ALHAJI SHUAIBU BOBBO HAMID & ORS V THE GOVERNOR OF ADAMAWA STATE & ORS
March 5, 2025ABDULHAMID SHEHU V KANO STATE
March 5, 2025Legalpedia Citation: (2024-04) Legalpedia 97714 (CA)
In the Court of Appeal
Tue Apr 30, 2024
Suit Number: CA/YL/132/2022
CORAM
1. Ita George Mbaba Justice Court of Appeal
2. Patricia Ajuma Mahmoud Justice Court of Appeal
3. Peter Oyinkenimiemi Affen Justice Court of Appeal
PARTIES
1. HALIDU MUSA
2. PADIO AMOS
3. ADAMU USMAN
4. DAHIRU YERIMA HAMMAN
5. EMMANUEL ISA
6. BITRUS T. ZIRINGANYI
7. ABU E. SHALLANGWA
8. HAMMA AHMADU
9. ILIYASU USMAN DASHEN
10. TANKO ALIYU
11. MUSA ADAMU
12. AHMED KATI
13. STEPHEN BIDA
14. YAKUBU KWAGHE
15. IBRAHIM BITRUS
16. PHILEMON FWA
17. ABUBAKAR BELLO
18. TITUS NDZAU
19. FRANCIS NATHANIEL
20. REUBEN H. MANVI
21. YAUBA YUNUSA PAKIN
22. EMMANUEL MUSA
23. RENOS ELI
24. BILSON LUKUS
25. ADAMU B. WATU
26. ISMAILA IBRAHIM TANKO
27. LINUS AFU DANDA
28. HALIMA IBRAHIM
29. SULEIMAN GARBA
30. JAPHET PAMASSA
31. JAMES MICHAEL
32. ESTHER PIUS
APPELLANTS
1. THE GOVERNOR OF ADAMAWA STATE
2. THE GOVERNMENT OF ADAMAWA STATE
3. THE HONOURABLE ATTORNEY-GENERAL ADAMAWA STATE
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
APPEAL, CONTRACT, EVIDENCE, JUDGMENT, LABOUR LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Appellants enjoyed statutory tenures of appointment for service, courtesy of the Adamawa State Local Government Establishment and Administration (Amendment) Law, 2017, which created Development Areas in the State, as well as office of the Development Area Administrators. The Development Areas were initially 29, but later increased to 50. The further amendment of the State Local Government (Establishment) Administration Law in 2017, fixed a tenure of one year for Appointee, from the date of his/her appointment.
Appellants were appointed on 25/09/2018 and their tenures were to end on 24/09/2019. The appointments were truncated, 4 months to the expiration of the fixed tenures, by the 1st Respondent, by Radio Broadcast on 6/6/2019 and the Appellants relieved of their services. Their salaries and allowances were spelt out in their appointment letters as well as other conditions of service.
Appellants took out the suit to claim what was due to them in the remaining 4 months they were expecting to complete their tenures and each of them came up with N841,942 (Eight Hundred and Forty-One Thousand, Nine Hundred and Forty-Two Naira) as total entitlement (salaries/allowances) for the remaining four months of the truncated service. And the sum total for the 32 of them amounting to the N26, 942, 144.00. They also made other claims as severance benefits, amounting to Twenty-Four Million, Six Hundred and Forty Thousand Naira (N240, 640,000.00) for all of them (that is, N880,000.00 each) – see Exhibit C.
This appeal is about their said salaries and allowances (N26,942,144) as the claims under Exhibit C has not been appealed.
The trial Court refused the claims and dismissed same on the grounds that Appellants failed to produced relevant documents like pay slips or bank statement of account or payment vouchers to prove their take home pay! The trial Court added that Appellants failed to plead the relevant particulars needed or relevant to sustain their said claim for N26,942,144.00.
Dissatisfied by the decision, the Appellants filed the instant appeal.
HELD
Appeal allowed
ISSUES
Whether the learned trial Judge was not wrong when he dismissed Appellants’ claim of N26,942,144.00 (Twenty Six Million Nine Hundred and Forty-Two Thousand One Hundred and Forty Four Naira), being claim for salaries and allowances of the unexpired four months of their tenure, as having not been proved?
RATIONES DECIDENDI
GROUND OF APPEAL – WHERE NO ISSUE IS DISTILLED FROM A GROUND OF APPEAL
By law, a ground of appeal from which no issue is distilled for determination, is deemed abandoned and must be struck out, for being abandoned. See Mato Vs The State (2024) LPELR – 61725 (CA), where this held:
“Appellant did not raise any issue from ground 2 of the appeal, which was on the defence of alibi. The said ground 2 is hereby struck out, having been abandoned, the law being that a ground of appeal from which no issue is distilled for determination, is deemed abandoned and must be struck out. See PDP VS. INEC (2014) LPELR – 23808 (SC), OSASERE IGBINOVIA VS. THE STATE (2021) LPELR – 54569 (CA).” – Per I. G. MBABA, JCA
SPECIAL DAMAGES – WHETHER SPECIAL DAMAGES MUST BE SPECIFICALLY PLEADED AND PROVED
It is true that special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, and the law on this is replete. See NNPC Vs CLIFCO NIG LTD (2011) 4 MJSC 142, NEKA BBB MANUFACTURING CO. LTD VS AFRICAN CONTINENTAL BANK LTD (2004) 1 SC (Pt.1) 32, UTA VS GOLFIC Securities Nig. Ltd & Ors (2022) LPELR – 57079 CA; Ajigbotosho Vs RCC (2018) LPELR – 44774 (SC), Egypt Air Ltd Vs Ibrahim (2021) LPELR – 55882 (CA) and UTC (Nig) PLC Vs Samuel Peters (2022) LPELR-57289 (SC), where the Supreme Court said:
“Ordinarily, the law is clear that special damages must not only be specifically pleaded, they must be strictly proved by credible evidence of particular losses. See Luke N. Onyiorah Vs. Bendict C. Onyiorah & Anor (2019) LPELR 49096 (SC), Okafor & Ors Vs. Obiwo & Anor (1978) LPELR – 2413 (SC).” Per ARIWOOLA, JSC (P. 12, paras. E-F) – Per I. G. MBABA, JCA
SPECIAL DAMAGES – MEANING/IMPLICATION OF STRICT PROOF OF SPECIAL DAMAGES
But, I do not think the requirement of strict proof of special damage(s) implies that, if some elements of special damages are established, the same should be jettisoned, if the sum total of the calculation of the claim, is wrong. The law requires the Court to pursue justice, and so where the Respondents have admitted the monthly take home of each of the Appellants, as N200,585.75 per month, a simple calculation of the same, for the 4 months Appellants were denied the completion of their tenure, was expected to be made by the Court, which left the admitted take home salaries and allowances of Appellants, for the remaining 4 months, at N25,674,976.00 (Twenty Five Million, Six Hundred and Seventy Thousand, Nine Hundred and Seventy Six Naira), as the special damages, accruable to the Appellants. The admitted amount should be taken as proved and awarded by the Court. – Per I. G. MBABA, JCA
AGREEMENTS – DUTY OF PARTIES TO UPHOLD TERMS OF AGREEMENT REACHED
…That, of course, affirmed that the Respondents had a duty to keep faith with the one-year tenure, specified in the terms and conditions of the Appointment – Exhibits 1 to 32, and failure to respect the tenure, amounted to breach of the contract, especially as no justifiable reason was given for the truncation of the appointment of the 32 Administrators, the same day. Parties are bound by the terms reached in their agreement. See Mekwunye Vs Imoukhuede (2019) LPELR – 48996 (SC), UBA Vs Marcus (2015) LPELR – 40397 CA and NNPC Vs FUNG TAI ENGINEERING CO. LTD (2023) LPELR – 59745 (SC), where it was held:
“The learned silk for the Appellant is right, for the law is elementary, that parties are bound by the terms and conditions which they freely agree to in their contractual relationship and the primary duty of the Court is to construe such terms as agreed by the parties and not to alter or in any way re-write the terms for the parties.” Per GARBA, JSC (P. 76, paras. A-B) – Per I. G. MBABA, JCA
CONTRACT – WHERE THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT PROVIDES A PROCEDURE FOR THE TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
In the case at Awulu Vs Polaris Bank Ltd (2022) LPELR – 58783 CA, it was held, relying on Obanye Vs Union Bank Plc (2018) LPELR – 44702 (SC), that:
“It is trite that where the contract of employment itself provides a procedure for the termination of the employment, the procedure as provided must be complied with to effectively bring the employment to an end. An employer who terminates the contract with his employee in a manner not envisaged by the contract will be liable for damages for the breach of the contract and that is the employee’s only remedy. It follows therefore that an employer who has the right to hire has the corresponding right to fire as well. Thus, without any reason, the employer can terminate the employment of his servant and render himself liable to pay damages and such other entitlements of the employee that accrued at the time of the termination, only. The Court, except where the employment is especially protected by statute, cannot compel the employer to re-instate the dismissed employee. See Olarewaju v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc (2001) LPELR-2573 (SC), Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt 9) 599, Osisanya v. Afribank (Nig) Plc (2007) LPELR-2809 (SC).
It was further held in Awulu Vs Polaris Bank (supra), thus:
“In the instant case where the terms of employment provide for specific period of notice before termination or salary in lieu thereof, the only remedy available to the appellant is the award of salary for the period of notice and other legitimate entitlements due to him at the time the employment was terminated and no more. See Katto v. C.B.N. (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 890 and Gabriel Ativie v. Kabel Metal Nig. Ltd (2008) LPELR-591 (SC). In correctly applying the law to the facts of the instant case, the lower Court held:- “All that the appellant is entitled to is one month salary in lieu of notice and any other entitlements legitimately due to him at the time of termination of his employment and nothing more.” The foregoing being a correct and just enforcement of the terms of the contract between the parties must persist. See U.B.N. v. Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385 and Olaniyan & Ors v. Unilag (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599 and AG Ferrero & Co Ltd v. Henkel Chemicals Nig. Ltd (2011) LPELR-12 (12).” Per MUHAMMAD, JSC. – Per I. G. MBABA, JCA
ADMISSION – WHERE THE RESPONDENT HAS ADMITTED AN AMOUNT AS RENUMERATION FOR THE APPELLANT(S)
…This is because to allow the judgment of the Court below to stand may inadvertently amount to miscarriage of justice. This is especially so as strict proof of special damages does not mean proof to the hilt. In a situation where the respondent has admitted an amount as the agreed remuneration for the Appellants, it appears to me to be an unnecessary adherence to technicalities for the trial Court to hold that failure of the Appellants to tender their pay slips was fatal to their case. – Per P. A. Mahmoud, JCA
SPECIAL DAMAGES – MEANING OF STRICT PROOF OF SPECIAL DAMAGES
Whilst there is no gainsaying that special damages must be specially pleaded and strictly proved by credible evidence of particular losses, and the law will not infer such losses from the nature of the acts alleged because they are exceptional in their character and do not follow in ordinary course [see NGILARI v MOTHERCAT LTD (1999) LPELR-1988(SC) 1 at 26 – 27, BADMUS v ABEGUNDE, BENJAMIN OBASUYI & ANOR v BUSINESS VENTURES LIMITED [2000] 12 WRN 112 at 131 and STROMS BRUKS AKTIE BOLAG v HUTCHINSON (1905) AC 515], the point to vigorously underscore is that strict proof of special damages does not mean unusual proof or proof beyond reasonable doubt. No. Rather it is basically proof that would lend itself to quantification. See MOMODU v UNIVERSITY OF BENIN [1997] 7 NWLR (PT 512) 235 and ONYIORAH v ONYIORAH & ANOR (2019) LPELR 49096(SC).
A claimant seeking special damages is merely required to lead credible evidence of such a character as would suggest that he indeed is entitled to the award of special damages. See DARE v FAGBAMILA [2009] 14 NWLR (PT. 1160) 177 at 183. In ORIENT BANK (NIG) PLC v BILANTE INT’L LTD [1997] 8 NWLR (PT 515) 37 at 91 – 92, this Court (per Niki Tobi, JCA, as he then was) clarified the legal position thusly:
“The degree of “strict proof” depends on the character of the act which produce the damage and the circumstances under which the act were done. Strict proof means no more than the evidence must show the same particularity as is necessary for its pleading. It should normally consist of evidence of particular loss, which are exactly known or accurately measured before trial. Strict proof does not mean unusual proof but simply implies that a plaintiff who has the advantage of being able to basis claim upon the precise calculation must give the defendant access to the facts which make such calculation possible. Strict proof in the context of special damages can mean no more than such proof as would readily lend itself to quantification or assessment.” – Per P. O. Affen, JCA
PERVERSE DECISION – MEANING OF A PERVERSE DECISION
Even though evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value thereto are the province and forte of the trial Judge (who is a peculiar adjudicator upon whom the heaviest burden of trial lies), this is a proper case in which this Court (being the appellate Court it is) ought to interfere with the findings as well as the eventual decision of the Trial Court dismissing the Appellants’ claim for being perverse and consequently liable to be set aside. A decision is said to be perverse where it is based on inadmissible evidence, or contrary to the evidence adduced, or it is speculative and not founded on any evidence, or the Court either ignored the obvious or took into account extraneous matter. See IGBIKIS v STATE [2017] 11 NWLR (PT 1575) 126 at 153 (SC) and WARD v JAMES [1965] 1 LLOYD’S REP. 145, (1966) 1 Q.B. 273. – Per P. O. Affen, JCA
CASES CITED
STATUTES REFERRED TO
1. Adamawa State Local Government Establishment and Administration (Amendment) Law, 2017
