DOUYE DIRI V ADVANCED NIGERIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY (ANDP) & 2 ORS
March 30, 2025AKIN AGBONZE OKE v. MR. JOSHUA OBAYUWANA
March 30, 2025Legalpedia Citation: (2020) Legalpedia (CA) 84173
In the Court of Appeal
HOLDEN AT BENIN
Sun Sep 27, 2020
Suit Number: CA/B/111/2020
CORAM
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
S.M.A. BELGORE, – JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
S.M.A. BELGORE, – JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU
S.M.A. BELGORE, – JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
PARTIES
ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS (APC)
MR. PETER AGUELE
AREA(S) OF LAW
Not Available
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The 1st Respondent before the High Court of Edo State, Benin Judicial Division by an Originating Summons but subsequently converted to Writ of Summons along with a Statement of Claim claimed against the Appellants and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for declarations; order of perpetual injunction; amongst other reliefs. The 1st Respondent case is that he expressed interest to contest for the nomination of the 1st Appellant ticket for the Chairmanship of the Esan South Local Government Election scheduled for 3/3/2018 and bought, paid for and submitted all the relevant nomination forms to the 1st Appellant. On 24/4/2018, when the primary election was held he emerged the candidate with the simple majority of the valid votes cast of 164 votes out of the 286 votes but curiously the 2nd and 3rd Appellants acting in concert with some others manipulated the process after the primary election had been conducted and concluded in which he emerged winner, only to present the 3rd Appellant as a consensus candidate who had secured a yes vote, which was contrary to the Constitution and guidelines of the 1st Appellant. He is thus entitled, according to him, to be the person to be sworn in to occupy the position of the Chairman of the Esan South Local Government Council of Edo State and all the ensuring benefits thereto and not the 3rd Appellant. In their defense, the 3rd Appellant stated that there was no primary election of the 1st Appellant held on 24/1/2018, since the 3rd Appellant had already emerged a consensus Candidate of the 1st Appellant at a meeting held on 17/1/2018 and that on 24/1/2018, his candidature by consensus was merely ratified by a yes vote and was therefore, the validly nominated candidate of the 1st Appellant for the Esan South Local Government Council election slated for and duly held on 3/3/2018, in which he also emerged victorious as the duly elected Executive Chairman of the Esan South Local Government Council. The 1st Respondent was never nominated as the Chairmanship candidate of the 1st Appellant and did not participate or emerge as its candidate on 24/1/2018 or on any other day since no primary election was held for the said nomination by the 1st Appellant. The trial Court granted the claims of the 1st Respondent against the Appellants. Aggrieved, the Appellants had promptly appealed to this Court vide an Original Notice of Appeal on three Grounds of appeal but subsequently an additional four grounds of appeal were filed with leave granted by Court. The 1st Respondent along with his Brief filed a Motion on Notice of Preliminary Objection. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents also filed their Briefs.
HELD
Appeal Dismissed
ISSUES
Whether the Benin High Court in Benin Judicial Division has the Jurisdiction to adjudicate in the case, when the cause of action arose in the Ubiaja High Court judicial Division Of Edo State, where the Respondent and the Principal Party; the 3rd Appellant, resides? Whether the court was right to assume Jurisdiction in a matter purely within the domain of the Political Party to nominate their candidate for election. Whether the judgment is against the weight of evidence? Whether the trial Judge was right when he ordered that the 3rd Appellant should refund all the salaries he earned while acting as the chairman of the council to the claimant/Applicant?
RATIONES DECIDENDI
ISSUE OF JURISDICTION – DUTY OF COURT ONCE THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION IS RAISED
“My lords, in considering the preliminary objection challenging the competence of this Appeal on the two grounds relied upon by the 1st Respondent, I bear in mind that the issue of incompetence has over the years dovetail into issue of jurisdiction and once raised must first be considered and resolved one way or the other before if need be the merit of the matter is considered if it survives the onslaught of the issue of incompetence. See Tukur V. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517. See also Orthopaedic Hospital Management Board V. Garba (2002) 14 NWLR (pt 788) 538 @ p. 563.
ISSUE OF JURISDICTION – FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
“Now, the issue of jurisdiction is very fundamental to adjudication because it goes to the foundational competence of any cause or matter or action before the Court. It is indeed the epicenter of the entire litigation process and thus, without it there can be no validity in any proceedings or resultant judgment or ruling of the Court. Thus, jurisdiction is radical and sine quo non to adjudication of any matter or action or cause in a Court of law and thus, without jurisdiction there can be no competence in the Court to exercise its adjudicatory powers. In such situation, it has been said, and quite admirably too in my view, that the laborers, that is the Litigants and their counsel on the one side and the Court on the other side would have labored in vain. See Madukolu V. Nkemdilim (1962) SCNLR 341. See also Elugbe V. Omokhafe (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 319 @ p. 334; Tukur V. Gongola State Government (No. 2) (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517; Western Steel Works Ltd. V. Iron & Steel Workers Union (1987) 1NWLR (Pt. 49) 284; NDIC V. CBN (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 766) 272. –
LIMITATION OF ACTION – MEANING AND OPERATION OF LIMITATION OF ACTION
“The first arm of the preliminary objection relates directly to what can be simply described as limitation of action, which is just a rule of law, codified in most jurisdictions into statutes of limitation, which prohibits the commencement of or continuation of stale matters. In its operation it extinguishes the right to action but not the cause of action itself, which is rendered bare and unenforceable in a court of law. See William O. Olagunju & Anor V. Nig Plc (2011) 46 NSCQR 583 @ p. 597; Christopher Obueke & 3 Ors V. Nsude Nwankwo Nnamchi & 2 Ors (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 313) 195; Egbe V. Adefarasin (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1; Woherem V. Emereuwa (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 398 @ p. 416; P. N. Udoh Trading Co. Ltd. V. Abere (2001) FWLR (Pt. 57) 900”. B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
ACTION, LIMITATION LAW, ELECTORAL LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
LIMITATION OF ACTION – TIME LIMITATION FOR HEARING AND DETERMINATION OF AN APPEAL ARISING FROM THE JUDGMENT OF A COURT IN A PRE – ELECTION MATTER
“Now, by Section 285(12) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), it is provided thus:
“An Appeal from a decision of a Court in a pre-election matter shall be heard and disposed of within 60days from the filing of the appeal”.
By the above provision, it goes with saying that there has been introduced constitutionally the conception and prescription of time limitation for the hearing and determination of an appeal arising from a judgment of the Court below in a pre – election matter in Nigeria”.-
PRE-ELECTION MATTERS – MEANING OF PRE-ELECTION MATTERS
“What then is a pre-election matter for the purposes of Section 285 (12) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)? Happily, the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as Amended) did not remain silent on this as would have led the Courts, and litigants and their Counsel, to grope in the dark as to its proper meaning. Thus in Section 285 (14), for the purpose of this section, “pre-election matter’ means any suit by-
(a) An Aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of the Electoral Act or any Act of the National Assembly regulating the conduct of primaries of political parties and The Provisions of the Guidelines of a Political Party for the conduct of party primaries has not been complied with by a political party in respect of the selection or nomination of candidates for an Election.
Furthermore, by Section 87 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), which the Court below, quite rightly in view, held as being applicable to the claims of the 1st Respondent and against which finding there is no ground of appeal by the Appellant in this appeal, it is provided inter alia thus:
87. (1) A political party seeking to nominate candidates for elections under this Act shall hold primaries for aspirants to all elective positions.
(2) The procedure for the nomination of candidates by political parties for the various elective positions shall be by direct or indirect primaries.
(3) A political party that adopts the direct primaries procedure shall ensure that all aspirants are given equal opportunity of being voted for by members of the party.
(4) A political party that adopts the system of indirect primaries for the choice of its candidate shall adopt the procedure outlined below
(ii) The aspirant with the highest number of votes at the end of voting shall be declared the winner of the primaries of the party and the aspirant’s name shall be forwarded to the commission as the candidate of the party.
Having taken time to scrutinize the claims of the 1st Respondent and the issues as joined by the parties, I am in complete agreement with the submissions of learned counsel for the 1st Respondent that the 1st Respondent’s Suit was clearly a pre – election matter, to which both the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), and the provision of Section 285 (12) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as Amended) apply with equal force, contrary to the misconceived submissions by learned counsel for the Appellants that these provisions do not apply. The finding to that effect by the Court below having not been appealed against in this Appeal by the Appellants remained valid, subsisting and binding not only on them but also the Respondents as well as this Court. Thus, none of the parties can simply merely wish it away without any ground of appeal challenging such a finding, and cannot even be allowed to contend anything to the contrary to the un-appealed finding of the Court below. See Ogini V. Obiyan (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt. 524) 179 @ p. 195”. –
PERIOD OF LIMITATION – DETERMINATION OF THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION OF AN ACTION
“In 1987 in Egbe V. Adefarasin (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1,the Supreme Court had considered and simplified the duty of the Court when faced with the resolution of the issue whether or not a suit is statute barred and had succinctly pronounced with finality inter alia thus:
“How does one determine the period of limitation? The answer is simply by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the Plaintiff a cause of action and by comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. This can be done without taking oral evidence from witnesses. If the time on the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute barred”
Later in 2004, the Supreme Court had revisited this issue and reiterated in Woherem V. Emereuwa (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 398 @ p. 416, inter alia thus:
“The law is firmly settled that the period of limitation is determinable by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim only to ascertain the alleged date the wrong in question which gave rise to the plaintiffs cause of action was committed and by computing such date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. If the time pleaded in the writ of summons or statement of claim is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, the action is statute barred”.
–
PERIOD OF LIMITATION – WHETHER THE STATUTORY LIMITATION PERIOD FOR DETERMINING PRE-ELECTION MATTER CAN BE EXTENDED
“In law, neither a party nor his counsel would be allowed the luxury of speaking from both sides of the mouth and thereby approbating and reprobating on the same issue. The hallmark of truth is consistency. I am therefore, unable to attach any credibility or indeed any worthiness to the Appellants’ counsel on this issue of whether or not the Electoral Act and the Constitution apply to this Appeal. Consequently, their contentions amounting to summersault and approbating and reprobating are hereby in its entirety discountenanced. I had already held, as was rightly and unassailably contended by the 1st Respondent’s counsel in line with the correct position of the law on the subject matter and as earlier truthfully asserted by the Appellants’ counsel before their summersault, that both the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) and the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 ( as Amended) apply to this appeal.
By Section 285(12) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as Amended), which has been reproduced earlier in this judgment, an appeal from the judgment of the Court below in a pre – election matter must be heard and determined within 60 days from the date the judgment appealed against was delivered and without any exceptions.
The Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) is the supreme law of the land and therefore, its provisions are superior to every other provision embodied in any Act or law. It is binding on all person and authorities in Nigeria. The provisions of Section of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) providing for a period of 60 days from the date of judgment for the hearing and determination of an appeal against the judgment of the Court below in a pre – election underscores both the sui generis nature and essence of time in both election and pre – election matters in Nigeria. These provisions are cast in stone and made mandatory. Not unexpectedly, there is no proviso to them to accommodate any human exigencies, including but not limited to Corona Virus pandemic, as they are couched in absolute terms. They therefore, accommodate no exception but must be strictly complied with by both the parties and the Court itself, and failure to do so renders such an appeal or action statute barre and thus liable to be dismissed. See Jallco Nig. Ltd V. Owoniboys Tech. Serv. Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 391) 531; CPC V. INEC (2011) LPELR – 4262011 (SC); AG Abia State V. AG Federation (2002) 5 NWLR (Pt. 763) 268; Adisa V. Oyiwola (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 116; Kawuwa & Anor V. PDP &Ors (2016) LPELR – 40344(CA) per Sankey JCA @ pp. 49 – 50.
My lords, in the circumstances, therefore, I hold firmly that this Appeal has become statute bared on 21/5/2020 and thus rendered incompetent to be heard and determined on the merit. It is further my considered view that this even Court lacks the vires to extend in any way or manner the 60 days limitation period as prescribed by Section 285(12) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) once it has lapsed. Thus, there is no known remedy yet and this Court is devoid of any requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this Appeal on the merit outside the 60 days as prescribed by law or to in any subtle manner or by any means act to extend on its own the life span of this Appeal.
Now, these Constitutional timelines are sacrosanct and have been described as the ‘Rock of Gibraltar’ and ‘Mount Zion’ which cannot be moved. Indeed, and quite true, the law may be harsh but it is the law and must be obeyed to the letter, more so when it is a constitutional provision! Thus, this Court being not the Creator, and indeed not pretending to be one, cannot bring back to life a dead appeal and assume jurisdiction over an Appeal which had since died on 21/5/2020 when it attained the ripe death age of 60 days as allowed it by law. We do not, and indeed cannot, raise dead appeals! See Kawuwa & Anor V. PDP &Ors (2016) LPELR – 40344 (CA) per Georgewill JCA @ pp. 14 – 15. See also ANPP &Ors V. Alhaji Mohammed Goni & Ors (2012) LPELR – 8730 (SC) per Onnoghen JSC (as he then was but later CJN); Afam Ogene V. Hon Chukwuka Onyema (2012) LPELR – 9774 (CA0; Ugba V. Suswan (2012) LPELR – 1912002 (SC); Saleh V. Donald (2012) LPELR – 432011 – (CA). –
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE – CONCEPT OF ‘SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE’ AND ‘TECHNICAL JUSTICE’ IN THE DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
In African Songs Limited & Anor V. King Sunday Adeniyi Adegeye (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 335 @ p. 365 – 366, I had cause to consider deeply the place of ‘substantial justice’ and ‘technical justice’ in the due administration of justice in this Country and had opined inter alia thus:
“My lords, while in today’s jurisprudence of ‘substantial justice’ the issue of ‘mere technicality’ no longer holds sway, yet it is truism that competence is the soul of adjudication. It is in this sense the issue of competence can no longer in law truly be regarded as ‘mere technicality’ but rather be seen as substantial issue of law. In other words while eschewing technicality for its sake, a Court can only exercise jurisdiction where all conditions precedent to the exercise of its powers have been fulfilled. See Andrew V. INEC (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1625) 507 @ pp. 540 – 541. See also Mrs. Susan Olapeju SinmisolaOlley V. Hon. Olukolu Ganiyu Tunji & Ors. (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1362) 275; Madukolu V. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR 587.
I do not think I can improve on the statement of law I made above and thus, I cannot but bow to it. I fully subscribe to its truism and so it is with the Appellant’s Appeal that has become grossly incompetent in law. In the circumstances therefore, I find great merit in the first ground of the preliminary objection of the 1stRespondent and it is hereby upheld.
Consequently, the 60 days for the hearing and determination of this Appeal by this Court from the date the judgment of the Court below was delivered as allowed by Section 285 (12) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as Amended) having elapsed, this appeal has become statute barred, spent, extinct, elapsed and expired by operation of law and that is the end of the matter! See Dr Casmir Anyanwu .V. Chief OkeyEze (2020) 2 NWLR (Pt 1708) 379 @Pp 390 – 391.-
PUBLIC OFFICIALS/SERVANT – POSITION OF THE LAW ON ENGAGEMENT IN PRIVATE PRACTICE BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
“I have taken time to consider the affidavit evidence of the parties and reviewed the submission of their counsel on this second ground of the 1st Respondent’s preliminary objection and it does appear to me that prior to 1999, by the Regulated and Other professions (Private Practice Prohibition)Law Lecturers Exemption)(No. 2) Order 1992, Lecturers were indeed exempted from the ban on private practice by Public Officials of State to enhance the quality of teaching and practical experiences shared with law students. However, it would appear that by the coming into effect on 29/5/1999 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 and its operation now as Amended, the regulation on exemption of Law lecturer and the law pursuant to which it was made has been expressly repealed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Certain Consequential Repeals) Decree No. 63 of 1999, and thus modified to conform with the provisions of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as Amended) now prohibiting all forms of engagement in private practice by Public Officers or Public Servants except for engagement in farming. I hold therefore, this exemption no longer subsists and therefore, does not offer any protection or exemption to the counsel for the Appellants. See Sections 315, 318 and Paragraph 15 of Part 1 of the 5thchedule to the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). See also Plateau State University V. Joseph& Ors. 2018) LPELR-46049(CA)”. –
STATE HIGH COURT – COMPOSITION OF STATE HIGH COURT
“Now, by Section 270(1)of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as Amended) a High Court was created and established for each of the States of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory. It follows that no one State of the Federation has more than one High Court for the State. However, for administrative convenience and for ease of access to justice in all the different parts of the State, the High Court Laws of the States divides the State into Judicial Divisions where the State High Court sits in those different Divisions to afford ease of access to justice and strictly for smooth administrative convenience in the due administration of justice. Thus, no one judge in any State of the Federation is appointed solely for any particular Judicial Division of the High Court of the State and therefore, each judge is appointed as a judge of the one State High Court and with jurisdiction to sit in any of the Judicial Divisions to which he is so duly assigned by the Chief Judge of the State. .
My lords, what I have been belaboring to say, perhaps in far too words, is simply that the High Court of a State as created and established by the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as Amended) is one High Court not withstanding how many Judicial Divisions it operates from by virtue of the Division of the one State High Court into several administrative Judicial Divisions by the High Court Laws of the State under the hand of the Chief Judge of that State. The High Court of each State of the Federation is thus one indivisible High Court.
Going by the succinct provisions of Section 270(1)of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as Amended), there is by law only one High Court of Edo State. However, for strictly and purely administrative convenience, Judicial Divisions are created under the hand of the State Chief Judge pursuant to the High Court Laws of Edo State and judges are assigned to man these Judicial Divisions. Thus, the jurisdiction of the High Court of Edo State is State wide and covers the territorial jurisdiction of the entire Edo State. There is therefore, in law no distinct jurisdiction of each of the Judicial Divisions as distinct from the one common jurisdiction of the High Court of Edo State as created and established by law. See Section 270 (1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as Amended), which provides thus:
“There shall be a High Court for each State of the Federation.
See also Section 270 (2) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as Amended) which provides as follows:
“The High Court of a State shall consist of-
A Chief Judge of the State, and
Such number of Judges of the High Court as may be prescribed by a Law of the House of Assembly of the State”
In law therefore, the Edo State High Court is one Court, and all the Judicial Divisions of the High Courts of Edo State have the same jurisdiction to entertain any matter arising from Edo State despite the creation of Judicial Divisions for mere purposes of administrative convenience. See Section 32 (1) of the High Court Law of defunct Bendel State, Cap 65, Laws of Bendel State of Nigeria 1976 now applicable to Edo State provides as follows
“For the more convenient dispatch of business the court may sit in two or more divisions and the Chief Justice may divide the State into divisions and assign any portion to any division which shall be known as a Judicial Division and may designate such Judicial Division by name and shall direct one or more judges to sit in one or more Judicial Divisions.”
In my view therefore, the High Court of Edo State whether sitting at Ubiaja Judicial Division or Benin Judicial Division or indeed any other Judicial Divisions of the High Court of Edo State is one High Court exercising the same powers and jurisdiction as conferred on the High Court of Edo State by Section 270 (1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as Amended) and all other powers enabling it in that behalf”. –
CANDIDATE OF A POLITICAL PARTY – NON-JUSTICIABILITY OF THE QUESTION OF WHO IS A CANDIDATE OF A POLITICAL PARTY
“My lords, it is true in law that the question of who is a candidate of a political party is clearly a political question and which is non – justiciable being at the sole discretion or within the powers of the political party concerned as its internal affairs over which no Court has the jurisdiction to superintend. See Nuhu V. Bwacha & Ors (2016) LPELR – 40810 (CA) per Georgewill JCA @ pp. 68 – 69. See also Onucha V. Okafor (1983) 2 NSCC 494; Taiwo V. Adeboro (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 584) 53; Anyanwu V. Ogunewe (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 738) 1012”. –
LOCUS STANDI -WHO HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING AN ACTION FOR BREACH OF THE ELECTORAL ACT?
“However, it is also equally true in law that a person who participated as a candidate in a primary election of a political party and alleges a breach of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as Amended) and non – compliance with the guidelines of that political party for the conduct of the primaries for selection of its candidate for election has the locus standi, the legal right, to sue and such an issue is not a political question and is thus, justiciable. See Ardo V. Nyako (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 244) 130; Anyanwu V. Ogunewe (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 738) 1012 @ p. 1039; Uwazurike V. Nwachukwu (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 680) 1206; Adedayo V. PDP (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 695) 204; Emenike V. PDP (2012) AlL FWLR (Pt. 640) 1261; Lado V. CPC (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 607) 545; APGA V. Anyanwu (2014) All FGWLR (Pt. 735) 243; See also Nuhu V. Bwacha & Ors (2016) LPELR – 40810 (CA) per Georgewill JCA @ p. 69.
Thus, the clear position of the law as resonate in virtually all the decisions of the apex Court as well as this Court as touching the issue of locus standi pursuant to Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act (2010 as Amended) is that a person, once he was a candidate at the primary election of a political party and who alleges a breach of the Electoral Act 2010 (as Amended) and the guidelines of the affected political party, such as the 1st Respondent in this appeal, indeed has the locus standi, the legal right, to sue by virtue of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as Amended). Indeed, such a claim, such as the claim commenced by the 1st Respondent before the Court below, is clearly justiciable in law. The 1st Respondent is thereby clothed with the requisite locus standi to sue as he did in his claim against the Appellants, and as was rightly held by the Court below, contrary to the erroneous contentions of the Appellants in this appeal and which contentions, being erroneous, must be discountenanced. See Alhassan & Anor V. Ishaku & Ors (2016) LPELR – 40083 (SC). See also Ardo V. Nyako (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 244) 130; Anyanwu V. Ogunewe (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 738) 1012 @ p. 1039; Uwazurike V. Nwachukwu (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 680) 1206; Adedayo V. PDP (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 695) 204; Emenike V. PDP (2012) AlL FWLR (Pt. 640) 1261; Lado V. CPC (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 607) 545; APGA V. Anyanwu (2014) All FGWLR (Pt. 735) 243; See also Nuhu V. Bwacha & Ors (2016) LPELR – 40810 (CA) per Georgewill JCA @ p. 69”.-
PLEADINGS – PARTIES ARE BOUND BY THEIR PLEADINGS – EFFECT OF FAILURE TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF FACTS PLEADED
“In law, the parties are bound by the averments in their pleadings. See Lipede V. Shonekan (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 374) 668 @ p. 686. The Court is also bound by the pleadings of the parties, and therefore, cannot go into an inquiry outside the pleadings or to adjudicate on matters not put in issue by the parties. See George V. Dominion Flour Mills Ltd (1953) All NLR 71. It is also the law that the onus is on the person to prove his allegation, and therefore a failure to adduce evidence in support of facts pleaded would result to failure to prove the facts pleaded or the pleadings would be deemed abandoned. See Amaechi V. INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1080) 227. See also Rt. Hon Tarzoor V. Ioraer 2015 LPELR – 25975 CA pp. 43 – 47”. –
FINDINGS OF A TRIAL COURT – RELUCTANCE OF THE APPELLATE COURT IN INTERFERING WITH THE FINDINGS OF A TRIAL COURT
“In law an appellate Court will not interfere with or disturb the correct findings of the trial Court. This is so because an appellate Court is not so much concerned with the correctness or wrongness of the reasons adduced by a trial Court for its decisions or conclusions but rather more concerned with whether the decision reached or conclusion arrived at was correct or wrong; that is the law. If it correct, that is the end of the matter! See Alhaji Ndayoko & Ors. V. Alhaji Dantoro & Ors. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187 @ p. 198, where Edozie, JSC., had pronounced with finality on this vexed issue, thus:
“An appellate court is only concerned with whether the judgment appealed against is right or wrong not whether the reasons given are right or wrong. Where the judgment is right but the reasons given are wrong, the appellate court does not interfere. It is only where the misdirection has caused the court to come to a wrong conclusion that the appellate court will interfere….”
See also Abaye V. Ofili (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 15) 134; Ukejianya V. Uchendu 18 WACA 46. –
COURT – ORDER OF RESTITUTION
“In the circumstances, the 3rd Appellant having illegally and without any color of right been sworn into an office that does not lawfully belong to him and having benefitted from the position of the Executive Chairman of Esan South East Local Government Area of Edo State under the guise of being the candidate of the APC in the 3/3/2018 election into the said Local Government Council conducted by the 2nd Respondent, and was returned elected, ought to purge himself of the fruits of his illegality, being merely an impostor. See LAU V. PDP & ors (2017) LPELR-42800(SC) @ p. 67, where the Supreme Court ordered the 4thRespondent to refund all the monies received by him from the Office as a Senator, directing inter alia thus:
“That the 4th Respondent –Alhaji Sani Abubakar Danladi- is hereby ordered to vacate the seat of the Senator representing the said Taraba North Senatorial District of Taraba State. It is also ordered that Alhaji Sani Abubabkar Danladi shall within ninety days from today refund to the National Assembly all National Assembly all monies he collected by way of salary/allowances whatsoever or howsoever described since he took the seat as the Senator representing Taraba North Senatorial District of Taraba State.”
My lords, this level of impunity, and of several acts of impunity in the political landscape in this great Country of all of us, had regrettably gone on unabated for far too long in our political life and governance and must therefore, be checked, stopped and abated forthwith through the instrumentality of the law, at least in this case. I hereby so put a stop to it as was also rightly done by the Court below and to affirm the very timely and apt orders of the Court below made in line with the relief as claimed by the 1st Respondent against the 3rd Appellant for restitution. –
CASES CITED
Not Available
STATUTES REFERRED TO
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)|Edo State High Court (Civil procedure) Rules 2018|Edo State Local Government Electoral Law, 2012|Electoral Act 2010|Evidence Act 2011|High Court Law, Cap. 65, Vol. III Law of Bendel State of Nigeria, 1976 (now applicable to Edo State)|Regulated and Other professions (Private Practice Prohibition) Law Lecturers Exemption) (No. 2) Order 1992|
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