“Traditionally and as a matter of law, an appellate Court should not interfere with the findings of facts of a trial Court except where the findings do not correspond with the evidence before it. In such a circumstance, such findings are described as being perverse. In the case Unity Bank Plc V Abba (2013) LPELR–22890(CA) this Court held – “I am not unmindful of the law that ascription of probative value to evidence led is done by the trial Court who has the obligation of evaluating the evidence led and after having heard the witnesses and observed their demeanour and that appellate courts are not given to the practice of interfering with the findings of facts made by the trial Court by substituting the findings for those of the trial Court except under certain circumstances such as where the findings of facts is demonstrated to be perverse; see Unity Bank V Bouari (2008) 7 NWLR Pt. 1086 pg.372 and the concurring judgment of Ogunbiyi, JCA as she then was (Now JSC).” See also Dasuki (Rtd) V FRN ELC (2018) 3047(SC) 1; Egbufor V State (2013) LPELR-20688(CA); Unity Bank Plc V Abba (2013) LPELR-22890(CA); Nteogwuile V Otuo (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt. 738) 58. Again, the Supreme Court in Adamu V State (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1565) 459, admonished thus: “Unless the Appellant is able to show that the the said findings are perverse, this Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact by the two lower Courts . The Appellant has failed to advance any special or compelling reasons to warrant such interference by this Court.” See also Iroagbara V Ufomadu (2009) 5-6 SC (Pt. 1) 83; Ojo V Gov. Oyo State (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 956) 1. Thus, any decision based on perverse findings will not stand. –

“On what constitutes a perverse decision, the law has not left it to conjecture. The apex Court in Abegunde V Ondo State House of Assembly (2015) 4-5 SC (Pt. 1) 1, defined it thus: “In UBN Plc V Chimaeze (2014) LPELR-SC 204/2006 this Court defined what a perverse decision is and how same is treated on appeal thus: “[A] decision of a court is perverse when it ignores the facts or evidence before it which lapse when considered as a whole constitutes a miscarriage of justice. In such a case, an appellate court is bound to interfere with such as decision… In the case at hand therefore, the appellant succeeds only if [he] establishes that in its findings in respect of the special and general damages the lower Court has ignored the evidence on record and/or wrongly applied a principle to the evidence. The appellant/cross respondent must establish too that the lapse has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.” See Atolagbe V Shorun (1985) LPELR-SC.14/1984.” –

“The law is long since settled that there are five ways to prove title to land, namely: By traditional evidence, By production of documents of title, By the exercise of numerous and positive acts of ownership extending over a sufficient length of time to warrant the inference that the person is the true owner, By acts of long possession and enjoyment of the land, and By proof of possession of connected or adjacent land and in circumstances rendering it probable that the owner of such connected or adjacent land would in addition be the owner of the land in dispute. See Anagbado V Faruk (2018) LPELR-44909(SC); Aigbobahi V Aifuwa (2006) LPELR-267(SC); Idundun V Okumagba (1976) 9-10 SC 227. –

“It is also the law that in civil matters, the Plaintiff/Claimant must prove his case on a balance of probability, relying only on the strength of his case, and not on the weakness of the defence, except where the Defendant’s case his position – Elf Petroleum Nig Ltd V Umah (2018) 1 SC (Pt. 1) 173. This is even more so where the Plaintiff is seeking a declaration of title. The Respondent, who also counter-claimed for the same farmland, has the same burden and standard of proof. Thus, the decision rendered would be based on which of the two parties proves a better title to the land”. –

“I cannot fault this finding of the lower Court in any way. Section 66 of the Evidence Act (supra) provides that – “66. When the title to or interest in family or communal land is in issue, oral evidence of family or communal tradition concerning such title or interest is admissible.” Consequently, evidence given in proof of traditional history is an exception to the hearsay rule. This is because in order to meet with the requirement of the law in respect of proof of title by means of traditional history, a party is required to give evidence in respect of the founder of the land and the succeeding progenitors, right up to the party laying claim to ownership of the land. This invariably means going back in time to a time beyond human memory which is sometimes referred to as “time immemorial”. This character of evidence is therefore acceptable, as was rightly pointed out by the lower Court. The trial Court was therefore patently wrong to have rejected the evidence adduced by the Respondent contending that it was hearsay, since traditional evidence is, by its very nature, hearsay as it is history which transcends human memory – Nteogwuile V Otuo (2001) LPELR-2071(SC); Sogunro V Sogunro (2017) (Pt. 1570) 297. Indeed, the Supreme Court per Oputa, JSC in Obasi V Onwuka (1987) LPELR-2152(SC) held “Traditional evidence is nothing but hearsay removed from the hearsay [rule] and elevated to the status of admissible evidence by a statutory provision of section 44 of the Evidence Law Cap. 49 of the Eastern Nigeria applicable to this case…” –

“It is true that the evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value is the province of the trial Court. However, where a trial Court fails to take advantage of its seeing and hearing the witnesses first hand, an appellate Court will be well-placed to examine the facts as disclosed in the cold Record to evaluate the evidence and make its findings thereon. This is what the lower Court has commendably done. –

“From all the above, the findings of the lower Court are in tandem with the settled principle of law as enunciated in the case of Obasi V Onwuka (supra) 6-7, E-A, where the Supreme Court held – “In considering such evidence a trial Court should always remember that there is inevitably bound [to be] conflict in the traditional stories of the parties. This does not mean that either side is lying. They may both be honest and truthful and yet genuinely mistaken. That is why it is necessary to test each side’s traditional history by reference to facts and acts done in recent years as established by evidence led, in order to see which side ought to be preferred on the basis of probability.” This Court faithfully toed the same line with the apex Court in the case of Uwahianri V Onyemaru (2017) LPELR-41672(CA) where it similarly held as follows: “The best way to test traditional history is by reference to the fact in recent years as established by evidence, seeking which of the two competing histories is more probable. The rule in Kojo II V Bansi (supra) is only applicable where the traditional histories (evidence) recounted by the two sides are probabale or conflicting or inconclusive, and a recourse is therefore had to other means, like acts of ownership and/or possession to determine which party has better title.” –

“It goes without saying that where parties elect to prove title via the mode of traditional history, it becomes inevitable that those who may have proper knowledge of such history from time immemorial may be family members, as well as others who may have benefited form the benevolence of predecessors who were family members. To exclude family members from the category of competent witnesses would therefor be ridiculous, and the law has not imposed such an unreasonable restriction on any party. It is even more incongruous as a proposition considering the fact that some of the witnesses called by the Appellant expressly admitted that they had a family relationships to each other, as well as to the Appellant. See the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW4. It was this which led the lower Court to observe as follows at page 288 of the Record – “Thus it is clear that the Respondent/Plaintiff’s witnesses are not only related to each other, but are related to him. The trial Court did not consider them as interested parties but instead wrongly described the witnesses of the Appellant as interested parties. The trial Court did not show from the evidence before it that the Appellant’s witnesses were motivated by personal interest in their testimony… The trial Court was therefore wrong to have described them as interested witnesses, thereby using this reason as the basis of rejecting their testimonies.” I could not agree more. This is undoubtedly the purport of Section 66 of the Evidence Act (supra) already referred to and set out earlier in this Judgment. Thus, the law allows oral evidence of family members or community members in proof of traditional history. For a further affirmation of this settled position of the law, the case of Odogwu V State (2009) LPELR-8506(CA) is pertinent. Therein, this Court, relying on a decision of the apex Court held – “The competence of witnesses generally is provided for in Section 155(1) of the Evidence Act. It provides: “All persons” shall be competent to testify unless the court considers that they are prevented from understanding the question put to them or from giving rational answers to those questions by reason of tender years, extreme old age, whether of body or mind or any other cause of the same kind.” “All persons” here include those who are even interested in the matter. In Yusuf V NTC Ltd (1977) 6 SC at 41; (1977) 1 NSCC 349 at 351, the Supreme Court held that it was wrong for the learned trial Judge to reject the evidence of the two witnesses called by the defendant merely because they were officials of the defendant and therefore interested parties.” (Emphasis supplied) Based on the above, I agree with the lower Court that the findings of the trial Court which run counter to the evidence adduced before it, were perverse. That being the case, the lower Court was right when it interfered with the decision because it is perverse and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. See Unity Bank V Kwara Chemical Co. Ltd (2019) LPELR-48468(CA) 38-42, B-C. Atolagbe V Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 380. –