CORAM
PARTIES
PATIENCE EKE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION
AREA(S) OF LAW
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Appellant was arraigned before the Federal High Court, holden at Benin City on a 2-count charge of promoting prostitution and deceitful inducement both contrary to and punishable under section 16 and section 19(1)(b) of Trafficking In Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act 2003 (as amended), respectively. The Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. Matter proceeded to trial and after the prosecution had called four witnesses, the judge was transferred and a new judge presided over the case. Consequently, the Appellant’s plea was retaken and she pleaded not guilty. At the end of the Prosecution’s case, the Appellant made a no case submission and it was overruled by the trial court. This appeal is against the said decision.
HELD
Appeal Allowed
ISSUES
Whether the learned trial Judge was not in error when he overruled the no case submission of the defendant (accused person).
RATIONES DECIDENDI
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS – MODE OF INTERPRETATION OF PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS WORDS
“The law is quite settled that in the interpretation of statutory provisions, where the words used are plain and unambiguous, the words are to be given their ordinary grammatical meanings. See Ahmed v. Kassim (1958) 3 FSC 51, (1958) SCNLR 28; Yerokun v. Adeleke (1960) 5 FSC 126, (1960) SCNLR 267; Nafiu Rabiu v. The State (No.2) (1981) 2 NCLR 293; Egbe v. Yusuf (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 245)1 and The State v. Sunday Ughanwa & Ors. (2020) 3 NWLR (Pt.1710) 22.
Therefore, the provisions of sections 46 and 39 of the Evidence Act, 2011 should be interpreted by attaching to the words used therein their natural, plain and ordinary grammatical meanings.
Thus, in Onu v. Idu (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 328) 691 at 708, the Supreme Court, while considering the provisions of Section 34(1) of the repealed Evidence Act, the same as those of section 46(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, held unequivocally that “The language of section 34(1) of the Evidence Act…is plain and simple to understand”.
The law appears to be that for a court to apply the provisions of section 46(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 the conditions stipulated therein must be fulfilled. See S. T. Hon’s Law of Evidence in Nigeria, 2nd Edition, page 1096 and the cases of Ikpuku v. Ikpuku (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 193) 571 and El-khalil v. Oredein (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 12) 371.
EVIDENCE – WHETHER THE USE OF EVIDENCE ADDUCED PREVIOUSLY IS ADMISSIBLE
“It is trite law that, save to contradict a witness, the use of evidence adduced previously in a case or trial before a retrial or rehearing of the case de novo is not permissible. See Uguru v. State (2002) FWLR (Pt. 103) 330 at 347, per Uwaifo, JSC and Oguntayo v. Adelaja (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 459) 1626. –
COURT – WHETHER A COURT CAN, BY ACQUIESCENCE, AGREEMENT OR CONSENT OF THE PARTIES, WAIVE COMPLIANCE WITH A MANDATORY STATUTORY PROVISION
“The learned trial Judge without due regard to the clear provisions of sections 46(1) and 39 of the Evidence Act 2011 decided to adopt the oral evidence of witnesses who had earlier testified before his learned brother. His lordship apparently acted on the consent of the parties before him. With respect, consent of parties is not one of the conditions stipulated in sections 46 and 39 of the Evidence Act, 2011. Like jurisdiction of a court, the court cannot, by the acquiescence, agreement or consent of the parties, waive compliance with the provisions of section 46(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 because the provisions are mandatory. See A. O. Eghobamien v. Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 797) 488 at 500 – 501, per Uthman Mohammed, JSC where the Supreme Court held as follows:
“The provisions of section 34(1) of the Evidence Act are mandatory and cannot be waived. If consent is given to admit evidence which is contrary to the provisions of a statute (e.g. S.34(1) of the Evidence Act) the courts most ignore it because it is a case of giving consent to an illegality.”
See also Kale v. Coker (1982) 12 SC 252.
A trial Judge, like any other learned jurist presiding over a cause or matter, is dominus litis and should not unnecessarily allow or permit the parties to dictate the course or pace of the proceedings in court.
The law seems to be that where a statute has prescribed a particular method or way of doing a thing, it is not permissible to employ any method or way outside the one prescribed by the statute. See Nwankwo V. Yar’Adua (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt.1209) 518; A. O. Eghobamien v. Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 797) 488 and Menakaya v. Menakaya (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt. 738) 203. –
COURT- DUTY OF A TRIAL COURT IN THE CONSIDERATION, EVALUATION, AND ASSESSEMENT THE EVIDENCE OF WITNESSES WHO TESTIFY BEFORE IT
“It is settled law that a trial court has the primary responsibility of considering, evaluating and assessing the evidence of witnesses who testify before it. A trial court must properly review the evidence and make proper findings. See Sagay v. Sajere (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 661) 360.
Where the findings are based on the credibility of witnesses, it is the duty of the learned trial Judge, who had the rare opportunity or privilege of hearing, seeing and observing the witnesses give evidence or testify, to make important, valid and specific findings of fact and ascribe probative valid to the evidence. See Chief Gafaru Arowolo v. Chief Sunday Edun Olowokere & Ors. (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1278) 280 at 307, per Adekeye, JSC. See also Ebba v. Ogodo (1984) 1 SCNLR; Odofin v. Ayoola (1984) 11 SC 72; Guda v. Kitta (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 629) 21; Wilson v. Oshin (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt.673) 442 and Sanni v. Ademiluyi (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt.807) 381”. –
BURDEN OF PROOF – ON WHOM LIES THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
“In criminal trials, the burden of proof lies on the prosecution to prove every accusation beyond reasonable doubt, See Igabele v. State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 975) 100; Nwaturocha v. State (2011) 6 NWLR (Pt.1242) 170, Galadima v. State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt.1355) 153 and The State v. Abdu Musa (2002) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1709) 499.
A defendant, such as the appellant, has no burden to prove his innocence, when no case of the commission of a crime has been made out against him”-
CASES CITED
Not Available
STATUTES REFERRED TO
Evidence Act, 2011|Trafficking In Persons (prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act 2003 (as amended)|