CORAM

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PARTIES

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LIGALI ADUNBI APPELLANTS

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THE STATE RESPONDENTS

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AREA(S) OF LAW

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SUMMARY OF FACTS

This appeal is from the judgment of the High Court of Justice of Lagos State, which convicted and sentenced the Appellant to death for causing the death of one Sube Adunbi, his mother, by strangulation, contrary to section 319 of the Criminal Code Law of Lagos State, 2003. The case of the Respondent was that the Appellant killed his mother by strangulation on the fateful day stated in the charge sheet for bewitching him and not helping him in life. The Appellant’s case on the other hand, was that his late mother who was a drunk came back drunk while he was fighting with his motor-vehicle conductor over disagreement on missing money and she went between them to separate the fight in the course of which she fell down and started gasping and eventually died on the same day. The court below believed and accepted the the Respondent’s evidence and disbelieved the defence of accident relied on by the Appellant upon which it convicted and sentenced him to death as charged. Not satisfied with the decision of the court below the Appellant has filed a notice of appeal.

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HELD

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Appeal Dismissed

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ISSUES

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Whether the arraignment of the Appellant was proper and valid Whether the High Court was right that the Respondent had proved the offences of murder against the Appellant as required by law; beyond reasonable doubt

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RATIONES DECIDENDI

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PRESUMPTION – PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF AN ARRAINGMENT

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“The presumption under section 168(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 (Evidence Act) that official or judicial acts are regularly done enured to the taking of the plea (supra) as there is no suggestion in the record that the appellant’s plea was taken without the charge read and explained to him. Moreover, the conviction was not based on the plea, nor does evidence exist showing the appellant was misled by the procedure (supra) as to occasion a substantial miscarriage of justice vide the proviso to section 19(1) of the Court of Appeal Act 2004. See also Udeh v. The State (1999) 7 NWLR (pt.609) 1 at 23 – 24 thus –
“… It is no where suggested that the charge was never read to the appellant or that he did not understand the same before he pleaded thereto. At all events, there is the provision of section 150(1) of the Evidence Act which stipulates thus –
“When any judicial or official act is shown to have been done in a manner substantially regular, it is presumed that formal requisites for its validity were complied with.”
The arraignment of the appellant was both a judicial and an official act and having been executed in a manner which was substantially regular, the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite et soleniniter esse acta donee probetur in contrarium upon which is presumed that judicial and official acts have been done rightly and regularly until the contrary is proved becomes fully applicable. See Peter Locknan and Another v. The State (1972) 5 S.C. 22 and James Edun and others v. I. G. of Police (1966) 1 All NLR 17 at 21. In the face of the above, it seems to me that the application of this presumption is sufficient to resolve the 1st issue in favour of the respondent.
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Finally on the issue of arraignment, the law is well settled that where, as in the present case, irregularity has been alleged in a trial, the burden is on the appellant to establish that the alleged irregularity has led to a substantial miscarriage of justice. Where the appellant does not show that the presumption of irregularity has led to a miscarriage of justice, it will be assumed that there was none. See Peter Locknan and Another v. The State (supra). As I have already observed, no irregularity has, in my judgment, been established in this case. And even if the appellant’s complaint is otherwise well founded, and I do not so hold, no substantial miscarriage of justice was established to have been occasioned thereby. I find that no irregularity has been established by the appellant in this case. I entertain no doubt that the arraignment of the appellant is without fault and is clearly valid”.
See further Ogunye and Ors. v. State (1999) 5 NWLR (pt.604) 548 at 567 – 569, Kalu v. State (1998) 13 NWLR (pt.583) 531 at 617, Olabode v. State (2009) 11 NWLR (pt.1152) 254 at 267 – 269.”-

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CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT- APPROPRIATE TIME TO OBJECT TO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

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“It is trite that the time to raise objection to the voluntariness of a confessional statement to the police is when it is sought to be tendered in evidence in which case a trial-within-trial would be conducted at that stage to determine the voluntariness of the statement. A challenge to such confessional statement on ground of voluntariness raised at defence stage, as in this case, was belatedly raised and did not affect the admissibility in evidence of the statements, Exhibits A3 and A5 vide F.R.N. v. Iweka (2013) 3 NWLR (pt.1341) 285 at 332 thus –
“At the risk of repetition but for emphasis, the law is trite that the voluntariness of a confessional statement can only be contested when it is about to be tendered in evidence. That is the appropriate time to raise the involuntariness or otherwise of a confessional statement. Where as in this case the respondent, was represented by counsel, it is assumed he ought to know what to do at each stage of proceedings. The Respondent failed to raise such objection. She cannot on appeal complain of absence of trial within trial. See Nwachukwu v. The State (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 902) 262 at 273; Oche v. The State (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1027) 214 at 219; Okoro v. The State (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 282) 425.
Since the essence of a trial-within-trial is to inter alia, decide whether or not to uphold an objection to the admissibility of a confessional statement, a retraction of an already admitted confessional statement cannot necessitate a trial-within-trial. To do so will be to take steps towards asking the court to re-decide, reconsider and re-determine the admissibility of a document already admitted and marked as Exhibit, thereby creating a vicious circle. The law is trite that once a court has taken their decision on an issue, it stands unless that decision is found to be perverse. It is a commendable path treaded by the trial court. It averted the ominous consequence of holding in one breath that exhibit 2A having been admitted is not now admissible simply because it was belatedly retracted for no good cause. This is in tandem with the settled principle of law that a court cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time”.
See also Afolalu v. State (supra).” –

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CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT- WHETHER A CONVICTION CAN BE BASED SOLELY ON A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

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“That a conviction can be based solely on a confessional statement after the court had properly assured itself of the probative value of the confession as in this case is no longer in doubt vide Essien v. State (2018) 6 NWLR (pt.1614) 167 at 175 per the lead judgment prepared by his lordship M. D. Muhammad, J.S.C., thus –
“I agree with learned appellant’s counsel that by virtue of a chain of decisions of this court, see R v. Sykes (supra), Dawa v. State (supra) and Ikpasa v. State (supra), it is desirable to base the appellant’s conviction on further evidence outside his confession, the requirement of such corroborative evidence is however not mandatory. The principle still is that the court, where the confession is direct, positive and unequivocal and properly proved, may convict an accused solely on such a confession. As learned respondent’s counsel rightly submitted, there is no evidence stronger than a person’s admission of the state of affairs: see Stephen v. State (supra), (1986) 5 NWLR (pt.46) 978, Oguonzee v. State (supra) and Ogoala v. State (1991) 2 NWLR (pt.175) 509”.
See also Oseni v. State (2012) 5 NWLR (pt.1293) 351, Hassan v. State (2017) 5 NWLR (pt.1557) 1, Fatai v. State (2013) 10 NWLR (pt.1361) 1 at 17 – 18, 20, Igba v. State (2018) 6 NWLR (pt.1614) 44 at 56 and 58.” –

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CONFESSION -WHETHER THE RETRACTION OF A CONFESSION WOULD DEVALUE OR DIMINISH THE POTENCY OF THE CONFESSION

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“The evidence of the appellant retracting the confession and advancing the defence of accident would not devalue or diminish the potency of the confession as in such case the confession is preferred to the subsequent evidence retracting it on the ground that the evidence is an afterthought vide the case of Egboghonome v. State (1993) 7 NWLR (pt.306) 383 where the Supreme Court sitting as a Full Court held to the effect that where an accused retracts his confessional statement the court may still convict on the retracted statement which was made voluntarily and is positive, direct and unequivocal taking into consideration evidence outside the confessional statement which will make it probable that the confession is true. See also Igba v. State (supra) at 58 – 59.” –

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MEDICAL EVIDENCE – WHETHER MEDICAL EVIDENCE IS OF ANY LEGAL NECESSITY WHERE CAUSE OF DEATH IS OBVIOUS

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“The appellant also confessed in his statements to the police that he strangled the deceased to death with a shoestring or rope on the same day thus making it unnecessary to tender medical evidence in proof of death and the cause of death of the deceased as the cause of death (strangulation) was obvious in the case vide Bamidele Patrick v. The State, unreported Appeal No. SC.384/2013 delivered by the Supreme Court on 23-02-18 per the lead judgment prepared by his lordship, Augie, J.S.C., inter alia thus –
“The law says that where cause of death is obvious, medical evidence ceases to be of any practical or legal necessity …”
See also Igba v. State (supra) at 68 following Ben v. State (2006) 16 NWLR (pt.1006) 582.”
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OFFENCE OF MURDER – WHETHER IT IS MANDATORY TO TENDER IN EVIDENCE THE WEAPON USED IN COMMITTING AN OFFENCE

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“The appellant admitted in his confessional statements to the police that he strangled his mother, the deceased, to death using a rope which he tied round her neck showing there was no dispute on the murder weapon which obviated the tendering of same in evidence; more so, it is not mandatory to tender in evidence the weapon used in committing an offence unless the defence makes it an issue in evidence in the case at the court of trial which was not the case here vide Babarinde v. State (2014) All FWLR (pt.717) 606, Attah v. State (2009) 15 NWLR (pt.1164) 284, Garba v. State (2000) 6 NWLR (pt.661) 378, Victor v. State (2014) All FWLR (pt.719) 1092.”-

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ARRAIGNMENT OF AN ACCUSED PERSON – ESSENCE OF ARRAIGNMENT OF AN ACCUSED PERSON

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“As very ably demonstrated in the lead judgment, the essence of an arraignment of accused person charged with the commission of a criminal is for him to be formally notified or informed in the language he understands, of the nature and essential details of the offence/s he is alleged to have committed before and by the court so as to provide him the opportunity to understand the offence/s and make a plea thereto. Once an accused person appears physically before a court and the nature and material details of the offence/s and make a plea thereto. Once an accused person appears physically before a court and the nature and material details of the offence/s he was charged with before the court are read and explained to him and he freely pleads to the offence/s, absence of record to that effect from the proceedings of the court or failure to record that the charge was read and explained to the accused person and pleaded thereto, would not affect the validity of the arraignment. Solola v. State (2005) 11 NWLR (937) 460, Udo v. State (2005) 8 NWLR (928) 521, Olabode v. State (2009) 11 NWLR (1152) 254 cited in the lead judgment, Madu v. State (2012) 15 NWLR(1324) 405 .” –

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ARRAIGNMENT – PRESUMPTION RAISED BY A FAILURE TO CONTEST ANY ASPECT OF AN ARRAIGNMENT

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“Where, as in the Appellant’s case, an accused person was represented by Counsel at the time of the arraignment and he did not contest or challenge any aspect of the arraignment, the presumption would be that all requirements of the law for a valid arraignment have been fully or at least, substantially complied with in line with the provisions of section 168(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 (Section 150 of 2004 Act), as shown in the lead judgment. Absence of the record that the charge was read and explained to the Appellant in the language he understands, that he clearly understood the nature of the offence he was charged with, that the Lower Court was satisfied on that fact and that he freely pleaded to the charge before recording the plea, from the record of proceedings of the arraignment, does not affect the validity of the arraignment.” –

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CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT – WHETHER A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT IS SUFFICIENT TO GROUND THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCUSED PERSON

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“I have read the judgment of the High Court and agree that even though the Appellant’s admission of the commission of the offence he was charged with in the confessional statement does not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proof; See Igabele v. State (2000) 6 NWLR (975) 100, Adekoya v. State (2012) 9 NWLR (1306) 539, the confessional statement was proved as required by law and was alone sufficient to ground the conviction of the Appellant for the offence he was charged with. Isah v. State (2010) 16 NWLR (1218) 132, Adebayo v. A.G Ogun State (2008) 7 NWLR (1085) 201, State v. Isah (2012) 16 NWLR (1327) 613, Dele v. State (2011)1 NWLR (1229)508” –

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CASES CITED

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Not Available

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STATUTES REFERRED TO

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Evidence Act 2011

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CLICK HERE TO READ FULL JUDGMENT