CORAM

S.U.ONU, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT

PARTIES

ABUBAKAR GABDO APPELLANTS

ALI HASSAN RESPONDENTS

AREA(S) OF LAW

SUMMARY OF FACTS

The Respondent, a ram merchant came to Lagos from Niger Republic to sell rams. On arrival some hoodlums attacked him with broken bottle and extorted money from him. Whilst some of the attackers escaped, one of them was unable to escape hence in the scuffle that ensued, the attacker drew out a knife and stabbed the Respondent who later struggled, overpowered him and also stabbed him with the knife. Some policemen came to the scene and arrested the Respondent. However, the attacker later died at the hospital as a result of the knife injury inflicted on him by the Respondent. The Respondent was charge to a Magistrate Court for the offence of manslaughter and was remanded in prison custody for over 10 years without trial. Fundamental human right proceeding was instituted against the Commissioner of Police as the 1st Respondent and the Attorney General of Justice, Lagos State, as 2nd Respondent at the High Court. At the trial, the 1st and 2nd Respondent did not file any affidavit evidence countering the case of the Respondent toward his unlawful detention without trial for over 10 years for the offence of manslaughter. The learned trial Judge relying on the affidavit evidence of the Respondent, awarded N7 Million compensation to the Respondent against the Appellant and the Commissioner of Police, jointly and severally. Garnishee proceeding was enforced only against the Appellant, hence the present appeal by the Appellant.

HELD

Appeal Allowed.

ISSUES

Whether the Appellant is liable for the continued remand of the Respondent in prison for over ten years without trial

RATIONES DECIDENDI

UNLAWFUL ARREST – NATURE OF DAMAGES UPON UNLAWFUL ARREST OR DETENTION – SECTION 35(6) OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION

“It is trite that by virtue of Section 35 (6) of the 1999 Constitution, any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained is entitled to compensation and public apology from the appropriate authority or person responsible for the incarceration; and by dint of the said section, a person who has established that he was unlawfully arrested and/or detained need not specifically ask for compensation before he is awarded one. The granting of compensation is automatic in such circumstances vide Jim-Jaja v. C.O.P. and Ors (2013) 6 NWLR (pt. 1350) 255” PER J. S. IKYEGH, J.C.A REMAND PROCEEDINGS – WHETHER SECTION 74(3) OF ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE LAW, 2011 SERVES AS A GROUND TO IMPUTE CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE REMAND PROCEEDING ON AN APPELLANT
“Where the appellant never knew of the pending remand proceedings, it was expecting too much statutory burden on the appellant to impute constructive knowledge of the pending remand proceedings on the appellant. Section 74(3) of ACJL 2011 would not serve as the platform to impute constructive knowledge of the remand proceedings on the appellant on the footing that it is intended to empower the appellant, regardless of the nature of the offence, whether triable on information as stated in Section 72(1) of ACJL 2011, or not triable on information, to unlimited powers to call for the duplicate case file for legal advice; and, which ministerial power is, in my considered opinion, expected to be exercised only in cases the appellant is aware of the remand proceedings; as the said ministerial power is not subject to executive control and makes only the appellant responsible for its exertion vide Abacha v. State (2002) 11 NWLR (pt.779) 437, Comptroller of Prisons v. Adekanye (2002) 15 NWLR (pt.790) 318”. PER J. S. IKYEGH, J.C.A INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS – DUTY OF COURTS IN INTERPRETING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
“I agree with both learned counsel that the constitutional and statutory provisions under discussion in the appeal have to be given their literal, plain and ordinary construction or meaning without resorting to external or internal aid. It is the duty of the Court to interpret the words of the law maker as used vide A.-G., Federation v. A.-G., Lagos State (2013) 16 NWLR (pt.1380) 249, Fidelity Bank Plc v. Monye and Ors. (2012) 10 NWLR (pt.1307) 1 at 31, Bronik Motors Ltd. v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) 1 SCNLR 296, A.-G., Bendel State v. A.-G., Federation (1982) 3 NCLR 1, Awolowo v. Shagari (1979) 6 9 SC 51, Adejumo v. Military Governor of Lagos State (1972) 3 SC 45 and Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (pt.117) 517”. PER J. S. IKYEGH, J.C.A PROCEDURAL LAWS – PURPOSE OF ENACTING PROCEDURAL LAWS
“Procedural laws of the sort under consideration in the appeal are enacted for the benefit of a defendant vide Okegbu v. The State (1979) 12 NSCC 151 at 174 per the judgment of Idigbe J.S.C., (of blessed memory) where His Lordship restated that such procedural laws are “usually construed as imperative; and that is the cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes especially where procedural provisions are inserted for the protection of accused person. See also the apt English case of The Secretary for Defence v. Warn (1968) 3 W.L.R. 609 at 614 per the speech of Lord Hudson which was cited with approval in Okegbu v. The State (supra) at 174.See also the apt English case of The Secretary for Defence v. Warn (1968) 3 W.L.R. 609 at 614 per the speech of Lord Hudson which was cited with approval in Okegbu v. The State (supra) at 174.” PER J. S. IKYEGH, J.C.A INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES – INTERPRETATION OF “MAY” IN SECTION 74(3) OF ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE LAW, 2011, OF LAGOS STATE
“The phrase “may” in Section 74(3) of ACJL 2011 means “shall”, “must” or “mandatory” “obligatory” thus placing an imperative duty on the appellant to request for the duplicate case files relating to any offence for legal advice from the subordinates of the commissioner of police for legal advice by the DPP’s office under the appellant vide Edewor v. Uwegba and Ors. (1987) 1 NWLR (pt.50) 313 at 339 thus: Most of the cases in which the word “may” has a mandatory meaning relate to cases in which they are used in penal statutes. See also Kotoye v. C.B.N. and Ors. (1989) 1 NWLR (pt.98) 419 and Ude v. Nwara and Ors. (1993) 2 NWLR (pt.278) 638 at 661.” PER J. S. IKYEGH, J.C.A DOCTRINE OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE – INTERPRETATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
“Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition) by Langan relying on the English cases of R. v. Leicestershire Justices (1850) 15 Q. B. 88, Mayer v. Harding (1867) L. R. 2 Q. B. 410, Harding v. Price (1948) 1 K. B. 695 and Nichols v. Hall (1873) L. R. and C. P. 322, illustrates the said principle of interpretation of statutes aptly in pages 326-327 thereof thus; IMPOSSIBILITY OF COMPLIANCE Enactments which impose duties upon conditions are, when these are not construed as conditions precedent to the exercise of a jurisdiction, subject to the maxim, lex non cogit ad impossibility. They are understood as dispensing with the performance of what is prescribed when performance of it is impossible. –

CASES CITED

Not Available

STATUTES REFERRED TO

Administration of Criminal Justice Law, 2011, of Lagos StateConstitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amendedPolice Act Cap, Laws of the Federation, 2004 (Police Act).Road Traffic Act 1930Summary Jurisdiction Act 1857|

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