Legalpedia Citation: (2023-07) Legalpedia 43070 (CA)

In the Court of Appeal

LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

Thu Jul 27, 2023

Suit Number: CA/L/1384/2017

CORAM

OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA JCA

ABUBAKAR SADIQ UMAR JCA

ABDULLAHI MAHMUD BAYERO JCA

PARTIES

BI-COURTNEY LIMITED

APPELLANTS

1. ASO SAVINGS AND LOAN PLC
2. ABACUS ESTATE LIMITED

RESPONDENTS

AREA(S) OF LAW

Appeal, Constitutional Law, Contract, Evidence, Judgment, Practice And Procedure, Property

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Sometime in 2009, the first respondent, an incorporated financial institution, granted a credit facility of N500M to the appellant on certain terms and conditions. The appellant mortgaged its property, situate and known as No. 70 Alexander Avenue, Ikoyi, Eti-Osa Local Government Area, Lagos State (the property) as collateral for the facility. The appellant defaulted in repayment of the facility. In 2010, the first respondent filed an action against the appellant, in the lower court, for the foreclosure of the legal mortgage. In response, the appellant raised a preliminary objection to the suit. Before the ruling on the objection, the parties reached an amicable settlement which was reduced into terms of settlement. On 20^th June, 2011, the terms of settlement were entered as consent judgment for the parties per M. O. Obadina, J, which has generated tons of litigations. The appellant defaulted in obeying the consent judgment.  As a result, the first respondent, in compliance with the consent judgment, sold the property to the second respondent and put it in possession thereon. This prompted the Appellant to return to court seeking declarations setting aside the consent judgment and nullifying every action rising from the said judgment. The Respondent joined issues and raised a preliminary objection.

In a considered ruling, the lower court upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the appellant’s “suit for amounting to an abuse of court process”. Aggrieved by the decision, the Appellants lodged the instant appeal.

 

HELD

Appeal dismissed

ISSUES

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

Ø  Whether, having regard to the question for determination in the Appellant’s Originating Summons dated 20th October 2016, the suit at the lower court was caught by the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatam?

Ø  Whether, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the lower court erred in its finding that the suit was an abuse of court process thereby dismissing the suit in limine?

Ø  Whether the refusal or omission of the lower court to consider, evaluate and determine all the issues and arguments submitted to the lower court by the Appellant, amounted to a denial of the Appellant of its constitutional right to fair hearing and amounted to a miscarriage of justice?

RATIONES DECIDENDI

RES JUDICATA – MEANING OF RES JUDICATA – FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA TO APPLY

By way of prefatory remarks, the expression ‘estoppels per rem judicatam’, which has acquired the nickname ‘res judicata’, owes its lexical ancestry to the Latin language in the original term as res adjudicata. Res judicata, a commonplace term in our corpus juris, simply connotes: a thing adjudicated. The principle implies that a verdict that was previously rendered in a court of law would constitute a bar to a subsequent action on the same terms. It is a rule of evidence that binds parties, privies and courts.  The doctrine finds anchorage in public policy couched in the two legal maxims:  Interest reipublicae utsit finis litium – it is in the interest of the public that there be a limit to litigation – and Nemo debet bis vexari  pro eadem causa – no man should be twice troubled for the same cause.  For the principle to apply, its propounder must show that:  (a) the parties in the previous and present action are the same; (b) the subject matter in the two actions are the same; (c) the issues in the two matters are the same and (d) the decision in the previous action must be final and delivered by a court of competent jurisdiction, see Cardoso v. Daniel (1986) 1 NSCC 387, (1986) 2 NWLR (Part 20) 1; Igwego v. Ezeugo (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 249) 561; Okpasin v. Assan (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 495; Abubakar v. B.O. & A. P. Ltd. (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1066) 319; Ayuya v. Yorin (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1254) 135; Makin v. F.U.T., Minna (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1278) 190; Adeyemi – Bero v. L.S.D.P.C. (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 238; Apata v. Olanlokun (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1383) 221; Abiola & Sons Co. Ltd. v. 7up-Bottling Co. Ltd. (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1322) 184; Abubakar v. B.O. & A. P. Ltd. (supra); Alapo v. Agbokare (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1198) 30; Yusuf v. Adegoke (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1045) 332; D.T.T. Ent. Co. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Busari (2011) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1249) 387; Apena v. Aileru (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1426) 111; Sylva v. INEC (2015) 16 NWLR (pt. 1486) 576; Ugo v. Ugo (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1597) 218; Yanaty Petroleum Ltd. v. EFCC (2018) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1611) 97. Soronnadi v. Durugo (2019) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1669) 551; Adeniran v. Olusokun II (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1673) 98; Igwemma v. Obidigwe (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1697) 117; Garba v. Tsoida (2020) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1716) 1; Oguntade v. Oyelakia (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1719) 41; Iheanacho v. Egbula (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1795) 174.

Where a plea of res judicata succeeds, a court of law is stripped of the requisite jurisdiction to try the matter in which it is raised.  Of course, the converse is true, that is, where it is a stillborn plea, a court will be invested with the vires to hear the matter in question, see Adigun v. Gov., Osun State (1995) 3 SCNJ 1, (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt. 385) 573; Ajibola v. Ishola (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt. 998) 628; Dakolo v. Rewane-Dakolo (2011) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1271) 22; Ogar v. Igbe (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 534; Zubair v. Kolawole (2019) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1682) 66. A party who mounts the defence of res judicata, as a shield, owns the burden to prove it to the satisfaction of the law, see Iheanacho v. Egbula (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1795) 174. – Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA

 

ISSUES – WHEN ISSUES IN MATTERS ARE TAKEN TO BE THE SAME

In the first place, the settled position of the law is that issues in matters are taken to be the same even though the wordings of the reliefs are different provided that the substance and end results are substantially the same, see Ministry for Works v. Tomas (Nig) Ltd. (2002) 2 NWLR  (Pt. 752) 740; Sani v. President, FRN (2020) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1746) 151; PDP v. Sheriff (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1588) 219.  It is, therefore, not the mandate of the law that the issues must mirror themselves “like Siamese twins in feature and outlook”, see Abubakar v. B.O. & A.P Ltd. (supra) at 373, per Tobi JSC. In point of fact, the law is duly satisfied once the issues are substantially the same in their likeness between/among the actions.  In essence, it is the ultimate progeny of the reliefs and issues, not their manner of phraseology, that determines their similarities or otherwise. – Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA

 

DISMISSAL – POWER OF THE COURT OF APPEAL TO MAKE AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL – MODE AND EFFECT OF DISMISSAL

There is no gainsaying the fact that this court, the penultimate court – the next to the apex court in the judicial pyramid in this country, is a court of competent jurisdiction.  It is, de jure, clothed with the vires to make the order of dismissal of that appeal, on the footing of the notice of withdrawal, flowing from the provision of order 11 rule 6 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2021. The nagging question, which begs and cries for the resolution of this court, is the finality or otherwise of the order of dismissal vis-à-vis the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatam.

Nota bene, an order of dismissal will be reached by a court after a judicious assessment of the facts and law before it. In legal parlance, dismissal of an action has been described as the most punitive relief grantable to a defendant against a plaintiff; hence the courts are reluctant in granting it, see Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 427; Adeleke v. Oyetola (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1721) 440.  A matter that is dismissed becomes a qualified candidate for an appeal because the court becomes functus officio vis-à-vis its adjudication.  An appeal that is withdrawn under order 11 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2021, with or without an order of court or consent of an adversary, is deemed to have been dismissed, see Y.S.G. Motors Ltd. v. Okonkwo (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1217) 524; Oyeyemi v. Owoeye (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1580) 364.  A notice of discontinuance connotes a voluntary termination of a suit or appeal by a claimant or appellant, see Mabamije v. Otto (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 171.  However, it is apropos to observe, pronto, that a decision which dismisses an appeal that is withdrawn is not a judgment on the merit, see Okenwa v. Military Gov. of Imo State (2001) 1 SCM 120.  In Uwemedimo v. Mobil Producing (Nig.) Unltd. (2019) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1685) 1, Rhodes-Vivour, JSC, incisively, declared:

When an appeal is heard on the merits and thereafter an order of dismissal is made, such an order is final and operates as estoppel per rem judicatam. The party that lost or all party’s are barred from re-litigating the same subject-matter.  The court is functus officio. The order of dismissal is final for ever. See Alhaji M.M. Dingyadi & ano v. INEC & 2 ors (2011) 4 SC, (Pt.1) p.1, (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 347; ACB v. Losada Nig. Ltd. & anor (1995) 7 SCNJ p. 185, (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt. 405) 26.

Thus, in the eyes of the law, a judicial decision wears the insignia of finality when it leaves nothing to be judicially determined or ascertained thereafter in order to render it effective, capable of execution, absolute, complete, certain and not lawfully subject to subsequent decision, review or modification by a court which pronounced on it, see Fadiosa v. Gbadebo (1978) 3 SC 219; Ogbogu v. Ndiribe (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 245) 40; Okugo v. Nwokedi (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 517) 467; Onyebuchi v. INEC (2002) 8 NWLR (Pt. 769) 417; The Hondo Place Ltd. v. Globe Motors Ltd. (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 273. Indubitably, a dismissed appeal, on account of a notice of withdrawn, does not exhibit these hallmarks of a final decision so as to crown it with a deserved toga of finality.  In effect, the decision in that appeal, viewed from the lens of the law, is, totally, divorced from finality and, ipso facto, disabled from constituting res judicata against the institution of this suit by the appellant. In the premises, the first respondent failed woefully to establish the second limb of this ingredient: that the decision in that appeal was final. – Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA

 

RES JUDICATA – CONDITION PRECEDENT TO BENEFIT FROM DEFENCE OF RES JUDICATA

“For a party who invokes the doctrine of res judicata, usually as a defense to an action, to benefit from its vineyard, they must establish all the conditions for its application. Put differently, the conditions must be established conjunctively, not disjunctively. All of them must co-exist concurrently. It is a burden imposed by the law on the party who invokes it as a defense. The collective proof of these conditions is a prerequisite for a successful invocation of the doctrine.

In the sight of the law, a condition precedent is defined as “the one that delays the vesting of a right until the happening of an event”. This definition is supported by legal precedents such as Atolagbe v. Awuni (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 525) 537 at 562, as stated by Uwais, CJN; Niger Care Dev. Co. Ltd. v. ASWB (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093) 493; A-G., Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 210; Jumbo United Co. Ltd. v. Leadway Ass. Co. Ltd. (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1536) 439.”

“For a party who invokes the doctrine of res judicata, usually as a defense to an action, to benefit from its vineyard, they must establish all the conditions for its application. Put differently, the conditions must be established conjunctively, not disjunctively. All of them must co-exist concurrently. It is a burden imposed by the law on the party who invokes it as a defense. The collective proof of these conditions is a prerequisite for a successful invocation of the doctrine.

In the sight of the law, a condition precedent is defined as “the one that delays the vesting of a right until the happening of an event”. This definition is supported by legal precedents such as Atolagbe v. Awuni (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 525) 537 at 562, as stated by Uwais, CJN; Niger Care Dev. Co. Ltd. v. ASWB (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093) 493; A-G., Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 210; Jumbo United Co. Ltd. v. Leadway Ass. Co. Ltd. (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1536) 439.” Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA”

ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS – MEANING OF ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS AND HOW IT CAN BE DISCERNED

The term ‘abuse of court process’ is an elusive concept in the wide domain of litigation. It exhibits variegated forms and is disobedient to one single definition. It has become a mantra in adjudication, usually set up as a shield by defending parties to abort the lifespan of an action in its embryo. An abuse of court process is an amorphous concept, connoting the proper and improper use of judicial process by a party in litigation to interfere with the due administration of justice.

Generally, the employment of judicial process is only regarded as an abuse when a party improperly uses the issue of the judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of their adversary, hindering the efficient and effective administration of justice. This occurs when there’s a multiplication of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues. In essence, the abuse lies in the multiplicity and manner of exercising the right, rather than the exercise of the right per se.

This principle is underscored by various legal precedents such as Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) 11/12 SCNJ (Pt. 1) 26/(1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156; CBN v. Ahmed (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 742) 369; Ntuks v. NPA (2007) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1051) 392; Dingyadi v. INEC (No. 2) (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 154; Dingyadi v. INEC (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 347; Oyeyemi v. Owoeye (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1580) 364; PDP v. Sheriff (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1580) 364; Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc v. L.G.C. Ltd. (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1598) 431; Conoil v. Vitol S.A. (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1625) 463; Alli v. NUC (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 161; Nwora v. Nwabueze (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1670) 1; Ogar v. Igbe (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 534; Dike-Ogu v. Amadi (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1704) 45; Optimum C & P. Dev. Ltd. v. Ake Shareholdings Ltd. (2021) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1807) 148.

It is discernible from the elastic nature of abuse of judicial process, chronicled above, that there are no hard and fast rules in detecting its absence or presence in any action. A court is enjoined by law to examine each case, predicated on its facts and circumstances, in order to ascertain if it displays an abuse of court process or not. On this score, the factual antecedents of each case have to be matched with the negative elements of abuse of court process. The barometer to gauge the existence of abuse of court process is the presence of multiplicity of suits bordering on the same issues and subject-matter between the same parties. Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA”

PARTIES – WHETHER ADDITION/SUBTRACTION OF PARTIES ALTERS THE SAMENESS OF PARTIES IN AN ACTION WITH MULTIPLE PARTIES

To improve readability, I would arrange the text into clear paragraphs:

“In any event, the general position of the law is that addition or subtraction of parties in suits does not derogate, impinge, or alter the sameness of parties in an action with multiple parties. This hallowed principle of law has received the blessing of the case-law in ex cathedra authorities, as seen in Abubakar v. B.O & A.P Ltd. (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1066) 319 and Abiola & Sons Ltd. v. 7 up Bottling Co. Ltd. (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1322) 184. In effect, the bone of contention inter se in the issue is canalized within a narrow compass: the absence of sameness of subject matter and cause of action/issue between the two actions. Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA”

WRONG REASON – WHETHER WRONG REASON CAN BE A GROUND TO DISTURB A CORRECT DECISION

“This existential suit cannot be abusive of non-existent appeal for want of contemporaneousness of the two actions. This suit, rather, as displayed above, was an abuse of the FHC suit which was offensive to the law.

Nevertheless, the appellant cannot reap from this improper rationalization by the lower court. The reason is plain. The lower court’s judicial act falls squarely within the perimeter of wrong reason. It is an elementary law that wrong reason, offered by a court, is never a compelling ground to disturb or upset a correct decision anchored on law.

Various legal precedents support this principle, such as A.I.E. Ltd. v. NNPC (2005) 1 NWLR (Pt. 937) 563; Ibulaya v. Dikibo (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 627; Afolabi v. W.S.W. Ltd. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 286; Inegbedion v. L.S.D.P.C. (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 211; Edikon (Nig.) Ltd. v. UBA Plc. (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1596) 74; Mainstreet Bank Capital Ltd. v. Nig. RE. (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1640) 423; MTN (Nig.) Comm. Ltd. v. Corporate Comm. Inv. Ltd. (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 427; Zailani v. Gumau (2020) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1709) 452.

A court is equipped with the jurisdiction to err on reasons for a decision without any irritation to the law. Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA”

ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS – POWERS OF THE COURT TO TRUNCATE MATTERS THAT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS

“In the mind of the law, a party’s intention or motive in proliferating actions against an adversary is of no moment, as stated in Saraki v. Kotoye. Interestingly, the law grants the courts the unbridled license, under their wide inherent powers, to truncate any matter that is guilty of abuse of court process, as seen in O.S.S.I.E.C v. NCP (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 451.

In the domain of abuse of court process, an action that is later in time vacates the temple of justice, as demonstrated in Dingyadi v. INEC (No. 1) (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224); A-G, Kwara State (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 266; Unifam Ind. Ltd. v. Ecobank (Nig.) Ltd. (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1653) 187. An action that is trapped in the intractable nest of abuse of court process is liable to dismissal without restoration, as evidenced in Dinyadi v. INEC (No.1); In Re: Apeh (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1576) 252; A-G, Kwara State v. Lawal; Nwosu v. PDP (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1640) 532; Ajaokuta Steel Co. Ltd. v. G.I. & S Ltd. (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1674) 213. Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA”

COURTS – CONDUCT OF COURTS REGARDING FINDINGS

“It will smell of judicial sacrilege to tinker with a finding that has not disclosed any tinge of hostility to the letters and spirit of the law. I, therefore, dishonour the appellant’s salivating invitation to crucify the lower court’s decision (ruling) on the underserved altar of abuse of court process for want of legal justification. Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA”

FAIR HEARING – MEANING OF FAIR HEARING – ATTRIBUTES OF FAIR HEARING

“To begin with, fair hearing denotes a trial conducted in accordance with all the legal rules formulated to ensure that justice is done to parties to the cause, as evidenced in various legal precedents such as Eze v. FRN (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589) 433; Ardo v. INEC (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1583) 450; Regt. Trustees, P.C.N. v. Etim (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1581) 1; Akingbola v. FRN (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1640) 395; La Wari Furniture & Baths Ltd. v. FRN (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1677) 262. Being the epicenter of the vexed issue, it is germane to exhibit some of the notable features of fair hearing, which has become commonplace in law and competes with jurisdiction for prominence in adjudications nowadays.

The ancient concept of fair hearing traces its pedigree to divinity. It was a common law doctrine that has metamorphosed into our jurisprudence and is firmly enshrined in section 36(1) of the Constitution, as amended. It donates to citizens the inviolate right to ventilate their grievances on the altar of the two concrete pillars of natural justice: audi alteram partem – hear the other side – and nemo judex in causa sua – no one should be a judge in his own case. The whole essence of fair hearing, which is coterminous with fair trial, connotes giving parties to any proceedings, be it judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative proceedings, an equal opportunity to present their cases. Fair hearing is entirely divorced from the correctness of a decision and focuses on the cardinal principle that a fair-minded person who watched the proceedings before a court or administrative or quasi-judicial body should conclude that it exhibited even-handedness and fairness in apportioning justice to the parties.

The case-law has inventoried essential attributes of fair hearing as enshrined in section 36(1) of the Constitution, as amended. These characteristics are calibrated thus: (a) That the court shall hear both sides not only in the case but also on all material issues in the case before reaching a decision which may be prejudicial to any party in the case. (b) That the court or tribunal gives equal treatment, opportunity, and consideration to all concerned. (c) That the proceedings be heard in public and all concerned shall be informed of and have access to such a place of hearing. (d) That having regard to all circumstances in every material decision in the case, justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to have been done. Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA”

FAIR HEARING – DUTY OF COURTS IN ENSURING FAIR HEARING

“The constitutional doctrine of fair hearing, which owes its ancestry to divinity, mandates the courts, on all the rungs of the judicial ladder, to always create a congenial, egalitarian, and hospitable milieu for parties to ventilate their perceived grievances in the temple of justice. It decrees, under pain of nullity of actions in default, that courts shall accord equal treatment, opportunity, and consideration to the cases of parties. In the Latin days of the law, it was encapsulated in the maxim: Audi alteram partem.

In the determination of legal rights of parties, justice must not only be done but must be manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done. Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA”

FAIR HEARING – MEANING OF FAIR HEARING – DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FAIR HEARING AND OUTCOME OF A HEARING

“Hearing a matter/application and the outcome of it are two divergent streams in the variegated tributaries of adjectival law. They are mutually exclusive. While the want of the former, in deserving circumstances, can denude a party’s right to fair hearing, the latter may be impotent to drain it.

The consequence is plain. The lower court’s refusal to grant the appellant’s defence is not, under any guise or any stretch of elastic imagination, tantamount to an infringement of its unassailable right to fair hearing as enshrined in section 36 (1) of the Constitution, as amended. This is because it was heard before the decision of the lower court was delivered, as evidenced in Dec Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Shell (Nig) Gas Ltd. (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1692) 273. In effect, the appellant’s inviolate right to fair hearing did not, in the least, suffer any morsel of defilement by the lower court.

It is, therefore, not available for it to harvest/harness from the sanctuary of the beneficent provision of section 36(1) of the Constitution, as amended, the fons et origo of all laws. In Adebayo v. A. –G., Ogun State (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1085) 201 at 221 and 222, the apex court, per Tobi, JSC, admonished:

‘…The fair hearing provision in the constitution is the machinery or locomotive of justice; not a spare part to propel or invigorate the case of the user. It is not a casual principle of law available to a party to be picked up at will in case and force the court to apply it to his advantage. On the contrary, it is a formidable and fundamental constitutional provision available to a party who is really denied fair hearing because he was not heard or that he was not properly heard in the case.’ Per O. F. Ogbuinya, JCA”

CASES CITED

NOT AVAILABLE

STATUTES REFERRED TO

1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)
2. High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004
3. Court of Appeal Act Cap C26, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004
4. Evidence Act, 2011
5. Court of Appeal Rules, 2021

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