CORAM

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HONOURABLE JUSTICE O. Y. ANUWE

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PARTIES

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Yahaya Jimoh Chegede

APPELLANTS 

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Transcorp Hotels Plc.  (Trading as Transcorp Hilton, Abuja)

RESPONDENTS 

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AREA(S) OF LAW

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EMPLOYMENT LAW, WRONGFUL TERMINATION, WORKPLACE INJURY, LIMITATION OF ACTION, NEGLIGENCE, DUTY OF CARE, PERSONAL INJURY, CONDITIONS OF SERVICE, PLEADINGS, EVIDENCE, DECLARATORY RELIEFS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

 

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SUMMARY OF FACTS

The claimant, Yahaya Jimoh Chegede, was employed by the defendant, Transcorp Hotels Plc (trading as Transcorp Hilton, Abuja), on 30 July 1994 as a Laundry Attendant in the defendant’s Laundry Department. His employment was governed by the Junior Team Member Conditions of Service. He remained in the defendant’s employment for over fifteen years and received various awards and certificates of commendation.

In approximately February 2000, the claimant alleged that a stain-removing chemical splashed into his right eye in the course of carrying out his duties as a Laundry Attendant, causing permanent deformity. The defendant’s in-house clinic treated him for about six months before referring him to the National Hospital Abuja on 5 April 2000. The National Hospital advised surgical treatment estimated at N80,000.00. The defendant directed payment of this sum for the surgery, which was performed on 9 May 2001. A post-surgery report dated 27 August 2001 stated the claimant had recovered and could resume normal duties. The claimant was also given a Personal Accident Claim Form of the National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria (NICON), which when completed yielded a payment of N71,425.90 to the defendant. In December 2008, the defendant approved an additional N80,000.00 for further eye treatment. In 2014, the defendant’s health provider referred the claimant to specialist eye care.

The defendant, however, disputed that the injury was caused by a chemical splash at work, maintaining instead that the claimant had a cataract diagnosed in 1999, and that all medical treatment provided was out of magnanimity rather than liability. The defendant insisted that the claimant had never sustained any accident in the course of his duties.

In November 2020, as part of a restructuring exercise occasioned by the economic challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, the defendant retired 450 members of staff including the claimant. By a letter dated 9 November 2020, the claimant was retired and paid all his entitlements including six months’ basic salary in lieu of notice. The claimant submitted his property clearance form on 10 November 2020 and collected his entitlements without complaint.

On 23 April 2021, the claimant wrote to the defendant alleging a workplace accident over twenty years earlier and stating that he required an eye transplant costing N6,200,000.00. The defendant denied the allegations. The claimant instituted this action on 17 May 2022 seeking declarations of wrongful termination and workplace injury, an order for reinstatement or compensation, an order compelling the defendant to fund an eye transplant, and general damages of N500,000,000.00.

 

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HELD

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On the wrongful termination claims, the Court held that the claimant failed to plead and prove the essential facts necessary to establish wrongful termination. The claimant did not plead how his retirement contravened the Junior Team Member Conditions of Service, did not plead the procedure by which he could be retired, and did not plead his entitlement to notice or the duration thereof. His assertion in evidence that he was not served any letter and not paid anything in lieu of notice was not pleaded and was therefore inadmissible. The Court also noted that the defendant adduced uncontradicted evidence that the claimant was paid all entitlements including six months’ basic salary in lieu of notice and that the claimant collected same without complaint. Furthermore, it is not the duty of the Court to examine an exhibited document to find how it supports the claimant’s case when material facts have not been pleaded.

On the workplace injury claims, the Court held that these claims were statute-barred. The cause of action accrued around February 2000 when the accident allegedly occurred. The claimant filed suit on 17 May 2022 — approximately twenty-two years after the cause of action arose — well outside the three-year limitation period prescribed by section 8(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act. The claimant’s excuse that he did not sue earlier because the defendant was taking care of his treatment did not avail him, as the Limitation Act does not freeze time during ongoing employment or medical treatment. The suit was entirely dismissed and parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

 

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ISSUES

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1. Whether the claimant established that his retirement from the employment of the defendant in November 2020 was wrongful and in breach of the Junior Team Member Conditions of Service?
2. Whether the claimant’s claims arising from the alleged workplace eye injury are statute-barred by virtue of sections 7(4) and 8(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, having been filed approximately twenty-two years after the cause of action accrued?
3. Whether the claimant proved the defendant’s negligence or breach of duty of care in relation to the chemical splash injury to his right eye?

 

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RATIONES DECIDENDI

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EMPLOYEE CLAIMING WRONGFUL TERMINATION MUST PLEAD AND PROVE TERMS OF CONTRACT HOW EMPLOYMENT CAN BE TERMINATED AND MANNER IN WHICH TERMS WERE BREACHED – FAILURE TO DO SO IS FATAL TO CLAIM

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“Where an employee complains of wrongful termination of his employment, the employee has the duty to plead and prove the terms of his contract of employment, how the employment can be terminated under the condition of service and the manner the terms of the contract were breached by the employer when his employment was terminated. See W.A.E.C vs. OSHIONEBO (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 370) 1501; PETROLEUM TRAINING INSTITUTE vs. MATTHEW (2012) All FWLR (PT 623) 1949. Let me add that relief 1 sought by the claimant is a declaratory claim. Before the Court can make a declaration that the termination of the claimant’s employment was wrongful, the claimant must plead and prove what made the termination wrongful.” — Per O. Y. Anuwe, J

 

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EVIDENCE ADDUCED ON FACTS NOT PLEADED IS INADMISSIBLE AND MUST BE REJECTED BY COURT – COURT CANNOT ACT ON UNPLEADED FACTS

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“In paragraph 31 of the claimant’s deposition of 17th May 2022, he said the termination of his employment was contrary to the Junior Team Member Conditions of Service as he was not served any letter and not paid anything in lieu of notice. This part of his evidence that he was not served any letter and not paid anything in lieu of notice was not pleaded. It is the law that evidence adduced on fact not pleaded is inadmissible and must be rejected by the court. See ADAKE vs. AKUN [2003] 14 NWLR [Pt. 840] 418.” — Per O. Y. Anuwe, J

 

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COURT CANNOT EXAMINE EXHIBITED DOCUMENT TO FIND HOW IT SUPPORTS CLAIMANT’S CASE WHERE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT PLEADED – DUTY LIES ON CLAIMANT TO PLEAD ESSENTIAL FACTS

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“In this case, the claimant failed to plead and prove the procedure in the Junior Team Member Conditions of Service by which he can be retired from the employment. He also failed to plead and prove how his retirement contravened the terms of the Junior Team Member Conditions of Service. Although the Junior Team Member Conditions of Service is in evidence as Exhibit, it is however not the duty of the Court to examine it to find how it supports the claimant’s case when the claimant did not plead the material facts. It is the duty of the claimant to plead the essential facts before the court can examine the document to see or find how it supports the averments of the claimant.” — Per O. Y. Anuwe, J

 

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BEFORE CLAIMANT CAN ESTABLISH NON-PAYMENT OF SALARY IN LIEU OF NOTICE HE MUST FIRST PLEAD AND PROVE ENTITLEMENT TO NOTICE ITS DURATION AND BASIS OF ENTITLEMENT TO PAYMENT IN LIEU

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“Before the claimant can be heard to say he was not paid anything in lieu of notice, he must have first explained to the court that he was entitled to notice, the duration of the notice, what entitled him to notice and in lieu thereof, what he is entitled to be paid. It is after these facts have been placed before the court that the court can properly believe that the failure to pay him anything in lieu of notice was a breach of the condition of service. In his evidence, the claimant merely said he was not paid anything in lieu of notice without any prior evidence that he was entitled to notice and duration of the notice.” — Per O. Y. Anuwe, J

 

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CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES IN RESPECT OF PERSONAL INJURIES MUST BE FILED WITHIN THREE YEARS FROM DATE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED – FAILURE TO DO SO RENDERS CLAIM STATUTE BARRED AND DEPRIVES COURT OF JURISDICTION

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“The implication of these provisions is that any action in which a claim is made for damages for negligence or breach of duty or damages in respect of personal injuries to any person, such action shall be instituted within a period of 3 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. Where any action in respect of the mentioned subject matters is not filed within the period of 3 years as specified, the action will be statute barred and cannot be entertained by the courts. See ELEBANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 328) 604.” — Per O. Y. Anuwe, J

 

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CLAIMANT CANNOT KEEP RIGHT OF ACTION ON HOLD BECAUSE EMPLOYER WAS TAKING CARE OF HIS AILMENT DURING EMPLOYMENT – LIMITATION PERIOD CONTINUES TO RUN FROM MOMENT CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE AND IS NOT FROZEN BY ONGOING EMPLOYMENT OR MEDICAL TREATMENT

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“The claimant pleaded in his reply that during his employment, he had no cause to institute action against the defendant because the defendant was taking care of his ailment until he retired from the employment. This excuse does not avail the claimant. The time to seek redress in court against the defendant with respect to the injury he said he sustained while on duty started counting against the claimant from the day he sustained the injury. He cannot keep his right of action on hold because he was still in the employment and expect the limitation period to freeze. While he can decide not to sue until he leaves the employment, the Limitation Act is not so patient or benevolent. The time set by the Limitation Act continues to run from the moment the cause of action arose.” — Per O. Y. Anuwe, J

 

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OBJECTION TOUCHING ON JURISDICTION OF COURT MUST BE CONSIDERED AND DETERMINED FIRST BEFORE COURT CAN TAKE ANY OTHER STEP IN PROCEEDINGS

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“From the arguments in issue 1 of the defendant’s final address, the issues raised pertains to the competence of the claimant’s reliefs 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 with the consequential effect on the jurisdiction of this court to entertain or determine these claims. The law is settled that any objection which touch on the jurisdiction of the court must be consider and determine first before the court can take any other step in the proceedings. See T.O.M.C NIG. LTD. vs. U.T.C PLC (2003) FWLR (Pt. 173) 130 at 151.” — Per O. Y. Anuwe, J

 

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CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES ON THE PARTICULAR DATE WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE INCIDENT IN QUESTION – TIME BEGINS TO RUN FROM THAT DATE AND AGGRIEVED PARTY MUST GO TO COURT TIMEOUSLY

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“A cause of action accrues on the particular date which gave rise to the incident in question. For the purposeful intendment of statutes with stipulation of durational limitation, the clock begins to wind down and time begins to run from the moment which culminates into the date on which the cause of action accrues.” — Per O. Y. Anuwe, J (citing Cross Rivers University of Technology v. Obeten (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 641) 1567 at 1583)

 

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TIME BEGINS TO RUN FOR FILING OF ACTION WHEN CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE – ONCE INTERESTS OF PARTIES ARE AT VARIANCE AGGRIEVED PARTY MUST PROCEED TO COURT WITHOUT DELAY

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“Time begins to run for the filing of an action when the cause of action arose. This means that once there exist two people with interest at variance to each other over a subject matter, then the aggrieved party must go to court timeously.” — Per O. Y. Anuwe, J (citing Dawodu v. Ajose (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 580) 1334 at 1348)

 

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UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT THAT CLAIMANT COLLECTED ALL RETIREMENT ENTITLEMENTS WITHOUT COMPLAINT DEFEATS CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION WHERE CLAIMANT DID NOT TRAVERSE SAME IN REPLY TO STATEMENT OF DEFENCE

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“In its amended statement of defence, as well in the evidence of DW, the defendant stated that as a result of the challenges caused by the Covid-19 Pandemic, it carried out restructuring exercise in 2020 and in that exercise, it had to retire 450 staff members, including the Claimant. The retired staff were paid all their entitlements. The claimant accepted his retirement and collected all his entitlements, including 6 months basic salary in lieu of notice. The claimant did not dispute these facts in his reply to the statement of defence and he did not adduce evidence to challenge the evidence of DW on the facts.” — Per O. Y. Anuwe, J

 

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PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM BASED ON CHEMICAL SPLASH IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT ACCRUES ON DATE OF INCIDENT AND FILING SUIT TWENTY-TWO YEARS LATER IS OUTSIDE THREE-YEAR STATUTORY PERIOD AND RENDERS CLAIM STATUTE BARRED

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“When the claimant filed this suit on 17th May 2022, he filed the suit about 22 years from the time his cause of action arose. It is clear that the claimant filed the suit outside the period limited in the Limitation Act for him to do so.” — Per O. Y. Anuwe, J

 

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COURT CANNOT MAKE DECLARATION THAT TERMINATION WAS WRONGFUL WHERE CLAIMANT FAILED TO PLEAD AND PROVE WHAT MADE THE TERMINATION WRONGFUL – DECLARATORY RELIEF REQUIRES SATISFACTORY PROOF ON STRENGTH OF CLAIMANT’S OWN CASE

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“Upon a thorough examination of the pleadings and evidence of the claimant with respect to his claims for wrongful termination of his employment, I find that he failed to establish the claims.” — Per O. Y. Anuwe, J

 

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WHERE CLAIMS IN RESPECT OF PERSONAL INJURY ARE STATUTE BARRED COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN SAME AND APPROPRIATE ORDER IS DISMISSAL

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“In view of the foregoing, I find that the claimant filed his claims in reliefs 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 against the defendant outside the limitation period prescribed in section 8 (1) and (2) of the Limitation Act. Consequently, reliefs 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 are statute barred and this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain same. In the circumstance, the appropriate order to make is that of dismissal of these claims.” — Per O. Y. Anuwe, J

 

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CASES CITED

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STATUTES REFERRED TO

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1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) Limitation Act — sections 7(4), 8(1)(2)
2. Evidence Act 2011 National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 — Order 45 Junior Team Member Conditions of Service (Transcorp Hotels Plc) dated 1 March 1994 — Article 5, I(i)

 

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OTHER CITATIONS

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