CORAM
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR -JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NIGERIA
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR -JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NIGERIA
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR -JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NIGERIA
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR -JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NIGERIA
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR -JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NIGERIA
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR -JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NIGERIA
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR -JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NIGERIA
PARTIES
ADEGBESAN THEOPHILOUS APPELLANTS
1. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
2. MOHAMMED RABIU LAWAN (Alias Shande Dzungwe Ako)
3. RAPHAEL OLORUNFEMI OKOMODA
RESPONDENTS
AREA(S) OF LAW
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Appellant together with two other persons were arraigned before the Lagos State High Court on a 19 count charge for conspiracy to and obtaining money by false pretences, stealing, and money laundering. The Appellant pleaded not guilty to some counts. On the same day he was arraigned, a joint application for bail of the Appellant and the two other persons were brought before the Court. The application was reserved for ruling on a future date by the Court and the Court ordered that the Appellant be remanded in Kirikiri Maximum Prison. After hearing the application, the trial Court dismissed same.
Thereafter the Appellant filed another application for bail pending the determination of the suit before the same court, but the application was dismissed by the Court. Dissatisfied with the dismissal of his applications, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.
HELD
Appeal Allowed.
ISSUES
1.Whether the Lower Court was right to refuse to admit the Appellant to bail.?
RATIONES DECIDENDI
BAIL APPLICATION- FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT IN AN APPLICATION FOR BAIL
“The length of sentence vis-a-vis the period of incarceration pending trial also appears to me to be one of the relevant factors for the consideration of a bail application. lf the whole sentence would be exhausted or spent during the trial of the appellant who had not been released on bail and it turned out the appellant is absolved of the crime(s) by the court below, the plain and unsavoury result would be that the appellant served a sentence he had not deserved or required to serve.” PER J.S. IKYEGH, J.C.A
EXERCISE OF DISCRETION- COURTS ARE ENJOINED TO EXERCISE DISCRETION JUDICIALLY
“It is trite that in an exercise of discretion, a Court is expected to act judicially by being guided by relevant facts and within the precincts of law – see C.B.N. v. Okojie (2002) 8 NWLR (Pt. 768) 48 at 61 SC” PER A. A. AUGIE, J.C.A.
DENIAL OF BAIL – MERE AVERMENTS SHOULD NOT WARRANT THE DENIAL OF BAIL BY A COURT
“It is also settled that mere averments by the Prosecution that an accused will not appear for his trial in the absence of any real concrete material to support such allegation, should not warrant the denial of bail by a Court – see Rajab v. The State (2010) LPELR-5001 (CA), Eyu v. State (supra)” PER A. A. AUGIE, J.C.A.
APPLICATION FOR BAIL – THE BURDEN IS ON THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED PERSON BE DENIED BAIL
“An accused person is presumed innocent, and the burden is on the Prosecution to show that the accused person should not be released on bail – see Onyirioha v. IGP (2009) 3 NWLR (PT. 1128) 342 (supra), Anaekwe v. COP (supra).” PER A. A. AUGIE, J.C.A.
GRANT OR REFUSAL OF BAIL – CONSIDERATIONS BY THE COURTS IN EXERCISING ITS DISCRETION IN THE GRANT OR REFUSAL OF BAIL
“The Court wields extensive discretionary power to either grant or refuse, however, in considering whether or not to grant or refuse bail, the trial Court is bound to consider the weight of facts pleaded to in an Affidavit before it – see Dokubo Asari v. FRN (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) 320.” PER A. A. AUGIE, J.C.A.
REFUSAL IN THE GRANT OF BAIL BY A TRIAL COURT – INSTANCES WHERE AN APPELLATE COURT WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION BY A TRIAL COURT IN REFUSING THE GRANT OF BAIL
“The decision to refuse bail to an accused is entirely at the discretion of a trial Court based on what was before it, and an appellate Court, would not ordinarily interfere unless its discretion was not exercised in accordance to law or it was exercised in a perverse manner – see Osafare v. FGN (2004) 14 NWLR (pt. 893) 305, Likita v. C.O.P. (2002) 11 NWLR (Pt. 777) 145, Atiku v. The State (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 757) 265.” PER A.A. AUGIE, J.C.A.
CASES CITED
STATUTES REFERRED TO
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999