CORAM
Ali abubakar Babandi umel Justice of the Court of Appeal
Ugochukwu Anthony Ogakwu Justice of the Court of Appeal
Mohammed Danjuma Justice of the Court of Appeal
PARTIES
IBRAHIM GALADIMA
APPELLANTS
THE STATE
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PENAL CODE, THEFT BY CLERK OR SERVANT, CONSPIRACY, SENTENCING, COMPENSATION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, EVIDENCE LAW, DUPLICITY IN CHARGES, JUDICIAL DISCRETION, EMPLOYMENT LAW, CONFESSIONAL STATEMENTS
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Appellant, Ibrahim Galadima, worked as a security guard at the Borno State Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency (RUWASA). He was employed by Septagon Security Limited, which attached him to RUWASA to provide security services. While on duty, the Appellant allegedly stole items from the RUWASA store at night, which were then sold to other accused persons.
The Appellant was one of six accused persons charged before the High Court of Borno State in Charge No. BOHC/MG/CR/197/2023: THE STATE vs. ABUBAKAR SADIQ & ORS. He was the 2nd accused person and was convicted for conspiracy contrary to Section 97(2) and punishable under Section 289 of the Penal Code Law, Cap. 102, Laws of Borno State, 1994, and theft by clerk or servant punishable under Section 289 of the same law.
Specifically, the Appellant was charged and convicted in Count Three for stealing ten buckets of chlorine chemical in February 2023, and in Count Four for stealing 101 units of solar pumps between February and August 2023. The Appellant made a confessional statement (Exhibit F) which was admitted without objection, wherein he admitted committing the offences charged.
The trial court sentenced the Appellant to four years imprisonment on Count Three and seven years imprisonment on Count Four, both without option of fine. Additionally, the court ordered compensation of N53,040,000.00 to RUWASA or seven years imprisonment in default thereof.
Dissatisfied with the conviction and sentence, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal on 15th July, 2024, challenging both the sentence and the compensation order.
HELD
1.The appeal was dismissed.
2.The Court held that the Appellant was properly convicted under Section 289 of the Penal Code Law as he was a servant of RUWASA within the meaning of the statute.
3.The Court found that the charges were not bad for duplicity as they involved separate and distinct transactions.
4.The Court held that the sentences imposed were within the statutory limits and represented a proper exercise of judicial discretion.
5.The Court affirmed that the compensation order was a proper exercise of judicial discretion under Section 78 of the Penal Code Law.
6.The decision of the lower Court including the conviction, sentence, and compensation order was affirmed.
ISSUES
1. Whether the concurrent conviction and sentences of the appellant under counts 2, 3 & 4 under Section 289 of the Penal Code Law without the option of a fine is justifiable in law?
2. Whether the order for the payment of the sum of N53,040,000.00 as compensation to RUWASA or to serve a term of 7 years in default thereof can be justified in law?
RATIONES DECIDENDI
DUPLICITY IN CHARGES – REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING DUPLICITY
“For a charge to be bad for duplicity, it must contain more than one offence in the same count or be a repetition of an offence already stated in another count. The requirement of the law is that each distinct and separate allegation of the commission of an offence should be precisely and clearly set out in a separate count.” – Per UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
DUPLICITY IN CHARGES – PREJUDICE REQUIREMENT FOR VITIATION
“Howbeit, the law is that a criminal trial cannot be vitiated on appeal for defect in charge due to duplicity unless the appellant is able to show that by virtue of the duplicity, he was misled and prejudiced as a result of which a miscarriage of justice was occasioned.” – Per UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES – DUTY TO INTERPRET WORDS AS WRITTEN
“The above provision is univocal. The duty of the Court is therefore to interpret the words contained in the statute and not go on a voyage of discovery outside the words employed, which words are clear and unambiguous.” – Per UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
DEFINITION OF SERVANT – DUAL EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
“a man may be the general servant of any person and yet at the same time be the servant of another in relation to a particular matter.” – Per Lord Russell
SECTION 289 PENAL CODE – TWO CLASSES OF LIABLE PERSONS
“Section 289, set out above makes two classes of persons liable for the offence therein. Firstly, whoever, being a clerk or servant, and secondly, whoever, being employed in the capacity of a clerk or servant.” – Per UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN SENTENCING – PARAMETERS AND LIMITS
“I shudder to think that our societal mores and values have sunk so low that theft is now considered a trivial offence. It is not. Banish the submission and the thought.” – Per UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION – REQUIREMENTS FOR PROPER EXERCISE
“It is abecedarian law that a Court has a wide discretion in the imposition of sentence, but that discretion must be exercised judiciously and judicially. Judicial discretion is a vital tool in the administration of justice. It is a sacred power which inures to a Judge.” – Per UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
APPELLATE INTERFERENCE WITH SENTENCES – WHEN PERMISSIBLE
“It is only when a sentence appears to err in the principle that this Court will alter it. If a sentence is excessive or inadequate to such an extent as to satisfy this Court that when it was passed there was failure to apply the right principles, then this Court will intervene.” – Per Ademola, CJN
AIMS OF SENTENCING – MULTIPLE PURPOSES
“The aim of sentencing is retribution, deterrence, reformation, and protection of society. The retributive aspect is designed to express public revulsion from the offence and to punish the offender for his wrong conduct, while deterrence is to discourage the convict from further offences as well as potential offenders from committing offences.” – Per UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
SECTION 78 PENAL CODE – DISCRETIONARY NATURE OF COMPENSATION
“The duty of the Court is to interpret the words contained in the statute and not go outside the words in search of an interpretation which is convenient to the Court or to the parties or one of parties. Even where the provisions of a statute are hard in the sense that they will do some inconvenience to the parties, the Court is bound to interpret the provisions once they are clear and unambiguous.” – Per Tobi, JSC
COMPENSATION UNDER PENAL CODE – NO VALUATION REQUIREMENT
“Based on this established principle of statutory interpretation, it is translucent that the provisions of the aforesaid Section 78 are clear and unambiguous. The Section neither requires the value of any stolen items to be established as a yardstick for ascertaining the amount to be awarded as compensation, nor does it stipulate a limit to the amount that can be awarded as compensation.” – Per UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
EXERCISE OF DISCRETION – JUDICIAL AND JUDICIOUS REQUIREMENTS
“‘Judicial’ means that the discretion must be exercised within the precincts of law, whilst ‘judicious’ implies that the exercise of discretion must take into cognisance all the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case at hand and be replete with intellectual candour and tenacity of mind and purpose.” – Per UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
APPELLATE INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION – LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES
“An appellate Court does not lightly interfere with the exercise of discretion by a trial Court. This is so because no one case can be an authority for the other in matters of discretion, for if it were otherwise that would put an end to the exercise of discretion.” – Per UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
CASES CITED
STATUTES REFERRED TO
1. Penal Code Law, Cap. 102, Laws of Borno State, 1994
2. Evidence Act 2011
3. Section 97(2) of the Penal Code Law (Conspiracy)
4. Section 289 of the Penal Code Law (Theft by Clerk or Servant)
5. Section 78 of the Penal Code Law (Compensation)
6. Sections 138 and 139 of the Evidence Act