CORAM
SALIHU MODIBBO JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
ALFA BELGORE (Presided), JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
SYLVESTER UMARU ONU (Read the Leading Judgment), JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
PARTIES
U. N. T. H. M. B APPELLANTS
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The plaintiff, herein respondent Claim for a declaration of this Honourable Court that the purported termination of plaintiff’s employment with the University of Nigeria Teaching Hospital, an order of this Honourable Court setting aside the said letter reference UNTH/PF.2166/163 dated 19th May, 1987, declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to remain and continue in employment at University of Nigeria Teaching Hospital, until she attains the retirement age as prescribed by law or until earlier retired on grounds of ill-health or other lawful cause and An order of this Honourable Court setting aside the purported retirement of the plaintiff all her rights and benefits: including her right to continue in employment at University of Nigeria Teaching Hospital until she attains the age of retirement as prescribed by law or until she is otherwise earlier retired on grounds of ill-health or other lawful cause.?
HELD
APPEAL DISMISSED
ISSUES
None
RATIONES DECIDENDI
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONTRACT OF PERSONAL SERVICE AND CONTRACT OF SERVICE WHICH ENJOY STATUTORY PROTECTION
“It is important to observe the difference in status between these contracts of personal service, and contracts of service which enjoy statutory protection. The latter can only be terminated in the manner prescribed by the governing statutory provision. A breach of the enabling statutory provision cannot result in a unilateral repudiation. It effects no change in the contractual relationship of the parties. The act is ultra vires and void. The contract cannot be discharged on the agreement of the parties without compliance with the enabling statutory provision. This is the fundamental difference between contracts having a statutory flavour to which the instant case belongs, and ordinary contracts of personal service.” KARIBI-WHYTE, PER BELGORE J.S.C
THERE IS NOTHING KNOWN TO OUR LAW LIKE A CHARGE BY PRESUMPTION OR BY IMPLICATION
“It is not enough where a person is being accused of misconduct that lead to termination of his appointment to invite him as a witness only before an Investigation Panel set up for the purpose. Nor can it be assumed that because he was invited to testify, that he was aware of the nature of the allegations against him. There is nothing known to law like a charge by presumption or by implication. In the instant case, even if the Investigation Panel were to be treated as a disciplinary panel, it did not lay any accusation of misconduct against the appellant before he was invited before it as a witness. The College Council adopted and accepted the recommendation of the Investigation Panel which it applied and terminated the services of the appellant, thus committing the same serious omission of not laying any formal accusation against the appellant and affording him hearing to defend himself”
POWER OF THE STATUTES
“It is now very well established that when an office or employment has a statutory flavour in the sense that its conditions of service are provided for by statute or regulations made thereunder, any person in that office or employment enjoys a special status over and above the ordinary master and servant relationship. In the matter of discipline of such an employee, the procedure laid down by such statute must be fully complied with. If not, any decision affecting the right or reputation or tenure of office of that employee will be declared null and void” KARIBI-WHYTE, PER BELGORE J.S.C
CASES CITED
Shitta-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission (1981) 1 SC. 40 at 56-57Olaniyan v. UNILAG (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.9) 599 at 612-613; 622-623Eperokun v. University of Lagos (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.34) 162 at 201Olatunbosun v. NISER (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.80) 25 at 41
STATUTES REFERRED TO
None