ODION OKHIRIA v. THE STATE

CORAM

JIMI OLUKAYODE BADA

PARTIES

ODION OKHIRIA APPELLANTS

THE STATE RESPONDENTS

AREA(S) OF LAW

SUMMARY OF FACTS

The Appellant and one Miss Aimuanohi Iziengbeaya Ihonre (PW7) had dated for about 4 years until she decided to call off the relationship as she felt it was not going to lead to marriage. The Appellant felt bad and threatened to kill or blind her. On 17/5/2002 at about 6.30pm while she was on her way to church at Ujemen in Ekpoma, the Appellant used his vehicle to block the vehicle which she boarded, dragged her out of the vehicle and beat her up. She was rescued from the Appellant. At about 8.00pm on the same day, the Appellant in company of his gang members including the 2nd and 4th accused persons went to her father’s house and destroyed the house including 5 other houses in the area. On 18/5/2002 at about 4.15pm, the Appellant returned in search of her, in company of some group of boys with gallon of what looks like fuel and other dangerous weapons like bottles, knives, etc. The Appellant was seen in front instructing the people with him and in the process, the house of PW1, Philemon Ikpefua was completely burnt down by fire set on it by the Appellant and those who were with him. The Appellant together with other persons were charged and arraigned at the High Court of Justice, Edo State of Nigeria, Auchi Judicial Division for the offences of conspiracy to commit arson and arson. At the conclusion of trial at the Lower Court, the Appellant was convicted and sentenced to 7years imprisonment with hard labour in Count 1 and 14 years imprisonment with hard labour in Count 2. Dissatisfied with the Judgment, the Appellant has appealed to the Court of Appeal.

HELD

Appeal Dismissed.

ISSUES

? Whether having regard to the totality of the evidence led at the trial and the circumstance of this case, the prosecution proved the offences of conspiracy to commit arson and arson against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

RATIONES DECIDENDI

BURDEN OF PROOF -WAYS IN WHICH THE PROSECUTION CAN ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF AN ACCUSED PERSON IN DISCHARGING THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

BURDEN OF PROOF -WAYS IN WHICH THE PROSECUTION CAN ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF AN ACCUSED PERSON IN DISCHARGING THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
“In my humble view, all that the prosecution is required to do in a criminal trial in order to discharge the burden of proof is to establish the ingredient of the offence. And one of the ways of discharging the burden of proof is by the evidence of an eyewitness of the crime. In Oseni Vs The State (2012) Volume 208 LRCN at 158 ratio 9 , the Supreme Court held among others as follows: – In discharging the burden of proof on the prosecution, the guilt of an accused person can be proved by: –
(1) The confessional statement of the accused person;
(2) Circumstantial evidence or;
(3) Evidence of an eyewitness of the crime.
What it means is that the three conditions need not co-exist. The evidence of one of them suffices to establish the ingredients of an offence in a criminal trial”. PER J.O. BADA, J.C.A.<foo< p=””></foo<>

STANDARD OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASE – WHETHER A PROSECUTION CAN PROVE HIS CASE BEYOND ALL SHADOW OF DOUBT

“Let me point it out straightaway that our law places on the prosecution the duty to prove a criminal case beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution do not have the duty to prove the case beyond all shadow of doubt, because that one places a heavier burden on the prosecution and it is unknown to our law. A Court can convict an accused person the moment the prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt. In Shurumo Vs The State (Supra) Page 1 ratios 9 & 16, it was held inter alia that: -Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubt or all shadow of doubt. It means the prosecution establishing the guilt of the accused person with compelling and conclusive evidence. It means a degree of compulsion which is consistent with a high degree of probability. See also the following cases:- Afolalu Vs The State (2011) Vol. 194 LRCN Page 136 at 142 and 144 ratios 1 & 4.-Musa Vs The State (2012) Volume 10 LRCNCC Page 255 at 262 ratio 11.”PER J.O. BADA, J.C.A.<foo< p=””></foo<>

PARTIES TO AN OFFENCE – FACTORS FOR DETERMINING PARTIES TO AN OFFENCE – SECTION 7, 8 AND SECTION 9 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE

“In order to determine whether the Appellant was responsible for setting the dwelling house of PW1 on fire, it would be necessary to read the provisions of: -Section 7, Section 8 and Section 9 of the Criminal Code which provides as follows:
-7. When an offence is committed, each of the following persons is deemed to have taken part in committing the offence and to be guilty of the offence, and may be charged with actually committing it, that is to say –
(a) every person who actually does the act or makes the omission which constitutes the offence;
(b) every person who does or omits to do any act for the purpose of enabling or aiding another person to commit the offence;
(c) every person who aids another person in committing the offence;
(d) any person who counsels or procures any other person to commit the offence In the fourth case he may be charged either with himself committing the offence or with counseling or procuring its commission. A conviction of counseling or procuring the commission of an offence entails the same consequences in all respects as a conviction of committing the offence. Any person who procures another to do or omit to do any act of such a nature that, if he had himself done the act or made the omission, the act or omission would have constituted an offence on his part, is guilty of an offence of the same kind, and is liable to the same punishment, as if he had himself done the act or made the omission; and he may be charged with himself doing the act or making the omission.
8. When two or more persons form a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another, and in the prosecution of such purpose an offence is committed of such a nature that its commission was a probable consequence of the prosecution of such purpose, each of them is deemed to have committed the offence.
9. When a person counsels another to commit an offence, and an offence is actually committed after such counsel by the person to whom it is given, it is immaterial whether the offence actually committed is the same as that counseled or a different one, or whether the offence is committed in the way counseled or in a different way, provided in either case that the facts constituting the offence actually committed are a probable consequence of carrying out the counsel.
In either case, the person who gave the counsel is deemed to have counseled the other person to commit the offence actually committed by him. (Underlining supplied).”PER J.O. BADA, J.C.A.<foo< p=””></foo<>

EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE – EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE IS THE PRIMARY DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT

“It is settled that evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence is the primary function of the trial Court. It is the trial Court that saw, heard and assessed the witnesses as they testified at the trial Court. When the trial Judge has evaluated the evidence and appraised the facts, it is not the business of an appellate Court to interfere and to substitute its own views for the views of the trial Court. The position of the law stated above was fortified by the Supreme Court when it held in Amadi VS FRN (2011) Vol. 9 LRCNCC Page 177 at 179 – 180 ratio 3, thus: – An appellate Court will not ordinarily disturb the finding of facts of a trial Court unless such findings are perverse and not supported by evidence. It is only the trial Court that has the singular advantage of seeing and listening to a witness, thereby watching his demeanor as he gives evidence and assessing him. See also the case of: – – Afolalu Vs The State (Supra) at 46 ratio 13.”PER J. O. BADA, J.C.A.<foo< p=””></foo<>