CORAM

---

John Inyang Okoro Justice

Uwani Musa Abba Aji Justice

Adamu Jauro Justice

Tijjani Abubakar Justice

Emmanuel Akomaye Agim Justice

---

PARTIES

---

1. CHUKWUMA ODII IFEANYI

2. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP)

APPELLANTS 

---

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC)

2. OGBONNA FRANCIS NWIFURU

3. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS (APC)

RESPONDENTS 

---

AREA(S) OF LAW

---

APPEAL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ELECTION PETITION, EVIDENCE, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

 

---

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Following the conduct of elections into the office of the governor of Ebonyi State by the 1st Respondent on the 18th day of March, 2023, the 1st Respondent declared the 2nd Respondent, who was the 3rd Respondent’s flagbearer, as lawfully elected and returned. Dissatisfied with the said outcome, the Appellants challenged the return and election of the 2nd Respondent before the Governorship Election Petition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) vide a Petition filed on the 7th day of April, 2023, on grounds of non-qualification, non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022. The Appellants also claimed that the 2nd Respondent was not elected by a majority of lawful votes cast at the election.

The Appellants’ challenge before the Tribunal was unsuccessful because the Tribunal found no merit in the petition and therefore dismissed it, the Tribunal affirmed the 2nd Respondent’s election in a judgment delivered on the 27th day of September, 2023.

The Appellants’ further appeal against the said judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeal (save for the dissenting judgment delivered by Georgewill, JCA with respect to the first issue before the lower Court bordering on non-qualification of the 2nd Respondent).

Nettled by the decision of the Court of Appeal, the Appellants initiated an appeal to this Court hence the instant appeal.

 

---

HELD

---

Appeal dismissed

 

---

ISSUES

---

1. Whether the Court of Appeal was not wrong in its majority decision, when it affirmed the decision of the Tribunal on Ground 1 of the Appellants’ Petition relating to the 2nd Respondent’s qualification under Section 177(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) (the “Constitution”), to contest the governorship election for Ebonyi State held on i8rh day of March, 2023 as not justiciable, rooted in membership, nomination and sponsorship of the 2nd Respondent and a matter within the domestic and internal affairs of a political party, thus amounting to a pre-election dispute?

2. Whether the Court of Appeal was not wrong when it affirmed the Tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence led at the trial in coming to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent was qualified to contest the election, despite the overwhelming evidence demonstrating that the 2nd Appellant was at all times material to the election a member of the 2nd Appellant, and not having been sponsored by the 2nd Appellant in breach of Section 177(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999?

3. Whether the Court of Appeal was not wrong when it affirmed the decision of the Tribunal that the Appellants’ allegations of non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022 against the Governorship election for Ebonyi State held on 18th day of March 2023 were not proved?

 

---

RATIONES DECIDENDI

---

JURISDICTION – HOW TO DETERMINE WHETHER A COURT HAS JURISDICTION IN A MATTER

---

Indeed, the law is settled that when a Court is faced with the question as to whether it has jurisdiction to entertain and determine a claim or not, it is the averments and reliefs sought in the originating processes that will guide the Court in deciding such question. In a nutshell therefore, it is the claim or the petition that determines the competence of a Court or Tribunal to determine same. The grievances contained in the claim or petition must come within the ambit of the law that confers jurisdiction on the Court or tribunal. See ABUBAKAR & ORS V. NASAMU & ORS (2011) LPELR -1831 (SC). – Per Tijjani Abubakar, JSC

 

---

COURTS – CONDUCT OF COURTS WHERE THE ISSUE OF MEMBERSHIP AND ALSO QUALIFICATION OF A CANDIDATE AS PRESCRIBED BY S. 177 OF THE CONSTITUTION ARE RAISED – WHETHER THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO DEAL WITH MATTERS IN THE ARENA OF INTRA-PARTY POLITICS

---

…rather, it seems to me that the Learned Senior Counsel deliberately failed, for some inexplicable reasons to comprehend the point that, with the manner the Appellants’ case is set up and as presently constituted, there is no path that can be towed by either the Tribunal or the Court below, and even this Court, to determine the issue of constitutional non-qualification of the 2nd Respondent as alleged by the Appellants, without first dabbling into the issue or determining whether, as the Appellants touted, the 2nd Respondent is a member of the 2nd Appellant. At the very least, a positive determination must be made in favour of the stance taken by the Appellants that the 2nd Respondent was, at the time of the election, a member of the People’s Democratic Party, the 2nd Appellant, and he was not sponsored to contest the election into the office of the Governor of Ebonyi State. Invariably, to take this step, the Tribunal will have to step into the arena of intra-party affairs which is not justiciable and outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

In ENANG V. ASUQUO [2023] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1896) 501 at 531, Para E., this Court, Per my lord and brother KEKERE-EKUN, JSC held as follows and I quote:

“Membership of a political party is a matter that is strictly within the domestic affairs of a political party and the Courts have no jurisdiction to determine who the members of a political party are, it is not justiciable. The choice of candidates for elective offices is a political issue and it Is governed by the rules, guidelines and Constitution of the political party concerned. It is a matter of internal affairs of the political party concerned. It is not to be questioned before any Court as it is non-justiciable. A Court thus has no jurisdiction to determine who a political party should sponsor. Nomination or sponsorship of a candidate for election is a political matter solely within the discretion of the party and this is so because the sponsorship or nomination of a candidate is a pre-primary election affair of the party.” – Per Tijjani Abubakar, JSC

 

---

JURISDICTION – WHETHER THE TRIBUNAL HAS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE HOW A CANDIDATE BECAME A PARTY MEMBER AND IF HIS SPONSORSHIP WAS VALID

---

As the Court below rightly held, it is not in dispute that in line with Section 177(c) of the Constitution, the 2nd Respondent was touted as a member of the All-Progressive Party and sponsored by the same party. It is not within the province of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction delineated under Section 285(2) of the 1999 Constitution to launch an investigation into how, when or where the 2nd Respondent became a member of a party and whether his sponsorship to contest for elected office was valid. The limit of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is all issues arising post the election, and not prior to it. The Courts below were therefore correct in holding that the issue of membership and sponsorship of a candidate is an internal affair of a party which is not justiciable, and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter, I must repeat that sponsorship of a candidate to contest election falls within the domestic affairs of a political party. See APGA V. ANYANWU [2014] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1407) 541, SHINKAFI V. YARI [2016] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1511) 340, ENANG V. ASUQUO (supra). – Per Tijjani Abubakar, JSC

 

---

MEMBERSHIP – WHETHER MEMBERSHIP OF A CANDIDATE CAN BE CONTESTED WHERE THE POLITICAL PARTY SPONSORS THE INDIVIDUAL FOR AN ELECTION – WHETHER PARTIES ARE BOUND BY THEIR PLEADINGS

---

In any event, I do not think the Appellants’ complaint on the non-qualification of the 2nd Respondent can see the light of the day because the provision of Section 177(c) of the Constitution, is clear and unambiguous to the effect that such a candidate must be a member of a political party and is sponsored by that political party.

In ONI V OYEBANJI (2023) LPELR, this Court was faced with similar situation and issue as in the instant case, and this Court, per my lord and learned brother AGIM, JSC dealt with the said issue exhaustively, and held as follows:

“It is obvious from the appellant’s petition that it is on the basis of the above-reproduced paragraphs of the petition that they contend that the 1st respondent was not qualified to contest the Ekiti State Governorship Election. The said paragraphs assert that because of the facts pleaded therein the 1st respondent was not validly sponsored by the 2nd respondent to contest the said election contrary to S.177(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and therefore was not qualified to contest the said election. S. 177(c) of the 1999 Constitution provides that “A person shall be qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State if he is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that political party”. The fact that the 1st respondent was sponsored by the 2nd respondent, in which he is a member, as its Ekiti State governorship candidate for the 18-6-2022 general election was not in dispute. The appellants’ argument that the sponsorship was not valid because the leadership of the 2nd respondent at the time it sponsored the 1st respondent was illegitimate and had no legal authority to head or manage the affairs of the party, admits the fact of the said sponsorship. The 2nd respondent has at all times consistently maintained that it sponsored the 1st respondent as its candidate for the 18-6-2022 general election of Governor of Ekiti State. The appellants having in their petition admitted the fact of the 1st respondent’s sponsorship by the 2nd respondent as its candidate for the said election, the petition failed and was not triable on that ground. Concerning the implication of pleadings in an election petition exactly the same with the above struck-out paragraphs of the election petition in this case, this Court in Jegede V. INEC (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1797) held thusly- “It is not in dispute, as it is admitted by all sides that the 3rd and 4th respondents contested the said election and were duly returned elected on the platform and sponsorship of the 2nd respondent… Concerning similar pleading in an election petition in Alahassan & Anor V Ishaku & Ors (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1520) 230 at 260 this Court held as follows- Per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC that “The appellants are bound by their own pleadings. It is so clear after reading the paragraphs referred to above that the appellants are actually saying that the 1st respondent was sponsored by the 2nd respondent. Their case that the 1st respondent was not sponsored by the 2nd respondent is inconsistent with the facts pleaded which are that the 1st respondent was in fact sponsored by the 2nd respondent. To support their case that the 1st respondent was not sponsored by the 2nd respondent, their pleadings should have read: “The 1st respondent was purportedly sponsored by the PDP”. Per Peter-Odili JSC that- “This is a glaring and fatal admission by the appellant that the 1st and 2nd respondent actually satisfied the provisions of Section 177(c) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and those paragraphs of the petition constitute admission against interest pursuant to Sections 20 and 21 of the Evidence Act.” Per Okoro JSC that- “The question may be asked, was the 1st respondent a member of a political party? Was he sponsored by a political party? The answer is not far-fetched. Apart from the 1st and 2nd respondents stating clearly that the 1st respondent was a member of the PDP and was sponsored by it, the appellants’ pleadings by their pleadings admitted this fact fully. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the petition, the appellants gave the answers to the questions I posed above… So by the appellants showing in the petition, they agreed that the 1st respondent was a member of PDP and that he was sponsored by that party. This satisfies qualification under Section 177(c) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).” – Per Tijjani Abubakar, JSC

 

---

S. 177 (C) OF THE CONSTITUTION – WHETHER S. 177 (C) OF THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF HOW A POLITICAL PARTY ARRIVED AT THE DECISION TO SPONSOR A PERSON AS ITS CANDIDATE/THE VALIDITY OF THE SPONSORSHIP – THE QUALIFICATION FOR ELECTION TO THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR IN S.177 OF THE CONSTITUTION

---

Indeed, the clear provisions of Section 177(c) of the Constitution do not provide for consideration of how a political party arrived at the decision to sponsor a person as its candidate or the validity of the decision to sponsor or the validity of the sponsorship itself. The fact that a member of the political party is sponsored by it as its governorship candidate for the general election makes such a person automatically qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State. The Constitution in Section 177 has covered the field on the criteria for qualification for election to the office of the Governor and Section 182 (1) covered the field on the factors that shall make a person not qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State. Once a person satisfies the criteria prescribed in Section 177 of the 1999 Constitution he becomes automatically qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State. An election petition alleging that a person elected is not qualified to contest the election can only be brought on the basis of non-compliance with any of the provisions of Sections 177 and 182 of the Constitution. Therefore, the provision of Section 134(1&3) of the Electoral Act, 2022 that an election may be questioned on the ground that a person whose election is questioned was, at the time of the election not qualified to contest the election, cannot be applied in such a manner as to permit the challenge to the qualification of an elected Governor on grounds not contained in Sections 177 and 182 of the Constitution. As this Court, emphatically held in ONI V. OYEBANJI (supra), that any criterion not provided for in S. 177 of the Constitution or any factor not provided for in Section 182 of the Constitution shall not be valid as a qualifying criterion under Section 177 or disqualifying factor under Section 182 of the Constitution. As this Court held in SHINKAFI & ANOR V. YARI & ORS (2016) LPELR – 26050 (SC) “Once a candidate sponsored by his political party has satisfied the provisions set out in Section 177 of the Constitution and is not disqualified under Section 182(1) thereof, he is qualified to contest election to the office of Governor of a State. No other law can disqualify him. – Per Tijjani Abubakar, JSC

 

---

S. 137 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT – THE LIMITATIONS OF S. 137 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT – APPLICATION OF S. 137 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT

---

…it has now been established that the provision of Section 137 of the Electoral Act, is not a blanket provision that can be waived by parties as a magic wand in any case where there is allegation of non-compliance with the Electoral Act, 2022. The provision is not without limitations, which limitation this Court recognised in our decision in OYETOLA & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (supra) at 58 – 59, PARAS D – E, where my lord JAURO, JSC explained the scope and extent of the application of Section 137 of the Electoral Act, 2022, with the following words;

“The Appellants have also argued that by virtue of Section 137 of the Electoral Act, they were relieved of the burden or duty of calling witnesses to prove allegations of non-compliance with the Electoral Act. The said Section 137 provides thus: “It shall not be necessary for a party who alleges non-compliance with the provisions of this Act for the conduct of elections to call oral evidence if originals or certified true copies manifestly disclose the non-compliance alleged.” The above provision is drafted in simple, clear and unambiguous words. The duty of this Court is therefore to apply a literal interpretation thereto by giving the words their natural, literal and ordinary meanings, devoid of any embellishment. See KASSIM V. ADESEMOWO (2021) 18 NWLR (PT. 1807) 67, AGUMA V. A.P.C. (2021) 14 NWLR (PT. 1796) 351, F.B.N. PLC V. MAIWADA (2013) 6 NWLR (PT. 1348) 444, MIL. ADM., BENUE STATE V. ULEGEDE (2001) 27 NWLR (PT. 741) 294. It is indubitable that Section 137 of the Electoral Act only applies where the non-compliance alleged is manifest from the originals or certified true copies of documents relied on. In the instant case, neither Exhibit BVR nor any other document relied on by the Appellants remotely disclosed, non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act. Hence, the section cannot be of any assistance to them. In the circumstance they still had a duty to call witnesses who witnessed the alleged acts of non-compliance to testify.”

It is abundantly clear that Section 137 of the Electoral Act, 2022 is limited to cases where the non-compliance alleged is manifest from the originals or certified copies of documents relied upon. – Per Tijjani Abubakar, JSC

 

---

ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION – WHETHER ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION OF RESULTS IS MANDATORY – THE DUTIES OF PRESIDING OFFICERS AND RETURNING OFFICERS OF INEC

---

Section 60(5) and 64(4), (5) & (6) of the Electoral Act, and paragraph 38 of the Guidelines…

…the election is disputed, as prescribed under Section 60 (4) of this Act.”

I am convinced that the only natural interpretation that can be accorded the above… provisions, particularly the combined provisions of Section 60(5); 64(4), (5) and (6) of the Electoral Act is that electronic transmission of results is not mandatory under our electoral jurisprudence. Section 60 of the Electoral Act, 2022 outlines the process of counting votes at the polling unit. It mandates the presiding officer to enter the votes scored by each candidate in a form prescribed by the Commission. This form is to be signed and stamped by the presiding officer, counter-signed by candidates or their polling agents (where available), and copies are to be distributed to polling agents and the police officer. Furthermore, the presiding officer is required to count and announce the result at the polling unit and transfer the results in a manner prescribed by the Commission, the 1st Respondent. Clearly, the 1st Respondent has been given the discretion to prescribe the manner in which results will be transferred. On the other hand, Section 64(4), (5), and (6) pertains to the duties of collation officers or returning officers. It explicitly mandates that these officers shall collate and announce the result of an election subject to verification and confirmation. The verification and confirmation include cross-checking the number of accredited voters and the votes with records transmitted directly from polling units under Sections 47(2) and 60(4) of the Act, respectively. Subsection (5) allows collation officers to use the data recorded and transmitted directly from polling units to collate and announce the result if the collated result at their level of collation is incorrect. Subsection (6) provides a mechanism for resolving disputes regarding collated results, including the use of specific data and original collated results, There is nothing in Sections 60 and 64 of the Electoral Act, which remotely suggests that the transmission of election results electronically is compulsory. No iota of compulsion is contained in these provisions and as this Court aptly said in AMAECHI V. INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (PT 1080) 227 SC; (2008) LPELR – 446 (SC), “it is certainly not the duty of a Judge to interprete a statute to avoid its consequence. The consequences of a statute are those of the legislature, not the Judge. A Judge who regiments himself to the consequences of a statute is moving outside the domain of statutory interpretation.”

I am clear in my mind that the Electoral Act, 2022 has not specifically provided that the results of the election shall be mandatorily electronically transmitted. The legislature thought it right and proper and for good reasons to use words like “deliver”, “transfer” and “transmitted directly” without qualifying with any mode or means, to describe the way collated results are to be moved from one stage in the electoral process to another, until the final results are collated and declared. – Per Tijjani Abubakar,JSC

 

---

COLLATION OF RESULTS – THE PROCESS TO BE FOLLOWED BY A COLLATION OFFICER IN THE COLLATION OF RESULTS WHERE INEC HARDCOPY OF RESULTS DOES NOT EXIST – WHETHER ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION IS MANDATORY IN COLLATION OF RESULTS – THE PURPOSE OF ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION RESULTS IN THE COLLATION PROCESS

---

Paragraphs 38, 48, 50, 51 and 93 of the Regulations and Guidelines…

…Further, Paragraph 93 of the Regulations and Guidelines which relates to the procedure to be followed by a collation officer during collation of results and where INEC hardcopy of results do not exist and use of duplicate hardcopies from other agencies. It reads:

“Where the INEC hardcopy of collated results from the immediate lower level of collation does not exist, the Collation Officer shall use electronically transmitted results or results from the IReV portal to continue collation. Where none of these exist, the Collation Officer shall ask for duplicate hardcopies issued by the Commission to the following bodies in the order below:

(i) The Nigeria Police Force; and

(ii) Agents of Political Parties.”

I have taken the liberty to reproduce the relevant provisions of the Regulations and Guidelines (save for paragraph 100 thereof) wherein reference is made to the phrase “electronically transmit” which the learned senior counsel for the Appellants touted as mandating the 1st Respondent to electronically transmit results. A careful examination of the referenced provisions of the Regulations and Guidelines reproduced supra does not support the arguments canvassed by the Appellants. To the contrary, with the use of the phrase “electronically transmit or transfer directly”, it is obvious that the Regulations and Guidelines contemplate the movement of the election results from one stage of the electoral process through alternative means and not exclusively through electronic transmission, as urged on us by the Appellants. No doubt, while the draftsman intended that technology will be entrenched in the election process but did not completely rid the process of manual transmission.

Without hesitation, the electronic transmission/collation of results in paragraph 38 of the INEC Regulations and Guidelines seems to me to be an exercise of the discretion conferred upon the 1st Respondent under Section 60(5) of the Electoral Act, 2022. By the clear provisions of the Regulations and the Guidelines, manual transfer/transmission of results has been positioned as an alternative by Respondent presumably due to the unique challenges of electronic mode of transmission, and this is the only reasonable conclusion I am bound to reach. Therefore, it appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpreting the words used in Section 60, 64(4) and (5) of the Electoral Act, 2022, and the relevant provisions of the Regulations and Guidelines to conclude that electronic transmission of results is mandatory under our laws as presently constituted.

Even though the key components of electronic transmission systems including secure capture, encryption, and transmission of election results in real-time or near real-time, ensure that citizens, political parties, and stakeholders have swift access to accurate election data; thereby fostering greater confidence in the integrity of elections, the question as to whether the 1st Respondent has, in the discharge of its statutory responsibility of midwifing the electoral process, failed to comply with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022 and which non-compliance substantially affected the outcome of the disputed election, must be determined in accordance with the letters and within the boundaries and province of the applicable laws in Nigeria. The fact that the 1st Respondent deployed BVAS machines and the IReV portal does not change the position that neither the Electoral Act nor the Regulations and Guidelines make it compulsory for results to be electronically transmitted or collated. In OYETOLA & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2023) LPELR- 60392 (SC) 22, paras A – E, this Court, provided clarification on the essence and status of the Collation System and the INEC Result Viewing (IReV) Portal and held as follows:

“As their names depict, the Collation System and the INEC Result Viewing Portal are part of the election process and play particular roles in that process. The Collation System is made of the centres where results are collated at various stages of the election. So the polling units results transmitted to the collation system provides the relevant collation officer the means to verify a polling unit result as the need arises for the purpose of collation. The results transmitted to the Result Viewing Portal is to give the public at large the opportunity to view the polling unit results on the election day. It is clear from the provisions of Regulation 38 (i) and (ii) that the Collation System and Result Viewing Portal are different from the National Electronic Register of Election Results. The Collation System and Result Viewing Portal are operational during the election as part of the process, the National Electronic Register of Election Results is a post-election record and is not part of the election process.”

Whereas the purpose of the Collation System is meant to provide the relevant collation officer the means to confirm/verify a polling unit result, the IReV Portal was deployed to allow the public view results in real-time. With this in mind, and having regard to the fact that neither the Electoral Act nor the Regulations and Guidelines, mandate that the election results be electronically transmitted, thereby allowing for manual transmission, it cannot then be heard that failure to upload result with the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) machines or device on the IReV Portal is a non- compliance of such nature that will substantially affect the outcome of the election. Therefore, the question as to whether there was non- compliance with the Electoral Act, 2022 by the failure to electronically transmit election result or whether the Appellants have discharged the burden of proving the non-compliance alleged by the 1st Respondent, does not arise in this case. Neither the Electoral Act, 2022 nor the Regulations and Guidelines mandate the electronic transmission/collation of election results by the 1st Respondents. – Per Tijjani Abubakar, JSC

 

---

S. 137 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT – WHETHER S. 137 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT ABSOLVES THE APPELLANT OF BURDEN OF PROOF

---

the provision of Section 137 of the Electoral Act, 2022, does not in any manner absolve the Appellants on the need to establish any alleged non-compliance; it is only where the non-compliance alleged is manifest on the face of the original copies or certified copies of documents brought before the Court. – Per Tijjani Abubakar, JSC

 

---

NOMINATION AND SPONSORSHIP – WHETHER A COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH ISSUES OF NOMINATION AND SPONSORSHIP OF A CANDIDATE FOR AN ELECTION

---

This issue has oftentimes been determined by this Court in a myriad of decided cases and the position is now trite that the issue of nomination and sponsorship of a candidate for an election is exclusively within the domestic or internal affairs of a political party which a Court cannot interfere, unless a complaint is lodged against his nomination pursuant to Sections 285(14) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 84(14) of the Electoral Act and Section 84(14) of the Electoral Act, 2022. See PDP & Anor. Vs. Lawal & Anor. (2022) LPELR – 59169 (SC), Pali Vs. Abdu & Ors. (2019) LPELR – 46342 (SC), Enang Vs. Asuquo & Ors. (2023) LPELR-60042 (SC). – Per J. I. Okoro, JSC

 

---

POLITICAL PARTY – WHETHER ANY STATUTE MANDATES THE COURT TO INQUIRE INTO WHICH POLITICAL PARTY A CANDIDATE BELONGED BEFORE CONTESTING AN ELECTION

---

I dare say that there is no statutory provision which mandates the Court to inquire into which political party a candidate belonged before contesting an election. What the law prescribes is that he must be a member of a political party and is sponsored by that political party. All that I am trying to say here is that as long as the 3rd Respondent which sponsored the 2nd Respondent has not raised any objection to his candidacy or denied that he is its member and was duly sponsored, the Appellants have no right to challenge his sponsorship. – Per J. I. Okoro, JSC

 

---

NOMINATION – CONDUCT OF COURTS TO ALL MATTERS OR ISSUES WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES

---

By the facts and evidence before us, it is a pre-election matter which has been settled abundantly by this Court. Every matter or issue within the parameters and circumference of nomination of a candidate, double nomination of a candidate, disqualification of a candidate, wrongful substitution of a successful candidate’s name by the Electoral Body, wrongful omission of a successful candidate’s name by the Electoral Body, complaints about the conduct of primaries, false declaration on oath about particulars of a candidate, have been considered to be a pre-election matter that cannot affect the qualification of a party to contest governorship election and not a matter for the election petition tribunal. See MODIBO v USMAN (2020) 3 NWLR (PT. 1712) 470 @ 500 – 515, GBILEVE V. ADDINGI (2014) 16 NWLR (PT. 1433) 394, ONI V. OYEBANJI (2023) LPELR (SC). – Per U. M. Abba-Aji, JSC

 

---

ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION OF RESULTS – THE PURPOSE OF ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION RESULTS – WHETHER IT IS MANDATORY TO ELECTRONICALLY TRANSMOT RESULTS

---

The Appellants challenged the Ebonyi State gubernatorial election held on 18th March, 2023, that produced the 2nd Respondent as Governor of the State, on the ground that it was invalid by reason of substantial non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022 in that, inter alia, the 1st Respondent did not electronically upload and transmit results of the polling units to the collation system and the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV). The point was exhaustively dealt with by this Court in APPEAL NO. SC/CV/935/2023 BETWEEN: ABUBAKAR ATIKU & ANOR V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) & 2 ORS (UNREPORTED) delivered on 26th October, 2023, before concluding that electronic transmission of results is not mandatory. There is no doubt that we are bound by the said decision.

It must be pointed out that the National Assembly in performing its legislative functions has made an attempt to make technology an integral part of our electoral process. This has the advantage of enhancing the integrity of elections and, truth be told, failure to use technology as intended can undermine the confidence of the voting public in the election conducted. That notwithstanding, perhaps in acknowledging the challenges that a complete dependence on technology may present, the lawmakers made detailed provisions for alternatives in the event that electronic transmission is not carried out. Hence, by the combined effect of the relevant provisions of the Electoral Act and INEC Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Elections, 2022, including Sections 60, 62(1) and 64(4) of the Electoral Act and Clauses 38, 48(b), (c) and Clause 93 of the INEC Regulations, electronic transmission is not mandatory. Thus, failure to transmit results electronically cannot, without more, amount to substantial noncompliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act. – Per Adamu Jauro, JSC

 

---

CASES CITED

---

---

STATUTES REFERRED TO

---

1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)

2. Electoral Act, 2022

3. INEC Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Elections, 2022

 

---

CLICK HERE TO READ FULL JUDGEMENT