ABIODUN OLALEKAN VS COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
September 5, 2025AYO SOLANKE VS ABRAHAM ABED & ANOR
September 5, 2025Legalpedia Citation: (1962-04) Legalpedia 88948 (SC)
In the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Holden at Lagos
Sat Apr 28, 1962
Suit Number: SC 412/1961
CORAM
ADEMOLA, JUSTICE SUPRE4ME COURT
UNSWORTH, JUSTICE SUPREME COURT
TAYLOR, JUSTICE SUPREME COURT
PARTIES
APPELLANTS
CATHERINE CARMELITA ADARAMAJA
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
MATRIMONIAL CAUSES—DISSOLUTION/EXERCISE OF JUDGES’ DISCRETION/APPEAL
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The petitioner/appellant instituted an action for the dissolution of his marriage to the respondent on grounds of cruelty; the Trial Court dismissed his action. He has appealed to this Court being dissatisfied.
HELD
The appeal, was allowed and the court set aside the judgment of the trial Judge and order that the marriage solemnised be dissolved
ISSUES
That the learned trial Judge did not disbelieve the evidence called in support of the petition. That in exonerating the respondent from the alleged acts of cruelty on account of her being in a state of pregnancy, the trial Judge was in effect setting up an answer or defence which was not set up by the respondent at the hearing, and In respect of which evidence was not adduced. That the trial Judge did not exercise his discretion judicially by rejecting the prayer of the petitioner.
RATIONES DECIDENDI
CRUELTY AS A GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE.
“The classic definition of legal cruelty is “conduct of such a character as to have caused danger to life, limb or health (bodily or mental) or as give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger.” Per TAYLOR, F.J.
THE GENERAL RULE IN ALL QUESTIONS OF CRUELTY.
“The general rule in all questions of cruelty is that the whole matrimonial relation must be considered, and that rule is of special value when the cruelty consists, not of violent acts, but of injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations, or taunts.” Per TAYLOR, F.J.
EXCEPTIONS TO WHICH THE COURT CAN SUBSTITUTE ITS DISCRETION FOR THAT EXERCISED BY THE JUDGE.
1. ‘It is not in doubt that this Court cannot substitute its discretion for that exercised by the judge unless it is made plain that in some way he has exercised his discretion wrongly, that is to say, not judicially, as by misdirecting himself in some material particular.’ Per TAYLOR, F.J.
CASES CITED
Moor v. Moor 1954 2 A.E.R. 458
Wilson v. Wilson 1920 Probate p.20
Burford v. Burford (1955), 3 A.E.R. 664, at p.665
Blunt v. Blunt (1943), 2 A.E.R. 76
STATUTES REFERRED TO
The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950
