CORAM
Ibrahim Mohammed Musa Saulawa-Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Jummai Hannatu Sankey -Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein -Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Obande Festus Ogbuinya- Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Abubakar Sadiq Umar- Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
PARTIES
CHUKWUKA OKORONKWO
APPELLANTS
INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC)
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION ACT, APPEAL, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Appellant was employed by the Respondent (INEC) in 1989 as an Administrative Officer. In January 1997, he was appointed an Electoral Officer and posted to Anambra State.
On September 13, 1997, the Appellant was suspended from work by the Respondent. On April 25, 2000, nearly three years after his suspension, the Appellant commenced an action at the Federal High Court, Enugu Judicial Division, seeking declarations that his suspension was wrongful, ultra vires, null and void; that he was entitled to be continued in his employment without inhibition by the letter of suspension; that he was entitled to his salary, promotion and other emoluments and benefits from September 13, 1997; and N1,000,000 damages for wrongful suspension.
The Respondent filed an Amended Statement of Defence, denying liability and raising a preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Court on the ground that the action was not commenced within three months as required by the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap 379, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. The Appellant, in his Reply, conceded that the cause of action arose on September 13, 1997, but argued that the Public Officers Protection Act did not apply to the suit as it was not founded on tort but on contract of service/employment.
The trial Federal High Court dismissed the preliminary objection and entered judgment in favor of the Appellant, granting all the reliefs sought. Dissatisfied, the Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the case was statute-barred under the Public Officers Protection Act since it was instituted approximately three years after the cause of action arose. The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of the trial Court and dismissed the Appellant’s case. Aggrieved, the Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
HELD
1. The appeal was dismissed.
2. The judgment of the Court of Appeal, Enugu Judicial Division, delivered on May 20, 2009, in appeal No. CA/E/188/2007, was affirmed.
3. The Court held that the Appellant’s cause of action arose on September 13, 1997, when he received his suspension letter, and the action was commenced on April 25, 2000, nearly three years after the cause of action arose, contrary to the three-month limitation period stipulated by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act.
4. The Court also held that the Public Officers Protection Act applies to contracts of employment where the employer is exercising statutory rights and duties, as in the present case, and not merely common law rights.
ISSUES
1. Whether the Court of Appeal was correct in law to have discountenanced the fact that in the circumstances, the Appellant’s suspension was a continuing injury or damage as stipulated under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap 379 Laws of Federation of Nigeria 1990 and not limited to the date of the letter of suspension — 13th day of September, 1997 only, and in so doing held that the Appellant’s cause of action is statute barred.?
2. Whether the Public Officers Protection Act Cap 379 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 applies to a cause of action founded on breach of contract of service/employment and as a corollary, whether the failure/omission of the Court of Appeal to determine the application or otherwise of the said limitation law did not occasion a miscarriage of justice.?
RATIONES DECIDENDI
STATUTE-BARRED ACTIONS – THE EFFECT OF STATUTE OF LIMITATION ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT:
“In the instant case, it is clear as earlier stated, that the Respondent failed to commence his action against the Appellant on the alleged wrongful suspension within the time prescribed.
Therefore, by virtue of the provisions of the Pubic Officers Protection Act, (supra), the action is statute-barred, robbing the lower Court of the required competence to adjudicate on the matter. In other words, the Respondent’s action having been caught by limitation of action law, is statute-bared and the trial Court therefore lacked competence to entertain the matter.
Having entertained it, the entire proceedings including the judgment is a nullity…” – Per A. Sanusi, JCA
CAUSE OF ACTION – WHEN A CAUSE OF ACTION BECOMES STATUTE-BARRED:
“A cause of action could be said to be statute-barred, where the proceedings can not be commenced because the period prescribed under the law of limitation has already lapsed.
And this can be determined simply by critically, albeit dispassionately, considering the originating process (the writ of summons and the statement of claim, or originating summons or motion, and the supporting Affidavit), alleging when the wrong was actually committed, thereby giving the Plaintiff a cause pf action. Thus, once the date on which the Originating process was filed is beyond the period prescribed by the limitation law, then the action is deemed to be statute-barred.” – Per IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.S.C.
STATUTE OF LIMITATION – THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF LIMITATION ISSUE:
It’s trite, that once an issue of limitation of time (statute bar) to institute a suit is raised, it becomes a preliminary issue, thereby touching upon the competence of not merely the action itself, but of the Court concerned. That’s absolutely so, because the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental thus must be resolved before proceeding to determine the case on the merits, if the issue is found unmeritorious.”– Per IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.S.C.
PURPOSE OF LIMITATION STATUTES – THE ESSENCE OF STATUTE OF LIMITATION:
“The whole essence of statute of limitation, is that where law prescribes a period within which an action should be filed, legal proceedings can not properly or validly be commenced after the expiration of the prescribed period. Thus, an action instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period is deemed to be statute barred.” – Per IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.S.C.
SCOPE OF PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION ACT – APPLICATION TO CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT:
“Fundamentally, Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act (supra) applies to contract of service, as in the instant case, where the Appellant was an employee of the Respondent, thereby entitling the latter to exercise its statutory right and duty (not being a Common Law right or contract under the master and Servant Relationship).”– Per IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.S.C.
STATUTORY LIMITATION – MANDATORY NATURE OF TIME LIMITATION UNDER PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION ACT:
“By the above provision, it is mandatory for any action commenced against any public act by a public officer to be so commenced within three months from the date of which the cause of action arose. In juxtaposition to the instant case, the Appellant commenced this action at the trial Court in April of the year 2000, essentially challenging his suspension by the Respondent. The said suspension occurred on 13-09-1997. Contrary to the argument of the Appellant that the cause of action is one that is continuing in nature, the cause of action apparently arose on the 13-09-1997. Thus, the Appellant’s suit ought to have been commenced three months from that date and not beyond. In other words, the action is statute barred.”– Per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.S.C.
EFFECT OF STATUTE-BARRED ACTIONS – CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH LIMITATION PERIOD:
“It is the law that any action brought beyond the period laid down by statute is statute barred.
It automatically takes away the right of an aggrieved party to seek redress over such action. It does not matter whether or not there is merit in that suit.”– Per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.S.C.
PURPOSE OF PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION ACT – PROTECTION FROM UNNECESSARY LITIGATION:
“The law is settled that the intendment of the Public Officers Protection Act is to protect a public office from detraction, distraction and redundant or unnecessary litigation… The Act is intended as much as within the limits of the law to protect a public officer from detraction and unnecessary litigation.”– Per MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.S.C.
DUTY TO SEEK PROMPT REDRESS – OBLIGATION ON PLAINTIFFS TO TIMELY INSTITUTE ACTIONS:
“The law is that a claimant or plaintiff must promptly seek redress in Court, upon the breach of his rights, within the time stipulated by law.”– Per MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.S.C.
JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TO INDOLENT PARTIES – COURTS WILL NOT AID DILATORY LITIGANTS:
‘The appellant knew that his right of action accrued on the 13th day of September, 1997 but waited, without any justifiable reason, until the 26th day of April, 2000 before instituting his action in Court. He has himself to blame for his inertia over the alleged breach of his contract of employment by the respondent. The appellant has not also been able to demonstrate that his claims fall within the known exceptions to the application of the Public Officers Protection Act. In the circumstances of this case, the appellant cannot be assisted by the Court. The law is that an indolent party cannot be aided by the Court.– Per MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.S.C.
APPLICABILITY OF LIMITATION STATUTE TO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS – DISTINCTION BETWEEN TYPES OF CONTRACTS:
“It is an elementary law that an action rooted in contract of employment is amenable to limitation law, for instance Section 2 of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. Per contra, an action propagated under specific contract, such as contract for work done, is disobedient to limitation legislation.” – Per OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.S.C.
EXCEPTIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION ACT – CATEGORIES OF CLAIMS EXCLUDED FROM THE ACT:
“The Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to cases of recovery of land, breaches of contract, or claims for labour or work done… I think that the phrase claims for labour or work done means: demands for compensation or payment for labour, services or work that has been completed or performed.”– Per MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.S.C.
CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS – STATUTORY VS. COMMON LAW EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS:
“As aptly posited by the Respondent's learned Counsel, generally, contracts of employment essentially falls into three categories: (i) Master And Servant Relationship; (ii) Where Servant holds an office at the pleasure of the Master; and (iii) The employment is governed by a statute… The question whether a contract of employment is governed by a statute or otherwise invariably depends upon the construction of the contract itself vis-a-vis the relevant statute. – Per IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.S.C.
CASES CITED
STATUTES REFERRED TO
Public Officers Protection Act Cap 379, Laws of Federation of Nigeria 1990
Public Officers Special Provisions Act Cap 381, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria
1990
Evidence Act
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)
Supreme Court Act, 2004
Supreme Court Rules (as amended in 2008)