CORAM
BOLARINWA OYEGOKE BABALAKI JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
PARTIES
ALHAJI MOHAMMED BELLO APPELLANTS
1.GOVERNOR OF GOMBE STATE2. GOVERNMENT OF GOMBE STATE3.ATTORNEYGENERAL & COMMISSIONER FOR JUSTICE GOMBE STATE4. DSP HASSAN USMAN RTD RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Plaintiff/Appellant was appointed and enthroned as the sitting Emir of Yamaltu in 2000. In the year 2003, the Government of Gombe State through the Auditor- General for Local Government carried out an audit inspection of the accounts of Yamaltu Emirate Council. Concerned by the report of the auditors, the Government of Gombe State through the office of the Secretary to the State Government, by a letter demanded that the Appellant within 24hours responds to the allegations of some financial improprieties in the handling of the account of Yamaltu Emirate Council, to which the Appellant obliged. The Appellant was later served with a letter of his removal from office as the Emir of Yamaltu, and a replacement was made. He was deposed, ostracized and banished to Nafada, a town in Gombe State, where he lives in exile. It is on account of these unfolding developments or events that the Appellant approached the trial Court to challenge his deposition, banishment and the letter (s) or queries served on him, describing all these as irregular, illegal null and void. The trial Court in a considered Judgment dismissed the claim of the Plaintiff on account of his failure to discharge the burden placed on him by law. The Plaintiff/Appellant dissatisfied with the judgment, appealed to the Court of Appeal. The 4th Respondent by his Notice raise a preliminary objection pursuant to Order 10 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rule 2011, which was majorly on the defects on the writ, that it had no suit number, that the 4th Respondent who was not made a party to the suit was served with the writ, that the writ was not properly headed among other.
HELD
Preliminary Objection Dismissed, Appeal Allowed.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Lower Court was right to dismiss the Appellants’’ case (Distilled from Originating Grounds 2, 3 and 4).
Whether or not the appointment of the 4th Respondent by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents is caught up by the doctrine of his pendis (Distilled from Originating Ground).
Whether or not Section 11A , 11B, 11C and 11D of the creation of Emirate, District, Village, Ward and Appoint and Deposition of Emirates and Chiefs (Amendment) Law 2004 of Gombe State pursuant to which the Appellant was arrested, detained and banished are inconsistent with Section 34(1), 35(1), 36(1) and 41(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. (Distilled from Additional Grounds 5 and 6).
RATIONES DECIDENDI
ORIGINATING PROCESS- NATURE AND VALIDITY OF A WRIT OF SUMMONS.
“A Writ of Summons is by its nature the process which heralds the activities of the Court judically, especially in the Superior Courts of record, upon the application being made by the Plaintiff requiring of the defendant to appear and give answers to any claim made against him. Since a Writ is akin to an Originating Process in the Court, the validity of same is dependent on and is conditioned upon set rules as for instance the form the writ is to take, the mode or manner the Writ was issued, facts as to whether the Writ was issued upon payment of certain fees and the rest of it.”
PAYMENT OF FILING FEE – EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.
“Relative to the payment of filing fees, the Civil Procedure Rules applicable to Gombe State provide under Order 53 Rule 1 (1) as Follows:-
“Subject to the provision of any written law and of the foregoing orders:
(1) The fees set out in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th appendix shall be payable by any person commencing the respective service for which they are specified in those appendix…”
The wordings of that provision of the Rules are couched in such mandatory terms as to give no room to the litigant or the Claimant who comes to court to file a process to turn his back and leave after dropping the process without having to meet the financial aspect of the obligation to pay requisite fees for filing that process. Failure by the litigant or claimant to make payment on all processes filed by him will oust the jurisdiction of the Courts to entertain the case relative to that process. The case of Abia State Transport Corporation V. Quorum Consortium Ltd (2009) 3-4 SC 187 and Abubakar V. Nasamu (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 630) are cases on point. The Apex Court has held in Onwugbufor V. Okoye (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 424) 295 at page 292 that:
“Quite apart from the fact that court orders must be obeyed as directed, it cannot be overemphasized that for a valid and effective commencement of a claim, the intending Plaintiff shall strictly comply with the provisions of relevant statutes and the rules made there under and governing the claims made such as the High Court law and the Rules of Anambra State. It is the responsibility of the Plaintiff inter alia to pay the requisite fees in respect of each and every reliefs to enable the Court Judicial functions to Commence. A Court shall not entertain a relief claimed without payment of the of the prescribed requisite fees being a condition precedent to the filing of a valid claim before the Court, it seems to me clear that the claim for forfeiture in the present suit is incompetent, improper the court and ought to be struck out.”
The same consideration should apply in my view to cases of a Writ of Summons or processes which though assessed and filed in the registry of the Court but were not duly authenticated by the person bringing it, the Court will not in those circumstances entertain such a process in the exercise of its Judicial functions, an issue which had the affirmation of this court in Aunam (Nig) Ltd Vs Leventis Motors Ltd. (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 01) 458.”
ISSUE OF NON-PAYMENT OF RELEVANT FILING FEES – NATURE OF THE ISSUE OF NON-PAYMENT OF RELEVANT FILING FEES ON A COURT PROCESS
“The issue of non-payment of relevant filing fees on a process and the failure by the party bringing it to authenticate that process are issues of fundamental importance so far as it raises queries on the authority of the courts to adjudicate on the matter. The apex court has held in Kida VS. Ogunmola (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt.997) 377 per Musdapher, JSC (as he then was) that:
“The validity of the originating processes in a proceedings before a court is fundamental, as the competence of the proceeding is a condition sine qua non to the legitimacy of any suit, therefore the failure to commence proceedings with a valid writ of summons goes to the root of the case and any order emanating from such proceedings is liable to be set aside as incompetent and a nullity. It clearly borders on the issue of jurisdiction and the competence of the court to adjudicate on the matter. Such issue can be raised at any time and it can never be alien to the proceedings…”
COURT’S REGISTRY- WHETHER A LITIGANT SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR THE LACK OF DISCHARGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES OF A COURT’S REGISTRY
“The duty of ascribing a Suit number and process to a case filed in the Courts are administrative functions vested in the registry for which the litigant should not take the blame where the Registry is found wanting in the discharge if its administrative duties. See: Dasofunjo V. Oni (1966) 2 All NLR 291; Duke V. Akpabayo Local Government (2005) 12 SC (Pt. 1) 1 or (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 130; BBN Ltd. V. Olayiwole & Sons Ltd (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 912) 434, 456; Olatonsosun Vs. Annenih (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1165) 560, 571.”
REMOVAL OF AN EMIR OR CHIEF – CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH AN EMIR OR CHIEF MAY BE DEPOSED UNDER THE EMIR AND CHIEFS LAW OF 2004 OF GOMBE STATE
“Permit me for the moment to revert to the law, the Emir and Chiefs law of 2004 of Gombe State. It is the law which Make provision for the Appointment and Deposition of Emirs and Chiefs. That law provides at Section 11(1) circumstances under which an Emir or Chief may be deposed. It provides as follows:-
“11(1) By reason of gross misconduct or incompetence or in public interest the Governor may after due consultation depose an Emir, Chief, District Head, Village Head or Ward Head if:-
(a)it is necessary for the preservation of peace order and good government, and
(b)The person concerned has been given the time and opportunity to defend himself…”
I do not think that the legislature in enacting that law intended to create a Gestapo out of the Governor who defies all rules and principles but unto whom is vested with the power of removal of any Emir, Chief etc., on account of gross misconduct, or incompetence or it is in the public interest that the Emir or Chief can be so removed. In the exercise of this power, it is incumbent on the Governor to first hold Consultation. Although we are not told with whom the Governor is to consult, the fact remains that the Governor cannot act alone. He must consult or hold consultation presumably with somebody before a decision is taken. A decision taken to remove or depose an Emir or Chief can be made only where it is necessary for the preservation of peace, Order and Good Government subject to the opportunity being extended to the person, the subject whose removal is proposed, calling on him to defend himself. These are conditions precedent to the exercise of the power of removal by the Governor, the absence of which the decision of the Governor to remove or depose an Emir or Chief can be set aside as arbitrary and irregular.
The case of Oyeyemi Vs. Commissioner for Local Government (1992) 11/12 SCNJ 266 comes to mind on the need for the Governor or the authority vested with power of removal to fulfil all conditions precedent to the exercise of that power. See further Exparte Adebo (1962) WRNLR 93;Orisakwe V. Governor of Imo (1982)1 FNR 152, 173-174,;Yakubu V. Governor of Kogi State (1997) 7 NWLR (Pt. 511) 66, 88.
I should also add that the Governor cannot Exercise his power of removal of an Emir or Chief under the law without “reason” being shown of “gross” misconduct or incompetence or in the public interest…”
The exercise of the power of removal is not complete if no reason is shown. The two are not synonymous. The law vest in the Governor the power to dethrone an Emir or Chief but the exercise of this power is in itself not the reason envisaged under the law, that is the Emir and Chief Law (2004) as amended, of Gombe State.”
EVIDENCE OF NON–COMPLIANCE WITH THE EMIR AND CHIEFS LAW OF 2004 OF GOMBE STATE – ON WHO LIES THE EVIDENCE OF PROVING NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE EMIR AND CHIEFS LAW OF 2004 OF GOMBE STATE
“So, the burden of introducing evidence of non –compliance with the provision of the law lie with the complainant or the person who is aggrieved by the decision of the Governor in the exercise of his powers of removal of an Emir or Chief. This is in line with Sections 131, 132 and 134 of the Evidence Act,. 2011 Cap E. 14”
PLEADINGS- NATURE AND RATIONALE FOR PLEADINGS
“Pleadings define the modus operendi and delimits the extent, scope and space within which the litigant is allowed to operate. See Odunukwe V. Adebanjo (1999) 4 NWLR (Pt.598)317, 320; Okwaranoni & Ors. V. Ibeke mbadugha &Ors. 2013)6 SCNJ 346; Sule Eyigebe V. MusaIyayi (2013) 5 SCNJ 428.This Court in Odunukwe V. Adebanjo (supra) speaking on the purpose of pleading and the mischief it is intended to arrest held as follows:-
“The aim of pleading is to enable parties reflect all the relevant material facts which must feature in the pleadings, the purpose of pleadings…, is to state, accurately the issues for trial and to appraise the other side of the case which it will meet in Court. Thus surprises or prevarications are never allowed in the conduct of cases in courts where pleadings are ordered.”
See further: Mrs. Vidah C. Okechukwu V. Attorney-General of Riverse State & Ors (2012) 2 SCNJ 58.; Buhari V. Obasanjo (2005 13 NWLR (Pt. 941) 1, 70; Order 24 Rule 4(2) and Order 24 Rule 11 of High Court Civil Procedure Rules Gombe State.”
EXAMINATION OF WITNESS- WHETHER A PARTY CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EVIDENCE PROFFERED DURING CROSS-EXAMINATION
“In Akomolade V. Guardian Press Ltd (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 118) 338, 357, Saji Vs. PAYE (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt. 923) 583; Alhaji MK vs. Bank of Nigeria Plc (2011) LP ELR 8971 (CA); Slee Transport Ltd Vs. Oladipo Oluwwagon & Ors. (1973 3 ECSLR (Pt. 11) 1183 it was held that the party on the other side can take advantage of evidence elicited under cross-examination of witness called by the adversary provided that evidence is covered by the pleadings.”
BURDEN OF PROOF – ON WHO LIES BURDEN OF PROVING A FACT
“The law is settled that the burden of first proving a fact is usually on the plaintiff. Sometimes it shifts to the defendant, depending on the state of the pleadings. However, he who asserts must prove, and so the burden is placed on the person asserting to establish his allegations. It is equally the law that the burden rests on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. The burden only shifts after the plaintiff must have discharged the initial burden on him. See Section 133, 135, 136 and 138 of the Evidence Act; Yesufu V Adama (2010) 3 SCNJ 95; Jolasun V Bamgboye (2010) 12 SCNJ 315; Egharevba V Osagie (2009) 12 SCNJ 166; Eya V Olopade (2011) 5 SCNJ 98; Dim V Enumuo (2009) 4 SCNJ 199. Orji V Dorji Textiles mill Nig. Ltd (2009) 12 SCNJ 251; Eyo V Onuoha (2011) 3 SCNJ 302; UBN Plc V Ajabule (2011) 12 SCNJ 133; & Arisons Trading & Eng. Co. Ltd V The Military Gov of Ogun State (2009) 6 SCNJ 141.”
STANDARD OF PROOF – STANDARD OF PROOF IN CIVIL LITIGATION
“Nevertheless, the burden of proof cannot be determined in vacuo but in relation to the issues raised in the pleadings. Where a fact is pleaded, no onus is cast on the other side to disprove the fact not proved. At the end of the day, proof in civil cases is determined on a preponderance of evidence and the balance of probability. However, a party can rely on the evidence of an opposing party which is in line with his case. Finally, it is not the practice to consider each paragraph of a party‘s pleadings in isolation but in conjunction with each other.”
ADMISSION OF FACTS – DUTY OF THE COURT WHEN FACTS ARE ADMITTED
“The law is since settled that a fact admitted by the other side needs no proof. See Also, admissions are relevant against the party who made it or his agent or principal. Therefore, a trial Judge is not to lose sight of any admission of material facts that may have been made by any one of the parties so as to add more weight to the evidence by the other. See Taiwo V Adegboro (2011) 5 SCNJ 125; FRN V Iweka (2011) 12 SCNJ 783; Shasi V Smith (2009) 12 SCNJ 210; Oseni V Bajulu (2009) 12 SCNJ 74; Federal Ministry of Health V Comet Shipping Agencies (2009) 4 SCNJ 173; & Kaydee Venture Ltd V The Hon. Minister of FCT (2010) 2 SCNJ 276.”
EVALUATION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE- WHETHER AN APPELLATE COURT CAN EVALUATE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE BEFORE IT
“Hence, an appellate court is on an equal pedestal as a trial court in the evaluation of documentary evidence. It is at liberty to examine exhibits and make logical deductions therefrom. Where documentary evidence is not challenged in any manner pejorative as to its integrity and authenticity, it is capable of being believed by the court. In the event that both documentary and oral evidence is given, the former stands as a yardstick and a hangar from which to assess the oral testimony. See: Egharevba V Osagie (supra); & Anyanwu V Uzowuaka (2009) 7 SCNJ 29; Salisu V Odumade (2010) 2 SCNJ 257; Ogbe V Asade (2009) 12 SCNJ 288; & Cameroon Airlines V Otutuizu (2011) 2 SCNJ 96; & Jinadu V Esurombi-Aro (2009) 4 SCNJ 39.”
RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING – CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEED RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING
“This is not surprising in view of Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution which guarantees fair hearing to all its citizens. See Ude V Nwana (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 638 at 644; and UNN Teaching Hosp. Mgt. Bd. V Nnoli (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 363) 376 at 401, where Onu, JSC held as follows:
“When a statute directs that a certain procedure be followed before a person can be deprived of his right, whether in respect of his person, property or office, such procedure must be strictly followed.”
COURT- RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COURT TO HEAR ALL PENDING APPLICATIONS BEFORE IT
“Nevertheless, the law is clear that applications/motions pending before a court, no matter how frivolous or irrelevant, must be determined and disposed of before a court can proceed to judgment. The applicant has a constitutional right to be heard. A court is therefore not cloaked with any jurisdiction or discretion to decide otherwise, or else the Judgment is a nullity. See: Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria V Wamal Express Services (Nig) Ltd (2011) 1 SCNJ 133; Akpan V Effiong Bob (2010) 5 SCNJ 141. In the celebrated case of Mobil Producing Nigeria Unltd V Monokpo (2003) 12 SCNJ 206 at 235-237, Uwaifo, JSC emphasized this point in these words:
“It has been laid down in many decisions that it is the duty of a court to entertain and decide on the merit of any application brought before it by any party notwithstanding the perceived strength or weakness of such an application. It seems to me that this principle of law has been solidly laid down by the Court of Appeal. There are very many of its decided cases on it, a few may be cited thus: Eguamwense V Amaghizemwen (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 41) 282; Harods Ltd V Anifalaje (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 43) 603; Kptoye V Saraki (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt. 528) 309; Okoro V Okoro (1998) 3 NWLR (Pt. 540) 65; Eruobuna V Obiorah (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 616) 622.Of the six cases cited above, Tobi, JCA made pronouncements in the last four in regard to the principle of law in question which I think will project the principle. Whether in his leading Judgments or his contributions in those cases, the learned Justice of Appeal made a consistent observation. To quote what he said in his leading Judgment in Eriobuna V Obiorah (supra) at page 642:
“A court of law or a tribunal has a legal duty in our adjectival law to hear any court process, including a motion before it. The process may be downright stupid, unmeritorious or even an abuse of court process. The court must hear the party or parties and rule one way or the other. A judge, whether of a court of law or tribunal, has no jurisdiction to come to a conclusion by resorting to his own wisdom outside established due process that a motion cannot be heard because it has no merit. That does not lie in the mouth of a judge in our adversary system of adjudication. The failure on the part of the learned tribunal to hear the motion of the 1st appellant filed on 1st May 1999 is against the provisions of section 33(1) of the 1979 Constitution on fair hearing, and particularly the natural justice rule of audi alterem partem.”
“… It is not only essential but mandatory for a court before which a motion (application) has been brought to hear and determine it at the appropriate time. It has no right to refuse to hear it unless possibly in a proper circumstance in the exercise of its punitive jurisdiction against a contemnor of a court order who is expected to purge himself of the contempt before he could be heard. Otherwise the court must set the motion down and hear and determine it one way or another even if it might be of the opinion that the motion was brought late and what it seeks is downright irregular and frivolous. It has to give the applicant a hearing. It is a basic right. If for any reason the motion was not expeditiously drawn to the attention of the court by the court officials who ought to do so, that could be no excuse for simply discountenancing it when later the court came to learn of its existence and instead proceeding to give judgment or make some order, more particularly when a decision on the motion was likely to have had a bearing on the judgment or order. The adversarial system of our justice administration demands no less. A refusal of a court to hear a motion is a breach of the right to a fair hearing guaranteed under the Constitution and an essence of the audi alterm partem rule of natural justice. It is perhaps important to add that if a judge or court were at liberty to decide to ignore any motion filed in court it would raise a fundamental issue. There will be a danger that instead of allowing the administration of justice to be done upon a compulsory even keel, it may be left to the tyranny of the arbitrary or selective decision of a particular judge or court as to and when any motion will be considered at all. The consequences of this to the normal run of court proceedings are disturbing to contemplate.”
PROCEEDINGS PENDING IN COURT – DUTY OF PARTIES TO RESTRAIN FROM ACTS PREJUDICIAL TO THE PROCEEDINGS PENDING IN COURT
“The law is certain that parties to proceedings pending in court should not do anything which may have the effect of rendering nugatory the judgment of the court or do anything which is prejudicial to the matter before the court. A party may not alter to his advantage or the disadvantage of his opponent issues in contest in a pending suit. This is the sort of action that was equally strongly deprecated by the Apex Court in Military Governor of Lagos State V Ojukwu V (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621 at 643; Uba V Etiaba (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1082) 154; & Sulu-Gambari V Bukola (2004) 1 NWLR (Pt. 853) 122.”
EVIDENTIAL BURDEN OF PROOF- NATURE OF EVIDENTIAL BURDEN OF PROOF IN CIVIL MATTER
“Generally, in civil proceedings it is to be constantly borne in mind that the burden of proof is not static in the sense that it depends on the issues of facts as joined by the parties so much so that it shifts from one party to the other depending on who asserts what and on whom the burden of introducing evidence lies. Thus the general onus of proof lies on the person who asserts the positive and not on the person who asserts the negative as enshrined in the Latin maxim: “Eiqui affirmat non eiqui negat uncumbit probatur”. In law, therfore, it is now well settled that he who asserts must prove his assertion except where his asssertion was admitted or not effectively denied and thus deemed admitted by the adverse party. See Ayinde V. Abiodun (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 616) 587. See also Ewo V. Ani (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 861) 610; Trade Bank Plc. V. Chami (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 836) 158; Osaruwa V. Ezeiruka (1978) 6 – 7 SC 135; Umeojiako V. Ezenamuo (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 126) 250; Ugbo V. Aburime (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 273) 101.”
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE- BASIS FOR THE SUPERIORITY OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OVER ORAL EVIDENCE
“The law is well settled and it is that the law accords a measure of primacy to documentary evidence as against oral evidence. This being so because, most of the documentary evidence being in a permanent form is less susceptible to afterthoughts and thus more reliable than oral evidence. It is for this reason that in law whenever documentary evidence is available in addition to oral evidence, it is used as hangers on which the veracity or credibility of oral evidence is tested or assessed by the courts. See Ezemba V. Ibeneme (2009) 14 NWLR (Pt. 798) 623. See also Nwankpu V. Ewulu (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt. 407) 269; Fashaun V. Adekoya (1974) 6 SC 83; Kimdey V. Military Governor of Gongola State (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 77) 445.”
EXAMINATION OF WITNESS – WHETHER EVIDENCE ELICITED DURING CROSS EXAMINATION IS RELEVANT BEFORE THE COURT
“I am fortified and guided by the trite position of the law in several decisions as are replete in the law reports to the effect that evidence elicited under cross examination once it is on facts pleaded by either or any of the parties to the suit is relevant and properly before the court in as much the same way as evidence led in chief in support of pleaded facts. In law, therefore such an evidence cannot be glossed over by the Court or ignore or discountenanced or brushed aside by the court merely because it was a product of cross examination as not being pleaded by the Appellant, it having been duly pleaded by the 1st – 3rd Respondents. See Akomolafe V. Guardian Press Ltd. (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1181) 338 @ p. 351. See also Bamgboye V. Olarenwaju (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 184) 132; Ogbeide V. Osula (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 86; Chief Eze V. Brig. Gen Okoloagu (Rtd.) (2009) LPELR 3922 CA; Jimoh V. Ayandoye (2012) LPELR 8006 CA.”
RULE OF LAW- ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNED AND GOVERNOR MUST BE IN LINE WITH THE LAW
“My lords, I thought I should perhaps further reiterate that in this Country governed according to the law and democratic norms, the law is no respecter of persons and frowns at every affront to and infractions of the rule of law once proved. It abhors impunity in whatever disguise. When the law stipulates that reason must be given for the exercise of powers conferred by it, particularly in the instant appeal for the deposition of the Appellant by the Governor of Gombe State, then reason must be proffered for any valid exercise of that power, which thus cannot be exercised in disregard of the provisions of the law in a Nation governed by law. Both those who govern and those they govern are subject to the law and must therefore, operate within the ambits and confines of relevant laws. Anything less or else will endanger the rule of law, the very soul of every civilized democracies wherever it is practiced in the world and Gombe State nay Nigeria is no exception to this rule. This was the position of the law even under Military rule in this Country, and should be so with even more force under Civilian democracy as currently practiced in Nigeria. See Military Governor of Lagos State V. Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621, where Kayode Eso JSC., (God bless his soul)…… “
CASES CITED
Not Available
STATUTES REFERRED TO
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999|Court of Appeal Rule, 2011|Emir and Chiefs law of 2004 of Gombe State. Evidence act