APPEAL, ELECTION PETITION, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Summary of Facts
The 1st Appellant was the candidate of the 2nd Appellant, Peoples Democratic Party, while the 1st Respondent was the candidate of the 2nd Respondent, All Progressive Congress (APC) in an election into the House of Representatives in respect of the Agege Federal Constituency. At the conclusion of the election, the 1st Respondent was declared the winner by the 3rd Respondent (INEC). Dissatisfied with the result of the Election, the Appellants filed a Petition at the National and State Houses of Assembly Election Petition Tribunal, (Panel 1), Ikeja, Lagos challenging the return of the 1st Respondent on the ground that he was not qualified to contest the election by virtue of section 138(1)(a) of the Electoral Act, 2010(as amended). The Appellants contended that the 2nd Respondent conducted its Primaries for the House of Representative without giving the 3rd Respondent a fresh notice as required by section 85(1) of the Electoral Act after rescheduling the date for the primaries and sought reliefs that the 1st Respondent did not participate in the said election as the notice of the Party’s Primaries fell short of the period required by section 85 (1) of the Electoral Act, 2010(as amended), an order nullifying the said election on grounds of non-qualification among others. At the conclusion of the trial, the Tribunal dismissed the petition hence this appeal at the instance of the Appellants. During the course of the appeal the Appellants challenged the competence of the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ brief of argument on the ground that it was filed out of time.

Held
Appeal Dismissed

Issues for Determination

• Whether the trial tribunal was right in its conclusion that the purpose of the notice required under section 85(1) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) is to enable INEC attend and monitor the primaries of political parties in order to perform its functions under Section 86(1) of the act. (Grounds 1, 4, 7 and 9 of The Notice Of Appeal)
• Whether in view of the 2nd respondent’s letters to the 3rd Respondent dated 19/9/14 (Exhibit R1) and 18/11/2014 (Exhibit P4), the trial tribunal was right to have held that the 2nd Respondent complied with the provisions of Section 85(1) of the Electoral Act (as amended) in the conduct of its primary elections which led to the emergence of the 1st Respondent as its candidate for the Agege Federal Constituency seat in the house of representatives election held on the 28th march, 2015. (Grounds 2, 3,5,6,8 and 10 of the Notice Of Appeal)

Rationes
FILING OF BRIEFS – DUTY OF THE COURT WHERE A BRIEF IS FILED OUT OF TIME
“Where there is a dispute as to whether the briefs were indeed filed out of time, the Court has the power to examine its Records to ascertain the relevant dates of service and filing. African Provincial Insurance Co Ltd V. Nigerian Tobacco Co Ltd(1987) 2NWLR (PT. 56) 299;Osafile V. Odi(NO 1) (1990) 3 NWLR (PT. 137) 130.” PER C. E. IYIZOBA, J.C.A

ELECTION PETITION – ATTITUDE OF THE COURT IN ELECTION PETITIONS WHERE THERE IS AN IRREGULARITY
“In the case of Owoeye V Oyinlola (2012) LPELR-7958(CA) Kekere-Ekun JCA (as she then was) agreed with Ariwoola JCA (as he then was) in Nwankwo V Kanu(2010) 6 NWLR (1189) 62 @ 91 C-Fthat where a Respondent’s brief is filed out of time without regularization but reacted to by the Appellant by filing a reply brief, the court should not in the interest of justice close its eyes to the briefs already before it. They considered the slip a mere irregularity that borders on technicality which should be ignored in favour of substantial justice. I am inclined to this general view where all the briefs are already in. But this is an election petition which is sui generis. Time is always of the essence.”PER. C. E. IYIZOBA, J.C.A

PRACTICE DIRECTIONS – NATURE OF PRACTICE DIRECTIONS
“We are bound by the decision of the apex court in PDP v INEC [2014] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1437) 525 @ 553 F-G; 554 C-E, 571A-G. There, the Supreme Court held that the Practice Directions are sacrosanct and contain only mandatory provisions which must be interpreted without recourse to any other document such as the Interpretation Act. The words used must be given their ordinary meaning and the Court has no jurisdiction whatever to extend time prescribed therein.”PER C. E. IYIZOBA, J.C.A

APPEAL FROM AN ELECTION TRIBUNAL – TIME FRAME FOR HEARING AN APPEAL FROM AN ELECTION TRIBUNAL
“By Section 285 (7) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) an appeal from a decision of the Electoral Tribunal must be heard and disposed of within 60 days of the date of the delivery of judgment by the Tribunal. In order to manage the 60 days judiciously, the time limit prescribed in the Practice Directions must be adhered to strictly.Indeed, the Supreme Court held in PDP v INEC (Supra) that any action taken outside the prescribed period is a nullity.”PER. C. E. IYIZOBA, J.C.A

ATTENDANCE OF A POLITICAL PARTY’S PRIMARY ELECTION – THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS EMPOWERED TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO ATTEND A POLITICAL PARTY’S PRIMARY ELECTION
“Section 85(2) gives INEC the discretion whether or not to attend the primaries. It may choose not to attend and to adopt other means of obtaining the Records it is mandated to keep under Section 86(1). It is consequently better not to speculate as to the purpose of the Notice under Section 85(1).”PER. C. E. IYIZOBA, J.C.ALITERAL RULE – THE LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION REQUIRES THAT WORDS USED IN A STATUTE SHOULD BE GIVEN THEIR ORDINARY AND NATURAL MEANING
“The primary rule of construction is the literal construction which requires that we give the words used in the statute, and only those words, their ordinary and natural meaning, omitting no words and adding none. Nwakire v C.O.P. (1992) NWLR (Pt. 241) 289 per Nnaemeka-Agu JSC. See also PDP VS INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (pt 1437) page 525 @ 558 C-D cited by appellants’ counsel where the court observed:
“The cardinal principle in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning of a statute or legislation must be derived from the plain and unambiguous expressions or words used therein rather than from any notion that may be entertained as to what is just and expedient. The literal rule of interpretation is always preferable unless it would lead to absurdity and inconsistency with the provisions of the statute as a whole.”
See also Dangana Vs Usman (2013) 6 NWLR (PT 1349) 50 @ 80-81 H-B also cited by Appellants’ counsel where the apex court observed:
“Furthermore, where the words of a statute are clear, unambiguous and unequivocally express the intention of the lawmakers, effect must be given to them irrespective of whether that produces a harsh or inconvenient result.” PER C.E. IYIZOBA, J.C.ACONDUCT OF PRIMARY ELECTION – REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 85 (1) OF THE ELECTORAL ACT ON THE CONDUCT OF PRIMARY ELECTION BY A POLITICAL PARTY
“Section 85(1) requires that a political party shall give INEC 21 days Notice before the date of its primary election. There is nothing in the section which dispenses with the requirement of 21 days notice if INEC officials attended and observed the primaryelections. It trite from decided cases of the apex Court that failure to give the requisite notice renders the primary election invalid, null and void. See Amaechi vs. INEC (2008) 1 MJSC 1-25 Page 1 at Page 44; Hon. Aidoko All Usman Atai and Anor. vs. Ocheja Emmanuel Dangana & 3 Ors. INEC Law Report (2012) Vol. 1 523 @ 541. Where for example, there is collusion between some unscrupulous INEC officials and the political party giving rise to some INEC officials attending to observe the primary election in the absence of the requisite notice, the primary election will non the less be declared a nullity. The 21 days notice is sacrosanct and must be complied with.”PER C. E. IYIZOBA, J.C.A

Statutes Referred To:
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria1999 (as amended)
Electoral Act 2010 (as amended)