CORAM
Uzo Ifeyinwa Ndukwe-Anyanwu Justice of the Court of Appeal
Mohammed Ambi-Usi Danjuma Justice of the Court of Appeal
Obande Festus Ogbuinya Justice of the Court of Appeal
PARTIES
1. HON. FATIMA RASAKI
2. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (P.D.P.)
APPELLANTS
1. OLADIMEJI LATEEF AJIJOLA
2. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (I.N.E.C.)
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ELECTORAL LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JURISDICTION, LIMITATION OF ACTION, RES JUDICATA, STATUTE OF LIMITATION, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION ACT, ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The case revolves around a primary election conducted by the 2nd Appellant (Peoples Democratic Party – PDP) on December 7, 2014, for the Ekiti Central Senatorial District. The contestants were the 1st Respondent (Oladimeji Lateef Ajijola), Barr. Obafemi Adewale, Hon. Fatima Raji Rasaki (1st Appellant), and Senator Bode Ola.
The 1st Respondent claimed that at the conclusion of the election, he was publicly announced as the winner, having polled 108 votes against the 1st Appellant’s 80 votes. He contended that officers of the 2nd Respondent (Independent National Electoral Commission – INEC) monitored the election and confirmed the result. However, the 1st Appellant’s name was forwarded to the 2nd Respondent instead. The 2nd Respondent accepted and listed the 1st Appellant on January 13, 2015, as the candidate of the 2nd Appellant for the Ekiti Central Senatorial District Election.
Consequently, the 1st Respondent initially instituted Suit No. FHC/ABJ/1087/2014 challenging the nomination of the 1st Appellant. Upon a Preliminary Objection filed by the Appellants, the trial Court declined jurisdiction and struck out the suit on the ground that there was no principal relief against the 2nd Respondent (INEC).
The 1st Respondent thereafter instituted another action (Suit No. FHC/AD/CS/16/2015), seeking declarations that the 1st Appellant could not be presented as the candidate, that the 1st Respondent should be recognized as the rightful candidate, and various other reliefs against the Appellants and the 2nd Respondent.
The 2nd Respondent filed a Counter-affidavit with a written address, while the Appellants raised a preliminary objection challenging the lower Court’s jurisdiction to hear the suit on the grounds that the 1st Respondent’s claim was statute-barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act and that the earlier determined Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1087/2014 constituted a bar for the 1st Respondent to re-litigate the matter (res judicata).
After consideration of all processes filed, the learned trial judge declined jurisdiction and transferred the suit to the High Court of Ekiti State. The Appellants, dissatisfied with the judgment, filed an appeal.
HELD
The appeal was allowed. The judgment of the trial Court delivered on August 6, 2015, was set aside. The consequential order of transfer of the suit to the High Court of Ekiti State was also set aside
ISSUES
1. Whether the learned trial Judge rightly invoked the provisions of Section 22 of the Federal High Court Act to transfer Suit No. FHC/AD/CS/16/2015 to the High Court of Ekiti State, when the said Suit is res judicata and an abuse of Court process?
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when, after finding that the parties, the subject matter, the questions for determination, and the reliefs sought in the earlier determined Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1087/2014 are the same as those constituted in Suit No. FHC/AD/CS/16/201, he failed to dismiss the latter suit?
3. Whether the learned trial judge ought not to have considered and relied on the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act to dismiss Suit No. FHC/AD/CS/16/2015, same being statute barred?
4. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he failed to dismiss Suit No. FHC/AD/CS/16/2015, having regard to the uncontroverted and unchallenged Appellants’ Affidavit in support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection?
RATIONES DECIDENDI
RES JUDICATA – REQUIREMENTS FOR PLEA OF RES JUDICATA TO SUCCEED
For res judicata to act as a bar to further adjudication, the following must be established. 1. It must be a judicial decision. 2. The Court that heard the matter had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. 3. The decision was final and on the merits. 4. It determined the same question as that raised in the subsequent case. 5. The parties in the subsequent case were either parties to the earlier case or their privies per RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC in ABIOLA & SONS BOTTLING COY LTD v. SEVEN-UP BOTTLING COY LTD (2012) LPELR 9279.– Per UZO IFEYINWA NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
RES JUDICATA – WHEN A DECISION MUST BE FINAL AND ON THE MERITS
The first suit FHC/ABJ/CS/1087/2014 did not satisfy the requirements stated above. The Federal High Court held that it had no jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter… Secondly, it is expected for a plea of res judicata to operate as a bar, the decision must be final and on the merit. I dare say that the Court had delivered a final decision when it held that it had no jurisdiction on all the parties especially (I.N.E.C.). The decision of the Court was not decided on the merit as it was aborted by the all-encompassing jurisdiction. Having not been heard on the merit the suit in FHC/ABJ/CS/1087/2014 cannot act as a bar to the subsequent proceedings in suit No. FHC/EK/CS/16/2015.– Per UZO IFEYINWA NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL HIGH COURT – WHEN MERE PRESENCE OF A FEDERAL AGENCY DOES NOT CONFER JURISDICTION
The 1st Respondent complained that the 2nd Appellant did not forward to 2nd Respondent (I.N.E.C.) the name of the candidate who scored the highest number of votes. Even though (I.N.E.C.) an agency of the Federal Government is named in the suit but the principal claims was not against it. The mere fact that I.N.E.C. is a party does not necessarily confer jurisdiction on the Federal High Court. The Supreme Court in many decisions had warned otherwise. To confer jurisdiction on the Federal High Court, the Court must have jurisdiction over the party and the subject matter.” – Per UZO IFEYINWA NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL HIGH COURT – DETERMINATION BASED ON NATURE OF CLAIMS AND PARTIES
It is not in all cases in which the Federal Republic of Nigeria or its agency is a party in the suit that the Federal High Court must Willy-Nilly without consideration to the nature of the aggrieved party’s claim, then assume jurisdiction. We have said time without number, that the most important consideration is the party’s claim. The choice of Court depends on the nature of the Claims/Reliefs and the parties involved” per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC in KAKIH v. P.D.P. (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1430) pg. 374. – Per UZO IFEYINWA NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION ACT – THREE MONTHS LIMITATION PERIOD
The Public Officers Protection Act is a limitation law and the substance of its Section 2(a) is that any action against any person for any act done in pursuance of any public duty must be commenced within three (3) months of the act, neglect or default complained of. The said section provides: ‘Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty, or authority, or in respect of any such law, duty or authority, the following provision shall have effect: (a) The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act neglect or default complained of or in case of a continuance or damage or injury, interim three months next after the ceasing thereof’. C.G. of Prisons v. Idehen (2009) LPELR 4003. – Per UZO IFEYINWA NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
CAUSE OF ACTION – WHEN TIME BEGINS TO RUN FOR LIMITATION PURPOSES
For the purpose of limitation of action, time begins to run from the moment the cause of action accrued. A cause of action accrues from the date on which the incident which gave rise to the cause of action occurred. In determining whether an action is statute barred or not, it is pertinent to ask when time began to run. Time begins to run when there is a party who can sue and another to be sued and all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the Plaintiff to succeed. N.I.I.A. v. AYANFALU (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1018) 246; FADARE v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, OYO STATE (11982) 3 SC 1 (1982) NSCC 52, 60, HUMBE v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, BENUE STATE (2000) 3 NWLR (Pt. 649) 419, BOARD OF TRADE v. GAYZER IRIME CO. LTD (1927) AC 610.” – Per UZO IFEYINWA NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
STATUTE OF LIMITATION – EFFECT ON CAUSE OF ACTION
Where the three (3) months limitation period granted by the Public Officers Protection Act had elapsed, the Plaintiff can no longer bring or institute this suit before a Court of law. The basic principle of law that a Limitation Law or Act removes the right to enforce the cause of action by judicial process because the period of time laid down by the Limitation Law for instituting such an action has elapsed. C.B.N. v. UKPONG (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt. 998) PG. 555, EMIATOR v. NIGERIAN ARMY (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 631) PG. 362. – Per UZO IFEYINWA NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION OF COURTS IN PRE-ELECTION MATTERS – INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 87(9) OF THE ELECTORAL ACT
The purpose/objective of the jurisdiction under S. 87 (9) (supra) is to take care of a situation where a political party conducts its primary election to the dissatisfaction of an aspirant/contestant thereat.” – Per MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION IN INTERNAL PARTY AFFAIRS – LIMITATION OF COURTS’ INVOLVEMENT
It is plain that the conduct of primary election of a political party is the internal affair of the political party over which the Courts have jurisdiction only when a violation by the party’s Rules or Constitution has been occasioned to a candidate or an aspirant, there at the primary Election. Where such is not ex-facie, disclosed on the pleadings or originating process against the party, the Courts, will have no jurisdiction to so delve into same, as the trite position of the law that the internal affairs of a political party to nominate or sponsor a candidate of its choice is one of good sense. – Per MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.
ROLE OF INEC IN PARTY PRIMARIES – LIMITATIONS ON INEC’S POWERS
It is not the role of the Independent National Electoral Commission to sponsor a candidate or present a candidate to itself. It can only accept, as it must, the candidate presented to it by the sponsoring political party, which candidate, it (The Independent National Electoral Commission) has no powers to reject or disqualify on any ground whatsoever. See Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act.– Per MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION OF COURTS IN ELECTORAL MATTERS – LIMITED ROLE OF COURTS IN SPONSORING CANDIDATES
The Courts have no power to sponsor a candidate outside the thin and limited powers conferred under Section 87 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as Amended). The jurisdiction of the Court relates to whether complaints, in respect of primary election for nomination of a candidate were conducted in line with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as Amended), the Constitution and the party guidelines. The interpretation of Section 87 of the Electoral Act is not meant to operate at large, so as to open a floodgate for litigations by political party members, who are dissatisfied with the conduct of the primary elections. – Per MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.
JUDICIAL POWER OF INTERPRETATION – LIMITATION ON JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
I am fortified, in my contrite view, that it is not the role of the judex to embark on a wild exploration in its interpretative duties by assigning to itself powers of interpretation beyond the express and/or legislative intent of an enactment in the bid to determining a perceived grievance. To do so, will amount to judicial hunger and/or thirst for jurisdiction where none exists. It is a no go endeavor. It is forbidden and every judex worth its salt avoids it like a plague. – Per MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.
STATUTE-BARRED SUITS – LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF STATUTE-BARRED SUITS
STATUTE-BARRED SUITS – LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF STATUTE-BARRED SUITS: “Where a suit is statute barred, the following legal consequences will follow: a) The party would lose the right of action. b) The party would lose the right to enforcement. c) The party would also irretrievably lose the right to judicial relief. d) The party would only have an empty cause of action which no Court will assist him to enforce. A.G. ADAMAWA v. A.G.F. (2014) LPELR 23221, DAUDA v. UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE, MAKURDI (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 796) Pg. 363. – Per UZO IFEYINWA NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
CASES CITED
STATUTES REFERRED TO
1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)
2. Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended)
3. Public Officers Protection Act
4. Limitation Act
5. Federal High Court Act, 2004
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