DR. ABDULLAHI ILIYASU v RAMAT POLYTECHNIC, MAIDUGURI
March 30, 2025VICTORIA SHOLA VS EZEDIASHI OFILI & 2ORS
March 30, 2025CHEVRON NIGERIA LIMITED VS NATIONAL UNION OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS WORKERS (NUPENG) & ORS
Legalpedia Citation: (2021-01) Legalpedia 17214 (CA)
In the Court of Appeal
HOLDEN AT LAGOS
Fri Jan 8, 2021
Suit Number: CA/L/268/2015
CORAM
OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, JUSTICE COURT OF APPEAL
JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, JUSTICE COURT OF APPEAL
BALKISU BELLO ALIYU, JUSTICE COURT OF APPEAL
PARTIES
APPELLANTS
NATIONAL UNION OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS WORKERS (NUPENG)
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
ACTION, APPEAL, COMPANY LAW, COURT, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, LABOUR LAW, LAW OF EVIDENCE, LEGAL PERSONALITY, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, TRADE UNION
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Appellant, which carries on the business of oil and petroleum exploration in Nigeria, had “outstanding contracts” with the first Respondent, a duly registered Trade Union, whereby it provided unskilled and semi-skilled workers to the Appellant. The 2nd Respondent provided the services of drivers to the Appellant at its requests. In June, 2010, members of the 2nd Respondent were unionised. The 2nd Respondent was unresponsive to the alleged unionisation. That sparked off demonstrations and picketing of the members of the 1st Respondent against the 2nd Defendant at the entrance, within and inside the precincts of the Appellant’s premises located at No. 2 Chevron Drive, Lekki, Lagos State. The Appellant claimed the demonstrations and picketing were illegal and violated its right to own, use and enjoy its property. Sequel to that, the Appellant beseeched the lower court, via a complaint filed on 21st October 2010, and tabled against the Respondent, the following reliefs:. a declaration that the 1st Defendant and its branches (i.e. NUPENG Delog Branch, NUPENG T. A. Amussah Branch, NUPENG J2 Const. & General Services Branch, NUPENG Tobinsco Nigeria Limited Branch, NUPENG Gladwyn Investment Limited Branch and NUPENG Astral Contracting Limited Branch) have no right to embark on picketing or demonstrations inside or within the precincts of the Claimant’s properties, premises or locations in furtherance of the dispute between the 1st Defendant, its aforesaid branches and the 2nd Defendant; a declaration that the disruption of the Claimant’s business and operations by the picketing and demonstrations embarked upon by the 1st Defendant and/or its branches (i.e. NUPENG Delog Branch, NUPENG T. A. Amussah Branch, NUPENG J2 Const. & General Services Branch, NUPENG Tobinsco Nigeria Limited Branch, NUPENG Gladwyn Investment Limited Branch and NUPENG Astral Contracting Limited Branch) inside and within the precincts of the Claimant’s premises, properties and locations in furtherance of the dispute between the 1st Defendant, its aforesaid branches and the 2 Defendant is unwarranted and illegal among other reliefs.
The Respondent denied liability and filed its statement of defence. At the closure of evidence, the trial court in a considered judgment dismissed the case. Aggrieved by the decision, the Appellant filed a notice of appeal and sought the same reliefs before the trial court. The Appellant contended that the lower court wrongly construed section 43 of the Trade Union Act, Cap T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, LFN, 2004 as it never permitted the picketing workers intimidation of non-picketing or incursion into the Appellant’s premises which was an infringement of its right to enjoyment of its property.
HELD
Appeal Dismissed
ISSUES
Whether having regard to the lack of dispute regarding the Appellant’s existence the learned trial judge was right when he held that the Appellant failed to prove that it is a citizen and if the failure to prove same extinguished the appellant’s constitutional right to property as guaranteed under section 43 of the 1999 Constitution.
Whether the lower court was right in its judgment when it ignored established legal principles on the nature and extent of employees’ right to picket when juxtaposed with section 43 of the 1999 Constitution.
RATIONES DECIDENDI
COURT – CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE COURT WILL DISPENSE WITH THE NEED OF CALLING PARTIES TO ADDRESS IT ON ISSUES RAISED SUO MOTU
“Indisputably, the law, seriously, frowns on a court raising an issue suo motu, on its own motion, and deciding same without input from the parties. Such an untoward judicial exercise will drag the court into the arena of conflict as well as impinge on the inviolable rights of parties to fair hearing as entrenched in section 36 (1) of the Constitution, as amended, see INEC v. Ogbadibo LG (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1498) 167; Gwede v. INEC (2014) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1438) 56; Egbuchu v. Continental Merchant Bank Plc. (2016) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1513) 192;Adedayo v. PDP (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1382) 1; Odedo v. Oguebego (2015) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1476) 229; Mainstreet Bank Ltd. v. Binna (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1526) 316 Mabamijie v. Otto (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 171 A-G., Fed. v. A-G., Anambra State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 314; Ogar v. Igbe (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 534. However, it is not an inelastic rule of law. It admits of certain exceptions. The need for address by parties becomes unnecessary when: “(a) the issue relates to the courts own jurisdiction; (b) both parties are/were not aware or ignore a statute which may have bearing on the case…. (c) … on the face of the record serious questions of the fairness of the proceedings is evident,” see Omokuwajo v. FRN (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 300 at 332: per Rhodes – Vivour, JSC; Aderibigbe v. Abidoye (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1150) 592; Effiom v. C. R. S. I. E. C. (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1213) 106; Gbagbarigha v. Toruemi (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 289; Kusamotu v. APC (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1670) 51; Garba v. Tsoida (2020) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1716) 1”. PER O.F.OGBUINYA, J.C.A
ISSUE – WHEN IS AN ISSUE JOINED ON A PARTICULAR FACT?
“In the view of the law, an issue is joined on a particular fact, necessitating its proof, when its assertion is disputed by an opposing party, see Galadima v. State (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1636)357. Put the other way round, the parties proffered evidence and addressed the lower court on the point. In this wise, the law mandates the lower court to make finding(s) thereon, see Odunukwe v. Ofomata (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 404; Aba v. Monday (2015) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1480) 569; Ikpeazu v Otti (2016) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1513) 38. PER O.F.OGBUINYA, J.C.A
JURISTIC PERSON – MEANING AND CATEGORIES OF JURISTIC PERSONS
“By way of prefatory observations, a juristic person is an entity armed with the capacity to ventilate his/its complaints in judicio. Generally, it is only natural persons, id est, human beings and artificial persons, such as body corporate/corporation,-an artificial being which is invisible, intangible and exist only in the contemplation of the law, that are imbued with the capacity to sue and be sued in law court. The jural units, which the law has cloaked with the garment of legal personality, are: human beings, incorporated companies, corporate sole with perpetual succession, trade unions, partnerships and friendly societies. No action can be commenced by or against any party except a natural person(s) save such a party has been accorded by a statute, expressly or impliedly, or by common, either a legal personality under the name by which it sues or is sued or right to sue or be sued by that name. Where either of the parties is not a legal person, capable of exercising legal rights and obligations in law, the action is plagued by incompetence and liable to be struck out on account of want of legal personality, see Agbonmagbe Bank Ltd. v. General Manager G.B. Olivant Ltd. (1961) 2 SCNLR 317; Kate Ent. Ltd. v. Daewoo Nig. Ltd. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 116; Fawehinmi v. NBA (No. 2) (1989) 2_ NWLR (Pt.105) 558; Ataguba & Co. v. Gura (Nig) Ltd. (2005).8 NWLR (Pt. 927) 429; A. -G., Anambra State v. A. -G., Fed (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1047) 4; Admin./Exec, Estate, Abacha v. Eke-Spiff (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 97; SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC(2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 317; M.M.A. Inc. v N.M.A. (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 506; Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 28; BB. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Interdrill (Nig) Ltd v. U.B.A. Plc (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt 1581) 52; Dairo v. Regd. Trustees, T. A. O.., Lagos (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 62; Bajehson v. Otiko (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1638) 138; Socio-Political Research Dev. v. Min., FCT (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1653) 313; Moses v. NBA (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1673) 59; Persons, Name Unknown v. Sahris Int’l Ltd. (2019) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1689) 203.
PER O.F.OGBUINYA, J.C.A
LEGAL PERSONALITY – ON WHOM LIES THE ONUS OF PROOF WHERE THE LEGAL PERSONALITY OF A PARTY IS CHALLENGED
“Incontestably, where the legal personality of a party is challenged by an adversary, the onus probandi resides in that party to lead evidence, parol or documentary, to establish its legal capacity. The most reliable/dependable way incorporation of a company can be proved is by tendering certificate of its incorporation, see NNPC v. Lutin Inv. Ltd. (2006) 2 NWLR (Pt. 965) 506; Citec Int’l Estate Ltd. v. E. Int’l & Associates (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 33; Socio-Political Research Dev. v. Min., FCT (supra). PER O.F.OGBUINYA, J.C.A
COURT – DUTY ON COURTS TO READ PLEADINGS HOLISTICALLY
“The law commands the court to read pleading holistically in order to garner a flowing story of it, see Okochi v. Animkwoi (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 851) 1; Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 366. PER O.F.OGBUINYA, J.C.A
ADMISSION – WHAT DOES ADMISSION CONNOTE?
“My noble Lords, in the mind of the law, admission connotes a statement, oral or documentary, made by a party which suggests an inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, see section 20 of the Evidence Act, 2011; UBA Plc. v. Jargaba (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1045) 237; Oguanuhu v. Chiegboka (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1351) 588. It “is a concession or voluntary acknowledgement made by a party of the existence of certain facts; a statement made by a party of the existence of a fact which is relevant to the cause of his adversary; a voluntary acknowledgement made by a party of the existence of the truth of certain facts which are inconsistent with his claims in an action”, see Adusei v. Adebayo (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 534 at 558 per Fabiyi, JSC; UBA v. Jaraaba (2007) 31 NSCQR 144; N.B.C.I. v. Integrated Gas (Nig.) Ltd. law, an admitted fact does riot need any proof, see Our Line v. S.C.C. Nig. Ltd. (2009) 7 SCNJ 358; Jolasun v. Bamgboye (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 285; Off or v. State (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 421; Mite v. Okpulor (2016) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1497 542; Cole v. Jibunoh (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 499; Orlanezi v. A.-G., Rivers State (2017) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1561) 224; Mba v. Mba (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 177; Adeokin Records v. M.C.S.N (Ltd/GTE) (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1643) 550; N.R.M.A & FC v. Johnson (2019) 2 NWLR (1656) 247”. PER O.F.OGBUINYA, J.C.A
INCORPORATION OF A COMPANY – EFFECT OF INCORPORATION OF A COMPANY
“There is no gainsaying the fact that, in the eyes of the law, a limited liability company, such as the appellant, is a persona ficta. It is an artificial person/being, which is invisible, intangible and exists only in the contemplation of the law, with rights and liabilities. On the incorporation of the appellant, the law granted it the unbridled licence to exercise enormous powers: to hold land, perpetual succession, sue and be sued and “all the powers of natural person of full capacity”, see sections 37 and 38(1) of CAMA. The appellant, armed with these solemn attributes/hallmarks, bestowed on it by the law, has the right, as of a right, to exercise the fundamental right, available to a Nigerian citizen, as enshrined in section 43 of the Constitution, as amended. On this premise, the appellant has the right to own immovable property, anywhere in Nigeria, and enjoy same subject to any constitutional or statutory limitations. PER O.F.OGBUINYA, J.C.A
RIGHT TO PICKETING – POSITION OF THE LAW ON THE RIGHT OF WORKERS TO PICKETING
Having dispensed with issue one, I proceed to settle issue two. The issue is plain and canalised within a narrow compass. It castigates the lower court’s finding that the appellant’s workers had the right to picket within its premises.
The lower court erected its finding on the provision of section 43(1) of the Trade Union Act. Since the provision is the cynosure of the issue, it is germane to pluck it out from where it is ingrained in the statute, verbatim ac litteratin, thus:
43. Peaceful picketing
It shall be lawful for one or more persons, acting on their own behalf of a trade union or registered Federation of Trade Unions or of an individual employer or firm in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to attend at or near a house or place where a person resides or works carries on business or happens to be, if they so attend merely for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information or of peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working.
The provision does not harbour any ambiguity. On this score, the law compels the court to accord it its ordinary grammatical meanings without any interpolation, see Bakare v. NRC (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 606; PDP v. Okorocha (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1323) 205; Kawawu v. PDP (2017) 3 NWLR(Pt. 1553) 420; Setracto (Nig) Ltd. v. Kpayi (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1558) 280; Adeokin Records v. MCSCN (2018) NWLR (Pt. 1643); Ecobank v Honeywell Flour (2019) NWLR (Pt. 1655) 55. PER O.F.OGBUINYA, J.C.A
DOCTRINE OF COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE – POSITION OF THE LAW ON THE INVITATION OF THE COURT TO DEPLOY THE DOCTRINE OF COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROVISION OF SECTION 43 OF THE TRADE UNION ACT
“The appellant- implored this court to employ the doctrine of comparative jurisprudence in the interpretation of the provision of section 43 of the Trade Union Act, citing a galaxy of foreign decisions to that effect. To begin with, it is elementary law that foreign decisions do not bind Nigerian courts. At best, they are persuasive authorities on the need for expansion of frontiers of Nigerian Jurisprudence, see Egbue v. Araka (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt. 848) 1; A.-G., Rivers State v. A.-G., Akwa Ibom (2011) 8 NWLR (Pt 1248) 31; South Atlantic Pet. Ltd. v. Min., Pet. Res. (2014) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1396) 24; Sifax (Nig.) Ltd. v. Migfo (Nig) Ltd. (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1623) 138; In Re: Abdullahi (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1639) 272. Secondly, as already noted, the provision of section 43 of the Trade Union Act is very submissive to clarity such that its interpretation does not necessitate any embellishments nor the legal voyage to a foreign land to harness from comparative jurisprudence. On this score, I dishonour the appellant’s salivating invitation to this court to deploy the doctrine of comparative jurisprudence in the construction of the clear provision of section 43 of the Trade Union Act. PER O.F.OGBUINYA, J.C.A
CASES CITED
Not Available
STATUTES REFERRED TO
