CORAM
PARTIES
SENATOR IYIOLA OMISOREPEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP) APPELLANTS
OGBENI RAUF ADESOJI AREGBESOLA & ORS
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The 1st Appellant, a candidate of the 2nd Appellant and the 1st Respondent sponsored by the 2nd Respondent were candidates who contested the Governorship election held in Osun State. At the end of the election, the 3rd Respondent (INEC) declared the result and returned the 1st Respondent as the winner of the election having scored the highest number of votes cast. Dissatisfied with the declaration of the 1st Respondent as winner of the election, the 1stAppellant filed a petition at the Governorship Election Petition Tribunal, Osun State, seeking some reliefs and an alternative relief on grounds that the 1st Respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful vote cast at the election, that the election was invalid by reason of corrupt practices, electoral malpractices and substantial non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), the Manual for Election Officials, 2014, and the Guidelines issued for the conduct of the election and the law in the conduct of the election. The 1st Respondent raised a preliminary objection to the petition and filed a Motion on Notice praying for an order striking out the Appellant’s reply to the first Respondent’s Reply on the ground that it was filed out of time, an order deeming the petition as abandoned and dismissing the petition for the Appellant’s failure to apply for the issuance of notice of pre-hearing session within the time prescribed by the Rules which was opposed by the 1st Appellant. At the close of evidence, the trial Tribunal overruled the preliminary objection of the Respondents and also dismissed the Appellants’ petition. Both parties were aggrieved with the trial Tribunal’s ruling. The Appellants appealed against the substantive judgment to the Court of Appeal while the 1st Respondent cross appealed against the ruling relating to the competence of the petition and the issue of admissibility of documents. In its judgment the lower Court dismissed the Appellants appeal and upheld the 1st and 2nd Respondent’s cross appeal in part. Still dissatisfied, the Appellants appealed to this Court against the lower court’s main judgment and against part of the judgment in the Cross Appeal. The 1st Respondent also cross appealed against part of the lower court’s judgment which discountenanced his objection against the admissibility of some documents tendered by the Appellant at the Tribunal.
HELD
Appeal Dismissed, Cross Appeal Dismissed
ISSUES
1. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in holding that Ground 13 of the appellants’ Notice and Issue five distilled therein (sic) are incompetent?
2. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in affirming the tribunal’s findings on the doctrine of severance; burden and standard of proof on allegation of non-compliance and irregularities in the conduct of the election?
3. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in affirming the tribunal’s findings that the appellants failed to prove substantial non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), Manual for Electoral Officials, 2014 and the Guidelines for the Conduct of the election having regard to the state of the pleadings and the evidence adduced?
4. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal did not fail in their duty to evaluate properly the appellants’ evidence and draw the necessary inferences as demonstrated before them?
5. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in affirming the findings of the tribunal which rejected the reports and evidence of PW15 and PW38?
6. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in the interpretation of paragraph 16 (1) and (2) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) on [the] appellants’ reply filed in the petition?
7. Whether [the] learned Justices of [the] Court of Appeal were right in affirming the tribunal’s findings that the allegations of corrupt practice were not proved beyond reasonable doubt?
8. Whether the Court of Appeal rightly upheld the preliminary objection of the first and second respondents on Ground 13 of the appellants’ Notice of Appeal and issue five distilled therefrom?
9. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the Tribunal properly applied the required standard of proof in respect of allegations of non-compliance made by the appellants?
10. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in holding that evidential burden would only shift to the third respondent if the appellants proved their allegations of substantial non compliance with the Manual for Election Officials, 2014 and Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended)?
11. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it upheld the findings of the Tribunal that the appellants failed to prove its allegations of non-compliance?
12. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in upholding the decision of the Tribunal rejecting the report and evidence of PW15 and PW38?
13. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the Replies of the appellants to the respondents’ Replies to the petition were filed out of time?
14. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in upholding the decision of the Tribunal that the allegations of corrupt practices made by the appellants were not proved beyond reasonable doubt?
15. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it held that the Tribunal examined and evaluated the totality of the evidence led by the parties and correctly found that the appellants failed to prove by credible evidence that the Governorship election conducted in Osun State on the 9th day of August, 2014 was invalid by reasons of corrupt practices, irregularities and substantial non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), the INEC Manuals as well as the Guideline for the Conduct of Election?
16. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the evidential burden would only shift to the third respondent if the appellants proved their allegations of substantial non-compliance with the Manual for Election Officials, 2014 and Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended)?
17. Whether the Court of Appeal was correct when it upheld the decision of the Tribunal that the first respondent was validly returned as the candidate who polled the majority of the lawful votes cast at the Governorship election conducted by the third respondent in Osun State on the 9th day of August, 2014?
18. Whether the Court of Appeal was correct when it upheld the decision of the Tribunal that struck out the appellants’ Reply to the third respondent’s Reply when it found that the Reply of the appellant was indeed filed out of the time prescribed by the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended)?
20. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in the interpretation of paragraph 18 (1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) in dismissing the appellants’ petition?
21. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in their interpretation of paragraph 16 (1) and (2) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act. 2010 (as amended) in striking out the appellants’ reply?
22. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal did not err in law in their decision dismissing the objection of the cross appellant to the admissibility of exhibits 1-185 and 249¬341 tendered by the first and cross respondents?
23. Whether the learned appellate Justices were right in overruling the objections of the cross appellant to the admissibility of exhibits 243 and 342 which were computer-generated documents but which were tendered in evidence by the cross respondents without complying with the mandatory requirements of section 84 of the Evidence Act?
24. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in their decision dismissing the objection of the cross appellant to the admissibility of exhibits 364-380 which were “sacks said to contain ballot papers 2 and wrongly relied by the Tribunal?
RATIONES DECIDENDI
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES – CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES CAN SUFFICE AS EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN RESPECTS.
“It is trite law and well established that the fact of non calling of any evidence by the 3rd respondent did not affect his case adversely in any way. In otherwords, by the very act of cross-examining the witnesses of the petitioners, the 3rd respondent had given evidence.” PER C. B. OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
COURT – ITS IS NOT THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO FIGURE OUT WHAT CAN ONLY BE ANSWERED BY EVIDENCE.
“It is not also the duty of a court to speculate or work out either mathematically or scientifically a method of arriving at an answer on an issue which could only be elicited by credible and tested evidence at the trial.” PER C. B. OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
TECHNALITIES – ATTITUDE OF THE COURT TO TECHNICALITIES
“Now, it is no longer in doubt that this court, and indeed, all courts, have made a clean sweep of “the picture of the law and its technical rules triumphant,” Aliu Bello and Ors v A. G, Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (pt 45) 528, 886. Let me explain. By its current mood, it is safe to assert that this court has, firmly and irreversibly, spurned the old practice where the temple of justice was converted into a forensic abattoir where legal practitioners, employing such tools of their trade like “the whirligig of technicalities,” daily butchered substantive issues in courts in their “fencing game in which parties engaged] themselves in an exercise of outsmarting each other,” Afolabi v Adekunle [1983] 2 SCNLR 141, 150. Those days are gone: gone for good!” PER C.C. NWEZE, J.S.C
BURDEN OF PROOF IN A CLAIM FOR DECLARATION – THE BURDEN IS ALWAYS ON THE PERSON SEEKING THE DECLARATION TO ESTABLISH THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO IT.
“In a claim for declaration therefore, the onus is always on the person who alleges to establish his case and not rely on the weakness of the defence. The petitioner must in such situation satisfy the court with cogent and compellable evidence properly pleaded, that he is entitled to the declaration. I wish to restate also that admissions by the defendant may not satisfy as proof. See Bello V. Magnes Eweka (1981) 1 SC 101.” PER C. B. OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
PLEADINGS – PLEADINGS DO NOT CONSTITUTE EVIDENCE, THUS FOR THE COURT TO ACT ON IT, EVIDENCE MUST BE LED.
“The law is again well settled that pleadings do not constitute evidence and the tribunal cannot act on such allegations without evidence being led thereon. In order to justify the allegation, the appellants ought to identify the evidence led by them in support of the allegations in those paragraphs that were not considered and evaluated.” PER C. B. OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
JUDGE – DUTY OF A JUDGE
“It has long been settled that a Judge is not permitted to embark on an inquisitorial examination of documents outside the court room. Worse still, he is not allowed to act on what he discovered in such a document in relation to an issue when that was not supported by evidence or was not brought to the notice of the parties to be agitated in the usual adversarial procedure, Ivienagbor v. Bazuaye[1999] 9 NWLR (pt 620) 552; (1999) 6 SCNJ 235, 243; Owe v. Oshinbanjo(1965) 1 All NLR 72 at 75; Bornu Holding Co. Ltd. v. Alhaji Hassan Bogoco(1971) I All NLR 324 at 333; Alhaji Onibudo & Ors v Aihaji Akibu & Ors [1982] 7 SC 60, 62; Nwaga v Registered Trustees Recreation Club (2004) FWLR (pt 190) 1360, 1380-1381; Jalingo v Nyame(1992) 3 NWLR (pt 231) 538; Ugochukwu v Co-operative Bank [1996] 7 SCNJ 22.” PER C.C. NWEZE, J.S.C
NATURE OF AN APPEAL -AN APPEAL IS USUALLY AGAINST THE RATIO DECIDENDI
“An appeal is usually against the ratio decidendi and, generally, not against an obiter, U. T. C Nigeria Limited v. Pamotei [1989] 2 NWLR (pt. 103) 244; Saude v. Abdullahi [1989] 4 NWLR (pt. 116) 387; Ede v Omeke [1992] 5 NWLR (pt. 242) 428; Dakar v Dapai [1998] 10 NWLR (pt. 577) 573; Abacha v Fawehinmi [2000] 6 NWLR (pt. 571) 573.” PER C.C. NWEZE, J.S.C
COURT – A JUDGE IS AN ADJUDICATOR, NOT AN INVESTIGATOR.
“A court or Tribunal should not embark upon cloistered justice by making enquiry into the case outside the court; not even by examination of documents which were in evidence when same had not been examined in the open court. A judge is an adjudicator; not an investigator. Duriminiya vs. C.O.P (1961) NNLR 70 at 74; Dennis Ivienagbor vs. Henry Osato; Bazuaye (1999) 6 SCNJ 235 at 243; ACN vs. Sule Lamido (2012) 8 NWLR (Pt 1303) 560 at 580.” PER J. A. FABIYI, J.S.C
GROUNDS OF APPEAL – DEFECTIVE PARTICULARS IN A GROUND OF APPEAL WOULD NOT RENDER THE GROUND ITSELF INCOMPETENT
“Courts are now encouraged to make the best they can out of a bad or inelegant ground of appeal in the interest of justice, Dakolo and Ors v Dakolo and Ors (2011) LPELR -915. Hence, bad or defective particulars in a ground of appeal would not, necessarily, render the ground itself incompetent, Prince Dr B. A. Onafowokan v Wema Bank [2011] 45 NSCQR 1; Best (Nig) Ltd v Black Wood Hodge [2011] 45 NSCQR; Abe v UNILORIN (20130 LPELR. Put differently, since the essence of Particulars is to project the reason for the ground complained of, the inelegance of the said particulars would not invalidate the Grounds from which they flow, NNB Plc v Imonikhe [2002] 5 NWLR (pt 760) 241, 310; D. Stephens Ind. Ltd and Anor v BCCI Inter (Nig) Ltd [1999] 11 NWLR (pt 625) 29, 3101.” PER C.C. NWEZE, J.S.C
GROUND OF APPEAL – SCOPE OF A GROUND OF APPEAL
“Judicial authorities by this court had settled the scope of a ground of appeal; that it is not one of mathematical exactitude and can arise in a number of situations. See the case of Akpan V. Bob (2010) 17 NWLR (P. 1223) 421 at 464-465.
“Although many authorities lay emphasis that a ground of appeal must stem from the text of the judgment (ipsissima verba), for instance, , such decisions in my humble view, by no means limit the scope of a ground definitions, a ground of appeal, can arise in a number of situations such as the following…………” PER C. B. OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF LOWER COURT – AN APPELLATE COURT CAN DISTURB THE CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF LOWER COURTS WHERE SAME IS PERVERSE OR NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD
“The law is trite and did not give this court the liberty to readily disturb concurrent findings of lower courts unless same is found to be perverse or not supported by evidence on the record.” PER C. B. OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
DUMPING OF EVIDENCE –IT IS THE DUTY OF A PARTY NOT JUST TO DUMP DOCUMENTS BEFORE A TRIBUNAL BUT TO FURTHER SHOW HOW THE DOCUMENTS AFFECT HIS CASE.
“Where a party dumps a truck load of documents on the tribunal without showing how these documents affect his case, it is not the duty of the court to embark on an independent enquiry to fix the documents on the evidence, moreso, when it is outside the hearing in court. See ACN v. Lamido (z0l2l 8 NWLR (pt. 1303) 5G0 at 580.” PER J. I. OKORO, J.S.C
ADDRESS OF COUNSEL – THE ADDRESS OF COUNSEL CAN NEVER TAKE THE PLACE OF EVIDENCE.
“It is trite that address of counsel however brilliant, cannot take the place of evidence particularly where there is no evidence to support the address. See Oduwole V. West (2010) 10 NWLR (pt. 1203) 598, Neka G.B.B. Manufacturing Co. Ltd V. ACB (2004) 1 SCNI193 at 205.” PER J. I. OKORO, J.S.C
PROOF OF ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPT PRACTICES IN AN ELECTION PETITION – ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPT PRACTICES IN AN ELECTION PETITION MUST BE PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS IT BOTHERS ON CRIMINALITY
“Allegation of corrupt practices touch on the realm of criminality. Same must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. See Nwobodo vs. Onoh (1984) 1 All NLR 1”. PER J. A. FABIYI, J.S.C
AMENDMENT OF PROCESS – AN AMENDMENT WOULD SUFFICE WHEN THE DESCRIPTION OF A PARTY ON A PROCESS IS A MERE MISNOMER
“It is the law that where the description of a party on a process in a litigation [as happened here] is a mere misnomer, an amendment would suffice to put it right provided that the person misnamed is a juristic entity and is in existence, just like the second respondent, A. B. Manu & Co. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Costain (W.A) Ltd. [1994] 7 NWLR (pt. 367) 112. The essence of such an amendment is to ensure that justice is done to all parties to the dispute, Vulcan Gases Ltd. v. G. F. Industries A. G. [2001] 9 NWLR (pt. 719) 610, 653.”PER C.C. NWEZE, J.S.C
PLEADINGS – DOCTRINE OF SEVERANCE OF PLEADINGS IN ELECTION CASES
“The doctrine of severance of pleadings in Election cases is also well enunciated in the case of Omoboriowo V. Ajasin (1984) SC NLR 108 wherein the two are separated constructively into compartments with one having no bearing on the other. The cases of Ikoku Vs. Oli (1962) All NLR 195 and Nwobodo Vs. Onoh (1984) NSCC 1 are also very explicit on the same principle. See also the case of Fayemi V. Oni (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1140) 223.” PER C. B. OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
EVIDENCE – EVIDENCE DISCREDITED DURING CROSS-EXAMINATION NEED NO REBUTTAL.
“It is also an established principle of law that where an evidence had been thoroughly discredited during cross-examination so much so that there is nothing left for purpose of weighing on an imaginary scale for consideration then such will certainly need no rebuttal.” PER C. B. OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
TECHNALITIES -RATIONALE BEHIND THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE COURT’S ATTITUDE TO TECHNICALITIES IN ELECTION MATTER
“This current approach, and a robust and wholesome one at that, is to permit litigants, more particularly, parties in election-related matters, to ventilate their grievances without any hindrances by technical arguments that have the tendency of clogging the wheel of electoral justice in the election Tribunals and courts entertaining appeals from them, Egolum v. Obasanjo [1999] 7 NWLR (pt. 611) 355; Nwobodo v. Onoh[1984] 1 SCNLR 1”. PER C.C. NWEZE, J.S.C
PLEADINGS – ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, ARE DEEMED ABANDONED
“It was pointed out that, as averments in pleadings do not constitute evidence, allegations in the pleadings which were unsupported by evidence, were deemed abandoned.” PER C.C. NWEZE, J.S.C
FILING OF ELECTION PETITION –TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE IN FILING ELECTION PETITION PROCEEDINGS
“It is clear that Election Petition proceedings are sui generis. Time for filing proceedings is sacrosanct. Interpretation Act provision is out of the matter. The decision in the case of Ikahriale vs. Okoh (2009) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1154) 1 at 38 is clearly in point. See also Tony Nwoye Okechukwu vs. INEC & Ors. (2014) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1436) 255 at 284.” PER J. A. FABIYI, J.S.C
CRIMINAL ALLEGATIONS IN ELECTION PETITIONS – NATURE OF PROOF WHERE ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPT PRACTICES ARE MADE IN ELECTION PETITIONS
“I need to emphasize that in Election Petitions, where allegations of corrupt practices are made, the petitioner making these allegations must lead cogent and credible evidence to prove them beyond reasonable doubt because they are in the nature of criminal charges. Being criminal allegations, they cannot be transferred from one person to another. It is personal. Thus it must be proved as follows:
1. That the respondent whose election is being challenged personally committed the corrupt acts or aided, abetted, consented or procured the commission of the alleged corrupt practices.
2. That where the alleged act was committed through an agent, that the agent was expressly authorized to act in that capacity or granted authority; and
3. That the corrupt practice substantially affected the outcome of the election and how it affected it.
See Aregbesola V. Oyinlola (2011) 9 NWLR (pt. 1253) 458 at 557, Audu V. INEC (No. 2) (2010) 13 NWLR (pt. 1212) 456 at544.” PER J. I. OKORO, J.S.C
ELECTION PETITION – CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE SUCCESS OF A PETITION ON NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ELECTORAL ACT
“It has been consistently reiterated by this court that for a petition to succeed on non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, the petitioner must prove not only that there was non-compliance with the provision of the Act but that same substantially affected the result of the election. In other words, the petitioner has two burdens to prove –
1. That the non-compliance took place.
2. That the non-compliance affected the result of the election.
The decisions in the cases of Buhari vs. INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 246 at 435; Buhari vs. Obsanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 941) 1 at 80; Akinfosile vs. Ijose (1960) SCNLR 447; Awolowo vs. Shagari (1979) 6-7 SC 51 are directly in point here.” PER J. A. FABIYI, J.S.C
ADMISSION – DEFINITION OF ADMISSION
“An admission has been defined also as “a voluntary acknowledgment made by a party of the existence of the truth of certain facts which are inconsistent with his claim in an action”. See Vockie V. General Motors Corp. Chevrolet Division D. C. Pa. 66 FRD 57, 60 (Black Dictionary, Sixth Edition of page 47) per Fabiyi, JSC (P. 25). See also Adusei V. Adebayo (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 534 which defines admission further as:
¬”a concession or voluntary acknowledgment made by a party of the existence of certain facts; a statement made by a party of the existence of a fact which is relevant to the cause of the adversary.” PER C. B. OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
DUTY OF APPELLANTS – AN APPELLANT MUST ESTABLISH A LAPSE IN THE DECISION ON APPEAL AND THE INJUSTICE IT CAUSED.
“Furthermore, the appellants are duty bound not only to establish a lapse in the decision they appeal from, they must go the extra mile of establishing the injustice the lapse occasioned. See Soleh Boneh Overseas (Nig.) Ltd (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt 99) 549 and Kate Enterprises Ltd V. Daewoo Nig Ltd (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt 5) 116.” PER M. D. MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE – EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN CROSS EXAMINATION ON MATTER THAT ARE PLEADED ARE ADMISSIBLE
“It has long been settled that evidence obtained in cross examination on matters that are pleaded, that is, on matters on which issues were joined [as was the case at the Tribunal], is admissible, Adeosun v Governor of Ekiti State [2012] All FWLR (pt 619) 1044, 1059; Akomolafe v Guardian Press Ltd [2010 3 NWLR (pt 1181) 338, 351; 353-354.” PER C.C. NWEZE, J.S.C
BURDEN OF PROOF IN CIVIL CASES – THE BURDEN IN CIVIL CASES IS NOT STATIC; IT SHIFTS AMONG PARTIES AS THE CASE PROGRESSES.
“As a general rule, in civil cases, including election petitions, while the general burden of proof in the sense of establishing his case lies on the plaintiff, such burden is not as static as in criminal cases. Not only will there be instances in which on the state of the pleadings the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff but also, as the case progresses, it may become the duty of the defendant to call evidence in proof or rebuttal of some particular point which may arise in the case. See Adegoke V. Adibi (1992) 5 NWLR (pr 242) 410.” PER J. I. OKORO, J.S.C
FAILURE OF AN APPEAL – WHERE AN APPELLANT FAILS TO SATISFY THE APPELLATE COURT ON THE WRONGFUL APPLICATION OF FACTS BY THE LOWER COURT HIS APPEAL WILL FAIL
“It is settled that where an appellant fails to satisfy the appellate court that the lower court was wrong in its application of the facts to the prevailing and applicable law, his appeal will fail.” PER C.C. NWEZE, J.S.C
DECLARATORY ACTION – BURDEN OF PROOF IN DECLARATORY ACTION
“I seek to state further that with the case at hand being declaratory in nature, the law makes it incumbent on the petitioners to prove their case and not rely on the absence of evidence by the respondents. See the following cases in point:- Gundiri V. Nyako (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1391) 211 at 252; CPC V. INEC (2012) FWLR (Pt. 617) 605 at 633 – 634; Fannami V. Bukar (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 198) 1210 at 1238 – 1239 and C.P.C. V. INEC (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 493 at 545.” PER C. B. OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
GROUNDS OF APPEAL – EVERY FAILURE TO ATTEND TO GROUNDS OF APPEAL WITH PARTICULAR DETAIL AS PRESCRIBED BY THE RULES OF COURT WILL NOT RENDER SUCH A GROUND INCOMPETENT
“It is not every failure to attend to Grounds of Appeal with the fastidious details prescribed by the rules of this court that would render such a ground incompetent. This is, particularly, so where sufficient particulars can be gleaned from the grounds of appeal in question and the adversary and the court are left in no doubt as to the particulars on which the grounds are founded, Ukpon and Anor v Commissioner for Finance and Economic Development and Anor (2006) LPELR -3349, citing Hambe v. Hueze[2001] 4 NWLR (pt.703) 372; [2001] 5 NSCQR 343, 352.” PER C.C.NWEZE, J.S.C
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE – DUTY OF COURTS TO ENSURE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IS ACCORDED TO ALL PARTIES
“It is a cardinal duty of the Courts to ensure, at all times, that substantial justice is accorded to all parties to the disputes before them, Adewunmi v. Attorney-General Ekiti State [2002] 2 NWLR (pt. 751) 474, 507; Afolabi v. Adekunbe [1983] 2 SCNLR 141; Shokunbi v. Mosaku (1969) 1 NMLR 54; Vulcan Gases v. G. F. Industries A. G (supra) 653.” PER C.C. NWEZE, J.S.C
DOCUMENTS –DOCUMENTS ARE TO BE TESTED IN OPEN COURT BEFORE IT CAN BE EVALUATED BY THE TRIBUNAL
“As a matter of law, documents are to be tested in open court before the tribunal can evaluate them. See ACN V. Lamido (2012) 8 NWLR Pt. 1303 p.56 at 580-581.” PER C. B. OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
DEPOSITION OF A WITNESS – WHERE THE DEPOSITION OF A WITNESS IS HELD TO BE CREDIBLE AND RELIABLE, THE COURT CAN ACT ON IT.
“The law is well settled that a court will act only on a written deposition of a witness which is his evidence in chief, if it is found to be, credible and reliable upon proper evaluation.” PER C. B. OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
CASES CITED
STATUTES REFERRED TO
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999(as amended)
Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended)
Interpretation Act, Cap 123, LFN, 2004.