MACAULEY JOSEPH V THE STATE

Legalpedia Citation: (2023-07) Legalpedia 42198 (CA)

In the Court of Appeal

THE KADUNA JUDICIAL DIVISON

Mon Nov 21, 2022

Suit Number: CA/K/194D/2021

CORAM

Jimi Olukayode Bada JCA

Muhammad Ibrahim Sirajo JCA

Peter Oyinkenimiemi Affen JCA

PARTIES

MACAULEY JOSEPH

APPELLANTS

THE STATE

RESPONDENTS

AREA(S) OF LAW

CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL LAW, JUDGMENT, APPEALS, LAW OF EVIDENCE, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

SUMMARY OF FACTS

The Appellant was arraigned before the High Court of Justice of Kaduna on a three-count charge of Conspiracy, Robbery and receiving of robbery property. At the trial court, the charge was brought against four defendants with the appellant being the fourth defendant, upon arraignment they all entered a plea of Not guilty. The Prosecution opened its case and called 4 witnesses who testified, the appellant and his co-accused persons testified in their own defence. The learned trial judge evaluated the evidence before him and convicted the 1^st-3^rd defendants of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and sentenced to death accordingly. The appellant was however convicted of count three of the charge and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial court, the appellant has launched an appeal to the instant court.

HELD

Appeal allowed.

ISSUES

1. Whether the learned trial judge was right in relying in the provisions of the Administration of criminal justice law of Kaduna 2017, a law which came into force after the filing of the Charge and subsequent arraignment of the Appellant in admitting Exhibit 7 (the Appellant’s purported confessional statement) and subsequently convicting the Appellant on the basis of same?
2. Whether having regard to the totality of the evidence led by the prosecution and the contents of the documentary evidence tendered, it can be said that the Prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt, the offence of receiving of a robbed property against the Appellant as contained in Count 3 of the charge sheet?
3. Whether the learned trial judge was right in convicting the Appellant for the offence of receiving of a robbed property as contained in Count 3 of the charge sheet solely on the uncorroborated and retracted confessional statement of the Appellant?

RATIONES DECIDENDI

STATUTES – WHETHER OR NOT STATUTES OPERATES PROSPECTIVELY OR RETROSPECTIVELY UPON ENACTMENT

In the Supreme Court case of GUSAU VS. A.P.C. (2019) 7 NWLR (PT. 1670) PAGE 194 PARA C – E, it was held per Augie JSC that:

 

“It is a cardinal principle of our law that a statute operates prospectively and cannot apply retrospectively unless it is made to do so by clear and express terms or it only affects purely procedural matters and does not affect the rights of the parties.”

In ELIAS VS. FRN (2016) LPELR – 40797 (CA), the Court of Appeal held per Sankey, JCA held at 127 – 128, paras F – E that:

“It is a fundamental principle of law that no statute shall be construed so as to have retrospective operation, unless it pertains to matters of procedure.”

The Supreme Court affirmed its decision in the cases of ORTHOPAEDIC HOSPITALS MANAGEMENT BOARD VS. GARBA (2002) 7 SC (PT. II) 138 and ARE VS. AG WESTERN REGION (1960) SCNLR 224 that:

“Unless it affects purely procedural matters, a statute cannot apply retrospectively except when it is made to do so by clear and express terms.” From these decisions, it is fairly apparent that while substantive laws cannot be interpreted by Courts of law to have retrospective operation, when it comes to rules of procedure, it is permissible. Thus, the ACJ Act being rules guiding the procedure of criminal trials in Federal High Courts and FCT High Courts, are capable of retrospective effect.”

I must say that contrary to the erroneous contention of the Appellant’s counsel, the ACJA being a statute containing provisions on practice and procedure, is capable of being applied retrospectively. But it must be noted that any retrospective application of the ACJA, being a procedure law, can only affect procedures pending before the court.

From the above cited cases, it is clear that whenever an Act or Statute is enacted, it does not have retrospective effect unless it bothers on only procedural law. Its effect cannot be backdated so as to be applied to substantive law issues that were in existence before its enactment. PER – MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS JCA

STATUTES – WHETHER OR NOT THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE LAW KADUNA STATE (ACJA) HAS A RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT

The Appellant’s counsel has further argued that as at the time the alleged offence was committed and even as at the time of arraignment, the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Kaduna State was not in existence and thus, it could not be applicable in the instant case. Reference has been made to the provision of Section 2 under Part 1 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Kaduna State 2017 which is reproduced hereunder as follows:

“This law shall come into operation on the 29^th day of May, 2017. There is nothing therein to show it has a retrospective effect. Section 492 of the aforementioned law made savings as to other forms and procedures. This Section saves the Criminal Procedure Code which has been the procedural law in use before the enactment of the Kaduna State Administration of

Criminal Justice Law.”

By the literal interpretation of the above provision, it is clear that the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Kaduna State would have retrospective effect as long as it is in respect of other forms and procedural law. PER – MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS JCA.

DOCUMENTS – THE PRESUMPTION OF THE LAW ON A PERSON WHO SIGNS A DOCUMENT

The person who signs a document is presumed by law to be the maker and thus, it is inconsequential that he did not write the said statement as claimed by him. As long as he involuntarily signed the said document, he has raised the involuntariness of making the confessional statement. PER – MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS JCA.

 

TRIAL WITHIN TRIAL – WHETHER OR NOT A TRIAL WITHIN TRIAL IS A FORM OF PROCEDURAL LAW

Is trial within trial a form of procedural law? The Supreme Court in the case of IBEME VS. STATE (2013) 10 NWLR (PT. 1362) PAGE 333 AT 357 PARA E – G, held per Chukwuma-

Eneh, JSC as follows:

“The principle of trial within trial is one aspect of dispensing equal justice and fairness under the Rule of Law. By this simple procedure, it is assured that statements of a person charged with a criminal offence obtained by a police officer or anyone in authority otherwise afflicted by any inducement, threats or promises being illegal at law are expunged from the mainstream of the prosecution case at the trial of his cause or matter; and the Court is precluded from acting upon it in dealing with the case. The procedure of trial within trial is so much used to exclude involuntary statements of an accused person that is contrary to the law and it has stuck on for good reason. It is in the light of the above dictum that the reliance on the procedure of trial within trial in our Criminal Justice System has to be judged… I must emphasis that the function of a court in trial within trial is narrowed down to determining solely the question of voluntariness of the statement in issue and not on whether or not the statement is that of the accused person or improperly recorded.”? A different consideration, however arises, where, subsequent to the complaint by the accused of the involuntariness of his statement, he denies that he made the statement, as in this instant case.

Having held that a trial within trial falls under procedural law, the provisions of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Kaduna State has retrospective effect in this regard and thus, the trial court was right when it relied on it during the trial of the Appellant. PER – MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS JCA.

BURDEN OF PROOF – THE POSITION OF THE LAW ON THE BURDEN OF PROOF

In our criminal law, the burden of proof is on the Prosecution and it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt as mandated by the provision of Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not evince proof beyond all iota/shadow of doubt. See generally, the cases of BANJO VS. STATE (2013) 16 NWLR (PT. 1331) 455; UMAR VS. STATE (2014) 13 NWLR (PT. 1425) 497; DIBIA VS. STATE (2017) 12 NWLR (PT. 1579) 196; AGU VS. STATE (2017) 10 NWLR (PT. 1573) 171 and THOMAS VS. STATE (2017) 9 NWLR (PT. 1570) 230. PER – MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS JCA.

PROOF – WHEN IS PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ATTAINED

In legal parlance, proof beyond reasonable doubt is attained when the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with a sentence “of course it is possible but not in the least probable.” See MAIGARI VS. STATE (2013) 17 NWLR (PT. 1384) 425.  PER – MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS JCA.

CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT – WHETHER OR NOT A COURT CAN CONVICT SOLELY ON A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

 

This brings me to the questions: can the court convict the Appellant in this case solely on the confessional statement? Is the confessional statement of the Appellant direct and unequivocal?

“The law is now settled that an accused can be convicted solely on his confessional statement. It is however desirable to have outside a confession, some evidence of circumstances which make it probable that the confession was true.”

Also, the Supreme Court, in the case of PETER ILIYA AZABADA VS. THE STATE (2014) ALL FWLR (PT. 751) PAGE 1620 PARA B held per Onnoghen, JSC that:

“The confessional statement of an accused, where it is direct, positive and unequivocal as to the commission of the crime charged is the best evidence and can be relied upon solely for conviction of the accused person. An accused person can be convicted on his confessional statement alone, where the confession is constant with other ascertained facts which have been proved.”

 

In the case of ISAH VS. STATE (2017) LPELR 43472 (SC), it was held per Bage, JSC that:

 

“Confession in criminal procedure is the strongest evidence of guilt on the art of an accused person. It is stronger than evidence of an eye witness because the evidence comes from the horse’s mouth who is the accused person. There is no better evidence and there is no further proof. Therefore, where an accused person confesses to a crime in the absence of an eye witness to the killing, he can be convicted on his confession alone once the confession is positive, direct and properly proved. In other words, a free and voluntary confession of guilt, direct and positive and if duly made and satisfactorily proved is sufficient without corroborative evidence so long as the Court is satisfied as to the truth of the confession.”

 

Before the Appellant can be said to be convicted based on his confessional statement, the Prosecution must have proved the ingredients of the offence for which he was charged. PER – MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS JCA.

 

OFFENCE OF RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY – WHAT ARE THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF PROVING THE OFFENCE OF RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY

In the case of AYEFIGBO VS. STATE (2018) LPELR – 45140, it was held per Abdullahi, JCA that the essential ingredients of receiving stolen property are:

“The Appellant was charged for receiving stolen property under Section 5 of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provision) Act. To prove the offence of receiving stolen property, two facts must be established, viz;

1. That the property in question was actually stolen and

2. That the accused knew that the property was stolen.

Once these two ingredients are established with credible evidence, the offence of receiving stolen property is proved.”

PER – MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS JCA.

 

FUNCTION OF APPELLATE COURT – APPELLATE COURTS TO QUESTION FACTS SO AS TO EVALUATE WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT EVALUATED THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT

In the case of OKPAKO VS. STATE (2018) LPELR – 43875 (SC), it was held per Aka’ahs, JSC thus:  It is trite law that the function of an appellate court in an appeal on question of facts is to ascertain whether the trial court properly evaluated the evidence before it and whether it correctly approached the assessment of the evidence and whether the admitted evidence was sufficient to support the decision arrived at. See generally, the cases of GAJI VS. PAYE (2003) LPELR (1300) 1 AT 15 – 16; VAB PETROLEUM INC VS. MOMAH (2013) LPELR (19770) 1 AT 30; AGBONIFO VS. AIWEREOBA (1988) 1 NWLR (PT. 70) 325 and ANYAOKE VS. ADI (1986) 3 NWLR (PT. 31) 731 AT 742. PER – MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS JCA.

 

JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT – WHETHER OR NOT AN APPELLATE COURT WILL INTERFERE IF THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS RIGHT

In this wise, the appellate court will be concerned with whether the decision of the trial court appealed against is correct and not whether the reasons or modalities leading to the decision reached were right. An appellate court will therefore not interfere if the judgment of the trial court is right, since a misdirection which does not occasion injustice will be immaterial and would not affect an otherwise unimpeachable decision. See the cases of AYENI VS. SOWEMIMO (1982) 5 SC 60 AT 73; OJENGBEDE VS. ESAN (2001) LPELR (2372) 1 AT 31 and NDAYAKO VS. DANTORO (2004) LPELR (1968) 1 AT 32. PER – MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS JCA.

 

FINDINGS OF FACTS – WHEN THE APPELLATE COURT WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE WITH THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT

However, the appellate court will have the right to interfere with the findings of fact made by the trial court if the decision has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. In the case of TSKJ (NIG.) LTD VS. OTOCHEM (NIG) LTD (2018) 11 NWLR (PT. 1630) PAGE 330 @ 344 PARAS E – F, PAGE 352 PARA G, it was held per I. T. Muhammad, JSC that:

 

“Permit me, my Lords, to draw attention from the outset in this issue that it is not the business of the court below (unless in exceptional circumstances) to evaluate and thus, ascribe probative value to evidence. That is the whole mark of the trial court that heard, saw, observed and ascribed probative value to evidence through witnesses. The only assignment expected of an appeal court (in the appeal) is to review, among other things, the evidence and the whole proceedings of the trial court.

… assessment of evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence is the primary duty of a tribunal of trial and Court of Appeal can only interfere if the trial tribunal has performed badly in that area.”

PER – MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS JCA.

 

CORROBORATION OF EVIDENCE – WHETHER OR NOT AN ACCUSED CAN BE CONVICTED BASED ON AN UNCORROBORATED CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

In the case of F. R. N. VS. IWEKA (2013) 3 NWLR (PT.

1341) P. 285 AT 336, it was held:

 

“A court can convict on a confessional statement alone without corroboration once it is satisfied of the truth of the confession.”

In the case of PETER ILIYA AZABADA VS. THE STATE (2014) ALL FWLR (PT. 751) 1620, PARA B, the Court, per the Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was) declared that:

 

“The confessional statement of an accused, where it is direct, positive and unequivocal as to the commission of the crime charged, is the best evidence and can be relied upon solely for conviction of the accused person. An accused person can be convicted on his confessional statement alone, where the confession is constant with other ascertained facts which have been proved… Confession in criminal procedure is the strongest evidence of guilt on the part of an accused person. It is stronger than evidence of an eye witness because the evidence comes from the horse’s mouth who is the accused person. There is no better evidence and there is no further proof.”

 

An accused person can be convicted on the uncorroborated confessional statement, however the court must be absolutely satisfied that undoubtedly it is true and unequivocal. I have read through the said Exhibit 7, i.e. the confessional statement of the Appellant and I make bold to say that it is not satisfactory enough to secure the conviction of the Appellant. PER – MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS JCA.

CASES CITED

Not Available

STATUTES REFERRED TO

Not Available

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