CORAM
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
ADAMU JAURO
ADAMU JAURO
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
ADAMU JAURO
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
ADAMU JAURO
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
ADAMU JAURO
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
ADAMU JAURO
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
ADAMU JAURO
ADAMU JAURO
ADAMU JAURO
ADAMU JAURO
ADAMU JAURO
ADAMU JAURO
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
ADAMU JAURO
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
ADAMU JAURO
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
ADAMU JAURO
ADAMU JAURO
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
ADAMU JAURO
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
ADAMU JAURO
ADAMU JAURO
ADAMU JAURO
ADAMU JAURO
ADAMU JAURO
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
ADAMU JAURO
PARTIES
JOHNSON ARIYO AKINNAWO
NATIONAL BOARD FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION
AREA(S) OF LAW
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Appellant herein was an employee of the Respondent since 2001. The Appellant was a Principal Accountant with the Respondent and was on a Secondment on two successive terms to the World Bank Science and Technical Education Post-Basic (STEP-B) Project Office Abuja. The Appellant on his own transferred/relocated his Secondment to Research Triangle Institute (RTI) as Director of Finance without the approval of the Employer/Respondent. After the said transfer, the Appellant wrote to notify the Respondent of the relocation and transfer. Upon receipt of the notification, the Respondent queried the Appellant for serious misconduct and for not seeking approval first. Thereafter, based on the recommendations of the Respondent’s Appointment, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee, and by a letter dated 23rd August, 2011, the Respondent terminated the employment of the Appellant, despite his apologies. Aggrieved by the act of the Respondent terminating his employment, the Appellant commenced an action at the National Industrial Court, Abuja wherein he sought declaratory reliefs, that the termination of his employment is illegal, unlawful, null and void and of no effect whatsoever in that the purported termination of appointment of the Claimant violates relevant Public Service Rules dealing with discipline of Public Servants of the Federation of Nigeria of the Claimant’s grade, an Order setting aside the purported termination of the Claimant’s appointment for want of compliance with relevant Public Service Rules among other reliefs. At the conclusion of trial, the court dismissed the claims of the Appellant for being statute barred. Dissatisfied with the said decision, the Appellant has filed an appeal before this court. The Respondent filed a preliminary objection contending that the notice of appeal is incompetent.
HELD
Preliminary Objection Dismissed, Appeal Dismissed
ISSUES
Whether the trial court was right when it held that the Appellant’s claim was statute barred by reason of the Public Officers (Protection) Act.
RATIONES DECIDENDI
APPEAL – CONCEPT OF A COMPETENT APPEAL
“An appeal can only be countenanced by the court if it is competent. A competent appeal is one that is initiated by due process of law and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. See Shaibu v. Nigeria Arab-Bank Ltd (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt. 551) 582, Skenconsult (Nig.) Ltd & Anor v. Ukey (1981) 1 SC. A court can only be competent if among other things all the conditions precedent for its having jurisdiction are fulfilled. Any defect in competence is fatal, for the proceedings are a nullity however well conducted and decided”.
RECORD OF COURT – DUTY OF COURT TO LOOK INTO ITS RECORD AND MAKE USE OF ANY DOCUMENT IT CONSIDERS RELEVANT
“The law is settled that a court of law is entitled to look into its record and make use of any document it considers relevant and necessary in determining issues before it. See Fumodoh v. Aboro (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 210, 229, Agbara v. Mimra (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 378, PDP & Ors. v. Ezeonwuka & Anor. (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 187, Eromosele v. FRN (2018) LPELR – 43851. The duty on the court is that of doing substantial justice between the parties.
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION – ESSENCE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION – WHETHER FILING A PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IS APPROPRIATE AGAINST ONE OR MORE GROUNDS OF APPEAL
“The whole essence of preliminary objection is to foreclose hearing the appeal. A preliminary objection is filed only when the respondent is satisfied that there is some fundamental defect in the appellant’s process. The sole purpose being to terminate the appeal usually on grounds of incompetence. See Ndigwe v. Nwude 1999 11 NWLR Pt. 626 P. 314, NEPA v. Ango 2001 15 NWLR Pt. 737 P. 627. Where the respondent complains of the competency of a ground of appeal as in this appeal, and the other grounds are in order, and can sustain the appeal the respondent ought to file a Motion on Notice to strike out the incompetent grounds and not a preliminary objection. See Muhammed v. Military Administrator Plateau State 2001 16 NWLR Pt. 740 P. 524, NDIC v. Oranu 2001 18 NWLR Pt. 744 P. 183. Finally, and for emphasis, a preliminary objection is filed only against the hearing of the appeal and not against one or more grounds of appeal.
PUBLIC OFFICERS (PROTECTION) ACT – NATURE OF THE LIMITATION PERIOD UNDER THE PUBLIC OFFICERS (PROTECTION) ACT
“The statute the court gave vent to in the instant case is the Public Officers (Protection) Act. This law is a Limitation Law. Where a statute provides for the institution of an action within a prescribed period of time, proceedings shall not be allowed to be initiated after the time stipulated by the statute has expired or elapsed. Any action that is instituted after the said prescribed period is completely barred as the right of the claimant to commence the action would have been extinguished. See Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1, Egbe v. Alhaji & 2 Ors. (1990) LPELR – 1033 (SC). Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act provides as follows:
“Where any action, prosecution, or other proceedings is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public or authority, or in respect of any neglect of default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority; a) The action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless is commenced within three months after the act, neglect or default complained”. The necessary intendment of the Act, from its preamble, is “to provide for protection against actions of persons acting in execution of public duties”.
The main purpose of the limitation period is to protect a defendant from the injustice of having to face a stale claim. if a claim is brought a longtime after the events in question, there is a strong likelihood that evidence which was available earlier may have been lost and memories of witnesses may have faded. It would be unfair to allow a defendant face such a claim where proof and defence would be almost impossible. Where actions are brought against public officials, they must be brought quickly, that is, within 3 months after cause of action accrues. This is designed to protect public officials who are very busy people from being distracted or submerged in a sea of litigation at times at the instance of professional litigants. Where a plaintiff’s action was filed outside the time allowed by the limitation law, the plaintiff would still have a cause of action but sadly one that cannot be enforced. See Sani v. Okene L.G. 2005 14 NWLR Pt. 944 P. 60 Eboigbe v. NNPC 1994 3 NWLR Pt. 347 P. 649, Utih v. Eggorr 1990 5 NWLR Pt. 153 P. 771. When a cause of action is complete, time begins to run for the purpose of the limitation law. The person who can sue and the person to be sued are easily identified. The aggrieved party is expected to file his action within the time stipulated by the limitation law. For example, if the time stipulated by the limitation law is 3 months, the action must be filed before 3 months from the date the cause of action accrued. See Lafia Local Government v. The Executive Governor Nasarawa State & Ors. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 94.
In the Minister of Petroleum & Mineral Resources & Anor. v. Expo Shipping Line Ltd (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1208) 261 at 292, the Supreme Court, (Per Adekeye, JSC) said: “It is not the law that Public Officers are immuned from suit under the Public Officer Protection Act, but that Suit against them must be instituted within a stated period, otherwise, they become stale”. It has been interpreted that both natural and artificial person (juristic personalities, be they human or legal institutions, incorporations/statutory bodies) are qualified to enjoy the protection of the Public Officers Protection Act”.
CAUSE OF ACTION – EFFECT OF A STATUTORILY BARRED ACTION
“The effect of a statutorily barred action, the appellant who might have had a cause of action loses the right to enforce the cause of action by judicial process because the period of limitation had elapsed. An action commenced after the expiration of the statutory period within which an action must be brought is not maintainable. In other words, when a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action must be initiated, legal proceedings cannot be properly and validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Any such action instituted must be struck out as not being properly instituted before the court. See the cases of Hassan v. Aliyu (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547, Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State (1998) (supra), Egbe v. Adefarasin (No. 2) NSCC 643”.
PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION ACT – WHETHER A PUBLIC OFFICER WHO ACTS WITHOUT A SEMBLANCE OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION CAN CLAIM PROTECTION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION ACT
“This line of presumption is very well known in our law but for that to happen, the court must ensure that the appellant in its duty effectively before the trial court, adduce credible evidence to establish bad faith or lack of semblance of legal justification. In the case of Hassan v. Aliyu (supra), the Supreme Court, per Onnoghen, JSC, (as he then was), held as follows:
“It is however, correct that where a public officer acts outside the scope of his authority or without a semblance of legal justification, he cannot claim the protection of the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act. It is the duty of the plaintiff/appellant to adduce evidence or facts to establish the bad faith, lack of semblance of legal justification etc. The facts to be produced must exist to enable the Court find the absence of semblance of legal justification etc, otherwise, once it is established that the action was instituted outside the statutory period of three months, the action is time barred and the court will have no jurisdiction to entertain same”.
CASES CITED
Not Available
STATUTES REFERRED TO
Public Officers Protection Act Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004|
CLICK HERE TO READ FULL JUDGMENT