CORAM
BELLO, JUSTICE SUPREME COURT
OBASEKI, JUSTICE SUPREME COURT
KAZEEM, JUSTICE SUPREME COURT
ANIAGOLU, JUSTICE SUPREME COURT
OPUTA, JUSTICE SUPREME COURT
PARTIES
BABATUNDE AJAYI
APPELLANTS
TEXACO NIGERIA LIMITED & ORS
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
CONTRACT- BREACH
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The appellant prayed the trial court for a declaration that he is the operations manager of the 1st respondents company under a contract of employment and that any breach of the said employment is null and void and an order of injunction against the respondents
HELD
The Court held that the High Court therefore erred in assessing and making an award of damages and that the Court of appeal was t4erefore justified in interfering with the findings of fact
ISSUES
(1) whether or not in all the circumstances, the Court of appeal ought to have interfered with the findings of the learned trial judge;
(2) whether it is correct as the court of Appeal held that Exhibit Dl governed the quantum of the plaintiffs entitlements;
(3) whether the Court of Appeal was correct in holding that the termination of the plaintiff’s employment was proper and that the allegation of malice was unsubstantiated.
RATIONES DECIDENDI
ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT
‘What is “anticipatory breach” of a contract? It is a breach of contract caused by the repudiation of obligations not yet ripe for performance. As Lord Blackburn puts it in Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor Benzon and Co. (1884) 9 App Cas 434: “Where there is a contract to be performed in the future, if one of the parties has said to the other in effect. ‘If you go on and perform your side of the contract, I will not perform mine’ that in effect amounts to saying ‘I will not perform the contract.’ In that case, the other party may say ‘you have given me distinct notice that you will not perform the contract, I will not wait until you broken it, but I will treat you as having put an end to the contract and if necessary I will sue you in damages, but at all events, I will not go on with the contract’. Obaseki, JSC.
ON WHETHER MALICE OR IMPROPER MOTIVE CAN VITIATE THE VALIDITY OF THE EXERCISE OF A RIGHT TO TERMINATE VALIDLY AN EMPLOYMENT.
‘Where in a contract of employment there exists a right to terminate the contract given to either party, the validity of the exercise of that right cannot be vitiated by the existence of malice or improper motive. It is not the law that motive vitiates the validity of the exercise of a right to terminate validly an employment of the employee. There must be other considerations. The exercise is totally independent of the motive that prompted the exercise.’ Obaseki, JSC.
CASES CITED
1 Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor Benzon and Co. (1884) 9 App Cas 434
2 Daniesl v. Shell-BP (1962) 1 All N. L. R. 19
3 Alran v. Eshiett (1977) 1 SC. 89 at 96-97
4 Kusamotu v. Wemabod Estate Ltd (1976) 11 SC. 79 at 293
5 Chief Frank Ebba v. Chief Ogodo (1984) 4 SC. 92 1 SC. NLR.372
6 Woluchem v. Gudi (1981) 5 SC.291 at 320;
7 Emegokwe v. Okadigbo (1973) 4 SC. 113, 117;
8 Metalirnpex v. A. G. Leventis (Nig) Ltd. (1976) , SC. 91 at p. 102;
STATUTES REFERRED TO
Not Available