CORAM
Onyekachi Aja Otisi,Justice of the Court of Appeal
James Gambo Abundaga,Justice of the Court of Appeal
Muslim Sule Hassan,Justice of the Court of Appeal
PARTIES
ALHAJI ALI MOHAMMED
APPELLANTS
1. HALIMA ABDULLAHI JA’AFARU
2. HABIBA ALIYU MAINA
3. HABASIYA MUHTAR
4. HAJIA RALIYA BELLO
5. YUSUF HASHIM
6. UMAR SHUAIBU
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
APPEAL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, EVIDENCE, LAND, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Respondents are the heirs of the late Alhaji Abdullahi Ja’afaru, who passed away leaving behind a large farmland of approximately 20 hectares (49.618 acres) located in Unguwar Dosa within Kaduna North Local Government Area. The original certificate of occupancy granted to the Respondents& deceased father was later revoked, and the land was acquired by the Kaduna State Government. The government subsequently created a layout and allocated several plots to the Respondents.
The Appellant, however, is alleged to have trespassed on the land, thereby obstructing the Respondents from conducting transactions on their respective plots. In contrast, the Appellant claims ownership of the land, asserting that he purchased a portion measuring 125 feet by 250 feet, which is covered by his own certificate of occupancy. This land is described as being in Unguwar Dosa New Extension, Kaduna. The Appellant has counter-claimed for the land in question.
The case was tried in the High Court of Kaduna State, which ruled against the Appellant. The Appellant is now appealing this judgment.
HELD
Appeal dismissed
ISSUES
Whether the Respondents as plaintiffs proved their claims to be entitled to judgment?
Whether the lower Court was not in error when it held that the Appellant as defendant/counter-claimant was unable to prove his counterclaim and dismissed it?
Whether the delivery of judgment by the learned trial judge 11 months after the final address of counsel is unconstitutional and vitiates the judgment?
RATIONES DECIDENDI
PROOF – BURDEN OF PROOF IN CIVIL MATTERS
This is a land matter and like all civil matters the claimant bears the burden of proof, and it is on preponderance of evidence or balance of probabilities. See Adakawa & Sons Ltd & Anor V. Standard Construction Ltd. (2023) LPELR-60808 (CA) Pp. 21-22 Paras C-B, Iwayemi & Anor V. Obolo (2015) LPELR-52265 (CA) Pp. 7-8 Paras B-A. The point must be emphasized that the claim of title to land being declaratory, the claimant can only succeed on the strength of his own case and not depend on the weakness in the defendant’s case. He must produce cogent and reliable evidence. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
PROOF – STANDARD OF PROOF IN CIVIL MATTERS
This is a land matter and like all civil matters the claimant bears the burden of proof, and it is on preponderance of evidence or balance of probabilities. See Adakawa & Sons Ltd & Anor V. Standard Construction Ltd. (2023) LPELR-60808 (CA) Pp. 21-22 Paras C-B, Iwayemi & Anor V. Obolo (2015) LPELR-52265 (CA) Pp. 7-8 Paras B-A.
The point must be emphasized that the claim of title to land being declaratory, the claimant can only succeed on the strength of his own case and not depend on the weakness in the defendant’s case. He must produce cogent and reliable evidence. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
LAND – DUTY OF A CLAIMANT IN A CLAIM OF TITLE TO LAND
This is a land matter and like all civil matters the claimant bears the burden of proof, and it is on preponderance of evidence or balance of probabilities. See Adakawa &Sons Ltd & Anor V. Standard Construction Ltd. (2023) LPELR-60808 (CA) Pp. 21-22 Paras C-B, Iwayemi & Anor V. Obolo (2015) LPELR-52265 (CA) Pp. 7-8 Paras B-A.
The point must be emphasized that the claim of title to land being declaratory, the claimant can only succeed on the strength of his own case and not depend on the weakness in the defendant’s case. He must produce cogent and reliable evidence. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
LAND – FOREMOST DUTY OF THE CLAIMANT IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF TITLE TO LAND
In an action for declaration of title to land, it is a fundamental principle of law that the first and foremost duty of the claimant is to establish the identity, size, location and boundaries of the land with such reasonable degree of accuracy and certainty that its identity will no longer be in doubt – FBN Plc V. Okelewu & Anor (2013) LPELR-20155 (CA) Pp. 23-24 Paras B-B, Aholu V. Govt of Rivers State & Anor (2018) LPELR-49259 (CA) Pp. 39-40 Paras E-A, Oladipupo & Anor V. Olaniyan & Ors (1999) LPELR- 5192 (CA) Pp. 12-13 Paras D-E, Adeosun & Anor V. Jibesin & Ors (2000) LPELR-10337 (CA) P. 19 Paras B-E. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
LAND – WHERE IDENTITY OF LAND IN DISPUTE BECOMES AN ISSUE
However, it is now settled law that the identity of a land in dispute will only be in issue if and only if the defendant in his statement of defence makes it one. If he disputes specifically either the area or the location or the features shown in the plaintiffs plan. Gbadamosi V. Dairo (2007) LPELR-1315 (SC) Paras G-A, Fatuade V. Onwoamanam (2014) LPELR-22665 (CA) Pp. 50 Paras. B- E. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
DEFENDANT – WHETHER A DEFENDANT WHO COUNTER-CLAIMS CAN DISPUTE THE IDENTITY OF THE LAND IN DISPUTE
It is also settled law that a defendant who counter-claims in a land suit cannot be heard to dispute the identity of the land in dispute. Geoge & Ors V. Zaka & Ors (2022) LPELR-58718 (CA) P 43 Paras B-D, Dick & Ors V. Otomewo & Anor(2022) LPELR-58133 (CA) P. 13 Para A, Olaniji V. Olusola (2022) LPELR-58082 (CA) Pp. 25-26 Paras F-B, Idakwo (Rtd) V. Ibrahim & Ors (2011) LPELR-8936 (CA) Pp. 56-54 Para E.
The averments in the Appellant’s amended statement of claim did not cast a strain on the plaintiff to prove the identity of the land since it was clearly known to the parties. See Atanda V. Iliasu (2012) LPELR-19662 (SC) Pp. 42-43 Paras D-A. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
DEFENDANT – WHERE A DEFENDANT COUNTER-CLAIMS THE LAND IN DISPUTE
…it smacks of common sense to contend that you do not know the identity of the land which you dispute as the Respondents land and yet proceed to state that it is you that own the land and not the Respondents. One cannot blow hot and cold at the same time. This is an attitude the law abhors. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
TITLE TO LAND – REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW FOR PROOF OF TITLE TO LAND
It is settled that title to land can be proved in five ways. The authority on this is legion. For instance, in the case of Agboola V. UBA Plc & Ors (2011) LPELR-9353 (SC), the Court held:
“The five ways of proving title to land, as stated in the Idundun case supra are: 1. By traditional evidence. 2. By production of documents of title. 3. By proving acts of ownership numerous and positive enough to warrant an inference that the person is the true owner (such as selling, renting out or farming on all or part of the land). 4. By proving acts of long possession and enjoyment of the land under Section 145. 5. By proof of possession of connected or adjacent land (the contiguity rule).”Per Mukhtar, JSC (P. 15, paras. A-D).
See also Momoh & Ors V. Umoru & Ors(2011) LPELR-8130 (SC) Pp. 54-55 Paras F-C, Oyewusi & Ors V. Olagbami & Ors (2018) LPELR- P. 28 Paras C-F.
It is important to note that a claim for declaration of title may be proved by any of the five ways of proving title to land which have been stated in the cases stated above. –Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
TRADITIONAL HISTORY – DUTIES OF A PARTY RELYING ON TRADITIONAL HISTORY TO ESTABLISH TITLE TO LAND
It is settled law that a party who seeks title to land and relied on traditional history must, if he is to succeed, plead and prove facts as to:
(a) Who founded the land,
(b) How the land was founded, and
(c) Particulars of the ancestors through whom he claims:
See Ewo & Ors V. Ani & Ors (2004) LPELR-1182 (SC) P. 15 paras A-C, Amadi & Ors V. Orlu & Ors (2023) LPELR-60695 (SC) P. 24 Paras A-B. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
GOVERNOR – POWER OF THE GOVERNOR TO GRANT STATUTORY RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY TO ANY PERSON FOR ALL PURPOSES
Section 5(1) of the Land Use Act provides that it shall be lawful for the Governor in respect of land, whether or not in an urban area to grant statutory right of occupancy to any person for all purposes.
In the case of Adole V. Gwar (2008) LPELR- 189 (SC), it was held:
“It is not in doubt that under Section 5(1) of the Land Use Act, it shall be lawful for the Governor to grant statutory right of occupancy to any person in respect of land, whether or not in an urban area. Under Section 5(2) of the Act, when such grant is made, all existing rights to the use and occupation of the land so granted shall be extinguished. Be it noted that the rights that are automatically extinguished following the exercise of the powers of the Governor under Section 5(2) of the Act are “existing rights to the use and occupation of the land “such as the rights of licences, mortgages e.t.c. but not vested rights such as statutory right of occupancy actually or deemed granted which are recognised by the Act itself. See Olohunde v. Adeyoju (supra). Where therefore there exist a prior grant, Section 5(2) of the Act cannot be applied to defeat it, as the Section cannot in that case be swallowed wholesale. See Nigeria Engineering Works Ltd v. Denap Ltd & Anor (2001) 12 SCNJ 251 at 275 Per Kalgo, J.S.C. The Section (i.e. Section 5(2) of the Act) will only be able to defeat the existing vested right if such right is revoked under Section 28 of the Act for any of the reasons stated there under. Otherwise, there will be in existence at the same time two valid rights of occupancy granted to different persons in respect of the same parcel of land, as was the case in the matter at hand. In such a case, it was contended, the latter right of occupancy is liable to be invalidated as the Court below rightly did in this case.”Per ONU, JSC (Pp. 12-13, paras. C-B).
See also Kari V. Ganaram & Ors (1997) LPELR-1666 (SC) Pp. 19-20 Paras F-C, Amachukwu V. Ojukwu (2009) LPELR- 8682 (CA) P. 30 Paras B-E, Dieli & Ors V. lwuno & Ors (1996) LPELR-943 (SC) 20 Paras A-B.
From the decided authorities, the grant of a statutory right occupancy to a person extinguishes all other existing rights to the use and occupation of the land which is the subject of the statutory right of occupancy – See also specifically S. 5(2) of the Land Use Act. However, this does not include vested rights such as statutory right of occupancy actually or deemed granted which are recognized by the Act itself. See Adole V. Gwar (Supra). – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
GOVERNOR – THE EFFECT OF THE GRANT OF STATUTORY RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY TO ANY PERSON FOR ALL PURPOSES BY THE GOVERNOR
Section 5(1) of the Land Use Act provides that it shall be lawful for the Governor in respect of land, whether or not in an urban area to grant statutory right of occupancy to any person for all purposes.
In the case of Adole V. Gwar (2008) LPELR- 189 (SC), it was held:
“It is not in doubt that under Section 5(1) of the Land Use Act, it shall be lawful for the Governor to grant statutory right of occupancy to any person in respect of land, whether or notin an urban area. Under Section 5(2) of the Act, when such grant is made, all existing rights to the use and occupation of the land so granted shall be extinguished. Be it noted that the rights that are automatically extinguished following the exercise of the powers of the Governor under
Section 5(2) of the Act are existing rights to the use and occupation of the land “such as the rights of licences, mortgages e.t.c. but not vested rights such as statutory right of occupancy actually or deemed granted which are recognised by the Act itself. See Olohunde v. Adeyoju (supra). Where therefore there exist a prior grant, Section 5(2) of the Act cannot be applied to defeat it, as the Section cannot in that case be swallowed wholesale. See Nigeria Engineering Works Ltd v. Denap Ltd & Anor (2001) 12 SCNJ 251 at 275 Per Kalgo, J.S.C. The Section (i.e. Section 5(2) of the Act) will only be able to defeat the existing vested right if such right is revoked under Section 28 of the Act for any of the reasons stated there under. Otherwise, there will be in existence at the same time two valid rights of occupancy granted to different persons in respect of the same parcel of land, as was the case in the matter at hand. In such a case, it was contended, the latter right of occupancy is liable to be invalidated as the Court below rightly did in this case. “Per ONU, JSC (Pp. 12-13, paras. C-B).
See also Kari V. Ganaram & Ors (1997) LPELR-1666 (SC) Pp. 19-20 Paras F-C, Amachukwu V. Ojukwu (2009) LPELR- 8682 (CA) P. 30 Paras B-E, Dieli & Ors V. lwuno & Ors (1996) LPELR-943 (SC) 20 Paras A-B.
From the decided authorities, the grant of a statutory right occupancy to a person extinguishes all other existing rights to the use and occupation of the land which is the subject of the statutory right of occupancy – See also specifically S. 5(2) of the Land Use Act. However, this does not include vested rights such as statutory right of occupancy actually or deemed granted which are recognized by the Act itself. See Adole V. Gwar (Supra). – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
TITLE TO LAND – WAYS OF ESTABLISHING TITLE TO LAND
I had earlier in this judgment stated the position of the law which is trite that there are five ways of establishing title to land, viz:
“1 . By traditional evidence.
2. By production of title documents duly authenticated and executed.
3. By acts of ownership extending over a sufficient length of time numerous and positive enough as to warrant the inference of true ownership.
4. By proof of possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstances rendering it probable that the owner of such connected or adjacent land would in addition be the owner of such connected or adjacent land in dispute.
5. By acts of possession and enjoyment.”
See the case of Ministry of Land and Survey, Nasarawa State V. Nwafor & Ors (2021) LPELR- 56254 (CA) Pp. 38-39 Para E. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
COURTS – DUTY OF THE COURTS WHERE A CLAIMANT PRODUCES DOCUMENTS OF TITLE TO PROVE TITLE TO LAND
The law has made it abundantly clear, and it is now trite that it is not sufficient just to flaunt and tender the instrument that purports to grant him the document of title. The production and reliance upon such an instrument inevitably carries with it the need for the Court to inquire into some or all of a number of questions including:
i. Whether the document is genuine and valid.
ii. Whether it has been duly executed stamped and registered.
iii. Whether the grantor has the capacity and authority to make the grant.
iv. Whether the grantor had in fact what he purported to grant, and
v. Whether it had the effect claimed by the holders of the instrument.
See the case of Edosa V. Ehinwenma & Ors (2022) LPELR- 56869 (SC) Pp. 11-13 Paras B-C, Nyomi Anor V. Njoku & Anor (2021) LPELR-55558 (SC) P. 41 Paras A-D, Odigie V. Obaseki (2022) LPELR-57134 (CA) P. 24 Paras A-F. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
LAND – DUTY OF PARTIES WHO TRACE THEIR ROOT OF TITLE TO LAND TO PARTICULAR PERSONS
Where a party in a land matter pleads and traces the root of his title to a particular person or family, that party to succeed must establish how that person or family derived his or its title to such land. In other words, that party must not only plead and establish his title to the land, he must also plead and prove the title of the person from whom he derived his alleged ownership of the land in dispute pursuant to the maxim, nemo dat quod non habet, meaning that no one can give that which he does not have. It is only if the person from whom he derived his title has a valid title to such land that he may lawfully pass on such title to anyone else. If the title of his vendor or grantor is defective and non-existent, then obviously, he will have no valid title to pass to anybody.
See Nwadiogbu & Ors V. Nnadozie & Ors (2001) LPELR- 2088 (SC) Pp. 20-21 Para C. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
EVIDENCE – WHERE EVIDENCE IS NOT PLEADED
The Appellant claimed that he bought the land from one Umaru Zurmi, and tendered Exhibit 11A and 11B. All these go to nothing because evidence on facts not pleaded goes to no issue because he did not plead this name in his statement of defence.
See Emegokwue V. Okadigbo (1973) LPELR-1124 (sc) Pp. 5-7 Paras E-D, Lemomu & Ors V. Alli- Babogun (1975) LPELR-1779 (SC) Pp. 15-16 Paras F -D, Akinola V. V.C. Unilorin & Ors (2004) LPELR-10898 (CA) P. 42 Para F.
However, even if he had pleaded the name of his vendor, the fact that he did not show by his pleadings and evidence the source of his vendor’s title still leaves the appellant’s title without a valid base. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
TITLE – WHERE A PARTY FAILS TO PLEAD/PROVE THE SOURCE OF VENDORS TITLE
The Appellant claimed that he bought the land from one Umaru Zurmi, and tendered Exhibit 11A and 11B. All these go to nothing because evidence on facts not pleaded goes to no issue because he did not plead this name in his statement of defence.
See Emegokwue V. Okadigbo (1973) LPELR-1124 (sc) Pp. 5-7 Paras E-D, Lemomu & Ors V. Alli- Babogun (1975) LPELR-1779 (SC) Pp. 15-16 Paras F -D, Akinola V. V.C. Unilorin & Ors (2004) LPELR-10898 (CA) P. 42 Para F.
However, even if he had pleaded the name of his vendor, the fact that he did not show by his pleadings and evidence the source of his vendor’s title still leaves the appellant’s title without a valid base. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
COUNTER-CLAIM – MEANING OF COUNTER-CLAIM
The law is trite that a counter-claim which is otherwise known as a cross-action or counter- action is a separate and independent action by a defendants who has some reliefs against the plaintiff. Being a cross-action, the counter-claimant is in the same position as plaintiff in the main action and it is guided by the same rules regarding pleadings. The burden of proof of the counter-claim is therefore on the counter-claimant in the same manner as required in any civil claim, i.e, on the preponderance of evidence – Suleiman V. Aremu & Ors (2021) LPELR-55768 (CA) Pp. 49-51 Para D, Omale V. Maikudi & Anor (2022) LPELR-56917 (CA) Pp. 19-20 Paras C-A Ozohili V. Imperial Homes Mortgage Bank Ltd (2021) LPELR-56747 (CA) P. 47 Paras B-E. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
COUNTER-CLAIM – BURDEN OF PROOF OF A COUNTER-CLAIM
The law is trite that a counter-claim which is otherwise known as a cross-action or counter- action is a separate and independent action by a defendants who has some reliefs against the plaintiff. Being a cross-action, the counter-claimant is in the same position as plaintiff in the main action and it is guided by the same rules regarding pleadings. The burden of proof of the counter-claim is therefore on the counter-claimant in the same manner as required in any civil claim, i.e, on the preponderance of evidence – Suleiman V. Aremu & Ors (2021) LPELR-55768 (CA) Pp. 49-51 Para D, Omale V. Maikudi & Anor (2022) LPELR-56917 (CA) Pp. 19-20 Paras C-A Ozohili V. Imperial Homes Mortgage Bank Ltd (2021) LPELR-56747 (CA) P. 47 Paras B-E. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
LAND – THE DUTY OF A CLAIMANT OF TITLE TO LAND
…this appeal being in relation to a land dispute, the law is that a claimant of title has the first duty of proving the identity of the land, with the exception that no such duty will arise if both parties know the land, and the defendant did not make it an issue in his pleading. In this appeal, none of the parties, that is, the appellant and the Respondents made the identity of the land an issue in its pleading. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
LAND – WHERE THE DUTY TO IDENTIFY A LAND WILL NOT ARISE IN A CLAIM OF TITLE TO LAND
…this appeal being in relation to a land dispute, the law is that a claimant of title has the first duty of proving the identity of the land, with the exception that no such duty will arise if both parties know the land, and the defendant did not make it an issue in his pleading. In this appeal, none of the parties, that is, the appellant and the Respondents made the identity of the land an issue in its pleading. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
DECLARATORY CLAIMS – STANDARD OF PROOF IN DECLARATORY CLAIMS
The point must be made that his claims being declaratory, he can only succeed on the strength of his case, and cannot depend on the weakness in the plaintiff's case. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
JUDGMENT – THE CONSEQUENCES OF DELIVERING A JUDGMENT OUTSIDE THE CONSTITUTIONAL THREE MONTHS TIME FRAME
The fact that the judgment of the trial Court was delivered outside the three months after the final addresses of counsel as prescribed by Section 294(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) is not in dispute. However, the said Section 294(1) is silent as to what the consequences is if a judgment is delivered outside the three months. But the proviso seems to give an insight; the proviso is thus:
“The decision of a Court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non- compliance with the provision of Subsection (1) of this Section unless the Court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.”
The apex Court in the case of Akoma & Anor V. Osenwokwu & Ors (2014) LPELR-22885 (SC) held:
“The question is what is the consequence(s) of the failure of the lower Court, in the circumstances of the case, to deliver its decision within ninety days of the final addresses of counsel? The answer is that the judgment/decision/order so delivered is valid except an appellant can satisfy the Court that the non-delivery of the judgment within the stipulated time has occasioned a miscarriage of justice to him. See Section 294 (5) of the 1999 Constitution, Owoyemi vs Adekoya (2003) 18 NWLR (pt. 852) 307." Per ONNOGHEN, JSC (P. 41, paras. B-D).
See also Molegbemi & Ors V. Ajayi & Ors (2011) LPELR- 4501 (CA) Pp. 31-33 Paras A-E, SPDC (Nig) V. Ekwems & Ors (2022) LPELR-61081 (SC) Pp. 73-79 Paras F-A.
It is clear from the proviso reproduced above and the decisions of this Court and the apex Court that it is not sufficient to show that the judgment was delivered outside 90 days as prescribed by Section 294(1) of the Constitution. The party complaining must convince the appellate Court that he suffered miscarriage of justice by reason of the non-compliance. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
JUDGMENT – DUTY OF A PARTY COMPLAINING THAT JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED OUTSIDE THE CONSTITUTIONAL THREE MONTHS TIME FRAME
The fact that the judgment of the trial Court was delivered outside the three months after the final addresses of counsel as prescribed by Section 294(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) is not in dispute. However, the said Section 294(1) is silent as to what the consequences is if a judgment is delivered outside the three months. But the proviso seems to give an insight; the proviso is thus:
“The decision of a Court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non- compliance with the provision of Subsection (1) of this Section unless the Court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.”
The apex Court in the case of Akoma & Anor V. Osenwokwu & Ors (2014) LPELR-22885 (SC) held:
“The question is what is the consequence(s) of the failure of the lower Court, in the circumstances of the case, to deliver its decision within ninety days of the final addresses of counsel? The answer is that the judgment/decision/order so delivered is valid except an appellant can satisfy the Court that the non-delivery of the judgment within the stipulated time has occasioned a miscarriage of justice to him. See Section 294 (5) of the 1999 Constitution, Owoyemi vs Adekoya (2003) 18 NWLR (pt. 852) 307." Per ONNOGHEN, JSC (P. 41, paras. B-D).
See also Molegbemi & Ors V. Ajayi & Ors (2011) LPELR- 4501 (CA) Pp. 31-33 Paras A-E, SPDC (Nig) V. Ekwems &Ors (2022) LPELR-61081 (SC) Pp. 73-79 Paras F-A.
It is clear from the proviso reproduced above and the decisions of this Court and the apex Court that it is not sufficient to show that the judgment was delivered outside 90 days as prescribed by Section 294(1) of the Constitution. The party complaining must convince the appellate Court that he suffered miscarriage of justice by reason of the non-compliance. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
JUDGMENT – WHETHER THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THE JUDGE TO GIVE REASONS FOR DELIVERING JUDGMENT OUTSIDE THE THREE MONTHS TIME FRAME
Section 294(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) Now nothing in the said Section mandates the trial Court to give reasons in the judgment why the judgment was delayed. Where miscarriage of justice is shown to have been proved, no reason can be good enough for the appellate Court to set aside such a judgment if doing so will meet the end of justice.– Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
SPECULATION – CONDUCT OF COURTS TO SPECULATION
It is trite that the Court does not act in conjecture or speculation to reach its decision on an issue. Addo V. State (2020) LPELR-55521 (SC) P. 28 Para A, NUP V. INEC (2021) LPELR-58407 (SC) P. 34 Paras B-D. – Per J. G. Abundaga, JCA
JUDGMENT – WHETHER A JUDGMENT WOULD BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE IT WAS DELIVERED OUTSIDE THE CONSTITUTIONAL 90 DAYS PERIOD
Judgment of a Court by virtue of Section 294 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) must be delivered within ninety (90) days after addresses by Counsel. See Igwe v. Kalu (2002) 5 NWLR (Pt. 761) 678 SC, Lawal v. Quadiri (2004) 6 NWLR (Pt. 868) 1 CA. Although the Court must deliver its judgment within ninety (90) days after conclusion of evidence and final addresses, it is permissible to deliver judgment outside the period if for instance, the Judge is sick. See Korobotei v. Obubo (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt. 620) 655 CA.
However, by virtue of the combined provisions of Section 294 (1) and (5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) the decision of a Court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely for being delivered outside the ninety (90) days period unless the appellant can show that the delay has caused a miscarriage of justice. See B.C.C. Plc v. Sky Inspection (Nig.) Ltd (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 795) 86 CA, Akoma & Anor v. Osenwokwu & Ors (2014) LPELR-22885 (SC), Skye Bank v. Njoku & Ors (2016) LPELR-40447 (CA) Pages 35-36. – Per M. S. Hassan, JCA
CASES CITED
STATUTES REFERRED TO
1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)
2. Land Use Act 1978