ALHAJI GARBA KAYERI v. ALHAJI UMARU KWALLA

Sections 2 and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act provide as follows: “2. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person shall be entitled to practice as a Barrister and Solicitor if and only if his name is on the roll.” “24. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meanings hereby assigned to them respectively, that is to say – “Legal Practitioner” means a person entitled in accordance with the provisions of this Act to practice as a barrister or as a barrister and solicitor, either generally or for the purpose of any particular proceedings;” By these provisions, all processes filed by a Legal Practitioner in Court must be signed in total compliance with these provisions. Any non-compliance will prove fatal to any proceedings arising therefrom. The provisions have been the cynosure of many judicial decisions in the past such that it has become settled in law that processes filed in Court must be signed by a Legal Practitioner, especially where it relates to an originating process such as a Further Amended Statement of claim in this case, which by the reason of amendment, dates back to the initial statement of claim. Reference to a few of these decisions will suffice to make the point. In the case of SLB Consortium Ltd V NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 317, 337-338, Rhodes-Vivour, JSC stated thus – “All processes filed in Court are to be signed as follows: First, the signature of counsel, which may be any contraption. Secondly, the name of counsel written. Thirdly, who the counsel represents. Fourthly, name and address of legal firm. Once it cannot be said who signed a process, it is incurably bad, and rules of court that seem to provide a remedy are of no use as a rule cannot override a law (i.e. the Legal Practitioners Act).” Again, in R.A. Oluyide & Sons Ltd V OAU, Ile-Ife (2018) LPELR-43711(SC) 16, A- Ogunbiyi, JSC held – “It is a matter of law to stress emphatically that the issue of non signing of the appellant’s Brief by a Legal Practitioner is jurisdictional. The law is trite and elementary that an issue of jurisdiction cannot be waived. As stated earlier, it is not an irregularity and can be raised at any time, even for the first time in this Court as held severally… In other words, the lower Court acted without jurisdiction when it allowed the appeal of the Respondent based on an incompetent Brief of argument. In the eyes of the law, the Respondent herein abandoned its appeal at the lower Court because it (the appellant at the lower Court) did not have a competent Brief of argument before the Court; the lower Court in the result acted without jurisdiction when it allowed the appeal of the respondent based on an incompetent Brief of argument. The Respondent’s Brief (Appellant at the lower Court) was signed by a proxy unknown to law… As a consequence, I hereby set aside the decision of the Court of Appeal for want of jurisdiction having relied on an incompetent appellant’s brief in arriving at its decision.” At pages 30-31, D-F of the Report, Sanusi, JSC also held as follows – “It seems to me that the issue at hand relates to non-signing of a process by a Legal practitioner which is purely a jurisdictional issue, because no appeal can properly be placed on an invalid or incompetent process. The respondent’s learned counsel’s stance is that the non-signing of the brief is merely a breach of the rules of Court which can be regarded as a mere irregularity. I do not share that view of his. It is beyond violation of rules of Court. This is because the Legal Practitioners Act provides that all processes filed in Court must be signed by a known and named Legal Practitioner as opposed to an unknown proxy who is obviously not a Legal Practitioner known to law. In the case at hand, it has been confirmed that neither any known legal practitioner nor Chief Olujinmi SAN, the learned Silk who purportedly authored the brief of argument in question on behalf of the appellant at the Court below, (now respondent herein) had signed the Brief… In that regard I am inclined to agree with the appellant’s contention that the respondent’s brief (filed at the lower Court on behalf of the Appellant thereat) is invalid and incompetent. The non-signing of the Brief of argument of the appellant thereat, had therefore vitiated the the Jurisdiction of the Court below to rely and act on it and determine the appeal before it, because in actual fact, there was no brief of the appellant and as such no competent Brief for it to rely on, hear and determine the appeal since its jurisdiction is eroded for non-availability of a competent brief of argument filed by an appellant before it.” See also Okafor V Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 521. By the same token and following the decision of the apex Court above, the trial Court’s reliance on an incompetent Further Amended Statement of Claim, which was signed by a proxy unknown to law, to wit: Ba’aba & Co., which is a Law Firm and not a Legal Practitioner whose name can be found on the Roll of the Supreme Court, vitiated the jurisdiction of the trial Court to rely and act on it in the hearing and determination of the case. This is because in actual fact, there was no competent Further Amended Statement of Claim for it to have relied on when it purported to hear and determine the case. The trial Court’s jurisdiction was eroded due to the non-availability of a competent Statement of Claim filed by the Plaintiff (now Respondent) before it. It has rendered the proceedings, as well as the decision of the trial Court arising therefrom, a nullity. Thus, the Judgment now appealed against, having been based on an incompetent process, that is, the Further Amended Statement of Claim, cannot stand as it was given without jurisdiction. –

“In the consideration of an Appeal from the decision of a trial Court, the duty of this Court is to review the findings of the said Court and decide whether it came to a right decision. Thus, my responsibility is not to re-evaluate the evidence of the parties adduced at the trial Court and to make my own findings thereon. Rather, it is to decide whether the lower Court was right in its decision in the light of its own review of the findings of the trial Court. Traditionally and as a matter of law therefore, an appellate Court should not interfere with findings of facts of a trial Court, except where the findings do not correspond with the evidence before it. In such a circumstance, the findings are described as perverse. It is in this vein that the Supreme Court in Adamu V State (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1565) 459, admonished thus: “Unless the Appellant is able to show that the said findings are perverse, this Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact by the two lower Courts . The Appellant has failed to advance any special or compelling reasons to warrant such interference by this Court.” See Unity Bank Plc V Abba (2013) LPELR–22890(CA); Dasuki (Rtd) V FRN ELC (2018) 3047(SC) 1; Egbufor V State (2013) LPELR-20688(CA); Unity Bank Plc V Abba (2013) LPELR-22890(CA); Nteogwuile V Otuo (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt. 738) 58; Iroagbara V Ufomadu (2009) 5-6 SC (Pt. 1) 83; Ojo V Gov. Oyo State (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 956) 1. –

“On what constitutes a perverse decision, the law has also not left it to conjecture. The apex Court in Abegunde V Ondo State House of Assembly (2015) 4-5 SC (Pt. 1) 1, defined it thus: “In UBN Plc V Chimaeze (2014) LPELR-SC 204/2006 this Court defined what a perverse decision is and how same is treated on appeal thus: “[A] decision of a court is perverse when it ignores the facts or evidence before it which lapse when considered as a whole constitutes a miscarriage of justice. In such a case, an appellate court is bound to interfere with such as decision… In the case at hand therefore, the appellant succeeds only if [he] establishes that in its findings in respect of the special and general damages the lower Court has ignored the evidence on record and/or wrongly applied a principle to the evidence. The appellant/cross respondent must establish too that the lapse has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.” See Atolagbe V Shorun (1985) LPELR-SC.14/1984.” –

“The law is settled that where the parties themselves know the land in dispute, the identity of the land is not is not in issue. The principle of law which is well established since the decision in Baruwa V Ogunshola (1938) 4 WACA 159, is that the onus is on the Plaintiff who seeks a declaration of title to land to show clearly the area of land to which his claim relates. Where however, the parties themselves know the land in dispute, this principle does not strictly apply. To buttress this sound principle of law, the Supreme Court in the case of Atanda V Iliasu (2012) LPELR-19662(SC) 42-43, D-A, per Muhammad, JSC held as follows: “Generally, a Plaintiff’s claim for declaration of title to land and/or injunction pursuant to [a] claim for damages consequent upon trespass by the Defendant succeeds only where the identity of the land in respect of which the reliefs are sought is certain. However, where the identity of the land is not in issue in the sense that parties know exactly the identity of the land, the subject-matter of the dispute between them, the requirement that the plaintiff and or parties prove(s) the identity of the land ceases to be a necessity.” –

“It is trite law that the burden of proving a claim of declaration of title to land is squarely on the Plaintiff, and the standard is on a preponderance of evidence. He must also succeed on the strength of his case and generally not rely on any weakness in the defence – Kolo V Lawan (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1637) 495, 511-512, F-B; Dim V Enemuo (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1149) 353, 377”. –

“As afore stated, it is the duty of a trial Court to evaluate and ascribe probative value to the evidence adduced by the parties before it. This indeed is the primary duty of the trial Court – Akinbade V Babatunde (2017) LPELR-43463(SC) 19, C-F, per Muhammad, JSC. Therefore, unless the Appellant establishes that its findings were perverse or based on the wrong application of some principle(s) of law, this Court will not interfere. For the sake of emphasis in respect of the part this Court should play in an Appeal such as this, see Nguma V AG, Imo State (2014) LPELR-22252(SC) 18-19, C-A, where Muhammad, JSC held: “It remains within the purview and competence of the trial Court, therefore, for obvious reasons, to first evaluate the evidence of witnesses. The trial Court does not share this jurisdiction with the appellate Court and where its jurisdiction is borne out from the evidence on record, an appellate court cannot interfere in such a circumstance even if the appellate Court concludes that the trial Court should have evaluated the evidence of the witnesses differently. Where however, the trial Court failed to use the opportunity afforded it to properly evaluate the evidence adduced at a trial, the appellate Court is competent to re-evaluate the evidence on record in order to obviate miscarriage of justice.” This settled position of the law was further emphasized by the apex Court in Faleye V Dada (2016) 40297(SC) 33-34, E-C, per Muhammad, JSC thus: “Firstly, the task of evaluating evidence and ascribing probative value to same is primarily that of the trial Court that saw and observed the witnesses in the course of their testimony. The appellate Court interferes only if the trial Court had failed to positively use the advantage it had of seeing and observing the witnesses by drawing the wrong conclusions from the proffered evidence. This Court had stated it times without number that it is none of its function or indeed that of an appellate Court to substitute its own views of the evidence for those of the trial Court that is better placed to deal with those matters. The appellate Court could only have interfered with the findings of fact of the trial Customary Court when the findings are perverse and/or consequent upon improper exercise of judicial discretion further resulting in miscarriage of justice.” See also ABC (Transport Co.) Ltd V Omotoye (2019) LPELR-47829(SC) 18, A-D, per Abba-Aji, JSC; Alo V State (2015) LPELR-24404(SC) 47, D-F, per Ogunbiyi, JSC; Abiodun V State (2013) LPELR-20343(SC) 10-11, D-A, where Onnoghen, JSC; PTN Ltd V Jubril (2012) LPELR-9727(SC) 50, E-F, Mukhtar, JSC; Otukpo V John (2012) LPELR-25053(SC) 20, E-F, per Onnoghen, JSC. –

“Section 294(1) and (5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) provides – “Every Court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than 90 days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses and furnish all parties to the cause or matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision within seven days of the delivery. The decision of a Court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of subsection (1) of the Section unless the Court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.” From these provisions, a Court is mandated to deliver its Judgment within 90 days after final addresses. This applies to both trial Courts and appellate Courts. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the delay in the delivery of the Judgment by the trial Court offends against Section 294(1) of the Constitution (supra). Ordinarily, that will render the Judgment a nullity. However, by Section 294(5) of the Constitution (supra), delay alone will not lead to setting aside the Judgment, unless there is a miscarriage of justice. See Akoma V Osenwokwu (2014) LPELR-22885(SC) 41-42, F-B, per Onnoghen, JSC; Owoyemi V Adekoya (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. (Pt. 852) 307. –

“However, in determining whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred as a result of the delay, a Court has to take into consideration not simply the length of time between when the final addresses were presented and the date on which Judgment was delivered, but the effect the delay has produced in the mind of the Court; such as, if the delay has affected the Court’s perception of the case/evidence, appreciation and evaluation of the case of the parties, particularly where the evaluation is based on the credibility of the witnesses as attested to by their demeanour while testifying – Dibiamaka V Osakwe (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 107) 101 (SC). Now, miscarriage of justice commonly depends on the circumstances of the given case. There would be a miscarriage of justice when an error can be seen in the proceedings and/or Judgment. More importantly, a miscarriage of justice occurs where it can be said that, if it had not been for the error evident on the face of the proceedings/Judgment, the decision would have been more favourable to the party that lost the case. There is also a miscarriage of justice when the decision given is inconsistent with established rights of the party complaining. Can this be said to apply to the Judgment of the trial Court? It is the duty of the Appellant to show how the delay in the delivery of the Judgment affected the perception, appreciation and evaluation of the evidence by the learned trial Judge or how the delay eroded the confidence in the entire judicial process which produced the Judgment. –

“The law is trite that every process filed in court must be signed by a legal practitioner under sections 2 and s 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act. Noncompliance with the provision is fatal to the process. See Oluide & Sons Ltd Vs OAU Ile Ife (2018) LPELR-4371(SC). –

“An incompetent process denies a court the jurisdiction to entertain the matter before the court. See Okpe vs Fan Milk Plc & Anor (2016) 12 S.C (pt III) 1. Chairman, Oyo State Government Traditional Council & Ors vs Adegboye III & Ors (2010) LPELR-3903 (CA). What amounts to incompetence was defined in the case of SPDC & Ors vs Chief Isaac Agbara & Ors (2016) 2 NWLR (pt 1496) 353 as meaning disqualification, inability or incapacity and lack of legal qualification or fitness to discharge the required duty.-