CORAM
IBRAHIM TANKO MUHAMMAD, JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEAL
IBRAHIM TANKO MUHAMMADM, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
PARTIES
1. ENGR. CHARLES UGWU
2. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY.
APPELLANTS
SENATOR IFEANYI ARARUME & ORS.
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The third Defendant forwarded the name of the Plaintiff who emerged the winner at the Governorship primaries to INEC as its candidate for the Imo State Governorship Election. Subsequently, the 3rd Defendant forwarded the name of 2nd Defendant in substitution for the Plaintiffs’ name by a letter as its candidate. In consequence of which the Plaintiff filed this suit claiming a declaration that the option of substituting a candidate whose name is already submitted to INEC by a political Party is only available to the political party or INEC when such candidate is disqualified by the court , a declaration that it is only a court of law by an order that can disqualify a duly nominated candidate of a political party whose name have been published in accordance with section 32 (3) of the Electoral Act 2006 amongst other reliefs. The trial court dismissed the Plaintiff’s suit. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial court, the Plaintiff appealed to the lower court while the 2nd Defendant cross appeal contending that the Federal High Court had no jurisdiction to hear the suit. The lower court allowed the Plaintiff’s appeal and dismissed the cross- appeal, hence an appeal to this court at the instance of the Defendants. ?
HELD
Appeal dismissed
ISSUES
1. Whether the/learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in holding that Section 34 of the Electoral Act, 2006 is justiciable
2. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in the interpretation of Section 34(1), (2) of the Electoral Act, 2006?
RATIONES DECIDENDI
REQUIREMENTS OF LAW – DISTINCTION BETWEEN THOSE REQUIREMENTS WHICH ARE SAID TO BE ‘MANDATORY’ AND THOSE WHICH ARE SAID TO BE MERELY DIRECTORY
“Where a requirement is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with; failure to comply invalidates everything that follows. Where it is merely directory, it should still be compiled with, and there may be sanctions for disobedience, but failure; to comply does not invalidate what follows.” PER TOBI, JSC
“VERIFY” – MEANING OF “VERIFY”
“The verb “verify”, a variant of the adjective “verifiable” means to make certain that a fact or statement or a state of things as stated is correct or true. It also conveys an element of “confirm”. PER TOBI, JSC
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES – A JUDGE MUST PAY ATTENTION TO THE GRAMMAR IN CONSTRUING A STATUTE
‘‘In construing a statute, the Judge must pay particular attention to the grammar or syntax in or underlying the construction. This does not make the Judge or turn him as a grammarian. By his professional training and his regular application of that training to the construction of statutes, he becomes an expert. His expertise coupled with the fact that as a Judge, words are his tools, his professional ability to construe the grammar or syntax in a statute cannot be in doubt.’’ PER TOBI, JSC.
ACCESS TO COURT – RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
“Right of access to court is a constitutional right which is guaranteed in the Constitution and no law, including that of a political party, can subtract from or derogates from it or deny any person of it. Such a law will be declared a nullity by virtue of section 1(3) of the Constitution”. PER TOBI, JSC
NOMINATION OF AN ELECTORAL CANDIDATE – LIMITATIONS ON A COURT IN NOMINATING ELECTORAL CANDIDATES
‘‘It is settled law that the issue of nomination or sponsorship of an election candidate is within the domestic affairs of the political parties and that the courts have no jurisdiction to determine who should be sponsored by any political party as its candidate for any election.’’ PER ONNOGHEN, JSC
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE – INSTANCES WHERE A JUDGE CAN BE ACCUSED OF MAKING THE LAW
‘‘A Judge is accused of making the law where there is no statute or statutory provision on the issue and this includes for all purposes the Constitution. This is because the only constitutional function of the Judge is put in the conservation Latinism, judicium est quasi juris dictum, meaning judgment, as it were, is a declaration of law. In other words, a law must be in existence before a Judge interprets it. If there is no law on an issue, a judge has nothing to interpret and if he goes to interpret where there is no law, he will be deemed to have made effort to hold the air in his hands, which is physically impossible. It is in such a situation that a Judge is accused of making the law.’’ PER TOBI, JSC
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES- INSTANCES WHERE THE LITERAL RULE WILL NOT BE APPLIED
‘‘It is only when the literal meaning result in ambiguity or injustice that a Judge may seek internal aid within the body of the statute itself or external aid from statutes in pari material in order to resolve the ambiguity to avoid doing injustice. See Mobil v. FBIR (1977) 3 SC 53.’’ PER TOBI, JSC
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES – THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE
‘‘The underlying principle in the interpretation of a statute is that the meaning of the statute or legislation must be collected from the plain and unambiguous expressions or words used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained as to what is just and expedient. See Adejumo v. Kassim (1958) 3 FSC 51; Lawal v. G.B. Olivant (1972) SC 124.’’ PER TOBI, JSC
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES – GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
‘‘As a general principle, the rules for the construction of statutes are very like those which apply to the construction of other documents. This is more so as regards the important point here that the words of an enactment, as in the piece of legislation above, must be constructed as a whole so as to give a sensible meaning to them. In other words, words in a statute ought to be construed – “ut res magis valeat quam pereat.” This rule of interpretation synchronizes with another established principle of interpretation to the effect that a statute must be read together as a whole and construed together in order to get to the true meaning of the statute and the intention of the law maker in enacting it. Hence, in this regard words of a statute have to be construed as bearing their natural or ordinary meaning and where, in the process, there is no ambiguity or resulting absurdity, there will be no need applying any of the other rules of interpretation. These are settled principles of the law of interpretation. See: Adah v. N.Y.S.C. (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt. 963) 65 at 78-80; Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Turver (1893) AC 468 at 477; Tukur v. Govt. of Gongola State (No.2) (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.117) 517; A.G Bendel State v. A.G. Federation (1981) 3 NCLR and A.G. Lagos State v. A.G. Federation (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 904) 1.’’ PER CHUKWUMA-ENEH, JSC
DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL – LIMITATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL ON PARTIES INVOLVED IN ILLEGALITY
‘‘The doctrine of estoppel cannot work in favour of parties who mutually give their consent or agree to an illegality. Estoppel, an equitable principle cannot aid illegality. It rather aids justice and fair play.’’ PER TOBI, JSC
CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORDS OF A STATUTE – DUTY OF THE JUDGE TO CONSTRUE THE WORDS OF A STATUTE AND GIVE THEM THEIR APPROPRIATE MEANING AND EFFECT
“This is because it is the duty of the Judge to construe the words of a statute and give those words their appropriate meaning and effect. See Adejumo v. The Military Governor of Lagos State (1972) SC 124. It is certainly not the duty of a Judge to interprete a statute to avoid consequences. See Aya v. Henshaw (1972) 5 SC 87.” PER TOBI, JSC
LEGISLATION- EFFECT OF A REPEALED ACT OR LEGISLATION
“The general position of the law is that where an Act or a legislation is repealed it is regarded in the absence of any provision to the contrary, as having never existed, except as to maters or transactions past and closed. See: Surtees v. Ellison (1829) 9 B & C 750, per Lord Terteerden”. PER MUHAMMAD, JSC
DECISION OF CASES – NO CASE IS DECIDED OUTSIDE ITS FACTUAL MILIEU.
‘‘It is elementary law that a case is decided on its facts. No case is decided outside its factual milieu.’’ PER TOBI, JSC
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES- LIMITATIONS OF A JUDGE IN INTERPRETING A STATUTE
‘‘The consequences of a statute are those of the Legislature; not the Judge. A Judge who regiments himself to the consequences of a statute is moving outside his domain of statutory interpretation. He has by that conduct engaged himself in morality which may be against the tenor of the statute and therefore not within his judicial power.’’ PER TOBI, JSC
LITERAL RULE OF CONSTRUCTION – THE LITERAL RULE OF CONSTRUCTION MUST BE APPLIED EXCEPT WHERE SAME WILL LEAD TO ABSURDITY AND INCONSISTENCY
“The literal construction must be followed unless this would lead to absurdity and inconsistency with the provisions of the statute as a whole. See Onashile v. Idowu (1961) 1 All NLR 313”. PER TOBI, JSC
ADMISSION OF A DOCUMENT – WHETHER PARTIES CAN BY SHEER COLLUSION CONSENT TO THE ADMISSION OF A DOCUMENT
“Parties, by sheer collusion and for their mutually anticipated benefit, cannot give consent to the admission of a document which the Evidence Act clearly provides is inadmissible. As admission of such evidence will clearly run counter or against the provision of the Evidence Act, the court will ignore the so-called consent and rule that the evidence is inadmissible.” PER TOBI, JSC
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES- DUTY OF A COURT TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE LANGUAGE OF A STATUTE WHERE SAME IS CLEAR
‘‘Thus, where the language of a statute is clear and explicit, the court must give effect to it, for in that case, the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. The court must bear in mind that its function in that respect is JUS DICERE, not JUS DARE, and the words of a statute must not be overruled by the judges, but reform of the law must be left in the hands of the Legislature.’’ PER MUHAMMAD, JSC
STATUTE –MEANING OF A STATUTE – DUTY OF THE COURT IN INTERPRETING A STATUTE
“A statute, it is always said, is “the will of the legislature” and any document which is presented to it as a statute is an authentic expression of the Legislative will. The function of the court is to interpret that document according to the intent of those who made it. Thus, the court declares the intention of the legislature. The court can elicit that intention from the actual words of the statute”. PER MUHAMMAD, JSC
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES – DUTY OF A JUDGE IN CONSTRUING A STATUTE
‘‘In the construction of statute, the primary concern of a Judge is the attainment of the intention of the Legislature. If the language used by the Legislature is clear and explicit, the Judge must give effect to it because in such a situation, the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. See Ojokolobo v. Alamu (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61), 377.’’ PER TOBI, JSC
CONSTRUCTION OF A STATUTE – DUTY OF A JUDGE TO FOLLOW THE RULE IN HEYDON’S CASE IN ARRIVING AT A REASONABLE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE
“To arrive at a reasonable construction of a statute, the Judge is entitled, following the Rule in Heydon’s case, to consider how the law stood when the statute was passed, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide, and the remedy which the new law has provided to cure that mischief. See Wilson v. Attorney-General of Bendel State (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 17) 572”. PER TOBI, JSC
“SHALL” –MEANING OF “SHALL” WHEN USED IN A STATUTE
“When the word “shall” is used in a statute, it is not permissive. It is mandatory. See Col. Kaliel Rtd. v. Alhaji Aliero (1999) 4 NWLR (Pt. 597) 139. The word “shall” in its ordinary meaning is a word of command which is normally given a compulsory meaning because it is intended to denote obligation”. PER TOBI, JSC
ATTITUDE OF DRAFTSMEN TOWARDS OUSTER CLAUSE
“Draftsmen are not miserly with their language of ousting the jurisdiction of the courts when they so wish or intend. They state their mind or intention clearly in order to avoid any speculation or conjecture about their intention.” Per Niki Tobi, JSC.
MISCHIEF RULE – IMPORT OF THE MISCHIEF RULE – DUTY OF A JUDGE TO ADOPT THE MISCHIEF RULE OF INTERPRETATION
‘‘One of the most useful guidelines to interpretation is the mischief rule which considers the state of the law before the enactment, the defect which the statute sets out to remedy and/or prevent, the remedy adopted by the Legislature to cure the mischief and the true reason of or behind the remedy. The duty of a judge therefore is to adopt such Interpretation that will enable the suppression of the mischief and to promote the remedy within the instant or intention of the statute. See Savannah Bank of Nigeria Limited v. Ajilo (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 97) 305.’’ PER TOBI, JSC
ARMS OF GOVERNMENT – DUTIES OF THE ARMS OF GOVERNMENT
“It is trite that it is the duty of the Legislature to make laws which are to be interpreted by the judiciary and executed by the Executive arms of the government.’’ PER ONNOGHEN, JSC
CASES CITED
1. Nigeria LNG Limited v. African Development Insurance Co. Ltd. (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 416) 6772. Col. Kaliel Rtd. v. Alhaji Aliero (1999) 4 NWLR (Pt. 597) 139?
STATUTES REFERRED TO
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,1999
Electoral Act 2006