota bene, the case-law has endorsed, in toto, a statement of claim as the major barometer to be used by the court to measure the presence or absence of its jurisdiction in relation to limitation law, see Akine v. Edjerode (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446; A.D.H. Ltd. v. A.T. Ltd. (2006) NWLR (Pt. 989) 635; Oni v. Cadbury (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Ladoja v. Ajimobi (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1519) 87; B.B. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Yar’adua v. Yandoma (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 213; Akpamgbo-Okadigbo v. Chidi (No. 2) (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 124; Isah v. INEC (supra); Lau v. PDP (supra); Azubuogu v. Oranezi (supra); Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386; A.-G, Fed. v. A.-G., Anambra State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 314; Roe Ltd. v. UNN (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 420; F.U.T., Minna v. Olutayo (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 176; A.-G., Lagos State v. Eko Hotels (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 518. It must be stressed, that it is only a plaintiff’s statement of claim or affidavit, not a statement of defence or a counter-affidavit, that is relevant in determining the jurisdiction of a court, see lzenkwe V. Nnadozie (1953) 14 WACA 301; UBA Plc. v. BTL Ltd. (2006) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1013) 361; Ngere V. Okuruket ‘XIV’ (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 440.
CAUSE OF ACTION – WHEN DOES A CAUSE OF ACTION BEGIN TO RUN?
“For the purposes of limitation statutes, a cause of action begins to run when a party becomes aware of an erosion of his right and there exists a person to be sued (the violator) to protect the encroached right, see Woherem v. Emenuwa (supra); Owie v. Ighiwie (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) 184; UBN Plc v. Umeoduagu (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 352; Okafor v. B.D.U., Jos Branch (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 385; Asaboro v. Pan Ocean Oil Corp. (Nig.) Ltd. (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1563) 42; Zubair v. Kolawole (2019) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1682) 66”.
PRE-ELECTION MATTER – TIME FRAME FOR INSTITUTING A PRE-ELECTION MATTER
“The provision has ordained the institution of pre-election matter within 14 days of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of. It is a common knowledge that Nigeria is a user of the Gregorian Calendar – a calendar of general application. By the Gregorian calendar computation, from 27th September, 2019 to 26th February, 2020, is a period of about 5 months. It admits of no argument, that the period of 5 months is far in excess of 14 days time frame decreed by section 285 (14) (c) of the Constitution, as amended, for the institution of action in a pre-election matter. In other words, the petition was filed in a flagrant defilement of the limitation provision of section 285 (9) supra.
SECTION 285 (14) (C) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1999 – IMPLICATION OF SECTION 285 (14) (C) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1999 ON THE INSTITUTION OF PRE-ELECTION ACTIONS
“The provision, to all intents and purposes, holds a premier position in the firmament of institution of pre-election actions. In, ample, demonstration of its superiority in law, its legislator/draftsman employed the phrase: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution”. Notwithstanding is, usually, intended to express a clear intention to exclude any impinging/impeding effect of any other provision in a legislation so that the provision it introduces will fulfill itself. Therefore, the import of the word, “notwithstanding”, a phrase of exclusion, is that the section supersedes, controls, and overrides all other provisions of a legislation, see Olatunbosun v. Niger Council (1988) 1. NSCC 1025; A.-G., Fed. Abubakar (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1035) 117; Ugwuanyi v. Nicon Ins. Plc (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1366) 546; Adebayo v. PDP (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1382) 1; A.-G., Lagos State v. A.-G., Fed. (2014) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1412) 217; Cocacola (Nig.) Ltd. v. Akinsanya (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1593) 74; Ehindero v. FRN (2018) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1612) 301; A.-G., Bauchi State v. A.-G., Fed. (2018) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1648) 299. It flows that every other provision in the Constitution, as amended, must bow to its preeminence vis-à-vis institution of pre-election matters. It is in clear recognition of its Olympian position, that the apex court has declared, in a galaxy of authorities, that any pre-election matter which is filed beyond/outside the 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of is statute-barred, see Biem v. SDP (2019) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1687) 377; Bello v. Yusuf (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1695) 250, Iliyasu v. Rijau (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1697) 1; Maigari v. Malle (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1697) 69; Obazee v. Ekhosuehi (2019) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1701) 245; Ibrahim v. Abdallah (2019) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1701) 293; Omagali v. David (2019) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1702) 438; APC v. Lere (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1705) 254, Saki v. APC (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1706) 515”.
PLEA OF LIMITATION LAW – EFFECTS OF A SUCCESSFUL PLEA OF LIMITATION LAW
“My noble lords, a successful plea of limitation law, as a shield, by an opposing party occasions two harmful effects against a claimant’s action. Firstly, he becomes a destitute of the right of action and judicial relief. In a word, it extinguishes his cause of action, see Egbe v. Adefarasin (No.2) (supra); Nasir v. C.S.C., Kano State (supra); Abubakar v. Nasamu (No. 1) (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1330) 407; INEC v. Ogbadibo LG. (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1498) 167; Buremoh v. Akande (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1563) 74; Okafor v. B.D.U., Jos Branch (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 385. Secondly, the court ceases to be crowned with the requisite jurisdiction to entertain his action. See Owners of the MV “Arebella” v. NAIC (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182; Olagunju v. PHCN Plc. (supra); JE.C. Inv. Ltd. v. Brawal Line Ltd. (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 495; INEC v. Enasito (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1602) 63; Toyin v. Musa (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt.1676) 22. The first respondent’s cause of action was plagued by these caustic effects. It had expired by effluxion of time which impinged on the jurisdiction of the tribunal to entertain it. These constitute serious coup de grace to the viability and validity of the petition which metamorphosed into this appeal”
PRE-ELECTION DISPUTE – COURTS WITH THE REQUISITE JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN PRE-ELECTION DISPUTE
“For the sake of completeness, since the first respondent’s cause of action orbits around pre-election dispute, the tribunal was not the forum competens for its determination. The courts that are equipped/clothed with the requisite jurisdiction to entertain it, pursuant to section 31 (5) of the Electoral Act, are the regular courts, videlicet: the Federal High Court, High Court of a State or FCT, see PDP v. INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1437) 525; Ekagbara v. Ikpeazu (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 411; Al-Hassan v. Ishaku (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1520) 230; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 114; Ogah v. Ikpeazu (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1594) 299; Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386”.
ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION – STATUS OF A PETITION INITIATED WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND SATISFACTION OF THE CONDITION PRECEDENT
“It is self-evident from this legal exposition, that the subject matter of the cause of action was outside the tribunal’s constricted jurisdiction and, ipso facto and de jure, constituted a feature in the petition which disrobed it of jurisdiction. At once, it, amply, demonstrates that the petition was initiated without due process of law and satisfaction of the condition precedent for the tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over it. In sum, the petition desecrated the second and third ingredients of jurisdiction. These infractions constitute serious dents on the first respondent’s petition that parented the appeal. Where a court is drained of the jurisdiction to entertain a matter, the proceeding germinating from it, no matter the quantum of diligence, dexterity, artistry, sophistry, transparency and objectivity injected into it, will be trapped in the intractable web of nullity, see Elugbe v. Omokhafe (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 319; Lokpobiri v. Ogola (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1499) 328; Garba v. Mohammed (supra); Isah v. INEC (supra)”.
ELECTION PETITION – INGREDIENTS A PETITIONER MUST ESTABLISH TO PROVE UNLAWFUL EXCLUSION FROM AN ELECTION
“Generally, a petitioner, like the first respondent, owns the onus probandi in election petition, see Gundri v. Nyako (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1391) 211. In Abubakar v. Yar’Adua (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 1, at pages 94 and 95, Katsina-Alu JSC (later CJN) confirmed:
The law is settled that in order to prove unlawful exclusion after valid nomination his party, a petitioner must show the following:
(i)That he was validly nominated by his political party
(ii) That an election was conducted
(iii) That a winner was declared and
(iv) That his name was not included in the list of the constants
These ingredients are conjunctive, not disjunctive.
‘NOMINATION’, ‘QUALIFICATION’ AND ‘VALID’ – MEANING OF ‘NOMINATION’, ‘QUALIFICATION’ AND ‘VALID’
The three important and operative words, which yearn for interpretation, are: Nomination, Qualification and Valid. The word “Nomination”, a noun, denotes: “1. The act of proposing a person for election or appointment.” Qualification, a noun, connotes: “1. The possession of qualities or properties (such as fitness or capacity) inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for a position or office, or perform a public duty or function” Valid, an adjective, signifies: “1. Legally sufficient; binding.” See Bryan GA. Garner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary Tenth edition (USA: West Publishing Co., 2014) pages 1211, 1436 and 1784 respectively.
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION – IMPORT OF SECTION 31 (2) OF THE ELECTORAL ACT ON THE NOMINATION OF CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION
“One of the provisions upon which the first respondent pegged its stance is section 31 of the Electoral Act. I will, at the expense of verbosity but borne out necessity and relevance, extract section 31 (2) of the Electoral Act, verbatim ac litteratim, thus:
The list or information submitted by each candidate shall be accompanied by an Affidavit sworn to by the candidate at the Federal High Court, High Court of a State or Federal Capital Territory, indicating that he has fulfilled all the constitutional requirements for election into that office.(Italics for emphasis)
This provision is comprehension- friendly. In this regard, the law gives me the nod to accord it its ordinary meaning without any embellishments. The provision, to my mind, has suo motu and proprio vigore created a nexus between nomination and qualification. This is because a candidate, in the spirit and letter of the provision, must show in his affidavit, sworn before any of the catalogued courts, that “he has fulfilled the constitutional requirements for election into that office”. The provision has evolved a meeting point for nomination and qualification. They cease to be like the two streams that flow in same canal without a confluence for their water. It must be underscored that the provision of section 138(1) (d) of the Electoral Act, upon which the first respondent hinged its petition, qualified the nomination in that it must be “validly nominated”. By the qualification of the nomination, the provision does not envisage a wolly nomination that roams at large. That cannot be the raison d’etre for the law insisting on valid nomination. It is my humble view that in electoral contest, only a candidate that possesses the requisite qualification for a particular office that can be validly nominated to vie for it. The converse is this. A candidate that is disrobed of the necessary qualification cannot claim to be validly nominated to contest for an elective office”.
OFFICE OF A GOVERNOR OR DEPUTY OF A STATE – REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTION TO THE OFFICE OF A GOVERNOR OR DEPUTY OF A STATE
“It is settled law, beyond any peradventure of doubt, that candidates that compete for the coveted and prestigious office of a Governor or Deputy of a State must meet the stringent conditions stipulated in sections 177, 182 and 187 of the Constitution, as amended. On this cardinal principle of law, judicial authorities galore, see Kubor v. Dickson (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 534; Wambi v. Donatus (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 223; PDP v. INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1437) 525; APC v. PDP (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1481) 1; Tarzor v. Ioraer (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 463; Al-Hassan v. Ishaku (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1520) 230; Wada v. Bello (2016) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1542) 372; Agi v. PDP (2017) NWLR (Pt. 1595); Mailaja v. Gaidam (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1610) 454.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE –NATURE OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
“A documentary evidence is permanent, incorruptible and indelible unlike oral evidence which oozes out of vocal cord of man and susceptible to distortions”.
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION – WHETHER THE MERE NOMINATION OF A CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION CAN ATTRACT SUBSTITUTION
“In the sight of the law, only valid nomination can attract substitution, see Lau v. PDP (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 60. It is a notorious principle of law that no one puts something on nothing and expects it to stand, see UAC v. Macfoy Co. Ltd. (1962) AC 152; CCB Plc. V. Ekperi (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 493; Alsthom v. Saraki (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 911) 208; Aderibigbe v. Abidoye (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1150) 592. In the Latin days of the law, it was encapsulated in the maxim: Lex non cogit ad impossibila – the law does not command the impossible, see Lasun v. Awoyemi (2009) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1168) 513”.
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION – EFFECT OF FAILURE TO FURNISH CREDIBLE, COGENT AND CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE IN PROOF OF VALID NOMINATION OF CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION
“There is no gainsaying the fact, deducible from the above legal dissections, done in due fidelity to the law, that the first respondent failed woefully to furnish credible, cogent and conclusive evidence in proof of valid nomination of its candidate for the election. A piece of evidence is credible when it is worthy of belief, see Agbi v. Ogbeh (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 1; Dim v. Enemuo (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1149) 353; Eta v. Dazie (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 248; A. J. Inv. Ltd. v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc.(2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 380; Emeka v. Chuba-Ikeazu (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589) 345. In the same vein, a piece of evidence is conclusive if it leads to a definite result, see Nruamah v. Ebuzoeme (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1372) 474; APC v. Karfi (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 16161) 479; Ojobo v. Moro (2019) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1700) 166. Proof, in law, is a process by which the existence of facts is established to the satisfaction of the court, see section 121 of the Evidence Act, 2011; Olufosoye v. Fakorede (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 272) 747; Awuse v. Odili (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt. 952) 416; Onyiorah v. Onyiorah (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1695) 227.
PERVERSE DECISION OF COURT – WHEN IS THE VERDICT OF A COURT PERVERSE?
“The finding summons the doctrine of perversion. A verdict of court is perverse when: it runs counter to the pleadings and evidence before it, a court takes into account matters it ought not to take into consideration, a court shuts its eyes to the evidence, a court takes irrelevant matters into account or it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice, see Udengwu v. Uzuegbu (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 836) 136; Nnorodim v. Ezeani (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 378) 448; Lagga v. Sarhuna NWLR (Pt. 1114) 427; Onyekwelu v. Elf Pet (Nig.) Ltd. (2009) 5 BWKR (Pt. 1133) 181; Momoh v. Umoru (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1270) 217; Ihunwo v. Ihunwo (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1357) 550; Olaniyan v. Fatoki (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1384) 477; Udom v. Umanah (No.1) (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1526) 179 Adeokin Records v. M.C.S.N. (Ltd)/GTE) (supra); Mamonu v. Dikat (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt 1672) 495; MTN (Nig.) Comm. Ltd. v. Corporate Comm. Inv. Ltd. (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 427; Offodile v. Offodile (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1698) 189; Bi-Courtney Ltd. v. A-G, Fed. (2019) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1679) 112; Wada v. Bello (supra)”.
RELIEF – WHETHER COURT CAN GRANT RELIEF SOUGHT FOR BY PARTIES
“It is rudimentary law, in our adversarial system of adjudication, that the duty of a court, in a civil action, is merely to render unto a party in accordance to his proven claim. The grant of that relief is a gratuitous award par excellence. It was a mirror image of a windfall. It is elementary law, that a court of law is not a santa claus that dishes awards to a recipient who never supplicated for it. In effect, the unmerited relief dashed to the unqualified candidates, who were no longer parties before the tribunal, is mired in the intractable nest of perversity.
RELIEF – WHETHER THE TRIBUNAL WAS RIGHT IN GRANTING A RELIEF AFTER IT HAD BEEN STRUCK OUT
“The tribunal by granting the relief, after it had been struck out, constituted itself, quo warranto, into an appellate court which upturned its earlier ruling striking out the relief. The self-acquired/crowned imaginary appellate status is, with due regard, offensive to the law, see Famu v. Kassim (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1352) 124; Cole v. Jibunoh (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 499; Ngere v. Okuruket ‘XIV’ (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 440; Eneh v. NDIC (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1645) 355. This is another serious blight on the tribunal’s grant of that relief. In sum, the tribunal’s jurisdiction to grant the reliefs was, totally, ousted and the grant must be mowed down by the unbiased judicial sword of this court”.
CASES CITED
Not Available
STATUTES REFERRED TO
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended,|Electoral Act|
