CORAM
FOLASADE AYODEJI OJO, JUSTICE COURT OF APPEAL
BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, JUSTICE COURT OF APPEAL
FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO, JUSTICE COURT OF APPEAL
PARTIES
APPELLANTS
ARNOLD ONYEKWERE EKPE
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
ACTION, APPEAL, COMPANY LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, COURT, FAIR HEARING, JUDGMENT AND ORDER, JURISDICTION, LEGAL PRACTITIONER, LOCUS STANDI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, WORDS AND PHRASES
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Respondent as Petitioner before the Federal High Court, Lagos Judicial Division commenced a Winding – Up Petition against the Appellants wherein he claimed for a Winding-up Order of Partnership Securities limited. Partnership Investment Company Plc.. SBDC Microfinance bank Limited and Life Care Partners Limited by the Court under the provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap. C20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. The Respondent’s claim that one Mr.Victor Ogiemwonyi, was the Chairman of the 1st and 2nd Appellants and the Chief Executive Officer of the 3rd Appellant and that on 28/6/2016, the Respondent, a retired banker, had instructed the 1st Appellant to sell 90 million shares he held in Ecobank Transnational Incorporated (ETI) at the price of N16.00 per share, exclusive of the dividend due to be declared on the said shares and the Respondent agreed to pay the 1st Appellant 2% commission on sales executed as instructed. However, the 1st Appellant sold over 96 million of the Respondent’s shares in ETI largely below the stipulated share price, for a total sum of N1, 296,885, 311.02 and failed to remit the proceeds to the Respondent. The sales were conducted between 30/6/2016 and 6/9/2016. Upon confrontation, the 1st Appellant admitted the sale of the shares by the 1st and 2nd Appellants and that some of the proceeds had been given to the 3rd Appellant. The Respondent demanded for the payment to him of the proceeds of the sale of his shares but the Appellants had failed to meet their obligations to the Respondent despite repeated demands for payment, hence the Winding Up Petition filed by the Respondent before the Court below, as a Creditor, for the winding up of the Appellants for the purposes of realizing his debts. The Respondent filed along with the Petition a Motion Ex-Parte seeking the appointment of a Provisional Liquidator to take possession of assets of the Appellants, which the Court below granted and made the Ex-Parte Orders appointing a provisional Liquidator for the Appellants. The Appellants on becoming aware of the Ex – parte Order made against them filed an application seeking an Order discharging and or setting aside the Ex – Parte Orders made against them by the Court below. Subsequently the Appellants also filed a Motion on Notice challenging the competence of the Respondent’s winding up Petition and the jurisdiction of the Court below to entertain it. In its ruling, the lower Court dismissed the 1st and 2nd Appellants’ application challenging the competence of the Respondent’s Winding – Up Petition for lacking in merit whilst the Petition was severed and transferred to the Benin Division of the Court below for trial against the 3rd Appellant. Aggrieved, the Appellants have appealed against same vide their Notice of Appeal which was subsequently amended containing ten Grounds of Appeal. The Respondent filed a Preliminary Objection, challenging the competence of this appeal.
HELD
Appeal Allowed
ISSUES
Whether the failure of the Court below to pronounce on the significant and crucial grounds and issues of law and jurisdiction raised by the Appellants does not amount to a violation of the Appellants’ constitutional right to fair hearing guaranteed by Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)?
Whether the Court below does not lack jurisdiction to entertain the Respondent’s Petition as presently presented?
Whether it was not wrong for the Court below to determine the substantive question of the Appellants’ alleged indebtedness to the Respondent at the interlocutory stage of hearing the Appellants’ objection?
Whether the Court below does not lack jurisdiction to sever the Respondent’s Petition and Order a transfer of the Petition against the 3rd Appellant to the Benin Division of the Court below after deciding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the Respondent’s Petition against the 3rd Appellant?
RATIONES DECIDENDI
WINDING-UP PROCEEDING – WHETHER THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF A COMPANY UNDER A WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS ARE DEPRIVED OF ANY RESIDUAL POWER TO ACT FOR THE COMPANY UPON THE APPOINTMENT OF A PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATOR
“At any rate, the law is, and as admirably conceded by the learned counsel for the Respondent, that upon the appointment of a Provisional Liquidator the Board of Directors of a Company under a Winding – Up proceedings still retains some residual powers to act for the Company and can file an appeal in a winding – up proceedings. See Re. Union Accident Insurance Company Limited (1972) 1 All E.R. 1105 @ p. 1113. See also Anakwenze & Ors. V. Tapp Industries Limited & Ors. (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 252) 142 @ p. 159. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
AUTHORITY OF A COUNSEL – ON WHOM LIES THE ONUS OF PROVING A CESSATION OF THE AUTHORITY OF A COUNSEL TO REPRESENT A PARTY
“In law, and on this point I agree completely with the apt submission of learned counsel for the Appellants, an appeal, such as the instant appeal, is not a fresh cause of action but a continuation of the matter before the Court below. Thus, if there is any challenge to the authority of counsel, the onus would be on the party who challenges the prior existing authority to prove cessation of that authority in the absence of any complain by the party who had retained the services of the learned counsel. In our law every person is entitled to counsel of his own choice. See Oredoyin V. Arowolo (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 114) 172, where it was held inter alia that in law an appeal is a continuation of the matter before the trial Court.
Having held therefore, that this appeal is not a fresh matter and that the Appellants’ still have the residual powers to act through their Board of Director, and in the absence of any complaint either by the Appellants’ Boards of Director or the Provisional Liquidator, I hold further that the Respondent failed woefully to prove any lack of authorization and or disclosed any sufficient interest to challenge the authority of the Appellants to retain the services of their learned counsel, being that the Respondent, himself, is not the Provisional Liquidator appointed on 8/11/2016b by the Court below for the Appellants. See Oredoyin V. Arowolo (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 114) 172; Ag. Oyo State & Anor V. Fairlakes Hotel Ltd (1988) LPELR 624 (SC); Re Union Accident Insurance Company Limited (1972) Lloyd Reports 297; Anakwenze & Ors. V. Tapp Industries Limited & Ors.(1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 252) 142 @ p. 159 – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
APPOINTMENT OF A PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATOR – WHETHER THE APPOINTMENT OF A PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATOR PRECLUDES THE COMPANY ITSELF FROM CHALLENGING A WINDING – UP PROCEEDINGS PENDING AGAINST IT
“In view of the preliminary objection by the Respondent against the appeal by the Appellants by reason of the appointment of a Provisional Liquidator for the Appellants by the Court below on 8/11/2016 before the filing of this appeal by the Appellants, I think it should be reiterated here and now that in law there is a fine, no matter how thin, distinction between the a duly incorporated Company itself and its Board of Directors, such that the appointment of a provisional liquidator does not operate and cannot operate to preclude the Company itself from challenging a winding – up proceedings pending against it and this is notwithstanding that the power of the Board of Directors of the same company may have ceased upon such appointment. See NDIC V. Financial Merchant Bank Limited (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 501) 519. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
BREACH OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING – EFFECT OF A BREACH OR DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING
“This is so crucial because the effect of a breach of the right to fair hearing is that it would invariably render such a proceeding and or resultant judgment or ruling a nullity and thus liable to be set aside on appeal, notwithstanding how meticulous the proceedings might have been conducted or how sound the judgment or ruling might have been on the merit. See Ekpenetu V. Ofegobi (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1323) 276; Amadi V. INEC ( 2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 595; Ovunwo & Anor. V. Woko & Ors ( 2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1277) 522. PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING – EFFECT OF A COURT’S FAILURE TO OBSERVE THE RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING OF CITIZEN BEFORE IT
“Now, so fundamental and crucial is the right to fair hearing of the citizen before all Courts of law in the land that a failure by a Court to observe it in the litigation processes would invariably vitiate both the proceedings and judgment or ruling or orders of such a Court whose proceedings is affected by the incurable virus of lack or denial of fair hearing, notwithstanding the merit or otherwise of the cases of the parties, all are rendered a nullity. No more! No less!! See Agbogu V. Adiche (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) 509 @ p. 531. See also Agbapounwu V. Agbapuonwu (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 165) 33 @ p. 40. PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
ISSUE OF FAIR HEARING – ISSUE OF FAIR HEARING MUST BE RAISED WITH ALL SERIOUSNESS AND IN GOOD FAITH
“However, it must be pointed out at once that the issue of fair hearing must be raised with all seriousness and in good faith. It must never be raised in bad faith or merely intended as a red herring to raise a storm in a tea cup without any factual basis. See Adegbesin V. The State (2014) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1413) 609 @ pp. 641 – 642”. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
COURT – DUTY OF COURT TO PRONOUNCE ON EVERY ISSUES PROPERLY PLACED BEFORE IT FOR DETERMINATION BY THE CONTENDING PARTIES – EXCEPTION TO THE RULE
“My lords, it is settled law that a Court must consider and pronounce on all issues arising and properly submitted before it for determination by the contending parties. Thus, generally issues for determination are formulated by the parties and or the Court. A Court is therefore, at liberty, and possesses the undoubted discretion, to modify or reject all or any of the issues formulated by the parties, and frame its own issues or re – frame the issues formulated by the parties, if in its view, such issues will not lead to a proper determination of the case but in so doing it must keep in focus the issues as joined by the parties in their processes before it.
It is thus, no longer in doubt that a Court is enjoined to pronounce, as a general rule, on all issues properly arising and placed before it for determination in order to arrive at the justice of the case and to afford the parties their right to have their issues submitted to the Court to be fairly considered and determined according to law. However, to every general rule there are exceptions and thus where the issue is subsumed in another issue or is found to be irrelevant or inapt or merely obfuscating the real issues for determination, it shall not be necessary for the Court to make separate pronouncement on either each of such subsumed issues or on irrelevant and inapt issues. See Sha (Jnr) V. Kwan (2000) 8 NWLR (Pt. 670) 685 @ pp. 691 – 692. See also Ogba V. Onwuzu (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 331; Spring Bank Plc V. Dokkin Ventures Nigeria Limited (2012) LPELR – 7983(CA); Uzuada & Ors V. Ebigah (2009) 8 – 9 NMLR 409 @ p. 422; Akpan V. The State (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 218) 431; Brawal Shipping Ltd. V. Onwudikoko (2000) 6 SCNJ 508 @ p. 522; Orji V. PDP (2009) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1161) 310 @ p. 408; Karibo V. Grend (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt.230) 426 @ p. 441; Ososana V Ajayi (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt.894) 527 @ p. 549; Okonkwo V. Udo (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 579) 16 @ p. 20”. PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
COURT – WHETHER A DELIBERATE FAILURE BY A COURT TO CONSIDER ALL RELEVANT ISSUES SUBMITTED BY A PARTY AMOUNTS TO A BREACH OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING OF THE PARTY
“It is settled law that a deliberate failure, or even inadvertently, by a Court to consider all pertinent and relevant issues arising from and submitted by a party would readily and justifiably be characterized as amounting to a failure to perform its statutory duty and a breach of the right to fair hearing of the party. See AG Federation V. Nse (2016) LPELR- 40518 (CA). See also Adebayo V. AG of Ogun State (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1055) 201; Dawodu V. National Population Commission (2000) 6 WRN 116 @ p. 118; Oyadiran V. Amoo (1970) 1 ANLR 313 @ p. 317; Ojogbue V. Nnubia (1972) 6 SC 227; Atanda V. Ajani (1989) 13 NWLR (Pt. 111) 511 @ p. 539; Okonji V. Njokanma (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 202) 131 @ pp. 150 – 152; Katto V. CBN (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 126 @ p. 49; Ovunwo V. Woko (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1277) 522 @ pp. 546 – 547 – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
WRITING A JUDGMENT – WHEN IS A JUDGE SAID TO HAVE DISCHARGED ITS DUTY OF WRITING A GOOD JUDGMENT?
“Now, whilst a party may not like the way a Court had written its judgment or ruling and truly such judgment or ruling may not have been elegantly written as the party may want it to be, and even if the way and manner a trial Court considers and arrives at its decision may not be appealing or appeasing to a party, or even to an appellate Court called upon to review the decision of the trial Court, yet once the decision reached by the trial Court is correct and in conformity with laid down principles, the facts and the dictates of justice of the case, then such a mere desire of the party is of no serious moment and would thus cease to be of any importance. See Eyo V. Inyang (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt. 715) 1. See also Jekpe V. Alokwe (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 715) 252.
It would thus be safe to opine that in law there is no specific format for Judges to follow in writing their Judgments as they are each entitled to adopt their individual style in writing their Judgments so long as such a judgment contains the issues or questions to be decided in the case; the essential facts of the case of each party and the evidence led in support; the resolution of the issues of fact and law raised in the case; the conclusion or general inference drawn from facts and law as resolved; and the verdict and orders made by the Court, it is a good judgment. Some judges write in flowery languages while others write in simple languages but in all, notwithstanding the style employed, once the constituents of a good judgment are manifest the judge has discharged his duty of writing a good judgment. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
JURISDICTION OF COURT – DUTY OF A PARTY RAISING AN OBJECTION TO THE JURISDICTION OF A COURT TO NARROW ISSUES TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OR SOME OF THE VITAL ISSUES RELIED UPON BY THE PARTY
“The word or term ‘Jurisdiction’ is a nebulous one covering as it were a multitude of issues and circumstances and may either be substantive or procedural and or against the powers of the Court to entertain a matter or the subject matter and other features of a case and must therefore, in my view, be specified to bring it into its proper context by setting out the grounds or basis for the challenge to jurisdiction since the issue of jurisdiction can lend itself to several grounds and facts subject to the specific grounds of objection raised by a party challenging jurisdiction.
Thus, in my view, no Court of law can just merely rely on the word or term ‘jurisdiction’ by a party not tied to any grounds or basis and then proceed to conjure and consider every conceivable issues of jurisdiction without any reference to any specific grounds of objection. A Court faced with a challenge to the competence of a Suit before it or even to its jurisdiction cannot jettison the specific grounds relied upon by the party so raising the objection to raise or narrow issues to the exclusion of all or some of the vital issues relied upon by the party and which cannot or may not have been subsumed in the narrowed issue raise by the Court.
It is true in law that a Court, such as the Court below, has the right in the exercise of its discretion to narrow down the issues as presented by the parties, particularly the Applicant before it, as the Appellants herein, it has not the right at all to ignore the grounds of objection raised by the Appellants while considering the narrow issue raised by it. Therefore, the Court below having identified the narrow issue, and quite correctly too in my view, as to whether or not it has the jurisdiction to entertain the Respondent’s Petition, it was however, under a duty to consider this narrowed issue in the light of the three grounds of objection relied upon by the Appellants., which regrettably it failed to do in the Ruling appealed against by the Appellants. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
COURT – EFFECT OF A COURT’S FAILURE TO CONSIDER AND PRONOUNCE ON VITAL ISSUES OF THE SUIT VALIDLY BEFORE IT
“In Osafile V. Odi (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 137) 130, the Supreme Court had pronounced with finality inter alia thus:
“A Court is bound to consider the case validly presented to it by parties before it. A refusal to do so on any pretext, except on a ground of law will amount to a denial of the right to hear such party, a ground fundamental to the administration of justice, the breach of which is fatal.”
See also Bellview Airlines Limited V. Carter Harris (Proprietary) Limited (2016) LPELR – 40989 (CA), per Georgewill, JCA; Elephant Group Plc. V. National Security Adviser & Anor (2018) LPELR – 45528 (CA), per Georgewill, JCA; Crown Flour Mills Ltd V. Olokun (2008) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1077) 254; In Re Farmart Produce and Shipping Line Ltd V. E. De. Comm (1971) 7 NSCC 256”. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
NON- COMPLIANCE WITH A CONDITION PRECEDENT – CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH A CONDITION PRECEDENT PRESCRIBED BY LAW
“Now, it is not in any dispute, as even the learned counsel for the Respondent had conceded, the Respondent did not serve or send any letter of demand to the Appellants for the payment of the alleged debts due to him. He also did not file the Petition 21 days after the service of the letter of demand as required by law and therefore, it is clear to me and I so hold firmly that the Respondent’s Petition filed without due compliance with and fulfillment of the condition precedent as prescribed by law was grossly incompetent. It is also the law that when a statue provides for a remedy as well as the procedure for seeking that remedy, that procedure must be strictly followed and complied with. The Respondent did not dispute the fact that he did not under and by his hand make any demand on any of the Appellants for the payment of his alleged debts and failing their payment within 21 days he had approached the Court below as required of him by law. See Udo Utuk V. The Liquidator (Utuks Construction Marketing Co. Ltd.) Anor (2009) LPELR – 4322 (CA), where this Court had held inter alia thus:
’It is a very serious matter, compliance with the relevant sections dealing with the winding up proceedings must be strictly observed and followed…Where a plaintiff commences an action which requires the fulfillment of a condition precedent or pre-condition for the commencement of the action that condition must be fulfilled before the action can be validly commenced. And where there is non-compliance with a stipulated pre-condition for setting the legal process in motion, any suit instituted in contravention of that condition is incompetent and that Court is equally incompetent to entertain the suit.’’
See also Tate Industrial Plc. V Devcom MB Ltd (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 901) 182; Niger Care Development Company Limited V ASWB (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093) 498. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.
COURT – EFFECT OF CONSIDERING THE SUBSTANTIVE SUIT AT THE INTERLOCUTORY STAGE
See Inyang V. Chukwuogor (2007) (Vol. 28) WRN 100, where it was held inter alia thus:
“By determining at the interlocutory stage the matters or issues in the substantive case or suit, the court will be seen as pre-empting its decision in the substantive case and there will be nothing for it to consider again in the substantive case for its ultimate or final decision has been rendered nugatory.”
– PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
LOCUS STANDI – CATEGORIES OF PERSONS WHO CAN PRESENT A PETITION FOR THE WINDING – UP OF A COMPANY UNDER THE COMPANIES AND ALLIED MATTERS ACT 2004
“On the locus standi of the Respondent to present the Petition against the Appellants, particularly the 2ndand 3rd Appellants, under the CAMA 2004, the categories of persons who can petition for the winding – up of a company duly incorporated under the Laws of this Country have been specifically set out, and these includes; The company; A creditor; Official Receiver; A Contributory; A Trustee in Bankruptcy; The Corporate Affairs Commission, or A Receiver and none other. See Section 410(1) of CAMA. See also Adegbesan V. Registered Trustees Of Church Of Mercy Gospel Mission (2012) LPELR – 7894 (CA); Ojukwu V. Ojukwu (2008) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1078) 435”. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
LOCUS STANDI – DEFINITION OF THE TERM “LOCUS STANDI” – DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PARTY HAS LOCUS STANDI
“My lord, in law the term ‘locus standi’, though expressed in Latin, simply refers to the legal capacity of a party to institute proceedings in a Court of law. Thus, all that a Claimant or a Petitioner as the Respondent, need to do to establish his locus standi is to succinctly plead in his pleadings the entire or sufficient facts establishing his rights and obligations,including or showing all the key elements of locus standi, namely: violation of civil rights and obligations, sufficient interest in the matter and how the interest arose; justiciable enforceable action, all culminating into showing the existence of dispute between the parties. Once, these facts are evident or apparent in the pleadings of a Claimant against a Defendant or Respondent as the case may be, the issue of locus standi is settled in favor of such a Claimant or Petitioner. In B.B. Apugo & Sons Ltd V. Orthopaedic Hospitals Management Board (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206@ p. 269, the Supreme Court had reiterated inter alia thus:
“A person has locus standi to sue in an action if he is able to show to the satisfaction of the Court that his civil rights and obligations have been or are in danger of being infringed. There are two tests for determining if a person has locus standi. They are: 1. The action must be justiciable, and, 2. There must be a dispute between the parties…To have locus standi the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim must disclose sufficient legal interest, and show how such interest arose in the subject matter of the action…He has locus standi if he can show that he has a stake in the subject matter or outcome of the case, and must be able to establish that what he suffers or the injury to his person was the consequence of the Defendant’s act or conduct. There must be nexus between the Plaintiff’s action and the Defendant’s actor conduct.”
See also Oregan V. Soremekun (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 44) 688; Pacers Multi-Dynamics Ltd V. M.V. Dancing Sister (2012) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1289) 169 @ p. 189; Thomas V. Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669”. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS – WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL CAN PRESENT A PETITION FOR THE WINDING UP OF A COMPANY ON GROUND OF PROTECTION OF PUBLIC INTEREST
“Thus, the issue is simply whether in law the Respondent can present a Petition for the winding – up of the Appellants on ground of protection of public interest? The simple answer to this is a resounding no: that is, he cannot do so! In law, it is only the Corporate Affairs Commission that is statutorily empowered so to do. See Section 323 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004, which provides thus:
“If, in the case of anybody corporate liable to be wound up under this Act it appears to the Commission…that it is expedient in the public interest that the body should be wound up, the Commission may (unless the body is already wound up by the Court) present a Petition for it to be wound up if the Court thinks it just and equitable to do so.’’
See also Sanusi V. Ayoola & Ors(1992) LPELR – 3009 SC; AG. Ogun State V AG. Federation (1982) LPELR – 11 (SC) – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS – STATUS OF A PETITION SEEKING THE WINDING UP OF MORE THAN ONE INCORPORATED COMPANY
“I cannot therefore, but agree complexly with the apt and unassailable submission of the learned counsel for the Appellants that in law a Petition seeking the winding up of more than one incorporated company is invalid as the law does not make provision for joint winding of distinct duly incorporated companies as was sought to be done by the Respondent. It cannot also be severed into several parts of one cause or matter as was vehemently but erroneously contended by the learned counsel for the Respondent. It is thus, clearly incompetent as against all the three Appellants and I so hold. See Re A. Company (1984) BCLC 307, where Mervyn Davies J, had pertinently observed thus:
“This is an application to issue one Petition, embracing four companies, that is to say a Petition in which there is sought relief for winding up in respect of four separate companies, being companies that, whilst having common shareholders, are not included in any group or the subject of any holding company. I refuse the application”
I have sufficiently advised myself that the above decision is a foreign decision and that I am not in any way or manner bound to follow it but the logical reasoning in it is very persuasive and I find myself persuaded by it. See Sections 408 and 567(1) of the CAMA; Rule 184(2) of the Companies Winding – Up Rules 2001. See also Gafar V. The Government of Kwara State (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1024) 375. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
ACADEMIC EXERCISE – ATTITUDE OF THE COURT TO ISSUES THAT ARE MERELY ACADEMIC
“My lords, once a matter or an issue becomes merely academic the Court is loath to and does not saddle itself with the consideration of issues which had become merely academic and therefore, of no utilitarian value to either of the parties. To embark on such exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court over matters which are no longer live and are best suited for the Faculties of Law in the several Universities scattered all over the Country, would clearly amount to nothing but sheer waste of the very precious and, if I may say scarce, judicial time. In Charles Oke & Anor V. Dr. Rahman Mimiko & Ors (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 693) 1853, the full Court of the Supreme Court per Muhammad JSC, had this to say on this issue:
“It is a principle of law long settled that the general attitude of the Courts of law is that they are loathe in making pronouncements on academic/hypothetical issues as it does not serve any useful purpose”
See also See Uba Plc V. Dana Drugs Ltd (2018) LPELR -44103 (CA), per Georgewill JCA; Oke V. Mimiko (No. 1) (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1388) 225 @ pp. 254 – 255. See also Mbachu V. Anambra – Imo Rivers Basin Development Authority, Owerri (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 342) 1482 @ p 1497. – PER B. A. GEORGEWILL, J.C.A
CASES CITED
Not Available
STATUTES REFERRED TO
1. Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap. C20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004
2. Companies Winding-Up Rules, 2001.
3. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)