Legalpedia Citation: (2023-07) Legalpedia 31029 (CA)

In the Court of Appeal

HOLDEN AT LAGOS, NIGERIA

Fri Jul 21, 2023

Suit Number: CA/LAG/CV/754/2022

CORAM

OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA JCA

FREDRICK OZIAKPONO OHO JCA

MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM SIRAJO JCA

PARTIES

1. 1.IBEJU/LEKKI LOCAL GOVERNMENT
2. LOCAL COUNCIL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
3. CHIEFTAINCY COMMITTEE OF IBEJU / LEKKI LOCAL GOVERNMENT

APPELLANTS

1. PRINCE SAFURAINI ADEDOYIN SANNI (Olori Ebi)
2. IMAM KAMILU BISIRIYU SANNI
3. ALFA TAOFIKI SANNI (Secretary)
4. SEMIU SINA BELLO
5. MOSIU BOLAJI SANNI
6. ADE BISIRIYU SANNI
7. MOSUDI SANNI (For and on behalf of SANNI ASIEBI-OKUSOKAN CHIEFTAINCY  FAMILY (Okun-Otolu Town, Ibeju Lekki Local Government Area)
8.  DR. TAJUDEEN ODUTOLANI KASALI
9.  TANSIRU AFOLABI KASALI
10. MOLIKI DAUDA ORESEGUN-OSIDINA
11. LAGOS STATE COUNCIL OF OBAS  & CHIEFS
12. LAGOS STATE GOVERNMENT
13. HON. COMMISSIONER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT & CHIEFTAINCY AFFAIRS
14. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF LAGOS STATE

 

RESPONDENTS

AREA(S) OF LAW

APPEAL, CHIEFTAINCY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CUSTOMS, EVIDENCE, LIMITATION LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

SUMMARY OF FACTS

The first – seventh respondents conceded that there are two ruling houses in Otolu – Okusokan and Tega Ruling Houses. They claimed to be the descendants of the Sanni-Ashieba-Okusokan. Okusokan, who founded Otolu community, had only one brother – Tega – from the same mother, Osepeju, but different fathers and three children: Okute, Ashieba and Joko. They asserted that it was their turn to produce the next Baale of Otolu, with the first respondent as the nominated candidate, on the demise of the last Baale from Tega Ruling House. It is their case that the eighth – tenth respondents were strangers from Ogun State and had no right to the Baale of Otolu. They alleged that, in September, 2011, the ninth respondent was installed the Baale of Otolu without going through the due process and the appellants and twelfth – fourteenth respondents gave recognition to it in the absence of any chieftaincy declaration for succession thereto. The actions and inactions of the appellants and eighth – fourteenth respondents caused serious injuries and damages to the first – seventh respondents. In a considered judgment, delivered on 3 rd October, 2018, lying at pages 374 – 374Q of the main record, the lower court granted the first – seventh respondents’ claims. The appellants were aggrieved by the decision hence the instant appeal.

HELD

Appeal dismissed

ISSUES

Whether or not this action of the 1st to 7th Respondents as the Claimants at the trial court in Suit No: IKD/102/2011 between Prince Safuraini Adedoyin Sanni & 6 Ors. Vs. Lagos State Council of Obas and Chiefs & 9 Ors is statute barred by reason of the provision of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law of Lagos State Cap P26, Laws of State of Nigeria, 2003?

 By the facts and circumstances of this case, whether the order of declaration made by the lower court rather than an order of certiorari was the appropriate order to make by way of judicial remedy against the administrative or executive order of the Governor of Lagos State made on 23rd April, 2003 in respect of the approval of the Baaleship stool of Otolu Community?

RATIONES DECIDENDI

LIMITATION LAWS – WHEN AN ACTION IS DEEMED STATUTE-BARRED BY REASON OF LIMITATION LAW – THE PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF LIMITATION LAWS

As a necessary prelude, where a statute prescribes a time-bar within which an action should be commenced, such legislation bears the name of limitation law. If an aggrieved person exhibits tardiness by suing his wrong doer outside the statutorily allowed period of time, his action is usually declared as statute-barred. Thus, a cause of action is statute-barred when no proceedings can be brought to enforce it because the period laid down by the limitation law has expired by effluxion of time, see Egbe v. Adefarasin(No. 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 47; Nasir v. C.S.C., Kano State (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1190) 253;CotecnaInt’ Ltd. v. Churchgate (Nig.) Ltd. (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 346; A-G., Adamawa State v. A-G., Fed. (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1428) 515; Mulima v. Usman (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1432) 160; Ibrahim v. Lawal (2015) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1489); N.R.M.A & F.C. v. Johnson (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 247; Daniel v. Ayala (2019) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1703) 25.

The raisons d’etre for limitation law are to ginger up aggrieved persons to be vigilant, to discourage cruel actions and to preserve the evidence by which a defendant will defend the action, see Aremo II v. Adekanye (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 572;Olagunju v. PHCN Plc. (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1254) 113;Lafia L.G. v. Gov., Nasarawa State (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 943; Sulgrave Holdings Inc. v. FGN (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 309; Awolola v. Gov., Ekiti State (2019) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1668) 247; Obazee v. Ekhosuehi (2019) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1701) 245; APC v. Lere (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1705) 254. Its other purpose is ingrained in the Latin maxim: interest recipublicae ut sit finis litium – it is in the interest of the state that there be a limit to litigation, see Asaboro v. Pan Ocean Oil Corp. (Nig) Ltd. (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1563) 42; Oteri Holdings Ltd. v. Oluwa (2021) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1766).

A successful plea of limitation law, as a shield, by an opposing party occasions two harmful effects against a claimant’s action. Firstly, he becomes a destitute of the right of action and judicial relief. In a word, it extinguishes his cause of action, see Egbe v. Adefarasin (No.2) (supra); Nasir v. C.S.C., Kano State (supra); Abubakar v. Nasamu (No. 1) (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1330) 407; INEC v. Ogbadibo LG. (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1498) 167; Buremoh v. Akande (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1563) 74; Okafor v. B.D.U., Jos Branch (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 385. Secondly, the court ceases to be crowned with the requisite jurisdiction to entertain his action. See Owners of the MV “Arebella” v. NAIC (2008)10 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182; Olagunju v. PHCN Plc. (supra); JE.C. Inv. Ltd. v. Brawal Line Ltd. (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 495; INEC v. Enasito (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1602) 63; Toyin v. Musa (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt.1676) 22. – Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA

COURTS – CONDUCT OF COURTS IN INTERPRETING STATUTES

This provision is comprehension-friendly in its purport and connotation. On this score, the law compels the court to accord its wordings their ordinary grammatical meanings without any embellishments, see Bakare v. NRC (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 606; PDP v. Okorocha (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1323) 205; Kawawu v. PDP (2017) 3 NWLR(Pt. 1553) 420; Setracto (Nig) Ltd. v. Kpayi (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1558) 280; Adeokin Records v. MCSCN (2018) NWLR (Pt. 1643); Ecobank v Honeywell Flour (2019) NWLR (Pt. 1655) 55. – Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA

COURTS – CONDUCT OF COURTS IN DETERMINING THE LIMITATION PERIOD OF AN ACTION

The orthodox judicial formula for gauging limitation legislation is simple. A court is enjoined to examine the filed writ of summons/the originating process or statement of claim, either of which will showcase when the cause of action was disclosed in it, with the period stipulated in the limitation statute within which to sue. If the date of filing in the matter is beyond the period allocated by the limitation law, then it is statute-barred. Conversely, if the time limit comes within that permitted by that law, then it is not statute-barred, see Woherem v. Emeruwa(2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 398;Aremo II v. Adekanya(supra);Elebanjo v. Dawodu(2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 76; Williams v. Williams (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095); Hassan v. Aliyu(2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 574; Nweke v. UNIZIK, Awka (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1598)454; Saki v. APC (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1706) 515.

Nota bene, the case-law has endorsed a statement of claim as the major process to be used by the court to measure the presence or absence of its jurisdiction in relation to limitation law, see Akine v. Edjerode (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446; A.D.H. Ltd. v. A.T. Ltd. (2006) NWLR (Pt. 989) 635; Oni v. Cadbury (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Ladoja v. Ajimobi (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1519) 87; B.B. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Yar’adua v. Yandoma (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 213; Akpamgbo-Okadigbo v. Chidi (No. 2) (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 124; Isah v. INEC (supra); Lau v. PDP (supra); Azubuogu v. Oranezi (supra); Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386; A.-G, Fed. v. A.-G., Anambra State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 314; Roe Ltd. v. UNN (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 420; F.U.T., Minna v. Olutayo (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 176; A.-G., Lagos State v. Eko Hotels (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 518. In an action commenced by dint of originating summons, the affidavit in support serves as the statement of claim, see Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 28; PDP v. Ezeonwuka (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 187; Lau v. PDP (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 60; Owuru v. Adigwu (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 1; CBN v. Aribo (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 130. It must be stressed, perforce, that it is only a plaintiff’s statement of claim or affidavit, not a statement of defence or a counter-affidavit, that is relevant in determining the jurisdiction of a court, see lzenkwe V. Nnadozie (1953) 14 WACA 301; UBA Plc. v. BTL Ltd. (2006) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1013) 361; Ngere V. Okuruket ‘XIV’ (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 440. – Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA

CAUSE OF ACTION – WHEN A CAUSE OF ACTION BEGINS TO RUN

For the purposes of limitation statutes, a cause of action begins to run when a party becomes aware of an erosion of his right and there exists a person to be sued (the violator) to protect the encroached right, see Woherem v. Emenuwa (supra); Owie v. Ighiwie (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) 184; UBN Plc v. Umeoduagu (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 352; Okafor v. B.D.U., Jos Branch (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 385; Asaboro v. Pan Ocean Oil Corp. (Nig.) Ltd. (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1563) 42; Zubair v. Kolawole (2019) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1682) 66; Oteri Holdings Ltd. v. Oluwa (2021) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1766) 334. – Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA

CALENDAR – THE CALENDAR USED IN NIGERIA

It is a fact of common knowledge, as entrenched and propagated in section 124 of the Evidence Act, 2011, that Nigeria is a user of the Gregorian calendar – a calendar that has acquired international endorsement. – Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA

LIMITATION LAW – THE CONDUCT OF COURTS IN APPLYING LIMITATION LAWS

Let me place on record, pronto, that it is still the statement of claim that is the template that a court uses to meter the violation or otherwise of the limitation law vis-à-vis the jurisdiction of court. The law does not recognise a statement of defence for the court to use as the index to measure the presence or absence of its jurisdiction in a matter, see lzenkwe V. Nnadozie (1953) 14 WACA 301; UBA Plc. v. BTL Ltd. (2006) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1013) 361; Ngere V. Okuruket ‘XIV’ (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 440; P. & C.H.S. Co. Ltd. v. Migfo (Nig.) Ltd. (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 553; Ahmed v. Ahmed (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 274; A. – G., Fed. v. A. – G., Lagos State (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1566) 20; Olugbemi v. Lawrence (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1591) 209; Oduah v. Okadigbo (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1660) 533; CBN v. Rahamaniyya G.R. Ltd. (2020) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1726) 314. – Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA

FRAUD – EFFECT OF FRAUD ON TIME LIMITATION PERIODS

The settled position of law is that the doctrine of statute-bar is jaundiced in the face of allegation or proof of fraud or fraudulent concealment or breach of trust. The law makes it unconscionable for statute-bar to thrive and operate where fraud lives. Thus, where fraud is involved, the time limitation period in limitation legislation will cease to have any effervescence, see Adekeye v. Akin – Olugbade (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 214/(1987) 2 NSCC 865; UBA v. B.T. L. Ltd. (2006) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1013) 61; Mulima v. Usman (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1432) 160; Okafor v. B.D.U., Jos Branch (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 385. – Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA

CERTIORARI – MEANING AND FUNCTIONS OF CERTIORARI – PROCEDURE FOR APPLICATION OF CERTIORARI

First and foremost, it is germane to understand the significance and hallmarks of certiorari, realisable under judicial review, which is the plank of the appellants’ grouse. Certiorari is one of the prerogative writs available to the High Court, the lower court, in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction/control over an inferior court, tribunal or a body entrusted with the performance of a judicial or quasi-judicial function to ensure that it does not exceed its jurisdiction or commit irregularities thereby making its decision prima facie bad, see Azika v. Gov., Northern Region (1961) All NLR (Pt. 4) 379; Okupe v. F.B.I (1974) 4 SC 83; Nwaobsi v. Military Admin. Delta State (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt. 831) 305; State v. Lawal (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1354) 565. The writ of certiorari has a constitutional flavour as it traces its paternity to the provision of section 272 (2) of the Constitution, as amended, see Lawal v. State (supra). Its primary function is to ensure that inferior courts or any body reposed with the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial duties/assignments keep within the limits of the jurisdiction bestowed on it by statute that created it or else its proceedings will be removed into the High Court to be quashed. It is meant to checkmate abuse/misuse of powers by those inferior courts or bodies, see JSC, C.R.S. v. Young (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1364) 1; Onyekwuluje v. Benue State Govt., (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1484) 40; Korea Nat. Oil Corp v. O.P.S. (Nig.) Ltd. (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1604) 394. The strict procedure for application for certiorari, under the umbrella of judicial review, is ordained in the various High Court Rules, see Ohakim v. Agbaso (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1226) 172. The four conditions that will necessitate for an order of certiorari are: lack of jurisdiction, breach of rules of natural justice, error of law on the face of the record and decision obtained by fraud or collusion, see State v. Lawal (supra); Esabunor v. Faweya (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1671). In judicial review, which shelters an order of certiorari, an appellate court is concerned with the legality and not the merit of the proceedings of the affected inferior court or body, see A.C.B. Plc v. Nwaigwe (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1246) 380. – Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA

WAIVER – MEANING OF WAIVER – TYPES OF JURISDICTION AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO WAIVER OF RIGHTS

In the eyes of the law, waiver is an intentional and voluntary abandonment, surrender or relinquishment of a right which a party is entitled to insist on its performance, see Ariori v. Elemo (1983) 1 SC 13. In the Latin days of the law, waiver of personal right was encapsulated in the maxim: Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto – an individual may renounce a law made for his special benefit.

The case-law bifurcates jurisdiction into two facets, videlicet: procedural jurisdiction and substantive jurisdiction. In Ndayako v. Dantoro (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187 at 219, Edozie, JSC, incisively and graphically, declared:

It is noteworthy that a distinction must always be drawn between two types of jurisdiction viz – jurisdiction as a matter of procedural law and jurisdiction as a matter of substantive law. Whilst the litigant can waive the former, no litigant can confer jurisdiction in the court where the constitution or a statute or any provision of the common law says that the court shall have no jurisdiction. A litigant may submit to procedural jurisdiction of the court e.g. where a writ has been served outside jurisdiction without leave.

See, also, A. – G., Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 210; Achonu v. Okuwobi (2017) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1584) 142; Oko v. State (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1593) 24; Zakirai v. Muhammad (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1594) 181; Kurma v. Sauwa (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1659) 247; BPE v. Dangote Cement Plc. (2020) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1717) 291. – Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA

WAIVER – WAIVER WITHIN THE SPHERE OF PROCEDURAL JURISDICTION

it is my, humble, view that first – seventh respondents’ failure to institute their action under a judicial review procedure falls squarely within the sphere of procedural jurisdiction which is submissive to acquiescence/waiver/estoppel by an adversary or, at worst, a curable irregularity. Put differently, such a failure does not fall within the wide territory of substantive jurisdiction, usually donated to the court by substantive statues, the Constitution and other legislations, that is not obedient to waiver/acquiescence by an opponent. The lower court’s Rules, which categorise modes of commencement of suits, that is allegedly violated fall within the commodious domain of subsidiary enactments, see section 37 of the Interpretation Act, Cap I 23, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004; Unilag v. Aigoro (1984) 15 NSCC 745; Agip (Nig.) Ltd. v. Agip Petroli Int’l (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1187) 34; Oyegun v. Nzeribe (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1194) 577; G.M.O.N. & Sons Co. Ltd. v. Akputa (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1200) 143. They do not invest jurisdiction on a court of law. Source of jurisdiction of courts is statutory. It is the Constitution and legislations that equip the court with jurisdiction, see Dada v. Ogunremi (1962) 2 SCNLR 417; State v. Onagoruwa (1992) 2 SCNJ (Pt. 1) 1; Afribank (Nig.) Plc. v. Akwara (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 974) 619; Onuorah v. KRPC Ltd. (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 393; Mailantarki v. Tongo (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1614) 69; Mainstreet Bank Capital Ltd. v. Nig RE (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1640) 423; Nduul v. Wayo (supra); Okorocha v. UBA Plc (2018) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1649) 441; APC v. Umar (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1675) 564. – Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA

CASES CITED

NOT AVAILABLE

STATUTES REFERRED TO

1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)
2. Obas & Chiefs Law of Lagos State.
3. Public Officers Protection Law of Lagos State Cap P26, Laws of State of Nigeria, 2003
4. Evidence Act, 2011
5. Interpretation Act, Cap I 23, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004

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