VICTOR DANIEL O. IRONBAR V. CROSS RIVER BASIN AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Legalpedia Citation: (2025-05) Legalpedia 77024 (SC)

In the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Fri May 23, 2025

Suit Number: SC.376/2007

CORAM

Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Tijjani Abubakar Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Haruna Simon Tsammani Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Habeeb Adewale olumuyiwa abiruJustice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Mohammed Baba Idris Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

PARTIES

VICTOR DANIEL O. IRONBAR (Carrying on business under the name and style of Danielson Enterprises)

APPELLANTS

CROSS RIVER BASIN AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

RESPONDENTS

AREA(S) OF LAW

AREAS OF LAW: CONTRACT LAW, AGENCY LAW, EVIDENCE LAW, PRIVITY OF CONTRACT, APPEAL, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE, CONCURRENT FINDINGS, BURDEN OF PROOF, CIVIL PROCEDURE, PLEADINGS, DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, CROSS-EXAMINATION

SUMMARY OF FACTS

The Appellant, Victor Daniel O. Ironbar, carrying on business as Danielson Enterprises, is a transporter whose business involves hiring vehicles on long and short-term basis. On May 3, 1988, Mrs. Lucy Inyang Udo (second defendant, now deceased) came to the Appellant’s office and introduced one Alhaji Mai Dunama, who arrived in the official vehicle of the Cross River Basin and Rural Development Authority (first defendant/Respondent). Alhaji Mai Dunama was a member of the Board of Directors of the Respondent Authority. The purpose of the visit was to negotiate the hire of three flat trailers from the Appellant for the transportation of the Respondent’s rice mill from Nkari Village in Ikono Local Government Area of Akwa Ibom State to Lafia in Plateau State. The Respondent had sold the rice mill to Amariya Foods Limited. The parties agreed orally to hire the three trailers at the rate of N1,500.00 per trailer per day.

Pursuant to the oral agreement, Mrs. Lucy Inyang Udo, again driven in the Respondent’s official vehicle, took delivery of the three trailers which were driven by the Appellant’s drivers to the rice mill in Nkari Village. While the trailers were being loaded at the rice mill, some irate villagers who were protesting the removal of the rice mill from their village riotously stormed the premises, assaulted the drivers and damaged/vandalized the three trailers and the Respondent’s official vehicle, rendering them immobile and not roadworthy. A report was lodged at Ikono Police Station by officials of the Respondent, who also caused the damaged vehicles to be towed to the Police Station.

The Appellant contacted Mrs. Lucy Inyang Udo who assured him that the Respondent had promised to effect repairs on the vehicles. By letter dated May 23, 1988, the Appellant enquired from the Respondent about the matter, and the Respondent replied by letter dated June 29, 1988 (Exhibit 2A), stating that arrangements were on hand for a report to be written on the vehicles before repairs could be undertaken. On August 22, 1988, the vehicles were released to the Appellant by the Police without being repaired. The Appellant carried out extensive repairs on his trailers and claimed special damages for cost of repairs (N80,000.00), loss of earnings for 126 days (N567,000.00), and general damages (N120,000.00) for breach of contract.

The Respondent denied hiring the trailers, maintaining that it had sold the rice mill to Amariya Foods Limited and had no business hiring trailers for its evacuation. The Respondent asserted that Mrs. Lucy Inyang Udo independently traveled with Alhaji Mai Dunama to negotiate with the Appellant for hiring trailers on behalf of Amariya Foods Limited. Alhaji Mai Dunama testified that he arranged for the evacuation on behalf of his friend, Alhaji Bagudu, the Managing Director of Amariya Foods Limited, not on behalf of the Respondent. The Respondent conceded N200,000.00 (representing 10% of the N2 million sale price) to Amariya Foods Limited as compensation for damages from the villagers’ attack.

HELD

1. The appeal was dismissed.

2. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Calabar Judicial Division, delivered on February 18, 2003.

3. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the two lower courts that there was no contractual relationship between the Appellant and the Respondent.

4. The Court found that the Appellant failed to discharge the onus of proof required to establish that Mrs. Lucy Inyang Udo was acting as agent of the Respondent in hiring the trailers.

5. The parties were ordered to bear their respective costs of the appeal.

ISSUES

1. Whether the lower Court gave the proper interpretation and due relevance to the testimonies and exhibits in this matter.

2. Whether the lower Court was justified in confirming the trial Court’s decision that there was no contract established between the parties in this matter.

RATIONES DECIDENDI

APPELLATE COURT’S DUTY IN EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE – PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF TRIAL JUDGE

It is the primary responsibility of the trial Judge to evaluate evidence placed before the Court as the trial Judge is the one that saw, heard and observed the demeanour of the witnesses. Therefore, where such a trial Court has properly evaluated the evidence, it is not the business of the appellate Court to substitute its own views for those of the trial Court. – Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.S.C.

PERVERSE DECISIONS – WHEN APPELLATE COURT MAY INTERFERE

A decision of a Court is said to be perverse (a) when it runs counter to the evidence and pleadings; or (b) where it has been shown that the trial Court took account of matters which it ought not to have taken into account or shut its eyes to the obvious; or (c) when such a decision has occasioned a miscarriage of justice; or (d) when the circumstance of the finding of facts in the decision are most unreasonable. – Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.S.C.

APPELLATE COURT’S APPROACH TO EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE – REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERFERENCE

Where a judgment of a trial Court is attacked on the ground of finding or non-finding of evidence or evaluation of evidence, the appellate Court will seek the following (i) the evidence before the trial Court; (ii) whether the trial Court accepted or rejected any evidence upon the correct perception; (iii) whether the trial Court correctly approached the assessment of the value on it; (iv) whether it used the imaginary scale of justice to weigh the evidence on either side; or (v) whether it appreciated, upon the preponderance of evidence, which side the scale weighed having regard to the burden of proof” – Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.S.C.

CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT – SUPREME COURT’S RELUCTANCE TO INTERFERE

This Court has reiterated in a plethora of decided cases that it does not make it a habit of disturbing the concurrent findings of lower Courts and would only do so if exceptional circumstances are shown. – Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.S.C.

EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES FOR DISTURBING CONCURRENT FINDINGS

This Court ordinarily will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact except in exceptional cases, where the findings are such as ‘shocks the conscience of the Court or by disregard to the forms of legal process or some violation of some principles of natural justice or otherwise substantial and grave injustice has been done’.– Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.S.C.

AVERMENTS WITHOUT EVIDENCE – WORTHLESSNESS OF UNSUPPORTED PLEADINGS

It is elementary that averments in pleadings which are unsupported by evidence are unavailing to the pleader as they go to no issue, and so must be discountenanced. The rationale is that an averment in a pleading is not evidence and cannot be substituted for evidence. Such an averment does not, therefore, amount to proof. Consequently, pleadings without evidence to support them are worthless.– Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.S.C.

ABANDONMENT OF PLEADINGS – FAILURE TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE

Facts or assertions of facts made in pleadings do not have the capacity to speak in their own proof, being bare, cold and dead allegations upon which a party relies to claim a right which he desires the Court to declare in his favour… Failure to produce or adduce evidence in support of the pleadings of fact would leave them dead on arrival and the claim based thereon liable to be dismissed. In such a situation, the pleadings are presumed and deemed to have been abandoned. – Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.S.C.

CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS EVIDENCE – UNCHALLENGED TESTIMONY

The records of the proceedings in the trial Court show that the evidence of the witness on the fact that he acted on behalf of Amariya Foods Limited, and not the Respondent, in hiring the trailers of the Appellant was not disparaged, discredited, dented or challenged under cross-examination and neither was it incredible or unbelievable. It is the law that such evidence can be believed and relied upon by the Courts in making findings.– Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.S.C.

PROPER STAGE FOR DISCREDITING WITNESS EVIDENCE

It is also elementary law that the proper stage for discrediting the evidence of a witness of a party is not in the address of Counsel or the brief of argument on appeal but down the line at the trial Court during cross-examination and possibly by presenting contrary credible evidence, and it cannot be appeal, as the Counsel to the Appellant sought to do. – Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.S.C.

ESTOPPEL BY CONDUCT – REQUIREMENT FOR SPECIFIC PLEADING

The allusion to the principle of estoppel by conduct by Counsel to the Appellant was also inapposite. The Appellant did not plead estoppel by conduct. It is trite law that that no matter the type of estoppel relied on by a party, it must be specifically pleaded in the pleadings of the party. – Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.S.C.

IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACTS – REQUIREMENTS FOR INFERENCE FROM CONDUCT

The inference of a contract’s existence from conduct refers to implied-in-fact contracts, where a legally binding agreement is formed not through explicit words, but through the parties’ actions, behavior, and surrounding circumstances… However, for an implied-in-fact contract to be inferred, the actions or conduct of the parties must be clear and unambiguous and pointed unequivocally to the existence of a contract.– Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.S.C.

PRIVITY OF CONTRACT – BURDEN NOT IMPOSED ON STRANGERS

It is settled in law on privity of contract that a person is not under any obligation to bear the burden of a contract to which he is not privy to. Only a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it. The reason for the clarification of the principle of privity to a contract is based on consensus ad idem. It is only the contracting parties that knows what their enforceable rights and obligations are, and therefore a stranger should not be saddled with the responsibility. – Per HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.

QUALITIES OF A GOOD BRIEF OF ARGUMENTS – BREVITY AND PRECISION

Some of the eternal qualities of a good brief of arguments are brevity and precision. It must not be too short as to leave out the essentials and must not be too long as to become otiose. The goal must be to achieve maximum brevity consistent with accuracy and clarity. A good brief does not allow for verbosity and must be a succinct statement of a party’s argument in the appeal. – Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.S.C.